Digital games are part of the creative industries, which is based on value creation through ideas and creativity. This market has gained relevance due to technology development that attracted both new firms and users. The present dissertation aims to explore three themes: (1) video game market as a two-sided market; (2) the effects of characteristics and behavior of game titles on consoles sales; and (3) project management to develop digital games. Those themes were explored through three articles: the first is a literature review and a bibliometric study of the economic concepts on two-sided market, which focused at identifying main topics, research trends and avenues for futures research. The second text is an analysis on the simultaneous influence of games\' quality and exclusivity on console sales. The last one is a qualitative, multiple-case study to understand, explore and suggest improvements to game project management in the Brazilian market. Findings include: (1) the main authors and topics, trends and developments, from and avenues for future research; (2) combinations of quality and exclusivity can affect console sales either positively or negatively, (3) quality has a predominant effect on sales over games non-exclusivity; and (4) the use of agile methodologies and Design Thinking are diffused among game developers. / Sem resumo.

Cette dissertation concerne l'analyse des problématiques économiques introduites par la numérisation et par la parution des nouveaux réseaux et supports numériques dans l'économie des médias. Le passage du modèle analogique et physique au modèle numérique, en opérant une séparation du concept d’expression signifiante et du support qui permet sa circulation auprès d'un large public, impose un recadrage des procédés de création et production dans plusieurs domaines de l'industrie des médias. En utilisant le cas d'étude de l’industrie de l'édition des magazines, l'introduction de cette dissertation analyse les enjeux économiques plus urgents pour une marque éditoriale face à la numérisation, au niveau d'entreprise et du secteur industriel. Dans le premier chapitre, on va approfondir l’analyse en explorant la littérature existante dans le domaine des effets de la numérisation et de la régulation dans l'économie des médias. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous analysons les dynamiques d'adoption d'une technologie numérique associée avec un réseau, dans contexte où les contenus media sont des biens complémentaires essentiels et en présence d'externalités positives associées avec le déploiement du réseau. La contribution originale du modèle que nous allons montrer est la possibilité d'évaluer différentes qualités de subsides au déploiement et différentes valeurs de l'innovation technologique. dans le troisième et dernier chapitre, nous développons un modèle pour analyser la tarification des produits soumis au droit d'auteur dans un marché biface avec réseaux de distribution multiples. / This dissertation deals with the economic issues introduced by digitization and by the roll-out of innovative networks and supports in the economics of Media goods. The switch from a “physical analogic model” to a “digitized model”, by separating the concepts of meaningful expression from the traditional support allowing for publishing contents, imposes a rethinking of many media industries' business models. Using the publishing industry as a study case, in the introduction we analyze the key economic issues emerging for magazine publishers facing digitization, both at the firm level and at the industry level, where new strategic interactions may occur, changing the traditional dynamics in the value chain. In the first chapter we then proceed to explore recent research efforts focusing on the effects of digitization and regulation on Media economics. The main contribution of this analysis is that it tries to conjugate the economic literature that analyses technology related issues generated by digitization with contributions analysing the impacts of new publishing protocols, following a value-chain based approach.In fact, the originality of the problem is that digitization is quite not just a technologic innovation, improving efficiency through the value chain but it is also a new written language. The study of all the different implications of digitiziation is thus essential in order to fully understand the emerging economic models in media industries. Economists will find in this chapter not only the more important contributions on pricing and bundling in digital two-sided markets or multi-channel distribution models, but also interesting contributions from other specialists, analysing questions related to regulatory framework and even epistemologic issues. In the second chapter we analyse the adoption dynamics of a digital technology associated with a network , when media goods are essential complements and there are positive externalities associated to a succesfull adoption. The original contribution of this model is that it allows for different types of subsidies and different stand-alone values for technology. In the third and last chapter, we develop a pricing model for copyrighted contents in a two-sided market with multi-channel distribution. We analyze both the case of a firm producing only on one market (digital or physical) and of a firm producing the substitutable versions in the two markets. We find that: (i) in the digital market the “free dailies” business model is sustainable only if the number of publishers is limited. (ii) Publishers that are active already in the traditional channel with relevant market shares should “defend” their market share setting higher prices for the digital versions of their products. (iii) Unless both the advertising revenues per copy and the total sales in the digital markets grow larger than the traditional market, a traditional publisher should keep operating in the traditional market. (iv) If the total cannibalization grows to be more than proportional the optimal strategy for a publisher can be not to produce the digital version of a given product.

Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate different types of spectrum licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign different sponsored slots to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems: Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing methods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, generalizing the current methods that only consider a single slot. Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, extending the existing methods for static settings.

