Esta tese tem por objetivo criticar a \"Doutrina Bush\", cujos termos foram lançados na Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA de 2002 e têm orientado a política externa da atual Administração daquele país no sentido de uma maior assertividade do poder militar estadunidense contra as ameaças, atuais ou futuras, que ponham em risco a sua posição de dominância no plano internacional, em particular no seu pleito de legalidade da legítima defesa chamada preemptiva. A este respeito, esta tese faz duas afirmações centrais: 1) que, ao contrário do que os termos em que está formulada nos querem fazer crer, não se trata de uma política de ataques preemptivos, mas sim de ataques preventivos, que não podem ser subsumidos ao instituto jurídico da legítima defesa; 2) que qualquer política de ataques preventivos decididos de maneira unilateral é incompatível com a manutenção da ordem no atual sistema em que se estruturam as relações internacionais na atualidade. Para tanto, na primeira parte da tese, é analisada a justificação político-filosófica da legítima defesa, cujo reconhecimento nos sistemas jurídicos positivos se revela uma condição racional de sua legitimidade, bem como, a partir dos limites marcados pelos princípios justificantes - agressão atual e necessidade dos meios empregados na defesa -, é apresentado um conceito ideal de legítima defesa; na segunda parte, expõe-se a regulação do instituto da legítima defesa no direito internacional, especialmente na Carta da ONU, contra a qual é, em seguida, comparada a proposta de \"legítima defesa preemptiva\" feita pela \"Doutrina Bush\". Desta se conclui que, nos termos em que é formulada, não pode ser considerada como legítima defesa, porque dispensa o requisito do ataque atual, em curso ou iminente, revelando-se verdadeira ação preventiva, cuja atribuição somente deve caber a um órgão que represente a comunidade internacional, no caso, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, sob pena de fragilizar a proibição do uso da força nas relações internacionais. Por outro lado, entendida a preempção nos estreitos limites da resposta antecipada a um ataque iminente, defende-se que seja abrangida pela permissão do uso da força em legítima defesa, desde que sujeita a alguma forma de controle posterior. / This thesis intends to refute the so-called \"Bush Doctrine\", whose terms have been laid down in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2002, and have since then oriented the present Administration\'s foreign policy towards a greater assertiveness of military power against either present or future threats to its dominant position in international relations, in particular its proposition of a right to preemptive self-defense. In this respect, this thesis advance two central claims: 1) that, contrary to what the actual terms in which this doctrine is formulated might want to suggest, it is not a policy of preemptive strikes that is being proposed, but one of prevention, which is beyond the reach of the legal right of self-defense; 2) that any policy of unilateral preventive strikes is contrary to the maintenance of order in the present international system. In order to support this claims, in the first part of the thesis, the philosophical and political justification of the right to self-defense is examined, the recognition of such a right in actual normative systems emerging as a rational condition of their legitimacy, and an ideal concept of self-defense is advanced that results from the application to the claim to individual self-preservation of the requirements deriving from this justification: an actual aggression and the concrete necessity of the means employed in the defense; in the second part of the thesis, the regulation of self-defense by international law, specially through the Charter of the United Nations, is explained, in the terms of which the legality of the Bush Doctrine\'s claim of preemptive self-defense is verified. Of this claim it is concluded that, at least in the way it is described by the National Security Strategy, it cannot be regarded as self-defense, because it does away with the necessary element of an actual aggression, either in progress or imminent, being in fact a variety of preventive use of force, the recourse to which should be restricted to an organ representing the community, in this case the Security Council of the United Nations, lest the prohibition of the recourse to force in international relations is relaxed. That notwithstanding, it is advanced that, as long as one understands preemption only as an early response to an imminent attack, it can be reconciled with the authorization to use force in self-defense, if subjected to some form of ex post control.

