In this project, I develop Nietzsche's account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche's discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human's ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche's account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche's discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human's ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

Uma conjectura a respeito dos primeiros trabalhos de Michel Foucault marca uma opinião comum sobre a chamada arqueologia do saber: ela desenvolveria um método autorreferencial e semiestruturalista, bem como uma teoria sobre a sociedade que teria esvaziado o social. Por consequência, o surgimento da genealogia do poder adviria desse esgotamento teórico-metodológico da arqueologia. Não reconstruímos integralmente tais interpretações, mas a respeito delas assinalamos que uma adequada caracterização da arqueologia não pode prescindir da crítica intrínseca que ela traz. Este trabalho, portanto, pretendeu restituir à arqueologia de Foucault seu caráter crítico e político, a partir da determinação das condições de surgimento da genealogia do poder, demonstrando a total compatibilidade entre arqueologia e genealogia. Nossa hipótese geral foi a de que a arqueologia desfruta de caráter político, porque, no próprio desenvolvimento de condições históricas e de regras específicas do discurso, pode-se apreender a transformação das condições de existência e funcionamento dos discursos. Ora, a modificação dessas formações já é uma forma de ação política; logo, por nossa hipótese, não se deve perguntar qual prática política envolve a arqueologia, mas que avaliação pode ela fazer das transformações no modo de existência das formações discursivas. O objetivo deste trabalho foi, portanto, o de remontar a crítica arqueológica, sobretudo a crítica às ciências, tal como ela se estrutura nos primeiros trabalhos de Foucault. Para expressar de modo consistente a subversão crítica da concepção foucaultiana de arqueologia, escolhemos um itinerário. Deslocamos a crítica do saber médico para a analítica da finitude (História da loucura, Nascimento da clínica, e As palavras e as coisas); propusemos uma fundamentação teórico-prática das regras do discurso (Arqueologia do saber) e, por fim, fizemos da crítica arqueológica uma operação do conceito nietzschiano de vontade de verdade. / A conjecture constituted on Michel Foucaults first essays imprints a common opinion about the so-called knowledge archeology: it would not only develop a self-referent and semistructural method, but also a theory about the society that would have emptied the social. As a consequence, the emergence of powers genealogy would come from the theoreticmethodological exhaustion of the archeology. We havent reconstructed fully such interpretations, but concerning them, we signalize that an appropriate characterization of the archeology cannot be separated from the inherent criticism that carries it. Therefore, this thesis is meant to refund Foulcauts archeology its critical and political aspect, beginning with the determination of the genealogy powers emergence conditions, showing the complete suitability between archeology and genealogy. Our general hypothesis is that the archeology possesses a political feature because, in the development of speechs specific rules and existence conditions one can anticipate the transformation of existence conditions and speech operation. Nevertheless, the modification of these conformations has already the shape of a political action; therefore, according to our hypothesis, one should not ask which political experience implicates archeology, but what kind of evaluation can be done on the transformation of discursive conformations existence mode. Thus, the objective of this study is to rebuild archeological criticism mainly when its related to the criticism of Sciences, the way it is structured in Foucaults first essays. To express, in a consistent way, Foucaults archeological subversively critical concept, we have chosen an itinerary. We have dislocated medical knowledge criticism from finitude analytics (Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic e The Order of Things), offering a theoretical-practical grounding for the discourse rules (The Archaeology of Knowledge) and, lastly, from the archeological criticism weve created operation of Nietzsches will of truth concept.

