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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Marinens sjöoperativa doktrin 1958-61 / The Swedish Navy’s naval doctrine 1958-61

Larsson, Bengt January 2009 (has links)
<p>1958 års Försvarsbeslut innebar att den svenska Marinens anslagstilldelning kraftigt minskades. Marinens uppgifter i invasionsförsvaret skulle i händelse av krig dessutom reduceras och till del övertas av Flygvapnet. FB 58 blev styrande för Marinens utveckling under hela perioden efter 1958.</p><p>Marinens sjöoperativa doktrin (doktrinen för sjöstridskrafterna) var vid denna tid inte officiell eller uttalad. Doktrinen har inte tidigare beskrivits som sådan för denna tidsperiod.</p><p>Uppsatsen beskriver Marinens sjöoperativa doktrin 1958-61. För rekonstruktionen prövar författaren en modell framtagen av övlt Tommy Pettersson (ChP 06-08) för en motsvarande studie av luftoperativ doktrin 1958-66. Uppsatsens beskrivning av doktrinen omfattar FB 58, säkerhetspolitik, ÖB krigsplanläggning på central nivå, beskrivningar av uppfattningen om hotbilden, fartygsmaterielen, taktik och marina övningar. Uppsatsen behandlar även beskrivning av samverkan och utveckling. Fokus för uppsatsen är doktrinen som den uttrycks genom marinens krigsplanläggning och krigsorganisation vilka beskrivs ingående</p> / <p>The 1958 parliamentary decision on defence marked a drastic reduction in the allotment of funds for the Navy. Furthermore, a significant portion of the Navy’s principal tasks in naval warfare would henceforth be taken over by the Air Force. The Navy’s development and doctrine has been heavily influenced by the 1958 decision on defence ever since.</p><p>The Navy did not at the time posses a formalized, official operational naval doctrine. The essay describes the factual doctrine for the 1958-61 time period. This essay is the first to attempt this.. For the reconstruction of the doctrine the author uses a theoretical model developed by ltcol Tommy Pettersson (ChP 06-08), for a similar study of the 1958-66 Air Force air doctrine on an operational level.</p><p>Aspects covered includes the 1958 defence decision, the supreme commander’s war planning, the Navy’s threat perception, vessels, equipment, exercises, inter service cooperation as well as development. Focus however is the doctrine as expressed in the Navy’s warplans and wartime organisation, which are described in some detail.</p>
2

Marinens sjöoperativa doktrin 1958-61 / The Swedish Navy’s naval doctrine 1958-61

Larsson, Bengt January 2009 (has links)
1958 års Försvarsbeslut innebar att den svenska Marinens anslagstilldelning kraftigt minskades. Marinens uppgifter i invasionsförsvaret skulle i händelse av krig dessutom reduceras och till del övertas av Flygvapnet. FB 58 blev styrande för Marinens utveckling under hela perioden efter 1958. Marinens sjöoperativa doktrin (doktrinen för sjöstridskrafterna) var vid denna tid inte officiell eller uttalad. Doktrinen har inte tidigare beskrivits som sådan för denna tidsperiod. Uppsatsen beskriver Marinens sjöoperativa doktrin 1958-61. För rekonstruktionen prövar författaren en modell framtagen av övlt Tommy Pettersson (ChP 06-08) för en motsvarande studie av luftoperativ doktrin 1958-66. Uppsatsens beskrivning av doktrinen omfattar FB 58, säkerhetspolitik, ÖB krigsplanläggning på central nivå, beskrivningar av uppfattningen om hotbilden, fartygsmaterielen, taktik och marina övningar. Uppsatsen behandlar även beskrivning av samverkan och utveckling. Fokus för uppsatsen är doktrinen som den uttrycks genom marinens krigsplanläggning och krigsorganisation vilka beskrivs ingående / The 1958 parliamentary decision on defence marked a drastic reduction in the allotment of funds for the Navy. Furthermore, a significant portion of the Navy’s principal tasks in naval warfare would henceforth be taken over by the Air Force. The Navy’s development and doctrine has been heavily influenced by the 1958 decision on defence ever since. The Navy did not at the time posses a formalized, official operational naval doctrine. The essay describes the factual doctrine for the 1958-61 time period. This essay is the first to attempt this.. For the reconstruction of the doctrine the author uses a theoretical model developed by ltcol Tommy Pettersson (ChP 06-08), for a similar study of the 1958-66 Air Force air doctrine on an operational level. Aspects covered includes the 1958 defence decision, the supreme commander’s war planning, the Navy’s threat perception, vessels, equipment, exercises, inter service cooperation as well as development. Focus however is the doctrine as expressed in the Navy’s warplans and wartime organisation, which are described in some detail.
3

