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2023 har en debatt om att införa euron åter kommit upp till ytan i Sverige. Men hur argumenterar egentligen enskilda politiker för euron? Skiljer det sig när de argumenterar internt i sitt parti gentemot hur de argumenterar till väljarna? Argumenterar enskilda politiker på ett förenklat vis när de talar till väljarna? Om så är fallet riskerar väljarna att inte få en fullständig bild av frågan. Genom en kvalitativ innehållsanalys som kompletteras med en enklare kvantitativ analys kommer dessa frågor att undersökas utifrån en omarbetad variant av Sjöblom och Hadenius arenamodell. Resultatet visar att det inte finns tydliga skillnader mellan hur politiker argumenterar på interna arenan respektive väljararenan. Däremot finns det tecken på att det finns andra orsaker till att politiker förenklar sin argumentation. Det tycks vara så att politiker målgruppsanpassar sin argumentation, men att det inte sker helt utifrån vilken arena de befinner sig på. En del argumentationer tycks även ske på flera arenor samtidigt. Arenamodellen verkar inte på ett godtagbart vis kunna förklara när enskilda politiker väljer att förenkla sina argument kontra när de väljer att argumentera komplext och nyanserat.

<p>In this thesis I deal with the issue of relativism that threatens Toulmin’s field- dependency thesis (i.e. the claim that the standards of argument appraisal depend on the argument field in which the argument occurs). After offering partial interpretation of the concept of “argument fields” and elucidating the concept of field-dependence, I argue that Toulmin’s field-dependency thesis does result in an unacceptably strong relativism.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

In this dissertation, we solve multivariable Nevanlinna-Pick type interpolation problems. Particularly, we consider the left tangential interpolation problems on the commutative or noncommutative unit ball. For the commutative setting, we discuss left-tangential operator-argument interpolation problems for Schur-class multipliers on the Drury-Arveson space and for the noncommutative setting, we discuss interpolation problems for Schur-class multipliers on Fock space. We apply the Krein-space geometry approach (also known as the Grassmannian Approach). To implement this approach J-versions of Beurling-Lax representers for shift-invariant subspaces are required. Here we obtain these J-Beurling-Lax theorems by the state-space method for both settings. We see that the Krein-space geometry method is particularly simple in solving the interpolation problems when the Beurling-Lax representer is bounded. The Potapov approach applies equally well whether the representer is bounded or not. / Ph. D.

I denna uppsats tas McCloskeys argument mot handlingsutilitarismen upp. Handlingsutilitarismen innebär att en handling är rätt ifall den leder till mer totalt välbefinnande än någon annan alternativ handling. McCloskeys argument mot handlingsutilitarismen handlar om att utilitarismen leder till oacceptabla konsekvenser. Utilitarismen anser det vara rätt att mörda eller straffa oskyldiga i vissa situationer som McCloskey argumenterar emot och anser det vara oacceptabelt. McCloskeys argument handlar om en sheriff som bor i en stad, sheriffen står inför ett svårt val och det är att antigen sätta dit och avrätta en oskyldig man eller låta staden genomlida farliga upplopp som eventuellt kan ta fler liv. Detta argument använder McCloskeys för att visa att utilitarismen leder till motbjudande handlingar. Argument som kommer att framföras mot McCloskeys är att hans exempel är orealistiskt. Även att handlingar så som att döda eller likande oftast inte leder till maximering av det totala välbefinnandet. / In this essay, McCloskey's arguments against act utilitarianism will be discussed. Act utilitarianism states that an action is right if it produces more total well-being than any other alternative action. McCloskey's argument against act utilitarianism is that utilitarianism leads to unacceptable consequences. Utilitarianism considers it right to murder or punish innocent people in certain situations, which McCloskey argues against and considers unacceptable. McCloskey's argument involves a sheriff who lives in a town. The sheriff faces a difficult choice: either to convict and execute an innocent man or to let the town suffer through dangerous riots that could potentially take more lives. McCloskey uses this argument to show that utilitarianism leads to repugnant actions. Arguments that will be raised against McCloskey are that his example are unrealistic. Also, that actions such as killing often do not lead to the maximization of total well-being.

This dissertation explores the relationship between mental properties and physicalism to confront the apparent inconsistency between mental realism and the tenets of physicalism. As I see it, the major obstacle to fully integrating mental properties into physicalism is the feasibility of downward mental causation. Specifically, stringent physicalists find it contradictory to maintain that the mind can affect the body without contradicting the tenets of physicalism. This inconsistency claim is most notably addressed in the Causal Exclusion Argument. Though I am not personally committed to physicalism as an absolute worldview, I respect its prevalence and the reasons for its dominance. Rather than reject physicalism, I approach the puzzle with epistemological humility and attempt to work within the scope of physicalism. This exploration involves critically examining physicalism’s leading mental-physical relationships, focusing on emergence as a plausible means to reconcile mental and physical properties without undermining either. Ultimately, I propose a modified form of physicalism that maintains its metaphysical and epistemological theses but in a milder form that is more conducive to emergent mental phenomena and the aspects of reality that are nonlinear and indeterminate. Guided by the work of Jaegwon Kim and Gerald Vision, this dissertation moves beyond their ideas, challenging reductionist perspectives within physicalism. The key contribution is the introduction of Dynamically Stable Causal Holism (or DSC Holism in brief), which represents a significant departure from traditional reductionist approaches, promoting a more holistic understanding of physicalism. Through nonlinear emergence and DSC Holism, I confront the Causal Exclusion Argument. A secondary original contribution is my approach to these puzzles. I integrate and synthesize concepts from the philosophy of science and special sciences to offer a fresh perspective on physically compatible mental realism and downward causation. / Philosophy