L’industrie de la finance a connu une multiplication d’innovations qui peuvent bouleverser les services financiers traditionnels. Elles brouillent les frontières entre banques et start-ups, accélérèrent les transactions, démocratisent l'accès au crédit, tout en imposant aux régulateurs le défi de construire un cadre règlementaire qui rééquilibre le compromis entre stabilité financière, concurrence innovation.Dans cette thèse, d'abord je réponds à cette question : comment les innovations influencent-elles la concurrence dans la banque de détail ? Un premier enjeu consiste à comprendre pourquoi certains de ces services innovants sont offerts par les plateformes non-bancaires, et comment les banques peuvent rivaliser avec des participants qui appliquent un modèle d'affaire différent. Après, je regarde quels sont les facteurs d’adoption de l'innovation par les consommateurs. Pour répondre à cette question, j'étudie à l'aide d'outils d'analyse empirique l'exemple des deux principales plateformes de prêts peer-to-peer aux USA, Prosper et LendingClub. Pour terminer, je me demande si la réglementation de l'innovation est nécessaire. Est-il optimal pour la société de réglementer les fournisseurs de services innovants ? Je propose deux modèles théoriques qui s'inscrivent dans les débats bien connus sur le niveau optimal des interchanges dans les systèmes de cartes de paiement et des clauses de parité des prix et d'exclusivité sur les plateformes en ligne. / During the last years, the finance industry has experienced a proliferation of innovations which may disrupt traditional financial services. They blur the boundaries between banks and financial start-ups, speed up transactions, democratize the access to credit, revise how we can purchase goods and how merchants can sell their products, while imposing regulators the challenge for a new level playing field which balances the trade-off between financial stability, competition and innovation. In this thesis, I try to answer to three main issues related to the topic of innovation in retail banking. Firstly, how do innovations impact competition in retail banking. One first issue is to understand why some of these innovative services are offered by non-bank platforms and how can banks compete with entrants that do not have the same business model. Secondly, I look at what the drivers of the adoption of innovation by consumers in retail banking are. What determines the diffusion of a new financial technology despite all the financial risks related to it ? To answer to these questions, I will look empirically at the example of the two main peer-to-peer lending platforms in the USA, Prosper and LendingClub. Third, I address the question on whether regulation of innovation is necessary. Is it optimal for the society to regulate the providers of innovative retail banking services? To answer to these questions, I address, in two theoretical models, the well-known debates on the optimal level of interchange fees in payment card systems and the imposition of exclusivity arrangements and price parity clauses in contracts between platforms and merchants.

The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.

L’objet de cette thèse est d’analyser l’évolution du marché des paiements de détail avec en toile de fond la constitution d’un espace unique pour les paiements en Europe. Notre analyse révèle notamment que ce marché évolue selon la théorie de la Reine Rouge ; en effet, sous le poids de la concurrence, les prestataires de service ne cessent de créer des moyens de paiement de plus en plus innovants afin de maintenir leur part de marché. Paradoxalement, la demande, elle, évolue plus lentement, essentiellement à cause des habitudes difficiles à changer. Pour la dynamiser, régulateur et industrie bancaire ont mis en œuvre de nombreux moyens. Notre étude révèle ainsi que bien que les facteurs sociodémographiques, technologiques et économiques déterminant les comportements de paiement varient et n’ont pas le même impact d’un pays à un autre, certains Etats présentent néanmoins suffisamment d’homogénéité pour appartenir à une même zone de paiement optimale. En outre, nous démontrons que l’harmonisation des pratiques bancaires et des réglementations mise en place pour la réalisation du marché unique a conduit à une convergence des comportements de paiement en Europe. Par ailleurs, en analysant le cas particulier des paiements par carte, nous développons un modèle multi-agents permettant de mettre en évidence l’importance des pratiques tarifaires telles que la commission d’interchange ou la règle de non-discrimination sur la concurrence entre instruments, intermédiaires et systèmes de paiement. L’expérimentation artificielle de ce modèle dévoile les conditions nécessaires à l’efficacité de la réglementation de ces pratiques par l’Etat. / The purpose of present thesis is to study the evolution of the retail payment market. This work is set against a backdrop of the creation of a single payment area in Europe. Our analysis reveals that this market is subject to the Red Queen dilemma; indeed, because of intense competition, payment service providers are forced to a constant evolution of technology in order to maintain their market share. Paradoxically, the demand for payment instruments tends to move slowly, basically because habits are difficult to change. To improve the dynamism of the demand response to innovation, regulator and banking industry have implemented new policies and procedures that encourage the development of trans-border payments. Thereby, although the sociodemographic, technological and economic factors which influence payment behaviours vary and don't have the same impact from one country to another, we find some remarkable homogeneity across countries that are eligible to form an optimal payment area. Besides, we show that the harmonization of the banking laws and products led to a convergence of the payment behaviours in Europe. In addition, by analyzing the case of the payment card industry, we develop an agent-based model which highlights the effects of the tariff practices such as the interchange fee or the no-surcharge rule, on competition within and between payment systems. The computational simulation of this model reveals necessary conditions to achieve the desired result of the regulation of these practices.