MONTEIRO, Átila Brandão. Nietzsche e a genealogia da verdade. 2016. 132f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2016. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-06-15T12:16:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_dis_abmonteiro.pdf: 1015767 bytes, checksum: 4f0b6b0d247f7209cd4c286f0b665803 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-06-15T13:13:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_dis_abmonteiro.pdf: 1015767 bytes, checksum: 4f0b6b0d247f7209cd4c286f0b665803 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-15T13:13:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_dis_abmonteiro.pdf: 1015767 bytes, checksum: 4f0b6b0d247f7209cd4c286f0b665803 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 / This dissertation aims to provide an interpretation about the set of reflections developed by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche around the notion of truth. Such reflection is carried out from different points of view present in his work, trying to observe how articulate the ideas of truth and life, with the thread of the notion of "will to truth". I seek, on the one hand, articulate the moments in which the philosopher undertakes criticism of the notion of truth, first directed to the metaphysical truths, but pointing and investigating at the same time, to the notion of veracity, as it passes the it is understood as the likely source of that. Then attempt to understand, in the wake of reflection on the veracity, how Nietzsche develops this critical and gives it a new direction with an existential and normative sense (since elects a criterion from which to assess the value of moral values), from the preparation of its genealogical procedure. The result of such reflections are essential to understanding the “will to truth” idea and also a possible sense of the truth to the philosopher. / A presente dissertação objetiva fornecer uma interpretação acerca do conjunto de reflexões desenvolvidas pelo filósofo alemão Friedrich Nietzsche em torno da noção de verdade. Tal reflexão é realizada a partir dos diferentes pontos de vista presentes em sua obra, procurando observar como se articulam as ideias de verdade e de vida, tendo como fio condutor a noção de “vontade de verdade”. Procuro, por um lado, articular os momentos em que o filósofo empreende críticas à noção de verdade, direcionadas primeiramente às verdades da metafísica, mas que apontam e investigam, ao mesmo tempo, para a noção de veracidade, na medida em que esta passa a ser entendida como a provável origem daquela. Em seguida, intento entender, na esteira da reflexão sobre a veracidade, como Nietzsche desenvolve esta crítica e dá a ela um novo direcionamento com um sentido existencial e normativo (uma vez que elege um critério a partir do qual é possível avaliar o valor dos valores morais), a partir da elaboração do seu procedimento genealógico. O resultado de tais reflexões são essenciais para a compreensão da ideia de vontade de verdade e, igualmente, de um sentido possível da noção verdade para o filósofo.

Uma conjectura a respeito dos primeiros trabalhos de Michel Foucault marca uma opinião comum sobre a chamada arqueologia do saber: ela desenvolveria um método autorreferencial e semiestruturalista, bem como uma teoria sobre a sociedade que teria esvaziado o social. Por consequência, o surgimento da genealogia do poder adviria desse esgotamento teórico-metodológico da arqueologia. Não reconstruímos integralmente tais interpretações, mas a respeito delas assinalamos que uma adequada caracterização da arqueologia não pode prescindir da crítica intrínseca que ela traz. Este trabalho, portanto, pretendeu restituir à arqueologia de Foucault seu caráter crítico e político, a partir da determinação das condições de surgimento da genealogia do poder, demonstrando a total compatibilidade entre arqueologia e genealogia. Nossa hipótese geral foi a de que a arqueologia desfruta de caráter político, porque, no próprio desenvolvimento de condições históricas e de regras específicas do discurso, pode-se apreender a transformação das condições de existência e funcionamento dos discursos. Ora, a modificação dessas formações já é uma forma de ação política; logo, por nossa hipótese, não se deve perguntar qual prática política envolve a arqueologia, mas que avaliação pode ela fazer das transformações no modo de existência das formações discursivas. O objetivo deste trabalho foi, portanto, o de remontar a crítica arqueológica, sobretudo a crítica às ciências, tal como ela se estrutura nos primeiros trabalhos de Foucault. Para expressar de modo consistente a subversão crítica da concepção foucaultiana de arqueologia, escolhemos um itinerário. Deslocamos a crítica do saber médico para a analítica da finitude (História da loucura, Nascimento da clínica, e As palavras e as coisas); propusemos uma fundamentação teórico-prática das regras do discurso (Arqueologia do saber) e, por fim, fizemos da crítica arqueológica uma operação do conceito nietzschiano de vontade de verdade. / A conjecture constituted on Michel Foucaults first essays imprints a common opinion about the so-called knowledge archeology: it would not only develop a self-referent and semistructural method, but also a theory about the society that would have emptied the social. As a