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This dissertation examines how new gender norms and family relations challenged the structures and categories of European welfare provision in the late twentieth century. It recovers a crucial yet forgotten era of welfare reform between 1957 and 1992, in which policymakers and publics grappled with how to adapt welfare institutions designed for paid industrial workers to suit the needs of unpaid family caregivers. These reforms were sparked by mass demographic and social changes in the age of affluence: working motherhood, the increase of migrant workers and their families, rising divorce rates, aging populations, and new definitions of equality. This process of reform was actually realized, however, amid the economic turmoil and political realignment of the 1970s and 1980s, as demographic changes and social movements pushed on the budgets of reformist governments and constrained the viability of their economic reforms. In this dissertation, I show how the attempt to develop social protections for family care entailed more than the creation of new or better benefits. Rather, addressing the demands of family care required that politicians, bureaucrats, sociologists, feminists, trade unions, poverty activists, and officials in the European Community rethink the very notions of “risk,” “aid,” and “insurance” on which European welfare states had been based. Drawing on archival records in five languages from seven countries, I reconstruct how centrist governments in the 1970s developed a series of innovative measures – social-security credits for caregivers, workplace protections for part-time workers, cash benefits for families with disabilities, leave allowances for caregivers, new entitlements and restrictions for family migrants, European Directives on gender equality– that reshuffled the relationship between welfare, employment, and care. But I also show how revisionist governments in the 1980s adapted those same policies to confront new economic conditions marked by high unemployment, low productivity, and low-wage, flexible work. The result was a new politics of welfare, developed first for caregivers in the 1970s and then expanded to the long-term unemployed and the socially “excluded” in the 1980s. Precisely because care troubled the categories of the post-war welfare state, care policies of the 1970s helped found the active employment policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Working at the intersection of the intimate and the international, this dissertation recovers how the post-industrial welfare state emerged from contestations over the gendered foundations of the industrial welfare state that preceded it.

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Denna studie har undersökt advokaters uppfattning och erfarenheter av straffrabattens avskaffande för unga lagöverträdare mellan 18-20 år. Studiens syfte var att undersöka på vilket sätt advokater upplever att avskaffandet av straffrabatten har medfört några konsekvenser samt hur lagändringen fungerat i praktiken och hur lagändringen framställs av advokaterna. Studiens undersökningsmetod var semistrukturerade intervjuer, och resultatet analyserades med hjälp av en tematisk analys. Resultatet visade att advokaterna beskrev konsekvenser på flera nivåer och tre teman utvecklades ur materialet: konsekvenser för de unga lagöverträdarna, konsekvenser för advokater samt konsekvenser för samhället. Studiens slutsats är att advokaterna ställer sig kritiska till lagändringen, något som kan förklaras både utifrån ett instrumentellt perspektiv och ett rättighetsperspektiv. / This study has examined lawyers' perceptions and experiences of the abolition of the penalty discount for young offenders aged 18-20 years. The purpose of the study was to investigate how lawyers perceive the abolition of the penalty discount to have brought about any consequences, as well as how the legal amendment operates in practice and how it is portrayed by the lawyers. The study’s research method was semi-structured interviews, and the results were analyzed using thematic analysis. The findings revealed that the lawyers described consequences on multiple levels and three themes developed from the material: consequences for young offenders, consequences for lawyers, and consequences for society. The study's conclusion is that lawyers are critical of the legal amendment, which can be explained from both an instrumental perspective and a perspective of human rights.

A large portion of the population of South Africa is made up of people who, due to poverty, disability, old age and/or lack of education, rely solely on social assistance provided by the government for their survival. The issue of the welfare state in terms of responding to these issues has been subject to increasingly heated debates especially with regard to long-term socio-economic improvements, moral obligations and economic sustainability. This dissertation generally explores the status of social welfare in South Africa, and more specifically, South Africa’s socio-economic status as a welfare state against the backdrop of selected philosophical arguments used to justify and criticize existing social welfare laws in South Africa, whilst keeping South Africa’s unique history in mind. Although South Africa already has a detailed set of social welfare laws and policies, the social and economic needs of the country are ever evolving and therefore it is important that these laws and policies be constantly re-evaluated in order to ensure that they are effective in addressing and meeting the changing socio-economic and other demands. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Jurisprudence)