Rapid digitalisation development has been stampeding widely across today’s societies, and not least in the payment industry. Though, the digitalisation in the payment industry has been very deviating, even between similar well-developed countries, and while there are positive and negative effects with both digital- and physical payment means, there is little knowledge that highlights the influencing factors and accompanied problems. This study therefore explore swhich, and how, different factors influence a country’s degree of digital payments, and creates further understanding of where the payment markets are heading in the future. It is done through a case study of four different industrialised countries, Sweden, Italy, Canada, and Switzerland which involves mapping the countries’ payment markets, as well as potential factors influencing a population’s payment habits, through a perspective of innovation theory in terms of dominant designs and technological discontinuities. Theory of network externalities and two-sided platforms are further used to explain and discuss how a two-sided market, likethe payment market, is affected by changes and other circumstances in different ways.Conclusions are then drawn from the used theories together with a comparison of the findings,and identifies certain influencers to a country’s distribution of payments, as well as provides indications of where the different payments markets are heading in the future. Data is mainly gathered through written material and credible databases, but also from semi-structured interviews. / Den snabba digitaliseringen har slagit sig fram i dagens samhällen, och inte minst i betalningsindustrin. Dock har digitaliseringen i betalningsindustrin varit mycket avvikande mellan liknande välutvecklade länder, och medan det finns positiva och negativa effekter med både digitala och fysiska betalningsmedel, finns det inte mycket kunskap om påverkandefaktorer och medföljande problem. Denna studie undersöker därför vilka, och hur, olika faktorer påverkar ett lands grad av digitala betalningar, och vidare skapar ytterligare förståelse för var betalningsmarknaderna är på väg framöver. Detta görs genom en fallstudie av fyra olika industrialiserade länder, Sverige, Italien, Kanada och Schweiz, som innebär en kartläggning av ländernas betalningsmarknader, och av potentiella faktorer som påverkar befolkningens betalningsvanor, genom ett perspektiv från innovationsteori i form av dominerande design och tekniska diskontinuiteter. Teori om nätverksexternaliteter och tvåsidiga plattformar används vidare för att förklara och diskutera hur en tvåsidig marknad som betalningsmarknadenpåverkas av förändringar och andra omständigheter. Slutsatser dras sedan från de användateorierna tillsammans med en jämförelse av resultaten och identifierar påverkande faktorer tillett lands betalningsdistribution, samt ger indikationer på var de olika betalningsmarknaderna är på väg framöver. Data samlades huvudsakligen in genom skriftligt material och från tillförlitliga databaser, men även från semistrukturerade intervjuer.

This dissertation details regulation's impact in networked markets, notably in deregulated electricity and internet service markets. These markets represent basic infrastructure in the modern economy; their innate networked structures make for rich fields of economic research on regulatory impact. The first chapter models deregulated electricity industries with a focus on the Texas market. Optimal economic benchmarks are considered for markets with regulated delivery and interrelated network costs. Using a model of regulator, consumer, and firm interaction, I determine the efficiency of the current rate formalization compared to Ramsey-Boiteux prices and two-part tariffs. I find within Texas's market increases to generator surplus up to 55% of subsidies could be achieved under Ramsey-Boiteux pricing or two-part tariffs, respectively. The second chapter presents a framework to analyze dynamic processes and long-run outcomes in two-sided markets, specifically dynamic platform and firm investment incentives within the internet-service platform/content provision market. I use the Ericson-Pakes framework applied within a platform that chooses fees on either side of its two-sided market. This chapter determines the impact of network neutrality on platform investment incentives, specifically whether to improve the platform. I use a parameterized calibration from engineering reports and current ISP literature to determine welfare outcomes and industry behavior under network neutral and non-neutral regimes. My final chapter explores retail firm failure within the deregulated Texas retail electricity market. This chapter investigates determinants of retail electric firm failures using duration analysis frameworks. In particular, this chapter investigates the impact of these determinants on firms with extant experience versus unsophisticated entrants. Understanding these determinants is an important component in evaluating whether deregulation achieves the impetus of competitive electricity market restructuring. Knowing which economic events decrease a market's competitiveness helps regulators to effectively evaluate policy implementations. I find that experience does benefit a firm's duration, but generally that benefit assists firm duration in an adverse macroeconomic environment rather than in response to adverse market conditions such as higher wholesale prices or increased transmission congestion. Additionally, I find evidence that within the Texas market entering earlier results in a longer likelihood of duration. / text