consequence, the emergence of powers genealogy would come from the theoreticmethodological exhaustion of the archeology. We havent reconstructed fully such interpretations, but concerning them, we signalize that an appropriate characterization of the archeology cannot be separated from the inherent criticism that carries it. Therefore, this thesis is meant to refund Foulcauts archeology its critical and political aspect, beginning with the determination of the genealogy powers emergence conditions, showing the complete suitability between archeology and genealogy. Our general hypothesis is that the archeology possesses a political feature because, in the development of speechs specific rules and existence conditions one can anticipate the transformation of existence conditions and speech operation. Nevertheless, the modification of these conformations has already the shape of a political action; therefore, according to our hypothesis, one should not ask which political experience implicates archeology, but what kind of evaluation can be done on the transformation of discursive conformations existence mode. Thus, the objective of this study is to rebuild archeological criticism mainly when its related to the criticism of Sciences, the way it is structured in Foucaults first essays. To express, in a consistent way, Foucaults archeological subversively critical concept, we have chosen an itinerary. We have dislocated medical knowledge criticism from finitude analytics (Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic e The Order of Things), offering a theoretical-practical grounding for the discourse rules (The Archaeology of Knowledge) and, lastly, from the archeological criticism weve created operation of Nietzsches will of truth concept.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / A presente dissertaÃÃo objetiva fornecer uma interpretaÃÃo acerca do conjunto de reflexÃes desenvolvidas pelo filÃsofo alemÃo Friedrich Nietzsche em torno da noÃÃo de verdade. Tal reflexÃo à realizada a partir dos diferentes pontos de vista presentes em sua obra, procurando observar como se articulam as ideias de verdade e de vida, tendo como fio condutor a noÃÃo de âvontade de verdadeâ. Procuro, por um lado, articular os momentos em que o filÃsofo empreende crÃticas à noÃÃo de verdade, direcionadas primeiramente Ãs verdades da metafÃsica, mas que apontam e investigam, ao mesmo tempo, para a noÃÃo de veracidade, na medida em que esta passa a ser entendida como a provÃvel origem daquela. Em seguida, intento entender, na esteira da reflexÃo sobre a veracidade, como Nietzsche desenvolve esta crÃtica e dà a ela um novo direcionamento com um sentido existencial e normativo (uma vez que elege um critÃrio a partir do qual à possÃvel avaliar o valor dos valores morais), a partir da elaboraÃÃo do seu procedimento genealÃgico. O resultado de tais reflexÃes sÃo essenciais para a compreensÃo da ideia de vontade de verdade e, igualmente, de um sentido possÃvel da noÃÃo verdade para o filÃsofo. / This dissertation aims to provide an interpretation about the set of reflections developed by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche around the notion of truth. Such reflection is carried out from different points of view present in his work, trying to observe how articulate the ideas of truth and life, with the thread of the notion of "will to truth". I seek, on the one hand, articulate the moments in which the philosopher undertakes criticism of the notion of truth, first directed to the metaphysical truths, but pointing and investigating at the same time, to the notion of veracity, as it passes the it is understood as the likely source of that. Then attempt to understand, in the wake of reflection on the veracity, how Nietzsche develops this critical and gives it a new direction with an existential and normative sense (since elects a criterion from which to assess the value of moral values), from the preparation of its genealogical procedure. The result of such reflections are essential to understanding the âwill to truthâ idea and also a possible sense of the truth to the philosopher.

With this dissertation, firstly, I address the issue of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) so-called ‘immoralism’. When he calls himself an ‘immoralist’ and even ‘the first immoralist’ (EH Destiny 2), he seems to be the first philosopher to consider morality as something negative, something we had better got rid of. Yet, he favours ‘noble morality’ and ‘higher moralities’ which he insists ought to be possible (BGE 202). I shall interpret Nietzsche’s explicit claim of ‘immoralism’ and his ‘campaign against morality’ as a rejection of a particular kind of morality ¾ Christian morality ‘that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself’ (EH Destiny 4). His ‘immoralism’ does not reject the idea of an ethical life. Nietzsche favours a ‘supra-moral’ version of life (GM II 2&BGE 257). The move from a moral to a supra-moral orientation to life implies a kind of self-overcoming, a process which has both a ‘negative’ (‘destructive’) and a ‘positive’ (‘productive’) side. Firstly, I shall give an account of the ‘negative’ side, which involves Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality. In his Genealogy, Nietzsche criticizes the man of ressentiment, the metaphysical