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar as ações militares lideradas pelos EUA no Afeganistão, em 2001, como resposta aos notórios ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro daquele ano contra o WTC e o pentágono, tendo como o foco confrontar os argumentos jurídico-políticos dos EUA utilizados no sentido de qualificar suas ações militares no referido conflito armado pretensamente sob a égide da legítima defesa, com os argumentos jurídicos trazidos pelas normas, usos e costumes e doutrina do direito internacional. Na primeira parte do trabalho, são relatados, mediante a utilização da doutrina internacional, e de documentos de política externa, os fatos envolvendo o conflito armado no Afeganistão de 2001, expondo os principais acontecimentos, segundo uma ordem cronológica, abordando também as Resoluções da ONU sobre tais eventos. Também será exposta uma breve síntese contendo uma contextualização histórica e geopolítica sobre o Afeganistão. Na segunda parte do trabalho, são destacadas algumas das seqüelas produzidas por tais fatos, quais sejam: a Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA, lançada em 2002, também conhecida como a \'Doutrina Bush\', com a respectiva política de ataques preventivos; e a subseqüente e polêmica invasão militar norte-americana ao Iraque em 2003, que ficou conhecida como a Segunda Guerra do Golfo. Finalmente, na terceira parte do trabalho, faz-se um enfrentamento mais direto dos argumentos utilizados pelos EUA para legitimar, sob o manto da legítima defesa individual ou coletiva, o uso da força contra o Afeganistão, expondo, para tanto, contra-argumentos lastreados no Direito Internacional vigente, contendo, em primeiro lugar, a evolução histórica da regulação do uso da força e do sistema de segurança coletiva, a imperatividade das normas internacionais que autorizam o uso da força, e suas exceções legítimas. Demonstrada a solidez dos arts. 2 (4) e 51 da Carta da ONU, e da Resolução 3314/74 da Assembléia-Geral da ONU, \"Definição de Agressão\", conclui-se pela ausência, no conflito objeto deste estudo, do elemento caracterizador da legítima defesa, o ato de agressão atribuível a um determinado Estado (o Afeganistão); da usurpação das limitações ao seu exercício: a proporcionalidade e provisoriedade da situação criada; bem como alertando-se sobre os riscos inerentes na redução dos requisitos previstos pelo artigo 51 da Carta das Nações Unidas. / This dissertation aims to analyze the actions led by the U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, in 2001, in response to the notorious terrorist attacks occurred on 11 September 2001 against the WTC and the Pentagon, mainly focusing on comparing all legal and political arguments which U.S. claim to qualify their military actions in the aforementioned armed conflict under the aegis of self-defense, with the legal arguments brought by the rules, practices and customs of international law and doctrine. In the first part of the work, by using the international doctrine, and documents of foreign policy, the facts involving the armed conflict in Afghanistan in 2001 are reported outlining the main events, according to a chronological order, and also addressing the UN Resolutions on such events. It will also be exposed on a brief contextualization of Afghanistan\'s history and geopolitical situation. In the second part of work, some of the sequels produced by such facts are highlighted, which are the following: the U.S. National Security Strategy, launched in 2002, also known as the \'Bush Doctrine\', containing its policy of preventive attacks, and also the subsequent and controversy U.S. military invasion of Iraq in 2003, which would became known as the Second Gulf War. Finally, in the third part of the work, there will be a more direct confrontation between the arguments used to legitimize the U. S. actions against Afghanistan, under the mantle of individual or collective self-defense, and therefore the counter-arguments supported by the existing international law, that will inc1ude, firstly, the historical evolution of the regulation of the use of force and the collective security system, the imperative international law that grants the legitimate exceptions for the use of force. Whereas there will be demonstrated the consistency of the artic1es 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter and the Resolution 3314/74 of the UN General Assembly, \"Definition of Aggression\" it is conc1uded that in this specific armed conflict, an essential element of self-defense is not present: an aggression attributable to a specific state (Afghanistan); and also are missing all the limitations required during self-defense exercise: the proportionality and the provisional character of the created situation in Afghanistan; lastly it is underlined the inherent risks of reducing the requirements established by Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The thesis analyzes how the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush used force in response to incidents of international terrorism. Key players in each administration and whether they advocated a law enforcement approach or a war paradigm approach to counterterrorism are examined. In addition, Koh's pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance forms a theoretical lens through which to compare and contrast administrations. An assessment of the role of Congress in making the administrations' counterterrorism policies confirms the vitality of this pattern, and suggests future administrations will adhere to it. During the George W. Bush administration, Koh's pattern of executive initiative (led by personalities like Vice President Cheney), congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance combined with the 9/11 tragedy and pervasive fears of another attack to create a 'perfect storm' known as the 'war on terror'. The research also analyzes to what extent the four administrations were constrained by international legal norms on the use of force, i.e. articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. On the domestic side, the thesis analyzes the extent to which American legal norms on the use of force constrained the administrations. Although the lack of compelling constraints on the use of force is present in all four administrations, the thesis indicates that the George W. Bush administration embodied an extreme example of this trend.

