Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mauricio Palma Resende.pdf: 1111626 bytes, checksum: 40dd782dff09615491e9d65b468e176e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-26 / This work aims to explore two directions associated with the development of the philosophy of language that leaded to dissonant conceptions of philosophy of law: in one hand, the Wittgenstein s thought on the language and the world; on the other hand, Luhmann s theory grounded on his thesis of an operational rupture regarding man and communication in autopoietic systems. Right after an explanation over both perspectives and their reflects on law, it is outlined a dialogue based on Wittgenstein with Luhmann s theory, discussion which in the end shows that the theory of functional social systems has an insufficient explanation of the corruption phenomenon in result of the thesis concerning the operational opposition man/communication, and affirms that Wittgenstein s notions such as language-games and form of life are worthy ways to struggle with this question. In conclusion, the work pictures the law as a factor based on human s language, positioning it on the mark of an analysis of its language games, which reveals cultural and historical aspects / trabalho busca explorar dois caminhos relacionados à filosofia da linguagem que conduziram a divergentes correntes da filosofia do direito: de um lado, as considerações de Wittgenstein sobre linguagem e mundo e, de outro, a teoria de Luhmann fundada na tese da separação operacional dos seres humanos da comunicação em sistemas autopoiéticos. Após a exposição do pensamento destes autores e seu reflexo no direito, é delineado um diálogo alicerçado em Wittgenstein com a teoria luhmanniana, sendo que ao final deste entende-se que a teoria da diferenciação funcional dos sistemas sociais apresenta uma explicação insuficiente do fenômeno da corrupção em decorrência da referida apartação do homem da comunicação, e afirma-se que noções wittgensteinianas como as de jogos de linguagem e forma de vida indicam um profícuo caminho para trabalhar esta questão de forma menos porosa. Em conclusão, retrata-se direito como plasmado pela linguagem humana, o que o confina à análise dos jogos de linguagem e revela suas feições culturais e históricas

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O objetivo é analisar as implicações da teorização pós-estruturalista para o pensamento educacional, especialmente no que se refere ao relativismo decorrente desta teorização, assunto que ganhou destaque nas discussões acadêmicas não só apenas de filosofia da educação como também nas relacionadas à filosofia da ciência e do pensamento social. Não se objetivou uma análise extensiva das possibilidades da filosofia pós-moderna para a educação, uma vez que a multiplicidade dos discursos, autores e idéias tornaria esta tarefa irrealizável e inadequada no que se refere ao escopo deste trabalho. Antes, o foco é estabelecido sobre a idéia da deposição das fundamentações realistas, racionalistas e naturalistas do discurso educacional, e sobre as críticas mais representativas que este movimento suscita na comunidade de pensadores da educação.

Models of memory in cognitive science and philosophy have traditionally explained human remembering in terms of storage and retrieval. This tendency has been entrenched by reliance on computationalist explanations over the course of the twentieth century; even research programs that eschew computationalism in name, or attempt the revision of traditional models, demonstrate tacit commitment to computationalist assumptions. It is assumed that memory must be stored by means of an isomorphic trace, that memory processes must divide into conceptually distinct systems and phases, and that human remembering consists in inner, cognitive processes that are implemented by distinct neural processes. This dissertation draws on recent empirical work, and on philosophical arguments from Ludwig Wittgenstein and others, to demonstrate that this latent computationalism in the study of memory is problematic, and that it can and should be eliminated. Cognitive psychologists studying memory have encountered numerous data in recent decades that belie archival models. In cognitive neuroscience, establishing the neural basis of storage and retrieval processes has proven elusive. A number of revised models on offer in memory science, that have taken these issues into account, fail to sufficiently extricate the archival framework. Several impasses in memory science are products of these underlying computationalist assumptions. Wittgenstein and other philosophers offer a number of arguments against the need for, and the efficacy of, the storage and retrieval of traces in human remembering. A study of these arguments clarifies the ways that these computationalist assumptions are presently impeding the science of memory, and provides ways forward in removing them. We can and should characterize and model human memory without invoking the storage and retrieval of traces. A range of work in connectionism, dynamical systems theory, and recent philosophical accounts of memory demonstrate how the science of memory can proceed without these assumptions, toward non-archival models of remembering.