two-worlds distinction: ‘true world’ and ‘apparent world’, and the ascetic ideal of the will to truth, which he considers as a will to nothingness (GM III 28). His notion of perspectivism advocates a plurality of values and perspectives as opposed to any notion of an absolute truth. Then, I shall look into his ‘positive’ ethic, as exemplified in the figures of Zarathustra and the Übermensch, and the paradox of the Übermenschas ‘the annihilator of morality’ (EH Books 1) and as ‘the designation of a type of supreme achievement’ (EH Books 1). By proclaiming a process of ‘self-overcoming of morality’ (BGE 32), I believe that Nietzsche proposes an experimental morality in order to improve mankind. He considers morality as a pose, as progress (BGE 216), and ‘mere symptomatology’ (TI ‘Improvers’ of Mankind 1). Morality is the effect, or symptom of a continuous improvement within an individual. Nietzsche seeks to make us become aware of our continuous self-improvement, that we should invent our own virtue (A 11) in order to become what we are. Nietzsche envisions the possibility of evolving a magnanimous and courageous human type who is capable of giving style to his character (GS 290), the supreme human achievement ¾ the Übermensch. His idea of the Übermensch implies a never-ending struggle for self-perfection and self-fulfilment. There are affinities between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Buddhism, such as emphasizing practice, the recognition of the transient nature of human existence, and an emphasis on impermanence. Buddhist teachings show various feasible ways to attain enlightenment and buddhahood. The path to enlightenment and buddhahood can be shown to share some features with Nietzsche’s process of self-overcoming, which leads to self-transformation and self-perfection. The emphasis on the practice of the spirit of Bodhisattva by Humanistic Buddhism seems to lend itself as complement to Nietzsche’s philosophy, a notion I explore in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. / Dissertation (MA (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Philosophy / unrestricted

[pt] Em fins de 2016 o conceituado Dicionário Oxford elegeu e divulgou que pós-verdade seria sua palavra do ano. A escolha teria se baseado no singular aumento de uso da palavra e seria relativa ao agitado panorama macropolítico que havia dominado a discussão pública, nos contextos aos quais se refere o dicionário, naquele ano. Sua definição remeteria a uma perspectiva na qual a emoção seria mais importante ao apelo público que referências aos fatos, tal como uma crescente desvalorização da verdade. A palavra, então, passou a ser bastante tematizada e discutida publicamente nesta chave. Partindo deste contexto, o presente trabalho chega à seguinte pergunta: por que se preteriria e defenderia, axiologicamente falando, uma afirmação enquanto verdadeira mesmo que epistemologicamente tais afirmações procedam ou não? A partir do debate acerca desta questão, o trabalho desloca seu olhar de uma vontade de verdade para uma vontade de identidade, pensando os processos pelos quais indivíduos ou grupos criam identificações acerca de certas verdades, em seu sentido axiológico. Assim, passa a indagar os mecanismos da identidade e consolidação de tais verdades; para isto, recorre aos postulados filosóficos de Friedrich Nietzsche e Jacques Derrida e estabelece uma narrativa, a partir da pergunta sobre a noção de pós verdade e seus limites, que se segue da vontade de verdade de acordo com o postulado por Nietzsche para as discussões acerca de identidades e identificações nos postulados de Derrida. Pergunta-se então, se em sentido axiológico se poderia falar de uma hipertrofia da verdade. / [en] At the end of 2016 the prestigious Oxford Dictionary has elected and announced that post-thuth was his word of the year. The choice was based on the significantly increase of the use of the word and it would be related to the main politics landscape that had been on the spots of the public discussion that year, about the contexts referred by the dictionary. His definition (of post-truth) would refer to a perspective where emotion was more important to the public appeal than references to facts, just as a growing devaluation of truth too. The word, then, got more themed and publicly discussed in this key. From this context, this text comes to the following question: why it would be preferred, pointed and defended, axiologically speaking, a statement as true even if epistemologically these statements proceed or not? From this debate, this text turns his view from a will to truth to a will to identity, thinking the processes in witch individuals or groups creates identifications about certain truths in their axiological sense. Thus, it begins to inquire the mechanisms of identity and the consolidation of those truths; in this purpose it resorts to the philosophical postulates of Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida and establishes a narrative starting from the question about the notion of post-truth, its limits, which follows from the will to truth according to postulates of Nietzsche to the discussions about identities and identifications on Derrida s postulates. So, it s possible to outline the possibilities, in an axiological sense, of a discuss about a hypertrophy of truth.