Diese Arbeit bewertet verschiedene Argumente, die nicht nur leugnen, dass Gehirnzustände und bewusste Zustände ein und dasselbe sind, sondern auch behaupten, dass eine solche Identität unverständlich bleibt. Ich argumentiere, dass keiner der Ansätze einen Physikalismus unterminieren, da sie für ihre stillschweigenden Annahmen über die Verbindung zwischen Arten der Präsentation und ihrer Erklärung keine direkte oder unabhängige Begründung liefern. Meiner Ansicht nach sollte die Intelligibilität psychologischer Identität nicht ausschließlich auf einer Meinungsanalyse basieren. Der Haupteinwand sollt dann sein, warum man annehmen sollte, dass eine vollständig intelligible Erklärung auf Beschreibungen der kausalen Rollen als Modi von Präsentationen beruhen sollte. Ich schlage dazu vor, den Blick auf “psychologische Konzepte” zu werfen. Psychologische Konzepte sind Konzepte, die eine Beschreibung von funktionalen Rollen benutzen aber von Erfahrungsqualitäten handeln. Ich schlage vor, diese in Qualitätsraum-Modellen zu analysieren um aufzuklären, warum von phänomenalen Konzepten erwartet wird, dass diese sich durch Beschreibungen der kausalen bzw. funktionalen Rollen auf etwas beziehen sollten. Der Qualitätsraum soll hier verstanden werden als multidimensionaler Raum, der aus mehreren Achsen relativer Ähnlichkeit und Unterschieden in den Anordnungsstrukturen verschiedener Modalitäten bewusster Erfahrung besteht. In meinem Vorschlag ist es möglich, dass einige Achsen des Qualitätsraumes selbst aus ihrem eigenen Qualitätsraum bestehen, so dass wir in die Beschreibungen der funktionalen Rollen “hinein zoomen” und “heraus zoomen” können und damit klarer sehen, wie die Erklärung eines bestimmten Bewusstseinsaspekts gestaltet ist, wenn man ihn in Begriffen psychologischer Konzepte betrachtet. / This thesis evaluates several powerful arguments that not only deny that brain states and conscious states are one and the same thing, but also claim that such an identity is unintelligible. I argue that these accounts do not undermine physicalism because they don’t provide any direct or independent justification for their tacit assumptions about a link between modes of presentation and explanation. In my view intelligibility of psychophysical identity should not be based exclusively on the analysis of meaning. The main concern then should be why expect that fully intelligible explanation must be based on the descriptions of the causal roles as modes of presentation. To this effect I propose that we examine "psychological concepts". The psychological concepts are concepts that use descriptions of the functional roles but are about qualities of our experiences. I propose to analyze them in quality space models in order to unveil why phenomenal concepts are expected to refer via descriptions of the causal or functional roles. The quality space should be understood here as a multidimensional space consisting of several axes of relative similarity and differences among the structures of ordering in different modalities of conscious experience. On my proposal it is possible that some axes in the quality space consist of their own quality spaces so we could “zoom in” and “zoom out” into the descriptions of the functional roles and see more clearly what the explanation of certain aspects of consciousness looks like when thought of in terms of psychological concepts.

Il est souvent arrivé que, par le passé, les scientifiques affirment l'existence d'objets inobservables dont ils rejettent aujourd'hui l'existence. Quelle leçon tirer de ce fait ? On est tenté d'en conclure que les méthodes qu'emploient les scientifiques pour connaître l'inobservable ne sont pas fiables, de sorte que cette connaissance serait située hors de leur portée. Cette thèse identifie et rejette deux présupposés qui conduisent à cette conclusion, à savoir que la méthode de l'hypothèse serait la seule manière de produire des connaissances des inobservables, et que cette méthode se déploierait de manière instantanée. Si, au contraire, les modalités concrètes de l'activité expérimentale et la dimension diachronique de la recherche théorique sont prises en compte, chacun de ces deux présupposés doit être rejeté comme abstrait. La connaissance des effondrements théoriques passés légitime alors la croyance en la vérité des théories actuelles. / History of science presents us with numerous cases in which scientists conclude that an unobservable entity previously posited as real actually does not exist. What the lesson is to be drawn from this fact ? One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the methods employed by scientists to produce knowledge of unobservable objects are not reliable: gaining this knowledge would be beyond their reach. This thesis identifies and rejects two presuppositions that lead to this conclusion: that the method of hypothesis is the only way to produce knowledge of unobservables and that it can be employed in an instantaneous manner. On the contrary, if the concrete modalities of the experimental activity and the diachronical dimension of theoretical research are taken into account, each of these two presuppositions appear to be too abstract and should be rejected. Knowledge of past theoretical collapses then legitimates the belief in the truth of current scientific theories.