This master thesis provides an analysis of the legality of preemptive self-defence under international law. In assessing the lawfulness of preemptive self-defence two basic sources of international law: customary and treaty law are examined. The analysis of the UN Charter rules showed that there is strong disagreement between scholars regarding the legality of anticipatory self-defence. However, the term “armed attack” in article 51 UN Charter should embrace imminent threats. Two basic reasons are: the advent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and new methods of warfare; the inherent right of anticipatory self-defence was not exhausted after the adoption of the UN Charter. The examination of customary international law showed that the Caroline doctrine allows states to act in anticipation of an armed attack if the requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled. In addition, the analysis of state practice and opinion juris prior and after September 11, 2001, revealed that anticipatory self-defence is not prohibited. The conclusion is maid that the right of anticipatory self-defence, if requirements of necessity and proportionality are fulfilled, is not illegal under international law. In contrast, the analysis of the UN Charter rules showed that preemptive self-defence against perceived threats is not legal under the UN Charter, because there is no actual armed attack or imminent threat against which state can legally defend itself. In addition, preemptive... [to full text] / Šioje magistro tezėje analizuojamas preventyviosios savigynos teisėtumo tarptautinėje teisėje klausimas. Du pagrindiniai tarptautinės teisės šaltiniai: sutarčių bei paprotinė tarptautinė teisė yra nagrinėjami siekiant išsiaiškinti, ar preventyvioji savigyna yra legali tarptautinė teisėje. Pirmoje darbo dalyje nagrinėjamas preventyviosios savigynos prieš neišvengiamas grėsmes (angl. anticipatory self-defence) legalumas dviejų pagrindinių tarptautinės teisės šaltinių atžvilgiu. Pagrindinė tarptautinė sutartis reguliuojanti karinės galios naudojimą yra Jungtinių Tautų (JT) Chartija. Nagrinėjant preventyviosios savigynos prieš neišvengiamas grėsmes legalumo JT Chartijos normų, reguliuojančių savigyną, atžvilgiu, buvo nustatyta, kad autoriai nesutaria dėl to, ar JT Chartija leidžia naudoti karinę galią prieš neišvengiamas grėsmes. Pagrindiniai mokslininkų nesutarimai kyla dėl JT Chartijos 51 straipsnio, kuris leidžia JT valstybėm narėm savigynos tikslais naudoti karinę galią, ginkluoto užpuolimo atveju, formuluotės. Iš esmės, nesutariama dėl dviejų frazių vartojamų JT Chartijos 51straipsnyje: „prigimtinė teisė“ bei „ginkluotas užpuolimas“ (angl. „the inherent right“, „armed attack“). Autorių susiskaidymas šiuo klausimu neleido nustatyti, ar preventyvioji savigyna prieš neišvengiamas grėsmes yra legali. Dėl to, buvo nagrinėjama, ar JT Chartijos 51 straipsnyje minima ginkluoto užpuolimo sąvoka apima neišvengiamas grėsmes ir tokiu būdu minėta tarptautinė sutartis leidžia... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

The first efforts to formulate the norms banning the use of force were reflected in the 1928 Kellogg–Briand pact. In the contemporary international law, prohibition of force has gained an extremely immense significance with the balance of powers changing and the processes of globalisation picking up pace. Emerging threats and the legal character of how different states respond to them is one of the most pressing topics of today’s international law. Obviously, the authors of the Charter could not have foreseen the modern challenges for the international peace and security, like the threat of weapons of mass destruction and the terrorism. The peacekeeping forces, the peace agenda, the humanitarian intervention have come to be the new examples of response to the contemporary challenges for the international peace and security and of a flexible practical application of the Charter’s provisions.

