- About
-
The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
provided by the
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
Search results
Showing 1 to 2 of 2 (0.037 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"arvoinen maailmansodan"" "subject:"arvoinen maailman""
| 1 |
Sledgehammerista Overlordiin:Yhdysvaltojen ja Ison-Britannian sodanjohdon yhteistyö Normandian maihinnousun valmisteluissa 1941 - 1944Paloniemi, J. (Jarmo) 26 June 2000 (has links)
Abstract
This study offers a new perspective on the publicly well-known
event Normandy invasion. However, this study concentrates on the
preparation time of the invasion. The subject is co-operation and
it is done by careful investigation of original sources. The minutes
of American and British meetings and conferences can be regarded
as the foundation stones of this research.
The study covers the time December 1941 to the sixth June
1944. This is a natural choice to start because after Japan had
attacked Pearl Harbour the United States joined the war and practically
allied with Great Britain. Study ends On the 6th June 1944 the operation
Overlord or the Normandy invasion started.
The Normandy invasion is a famous military operation. However,
the preparation time before the 6th June 1944, invasion and particularly
the co-operation during the preparations are less known. There is
a plethora of studies dealing with the co-operation but the sources
of those studies are limited. Some studies have also aged, so a
new fresh analysis is needed.
The co-operation between the American and British war leaders
can be described as a mixture of distrust, selfishness - especially
on making decisions of strategy - and subjectivity. These
two great allies did not find a real harmony in the preparations.
Roosevelt was slow to act when the war events would have needed
quick decisions. His style to arrange only few meetings with his
most important soldier, General George C. Marshall, rendered the
whole work of the United States military leadership. Churchill's
imagination and quickly changing opinions frustrated his key man
General Alan Brooke who, however usually managed to keep Churchill
on line.
One of the main problem in this co-operation was the lack
of personal contact between Marshall and Brooke. The problems were
solved many times by Field-marshal John Dill - the leader
of British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. Dill reached the trust
of every single person in the alliance. Harry Hopkins as president
Roosevelt's close personal adviser was a great link between
the president and Marshall.
The battle of Stalingrad changed the position of view on the
Normandy invasion planning. After Stalingrad Roosevelt thought the
French invasion as a likely cornerstone of the American politics after
the war. By Overlord the power of Soviet Union could at least be
limited.
General Dwight David Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander of
Overlord operation lead the final preparations in spring 1944. Eisenhower
had on several occasions a narrow margin to act because both political
and military pressure. In spite of this he was successful and like
Hopkins and Dill he was the main person to ensure that the co-operation
worked.
|
| 2 |
"Åtgärder som befrämja rikets försvar och överensstämma med flaggans värdighet" : En undersökning av Sveriges marinstrategi våren 1941Strömgren Lasell, Victor January 2021 (has links)
Denna uppsats undersöker Sveriges marinstrategi i händelse av krig med Tyskland respektive Sovjeteunionen våren 1941 utifrån Chefen för Marinens instruktioner för krigsfall I respektive II. / This paper explores Swedish naval strategy during the Second World War (1939-1945), an area that has not seen significant research. This paper focuses on how Swedish maritime forces were to be used in case of war with Germany (War Plan I; Krigsfall I), and with the Soviet Union (War plan II; Krigsfall II). This paper focuses on Swedish planning during the spring of 1941. The period after the fall of France (June 1940) and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) was a period where both Germany and the Soviet Union possessed what could be described as strategic freedom of action. This means large parts of their armed forces could have been used for operations against Sweden. The basis for each potential conflict was different: Germany occupied Norway and Denmark and could launch a ground invasion of Sweden directly; meanwhile Sweden and the Soviet Union were still separated by Finland and the Baltic Sea. Maritime forces would therefore play very different roles in the two War Plans. No official plans in case of war with the western Allies existed at the time, and hence this has not been explored here. The conclusion of this paper is that Swedish naval strategy at the time was somewhat offensive and focused on gaining sea control, at least in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Bothnia, to maintain freedom of action to be able to conduct troop movements along the Swedish coast, to the island of Gotland, and to Finland.
|
Page generated in 0.0406 seconds