Debating Cannae: Delbrück, Schlieffen, and the Great War

Jones, Andrew Loren 01 May 2014 (has links)
Debating Cannae: Delbrück, Schlieffen, and the Great War provides the reader a view of the historical struggle between Alfred von Schlieffen and Hans Delbrück. They argued fiercely about the foundation of the German Empire and the use of history. The first chapter provides the context of the foundation of the German empire. The second chapter explores the debates between Schlieffen and Delbrück by investigating their writings. The third chapter surveys the effect that the Delbrück and Schlieffen culture war had upon the First World War. This work expands the current view of Schlieffen by demonstrating his commitment to his interpretation of history. The reader will gain an appreciation for the impact of the historical struggle between these two historians. Delbrück believed that nationalism needed to be controlled through objectivity and a contextual understanding; in contrast, Schlieffen believed that nationalism needed to direct one’s historical research as well as one’s life.
4

När militarisering mötte välfärdsstat : Beredskapsplaneringen av svensk sjukvård 1950–1985 / When warfare met welfare : Swedish contingency planning of healthcare in war during the period 1950 to 1985

Skriveus, Gerhard January 2023 (has links)
This paper studies when warfare meets welfare in the Swedish contingency planning of healthcare in war during the period 1950 to 1985 with the aim of analysing how the planning changed, what caused these changes and how this can be linked to societal changes in the post-war Sweden. The analysis is carried out with the help of a self-adapted stakeholder model where first the change in planning and management is analysed and then seeks causal explanations for the key changes based on three military and three civilian drivers. The starting point for civilian contingency planning for health care in war was the Civil Air Protection investigation (SOU 1936:57). The investigation found that the need for civilian hospitalcare in war had changed because total war had blurred the boundaries between military and civilian health care. The report therefore proposed that a joint plan for hospital care in war should be established. The base of the new organization was the emergency hospitals, which were largely existing healthcare facilities, given that name in a war situation. To recreate wartime planning for health care, a Health Care Preparedness Board (Swe:Sjukvårdsberedskapsnämnden) was established in 1948 responsible for planning of health care in wartime. There were three major turning points in the planning. In 1950 based on experience from the conventional bombing wars of World War II, in 1959 based on the increasingly powerful nuclear weapons and in 1969 due to Sweden ceasing to plan total defence for a nuclear war. The consequences of the first two redesigns involved the wartime establishment of hundreds of small emergency hospitals outside the city centres, while from 1969 the large peacetime hospitals returned as the core of wartime health care. The 1970s and 1980s were characterized by a decentralization of responsibility of planning and wartime management from the state to the county councils (Swe: landstingen). The main causes for the turning points were the development of nuclear weapons and the expansion of the welfare state. The impact of nuclear weapons is demonstrated by the fact that there is a start and an end to the nuclear phase of planning. The expansion of the welfare state meant that the role of the county councils over 30 years went from carrying out orders from the state and the armed forces to controlling both management and planning and where the military's right toissue wartime directives was abolished. This can be explained by the expansion of health care during the same period and the increased power of the county councils that came with the expansion.The study shows that the militarization of Swedish civilian society was strong up until about 1970, but then rapidly declined and it was increasingly the armed forces that had to adapt to the structure and requirements of the peacetime health care rather than the other way around. Again,the reason for this shift is the significant expansion of the welfare state and the peacetime healthcare system, which shifted both economic and political power away from the military to the civilian health care system.
5

Kvinnorörelsen och efterkrigsplaneringen : statsfeminism i svensk arbetsmarknadspolitik under och kort efter andra världskriget / The feminist movement and post-war planning : state feminism in the Swedish labour market policy during and shortly after the second world war