Coercive diplomacy attempts to use military force in a limited fashion as a diplomatic and political tool in order to persuade an opponent to cease aggression rather than to bludgeon him into stopping. The use of limited military force in coercive diplomacy is not a military strategy, but rather a refined political and psychological instrument used for resolving a crisis. One relatively new instrument in the toolbox of limited force when engaging in coercive diplomacy, fashioned to deter adversaries, is the use of no-fly zones. The term no-fly zone describes the physical area of a nation that is patrolled using the airpower of another sovereign state or coalition. However, despite its relatively frequent use in its short history, it has largely been ignored in theoretical studies of coercive diplomacy. As scholars, such as Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, have presented a critical view on the limitations of approaching a study on a single instrument in coercive diplomacy, this paper grounds the argument that there is still value in this approach. Given that the conditions of coercive diplomacy mainly focus on an array of coercive instruments at a political level, are the conditions in the theories of coercive diplomacy sufficient to explain the political success of the military instrument of no-fly zones? Hence, this paper illustrates the theoretical reach of the theories of coercive diplomacy by highlighting the fungibility of the coercive diplomacy’s theoretical ‘success conditions’ when assessing a single military instrument. By studying the political success and failure in four separate cases, this paper proposes an analytical framework, which is by and large, derived from Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Alexander George’s theoretical basis. However, as the theoretical basis does not fully cover all of the political dimensions of no-fly zones, an additional variable is proposed. The resulting analytical framework suggests that this is a viable approach, but only by combining Jakobsen’s revised conditions with the original work of Alexander George, in addition to the proposed variable. Thus, this result contributes to the large body of scholarly work on coercive diplomacy theory and the debate whether one can assess a specific coercive instrument with the political ‘success conditions’ of coercive diplomacy, or not. / Master Thesis

This study draws from Zygmunt Bauman´s theory that a governmental policy of values can reduce the personal responsibility and moral choices for employees, to focus only on maintaining the government’s internal rules and regulations. The apparent risk with this type of moral attenuation is that the employee is deprived of the possibility to react morally on conduct of the government’s external misuse of power. In this study, this theory is connected to the Swedish Armed Forces’ policy of values, as these values do not include a critical standpoint for officers and soldiers. The policy is instead aimed at maintaining the internal rules and regulations of the Armed Forces, thus neglecting moral functions’ for officers and soldiers applicable to the use of force.The purpose of this study is to show how development of the current policy of values can make it possible to mitigate the risk of moral attenuation, by using a postmodern theory for ethics. The study analyses the decision to use force in Afghanistan, and finds that the ethics for military violence are based on a liberal ontology. With a postmodern paradigm on ethics, the study then criticizes the liberal ethics at hand for the use of force in Afghanistan.The study concludes that the policy of values set by the Swedish Armed Forces could be revised by adapting an ethical awareness to the risks of moral attenuation. Further, the study suggests that the policy should include the fact that the use of language can dehumanize groups of people, with the apparent risk that the use of force aimed at these people, is morally unsound.

Due to the crisis lived in Mali since 2012, due to a non-international armed conflict between the government and different armed groups, the Security Council of the United Nations Organization declared that the situation in Mali constituted a threat to international peace and security. This led to the military intervention in Mali by France. This article aims to analyse the arguments with which the French government attempted to justify its intervention in order to determine if those arguments are legal or not. / Debido a la crisis que vive Malí desde el año 2012, a causa de un conflicto armado no internacional entre el gobierno y varios grupos armados, el Consejo de Seguridad de la Organización de Naciones Unidas declaró que dicha situación representaba una amenaza contra la paz y la seguridad internacionales. Ello condujo a la intervención  militar de Francia  en la República de Malí. Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar los argumentos con los que el gobierno francés justificó su intervención para así determinar sidichos argumentos son legales o no.

The prohibition of the threat or use of force is part of the structural principles of contemporary international law. As a corollary to this norm, no state may violate the territorial integrity of the other one. However, one of the most recent issues that has sparked intense debate has been the fact that the Russian Federation annexed Crimea in March 2014. In this context, the present article examines how Russia’s action is contrary to article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, despite the arguments made by its authorities. It also evaluates if this situation creates an obligation of non- recognition for other members of the international community. Finally, we will discuss the potential impact of this event on the future development of international law relating to international peace and security. / La prohibición de la amenaza y uso de la fuerza pertenece al dominio de los principios estructurales del derecho internacional contemporáneo. Como corolario de esta norma, ningún Estado puede vulnerar la integridad territorial de otro. Sin embargo, uno de los problemas más recientes y que ha suscitado un intenso debate ha sido el hecho de que la Federación Rusa haya anexado Crimea en marzo de 2014. En este contexto y pese a los argumentos vertidos por sus autoridades, el presente artículo examina cómo es que la actuación rusa es una manifestación contraria al artículo 2, párrafo 4 de la Carta de Naciones Unidas. Se evalúa también si de esta situación se deriva una obligación de no reconocimiento para los otros miembros de la comunidad internacional. Por último, se verá cuál es el impacto que tiene este evento para el desarrollo futuro del derecho internacional en materia de paz y seguridad internacionales.