有關漢語動結式的議題，中心語與論元體現皆呈現了複雜的現象。就中心語這部份，過去研究(Cheng & Huang, 1994; Gu, 1992; Huang & Lin, 1992; Y. Li, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1999; C. Li, 2008, 2009; Shen, 1992; Tai, 2003)的論點相當分歧，顯示漢語動結式中心語的位置仍有討論的空間；至於論元體現方面，由於論元與詞類間的互動會帶出許多不同的語意和句法表現，而先前的研究(Her, 2004, 2007; Li, 1990, 1995)尚未足以完整的解釋這些情形。 本研究主要從詞彙的角度來探討中心語和論元體現這兩個議題。首先，依照Her (2004, 2007)的分析方式，本研究嘗試排列出漢語動結式合法的論元結構，並利用這些論元結構描述各個動結式的論元體現，解釋可能的語意及句法結構。接著，同樣根據所提出的合法論元結構，以顯現的論元為主，並採用有關判斷中心語的假設(Zwicky, 1984; Y. Li, 1990, 1995; Chung, 2006; C. Li, 2008, 2009)，整理出漢語動結式中心語的位置。最後，詞彙功能語法中的詞彙映照理論驗證了本研究前半部分對論元體現與中心語的討論，這個理論也另外解釋漢語動結式處所詞倒置的現象。 / Two issues regarding Mandarin resultative compounds, headedness and argument realization, present a complex phenomenon. For one thing, extensive studies (Cheng & Huang, 1994; Gu, 1992; Huang & Lin, 1992; Y. Li, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1999; C. Li, 2008, 2009; Shen, 1992; Tai, 2003) concerning headedness fail to critically determine the head of a Mandarin resultative compound. For another, despite previous research (Her, 2004, 2007; Li, 1990, 1995), the interaction between arguments and grammatical functions of Mandarin resultative compounds remains inconclusive. To settle the foregoing matters, the purpose of this thesis is to probe into argument realization and headedness from a lexicalist approach, aiming to provide a full account of both issues. In the first part of this thesis, following Her’s (2004, 2007) analysis, the thesis focuses on formulating systematic feasible argument structures for Mandarin resultative compounds, then examining the argument structures of a resultative compound to explain its possible readings and syntactic representations. Based on the available argument structures proposed in the first half, the second part of the thesis investigates the headedness of Mandarin resultative compounds, suggesting that the head can be determined when arguments are overt. The criterion for headedness that is adopted in this thesis involves assumptions proposed by Zwicky (1984), Y. Li (1990, 1995), Chung (2006), and C. Li (2008, 2009). Finally, the thesis demonstrates that both issues of argument realization and headedness are well governed by Lexical Mapping Theory and that Lexical Mapping Theory further clarifies constructions with locative inversion of Mandarin resultative compounds.

This dissertation is centered around a set of apparently conflicting intuitions that we may have about mathematics. On the one hand, we are inclined to believe that the theorems of mathematics are true. Since many of these theorems are existence assertions, it seems that if we accept them as true, we also commit ourselves to the existence of mathematical objects. On the other hand, mathematical objects are usually thought of as abstract objects that are non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. This makes it difficult to understand how we can have knowledge of them and how they can have any relevance for our mathematical theories. I begin by characterizing a realist position in the philosophy of mathematics and discussing two of the most influential arguments for that kind of view. Next, after highlighting some of the difficulties that realism faces, I look at a few alternative approaches that attempt to account for our mathematical practice without making the assumption that there exist abstract mathematical entities. More specifically, I examine the fictionalist views developed by Hartry Field, Mark Balaguer, and Stephen Yablo, respectively. A common feature of these views is that they accept that mathematics interpreted at face value is committed to the existence of abstract objects. In order to avoid this commitment, they claim that mathematics, when taken at face value, is false. I argue that the fictionalist idea of mathematics as consisting of falsehoods is counter-intuitive and that we should aim for an account that can accommodate both the intuition that mathematics is true and the intuition that the causal inertness of abstract mathematical objects makes them irrelevant to mathematical practice and mathematical knowledge. The solution that I propose is based on Rudolf Carnap's distinction between an internal and an external perspective on existence. I argue that the most reasonable interpretation of the notions of mathematical truth and existence is that they are internal to mathematics and, hence, that mathematical truth cannot be used to draw the conclusion that mathematical objects exist in an external/ontological sense.