La tesi si snoda lungo tre piani di analisi per esaminare i rapporti fra Unione europea e welfare state. Innanzitutto, essa guarda alla CEE come organizzazione sorta principalmente per perseguire l’integrazione economica degli Stati membri senza interferire sulla loro funzione di welfare. Nel ripercorrere l’evoluzione delle competenze sociali dell’Unione europea, la tesi suggerisce come i sussistenti limiti procedurali e sostanziali evidenzino quella logica. In secondo luogo, la tesi ricorre alla categoria di costituzione economica europea al fine di spiegare la limitazione di sovranità cui gli Stati membri sono andati incontro per favorire l’attuazione del principio di libertà economica. Su questa base, vengono enucleati taluni effetti prodotti dalla costituzione economica europea sul welfare state. Un’attenzione particolare è dedicata ai riflessi della costituzione economica in materia pensionistica. Infine, la tesi guarda alle innovazioni apportate dalla Strategia di Lisbona e dal Trattato di Lisbona, con particolare riguardo al rafforzamento del metodo aperto di coordinamento ed all’entrata in vigore della Carta dei diritti fondamentali. In questa luce, si coglie la tendenza all’edificazione di un modello sociale europeo. Avendone discusso genesi e sviluppo, vengono illustrati i suoi tratti distintivi ed i suoi riflessi sulle politiche nazionali di sicurezza sociale e del lavoro. / The thesis examines the relationship between European Union and Welfare State under three different perspectives. Firstly, it looks at the EEC as an organization pursuing economic integration of Member States while not interfering with their welfare function. In tracing the evolution of the social competences of the European Union, it is highlighted how the original logic still underlies the existence of procedural and substantive limits to those competences. Second, the thesis draws on the category of European economic constitution to explain how Member States bounded their sovereignty in order to give full effect to economic freedom. On that basis, the thesis describes some of the inroads made by the European economic constitution into national welfare states, with special attention to its effects on pension systems. Finally, the thesis looks at some of the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Strategy and the Lisbon Treaty, focusing on the strengthening of the Open Method of Co-ordination and the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this perspective, the thesis captures the emergence of a European social model. Having discussed origins and development of the European social model, its main distinctive features and reflexes on domestic social policies are spelled out.

This essay explores if and how welfare attitudes in Sweden and in the United Kingdom have changed since the 1990s. Due to an increase in privatization and globalisation during the last 20-30 years, Sweden has become more economically liberal or right wing, aligning more with countries like the United Kingdom. The question therefore is to see if Sweden’s welfare attitudes have changed to become more like the welfare attitudes in the United Kingdom. There is a lack of research on how welfare attitudes change over time, as earlier research has focused more on comparison between countries or between groups. This essay uses empirical data from The International Social Survey Programme, in which three surveys from the years of 1996, 2006 and 2016 has been selected. In these surveys respondent have been asked how much responsibility they think the government should have for its citizens. The results show that the development in welfare attitudes in Sweden and United Kingdom are remarkably similar to each other. The analysis of the empirical data showed no differences between Sweden and the United Kingdom in welfare attitudes across all time periods. Compared to 1996, most groups in these countries wanted less state intervention in welfare generosities which is meant to aid poorer and more economically vulnerable people in their own society.

By conducting a case study of two diaconal institutions, Samariterhemmet in Uppsala/Sweden and the Evangelisches Diakoniewerk Schwäbisch Hall e.V. in Germany, the thesis compares the roles of church diaconal work within the Swedish and the German welfare system. These two systems are characterised by the different roles given to independent welfare organisations. The overarching research question is if and in which way the two diaconal institutions are effected by current changes within the field of welfare and how these changes challenge them to redefine their roles. The material analysed contains written documents, interviews with selected representatives and the results of participant observation in both institutions. As changes in the roles of independent welfare organisations were expected the results are unexpected. The two diaconal institutions show considerable persistence. Neither the orientation of their fields of work nor their own definitions of their roles within the welfare system have changed during the 1990s. In addition, the study reveals that both institutions regard themselves as a critical voice within the welfare system although their welfare engagement differs considerably. The German institution is a huge welfare provider while the Swedish institution conducts targeted initiatives. The analysis of four decisions within hospital work reveals that security of planning and freedom of action motivate the institutions to undertake responsibility for social services. The study points especially to the fields of education and research helping the institutions to maintain and to develop the diaconal profile. Altogether the results underline the need for more research on the meso-level of the third sector. This would contribute to a more nuanced discussion on the future role of independent welfare organisations within the Swedish and the German welfare system.