Almgren, Nina January 2006 (has links)
This thesis has analysed the relations among the women’s movement, the state and the labour market policy during and shortly after the Second World War and to what extent this period can be characterised as a formative phase as regards gender relations. The aim has been to study women’s strategic actions in order to influence the Swedish Government’s labour market policy in the period from 1939 to 1947. The thesis shows the conflicts of interest that manifested themselves between Statens arbetsmarknadskommission (SAK, ‘the National Swedish Labour Market Commission’) and its advisory women’s group, experts on women’s issues, concerning the planning and utilisation of female labour. SAK thought that the work of the experts on female issues should only focus on the short-term labour problems caused by the national crisis situation, while the experts on women’s issues were of the opinion that they should also work with long-term labour-market issues for women. These different ways of thinking and understanding the problem originated in different views on women’s work. The experts on women’s issues wanted to strengthen women’s position on the labour market by abolishing the wage differences between the genders, breaking the gender segregation in education, and broadening the occupational choices of girls. They had three strategies for achieving this: a strategy of professionalisation, a strategy of change, and a strategy of state feminism. The strategy of professionalisation was aimed at raising the value of traditional female work, in terms of both status and wages. The strategy of change was aimed at creating new opportunities for women to leave typical low-wage jobs and gain access to better paid jobs in male-dominated areas. The strategy of state feminism was aimed at paving the way for women in new and expanding occupational areas beside the traditional male occupations. Can the period during and shortly after the war be characterised as a formative phase of the issue of gender relations? It is evident that this period did not involve a revolution of the societal gender order. The idea of women as reserve labour did not disappear. The post-war planners considered that, in the transition to peace, the women who had replaced men who were called up should be redeployed or retrained for employment in household work, in hotels, restaurants and cafés, in shops and in health care. In spite of the great shortage of labour in the post-war period, leading politicians and economists stuck to old ways of thinking. A clear indication on the part of the Government was that the women’s movement’s demand for long-term planning in order to utilise female labour was turned down. One important difference from the First World War was that the Government produced peace plans for women’s work during the Second World War. The period also led to ideological and institutional consequences that could be the beginning of a change of the societal gender order. From her central position in Kommissionen för ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering (‘the Commission for economic post-war planning’), Karin Kock could see to it that women’s demands for greater occupational mobility and a loosening up of the gender division of labour had an impact on the post-war planning of the war years. The experiences of women in male industries in the Second World War, both in Sweden and abroad, showed to some extent that it was possible to change the gender division of labour. The modern welfare state also came to correspond to a great extent to the state feminist strategy of the experts on women’s issues. With the historical formation of the welfare state a new type of occupational groups developed, the so-called welfare state professionals.
6

"Åtgärder som befrämja rikets försvar och överensstämma med flaggans värdighet" : En undersökning av Sveriges marinstrategi våren 1941

Strömgren Lasell, Victor January 2021 (has links)
Denna uppsats undersöker Sveriges marinstrategi i händelse av krig med Tyskland respektive Sovjeteunionen våren 1941 utifrån Chefen för Marinens instruktioner för krigsfall I respektive II. / This paper explores Swedish naval strategy during the Second World War (1939-1945), an area that has not seen significant research. This paper focuses on how Swedish maritime forces were to be used in case of war with Germany (War Plan I; Krigsfall I), and with the Soviet Union (War plan II; Krigsfall II). This paper focuses on Swedish planning during the spring of 1941. The period after the fall of France (June 1940) and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) was a period where both Germany and the Soviet Union possessed what could be described as strategic freedom of action. This means large parts of their armed forces could have been used for operations against Sweden. The basis for each potential conflict was different: Germany occupied Norway and Denmark and could launch a ground invasion of Sweden directly; meanwhile Sweden and the Soviet Union were still separated by Finland and the Baltic Sea. Maritime forces would therefore play very different roles in the two War Plans. No official plans in case of war with the western Allies existed at the time, and hence this has not been explored here. The conclusion of this paper is that Swedish naval strategy at the time was somewhat offensive and focused on gaining sea control, at least in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Bothnia, to maintain freedom of action to be able to conduct troop movements along the Swedish coast, to the island of Gotland, and to Finland.

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