There are historically three main trends in understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The first is the interpretation offered by the Vienna Circle. They read Wittgenstein as arguing that neither metaphysical nor normative propositions have any cognitive meaning, and thus are to be considered nonsense. This interpretation understands Wittgenstein as setting the limits of sense, and prescribing that nothing of substantive philosophical importance lies beyond that line. The second way of reading the Tractatus, which has became popular since the 1950s, is the interpretation which most currently accept as the early Wittgenstein's view; for this reason I refer to it as the 'standard reading.' According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein did not consider metaphysical and ethical discourse as nonsense. Rather, relying upon the distinction between saying [sagen] and showing [zeigen], he meant that these truths cannot be uttered, but instead are only shown. The standard reading can perhaps be best understood in contrast with the third interpretation, dubbed the "resolute reading." The resolute reading takes seriously Wittgenstein's remark at 6.54 that "[m]y propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsense [unsinnig]." According to the resolute interpretation, Wittgenstein is not advancing a series of philosophical theses in the Tractatus. Rejecting the distinction characteristic of standard readings, between propositions without sense [sinnlos] and just plain nonsense [unsinnig], these interpreters read Wittgenstein as treating ethical and metaphysical inquiry, as well as a bulk of the doctrines in the text, as nonsense. To them, Wittgenstein did not intend to put forth any theses in the the text. Instead his methodology is therapeutic, similar to the later philosophy. It In this essay I explain each interpretation, and evaluate them in terms of textual and philosophical viability. I conclude by arguing that the biases which exist in the tradition of analytic philosophy substantively temper the interpretation of historical texts, which ultimately leads to the fundamental distinction between these three interpretations.

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Cette thèse propose une justification pragmatiste de la mécanique quantique. Celle-ci consiste d'abord à dégager les fonctions que doit remplir toute théorie pour permettre aux physiciens de mener à bien leur activité de recherche en microphysique, puis à démontrer que la mécanique quantique est la seule théorie qui remplit exactement ces fonctions. L'approche pragmatiste défendue nous conduit en outre à resituer la description de la mesure dans le contexte de la pratique des physiciens et à mettre ainsi en évidence une rupture entre la phase de la prédiction théorique et celle du constat du résultat de mesure, laquelle délimite les domaines du possible et de l'actuel. Cette approche présente l'avantage de dissoudre le problème de la mesure, sans modifier le formalisme quantique et sans soulever de nouveaux problèmes.

<p>The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to the debate about Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), and provide a practical tool for teachers with which they can relate to ethical and moral learning in the ESD context. This aim is based on the ambition to develop an approach that takes its starting point from our practical experience of ethics and morals, inspired by the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the transactional perspective developed by John Dewey. This implies that ethics and morals are regarded as a human tendency that is observable in action. The central method used to clarify ethical and moral meaning-making is, by the use of examples, to remind of common experiences of how this meaning-making appears in everyday situations. These clarifications are made in order to dissolve (rather than solve) philosophical problems, as well as to create new knowledge. The approach has been applied to four different studies. The first study focuses on the differences between three selective traditions in environmental education: <i>fact-based, normative and pluralistic,</i> with regard to the relationship between facts and values. It is argued that a pluralistic approach can be seen as way of relating facts and values in practice, and consequently that the democratic process neither precedes nor succeeds education but is an integral part of it, and that students therefore are constituted as citizens participating in the progress of sustainable development. The purpose of the second study is to suggest an approach that allows <i>in situ</i> analysis of how individuals’ prior experiences are included in the processes of moral meaning-making. A concrete example shows how individuals can transform the moral discourse in different situations. In the third study, it is suggested that the ethical tendency can be recognised as a communication in which certain values and actions are treated as if they were universally good and right. Three different kinds of situations in which this communication appears are highlighted: <i>personal moral reactions, norms for correct behaviour and ethical reflections.</i>The diverse conditions for learning in these situations are discussed, and specific notice is taken of the risk of indoctrination in ESD. The fourth study addresses the question of how to understand and deal with criticism in a pluralistic educational approach. Through reminders of how criticism appears in everyday practice, it is argued that criticism does not necessarily have to be understood theoretically. Criticism can also be seen as the diverse ways in which human beings morally react, encounter different norms and ethically reflect.</p>