L’itinérance est un domaine à la fois passionnant et exigeant de la politique publique. C’est un domaine nouveau, très complexe, mal défini et mal compris. Du milieu des années 1990 au milieu des années 2000, l’itinérance chronique a augmenté au Canada, et jusqu’ici, tant le gouvernement fédéral que les provinces n’ont pas réussi à la contrer sérieusement. En l’absence d’initiatives de la part du fédéral et des provinces, les groupes locaux de partout au pays se sont unis pour lutter contre ce qui était de plus en plus appelé la crise de l’itinérance. L’ampleur de l’itinérance chronique est très similaire dans les grandes villes du Canada. Confrontés au même problème, les décideurs locaux des quatre plus grandes et plus importantes villes du Canada – Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto et Montréal – se sont unis pour constituer différents modèles de gouvernance de l’itinérance. En d’autres termes, il existe différents pourvoyeurs de protection sociale pour les itinérants chroniques, soit l’autre 1 %, dans chacune de ces villes. Les modèles de gouvernance locale présentent deux différences principales : le rôle du gouvernement local, et la centralisation ou la fragmentation du modèle. À Vancouver et à Toronto, le gouvernement local est très impliqué dans la gestion de l’itinérance et y a fait d’importants investissements politiques et financiers. Tandis qu’à Montréal et à Calgary, le gouvernement local joue un rôle bien moins important. Ensuite, la gouvernance de l’itinérance est centralisée dans un seul organisme ou une seule agence à Calgary et à Toronto, alors qu’elle est divisée en plusieurs intervenants à Vancouver et à Montréal. Je me penche sur ce qui pourrait expliquer cette grande différence entre les modèles de gouvernance de l’itinérance, et j’analyse les conséquences théoriques et pratiques que cela peut avoir sur la protection sociale au Canada. Je conclus que le rôle du gouvernement local dans la coalition gouvernante est déterminé par les pouvoirs des villes en matière de logement et par l’engagement des politiciens locaux pour lutter contre l’itinérance. À Vancouver et à Toronto, il y a soit des pouvoirs importants en matière de logement, soit un engagement politique solide à l’égard de l’itinérance, soit les deux. À Montréal et à Calgary, il y a comparativement moins de pouvoirs formels en matière de logement, et l’engagement politique à l’égard du problème est relativement faible. Dans chaque ville, c’est l’organisation des forces sociales locales qui détermine la fragmentation ou la centralisation de la coalition gouvernante. À Vancouver et à Montréal, les forces locales et sociales sont fortes et organisées, mais elles sont divisées, ce qui fait que la gouvernance de l’itinérance est fragmentée. À Calgary, les forces sociales locales sont dominées par le secteur privé, alors qu’à Toronto, les forces sociales locales sont mal organisées et la Ville est un intervenant fort, et en quelque sorte dominant. Cela explique la centralisation de la gouvernance de l’itinérance dans ces deux villes. Malgré leur engagement et leur créativité, aucun des modèles de gouvernance locale n’a réussi à réduire fortement l’itinérance. Aucun ordre de gouvernement seul ne peut résoudre le problème de l’itinérance, et l’absence du gouvernement fédéral des discussions concernant les politiques en matière de logement et d’itinérance était suffisante pour limiter le succès des initiatives menées à l’échelle locale. Ces deux conclusions à la fois confirment et remettent en question les théories existantes de l’État-providence. D’une part, cela confirme l’argument que l’évolution de l’État providence est le reflet l’évolution du fédéralisme, et qu’il y a de plus en plus un nouveau concept du capital social et humain en politique sociale. D’autre part, toutefois, il met au défi ces écrits, en soulignant le rôle que joue le niveau local dans la production de la protection sociale. Les études sur l’itinérance et l’État providence devraient accorder une attention particulière non seulement aux paliers de gouvernement fédéral et provincial, mais également au niveau local aussi. / Homelessness is a challenging and fascinating area of public policy; it is new, very complex, poorly defined and poorly understood. From the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, chronic homelessness was growing throughout Canada, yet federal and provincial governments failed to respond to it in any meaningful way. In the absence of federal or provincial leadership, local groups across the country have come together to fight against what was increasingly called a crisis of homelessness. The scale of chronic homelessness is very similar in big cities across Canada, yet facing the same problem, local actors in Canada’s four biggest and most important cities – Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal – came together to form different models of governance of homelessness. In other words, there are very different producers of social protection for the chronically homeless, the other 1%, in each of these cities. There are two main differences in the local governance models: the role of the local government and the centralization or fragmentation of the model. In Vancouver and Toronto, the local government is highly involved in governing homelessness and has made significant political and financial investments, whereas in Montreal and Calgary the local government plays a much smaller role. Further, the governance of homelessness is centralized in one single body or agency in Calgary and Toronto, whereas it is divided among a number of actors in Vancouver and Montreal. I ask what explains these very different models of governance of homelessness, and I consider the theoretical and practical consequences this has for social protection in Canada. I conclude that the role of the local government in the governing coalition is determined by its housing related powers and the local political commitment to homelessness. In Vancouver and Toronto, there are either significant local housing related powers, a strong political commitment to homelessness, or both. In Montreal and Calgary, there are comparatively few housing related powers and the political commitment to the issue is relatively weak. The fragmentation or centralization of the governing coalition is determined by the organization of local social forces in each city. In Vancouver and Montreal local social forces are strong and organized, but divided, making the governance of homelessness fragmented. In Calgary, local social forces are dominated by the private sector whereas in Toronto, local social forces are poorly organized and the city is a strong and somewhat domineering actor. This explains the centralization of the governance of homelessness in these two cities. Despite their commitment and creativity, none of the local governance models has been successful at significantly reducing homelessness. No one level of government alone can solve homelessness, and the absence of the federal government from policy discussions regarding housing and homelessness has been enough to limit the local level successes. These conclusions both confirm and challenge existing theories of welfare state. On the one hand, it confirms the argument that the evolution of the welfare state has mirrored the evolution of federalism, and that there is increasingly a new human or social capital paradigm of social policy. It challenges this literature, however, by highlighting the role that is played by the local level in the production of social protection. Studies of homelessness and the welfare state should pay careful attention not just to federal and provincial governments, but to the local level as well.