This thesis sheds light on the functioning and characteristics of payment systems to serve as a foundation for understanding the drivers for higher payment system efficiency. Its central goal is to develop insights into the determinants of collective payment choice suitable to lower payment costs to society. So far, the institutional environment, as potential important influence on the payment instrument mix, has not been focused on in the literature. Therefore, particular emphasis is laid on the empirical analysis of the impact of institutional factors on the share of card payments on consumer spending at the point of sale (POS). For this, a unique panel data set is constructed covering the eight most important European payment markets ranked by non-cash transaction volumes. The empirical results allow formulating conditions necessary to achieve a more efficient payment mix. They also form a basis for the assessment of related policy measures with a focus on the SEPA project in terms of their efficiency enhancing effect. Future research could possibly build upon the panel data collected.

This thesis sheds light on the functioning and characteristics of payment systems to serve as a foundation for understanding the drivers for higher payment system efficiency. Its central goal is to develop insights into the determinants of collective payment choice suitable to lower payment costs to society. So far, the institutional environment, as potential important influence on the payment instrument mix, has not been focused on in the literature. Therefore, particular emphasis is laid on the empirical analysis of the impact of institutional factors on the share of card payments on consumer spending at the point of sale (POS). For this, a unique panel data set is constructed covering the eight most important European payment markets ranked by non-cash transaction volumes. The empirical results allow formulating conditions necessary to achieve a more efficient payment mix. They also form a basis for the assessment of related policy measures with a focus on the SEPA project in terms of their efficiency enhancing effect. Future research could possibly build upon the panel data collected.:1 Introduction 1.1 Payment behaviour in selected European countries 1.2 Research question and approach 2 Foundations: Payment systems and markets 2.1 Functioning of payment systems 2.1.1 Payments, market participants and payment system 2.1.2 Payment instruments and methods 2.1.3 Clearing and settlement arrangements 2.1.4 First observations on obstacles to payment systems development 2.2 Network character of payment markets 2.2.1 Theories of networks 2.2.2 Demand-side network effects in payment markets 2.2.3 Two-sided markets and payment cards 2.2.4 Supply-side economies of scale and open access to infrastructure 2.2.5 Obstacles to payment system development 3 Efficiency of payment systems 3.1 Research on payment infrastructure costs 3.1.1 Efficiency of interbank retail payment systems 3.1.2 Efficiency of intrabank payment processing 3.1.3 Factors influencing infrastructure efficiency 3.2 Research on payment instrument costs at the POS 3.2.1 Methodology and classification of the literature 3.2.2 Estimates of payment costs at the POS 3.2.3 Indicative efficiency ranking of payment instruments 4 Research on payment instrument choice at the POS 4.1 Data sources and categorisation of payment choice determinants 4.2 Price characteristics of payment instruments 4.3 Non-price characteristics of payment instruments 4.4 Transaction attributes 4.5 Constraints on payment choice 4.6 Developing an institutional view of payment choice 5 Empirical analysis: Institutional determinants shaping the POS payment mix 5.1 Two-step modelling approach 5.2 Panel construction and exploration of key data series 5.2.1 Panel data collection and overview of variables 5.2.2 Card usage and cash holding 5.2.3 Payment card diffusion and POS terminal density 5.3 European card schemes and markets 5.3.1 Institutional data collection 5.3.2 Description of European card markets 5.3.3 Overview of institutional data series 5.4 Payment decision 5.4.1 Development of the model and possible extensions 5.4.2 Discussion of the regression results 5.4.3 Diagnostic tests 5.5 Sourcing decision 5.5.1 Diffusion of payment cards 5.5.2 Density of POS terminals 5.5.3 Cash holding and availability at ATMs 5.6 Conclusions: Institutional determinants of payment choice 5.6.1 Linking empirical and theoretical analysis 5.6.2 Route for further research 6 Prospects for an efficient European payment mix 6.1 Objectives for establishing a European payment markets 6.2 SEPA for cards regulatory framework 6.2.1 Regulatory ecosystem 6.2.2 Regulatory framework set by European authorities 6.2.3 Standardization industry initiatives 6.3 Remaining obstacles for an efficient payment mix and outlook Appendix 6.3.1 A–1: Credit- and debit-based payment mechanism 6.3.2 A–2: Multilateral settlement: Access, settlement assets and methods 6.3.3 A–3: Statistical properties of variables 6.3.4 A-4: Unit root tests References