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar as ações militares lideradas pelos EUA no Afeganistão, em 2001, como resposta aos notórios ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro daquele ano contra o WTC e o pentágono, tendo como o foco confrontar os argumentos jurídico-políticos dos EUA utilizados no sentido de qualificar suas ações militares no referido conflito armado pretensamente sob a égide da legítima defesa, com os argumentos jurídicos trazidos pelas normas, usos e costumes e doutrina do direito internacional. Na primeira parte do trabalho, são relatados, mediante a utilização da doutrina internacional, e de documentos de política externa, os fatos envolvendo o conflito armado no Afeganistão de 2001, expondo os principais acontecimentos, segundo uma ordem cronológica, abordando também as Resoluções da ONU sobre tais eventos. Também será exposta uma breve síntese contendo uma contextualização histórica e geopolítica sobre o Afeganistão. Na segunda parte do trabalho, são destacadas algumas das seqüelas produzidas por tais fatos, quais sejam: a Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA, lançada em 2002, também conhecida como a \'Doutrina Bush\', com a respectiva política de ataques preventivos; e a subseqüente e polêmica invasão militar norte-americana ao Iraque em 2003, que ficou conhecida como a Segunda Guerra do Golfo. Finalmente, na terceira parte do trabalho, faz-se um enfrentamento mais direto dos argumentos utilizados pelos EUA para legitimar, sob o manto da legítima defesa individual ou coletiva, o uso da força contra o Afeganistão, expondo, para tanto, contra-argumentos lastreados no Direito Internacional vigente, contendo, em primeiro lugar, a evolução histórica da regulação do uso da força e do sistema de segurança coletiva, a imperatividade das normas internacionais que autorizam o uso da força, e suas exceções legítimas. Demonstrada a solidez dos arts. 2 (4) e 51 da Carta da ONU, e da Resolução 3314/74 da Assembléia-Geral da ONU, \"Definição de Agressão\", conclui-se pela ausência, no conflito objeto deste estudo, do elemento caracterizador da legítima defesa, o ato de agressão atribuível a um determinado Estado (o Afeganistão); da usurpação das limitações ao seu exercício: a proporcionalidade e provisoriedade da situação criada; bem como alertando-se sobre os riscos inerentes na redução dos requisitos previstos pelo artigo 51 da Carta das Nações Unidas. / This dissertation aims to analyze the actions led by the U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, in 2001, in response to the notorious terrorist attacks occurred on 11 September 2001 against the WTC and the Pentagon, mainly focusing on comparing all legal and political arguments which U.S. claim to qualify their military actions in the aforementioned armed conflict under the aegis of self-defense, with the legal arguments brought by the rules, practices and customs of international law and doctrine. In the first part of the work, by using the international doctrine, and documents of foreign policy, the facts involving the armed conflict in Afghanistan in 2001 are reported outlining the main events, according to a chronological order, and also addressing the UN Resolutions on such events. It will also be exposed on a brief contextualization of Afghanistan\'s history and geopolitical situation. In the second part of work, some of the sequels produced by such facts are highlighted, which are the following: the U.S. National Security Strategy, launched in 2002, also known as the \'Bush Doctrine\', containing its policy of preventive attacks, and also the subsequent and controversy U.S. military invasion of Iraq in 2003, which would became known as the Second Gulf War. Finally, in the third part of the work, there will be a more direct confrontation between the arguments used to legitimize the U. S. actions against Afghanistan, under the mantle of individual or collective self-defense, and therefore the counter-arguments supported by the existing international law, that will inc1ude, firstly, the historical evolution of the regulation of the use of force and the collective security system, the imperative international law that grants the legitimate exceptions for the use of force. Whereas there will be demonstrated the consistency of the artic1es 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter and the Resolution 3314/74 of the UN General Assembly, \"Definition of Aggression\" it is conc1uded that in this specific armed conflict, an essential element of self-defense is not present: an aggression attributable to a specific state (Afghanistan); and also are missing all the limitations required during self-defense exercise: the proportionality and the provisional character of the created situation in Afghanistan; lastly it is underlined the inherent risks of reducing the requirements established by Article 51 of the UN Charter.