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Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:08:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2001-09-24T00:00:00Z / Aborda Preços de Transferência, métodos de determinação por parte de empresas e governos. Formação das taxas de juros, Preços de Transferência nas operações de transferência internacional de recursos e a legislação brasileira sobre o assunto. Críticas e restrições à abordagem brasileira e proposta de modelos alternativos para o estabelecimento de juros praticados na transferência internacional de recursos entre empresas vinculadas ou situadas em paraísos fiscais.

The aim of this diploma thesis is to make a model comparability analysis of controlled transactions within the reinsurance of insurers and to recommend appropriate transfer pricing methods based on defined assumptions. The work is divided into three parts. The first part deals with transfer pricing issues, focusing on comparability analysis and recommended transfer pricing methods according to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations formulated by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Guidelines OECD). The second part describes the basic knowledge and routine practice for the area of reinsurance connected to the transfer of insurance risks. The last part combines the first two chapters, i.e. application of transfer pricing methods in the light of the comparability analysis according to the Guidelines OECD for reinsurance of insurers. The application itself is implemented through the model comparability analysis in order to recommend appropriate transfer pricing methods, i.e. in accordance with the arm's length principle.

Les rapports entre concurrence et droit fiscal, en tant que technique de mise en oeuvre du prélèvement fiscal, sont multiples et complexes. Il apparaît sans peine que la concurrence est affectée par le droit fiscal, dans la mesure où tant les dépenses fiscales que les normes fiscales peuvent dénaturer le rapport concurrentiel. En pratique un tel biais concurrentiel résulte de critères d’imposition ratione materiae ou personae qui décorrèlent la charge fiscale de l’avantage concurrentiel, lequel détermine à lui seul l’issue du jeu concurrentiel, et est réductible à l’avantage en valeur ajoutée. Dit de manière plus analytique, le droit fiscal est distorsif de concurrence lorsqu’il traite certains concurrents ou actes concurrents de manière différenciée, soit de jure, soit de facto, c’est-à-dire en fonction de leurs caractéristiques économiques, dans la mesure où une telle différenciation ne recoupe pas les différences de valeur ajoutée. Le jeu concurrentiel est par ailleurs un instrument du droit fiscal, qui définit un principe dit « de pleine concurrence » pour déterminer objectivement la base imposable d’échanges intragroupes. Ce principe, qui emporte des effets importants en droit commercial et en droit de la concurrence, permet en outre d’exposer empiriquement les distorsions de concurrence naissant d’une méconnaissance de la valeur ajoutée propre à chaque contribuable. Au final, la distorsion fiscale de concurrence apparaît bien comme une affaire de critère d’imposition ; cette dimension juridique pose nécessairement la question de la réception de cette distorsion par le droit positif. magistère de fait dessine ainsi une norme matérielle de concurrence qui affecte le droit fiscal. Ainsi, en droit interne, la teneur et la mise en oeuvre du principe d’égalité devant l’impôt repose de manière croissante sur des analyses concurrentielles spontanées du juge de l’impôt et du juge constitutionnel, dont la seule limite paraît être une approche abstraite de l’égalité et une grande latitude d’appréciation laissée par ces derniers au pouvoir fiscal. Ce rapport d’influence se double d’une véritable instrumentalisation du droit fiscal sur le terrain du droit économique, qui subordonne la fiscalité à sa propre finalité concurrentielle. En effet, le droit de l’Union européenne recourt de manière étendue et explicite à l’analyse concurrentielle dans son contrôle de conventionalité du droit fiscal, en s’opposant aux mesures fiscales internes susceptibles, par une atteinte à l’obligation de traitement national ou une concurrence fiscale déloyale, de mettre en échec l’intégration économique européenne. Appliquant au droit fiscal un prisme purement économique ne présentant que des égards très limités pour les objectifs et méthodes fiscales, le droit de l’Union européenne porte en germe la censure de toute politique fiscale, même indistinctement applicable, à raison de son objet mais plus encore de ses effets anticoncurrentiels. L’expression ultime de l’instrumentalisation du droit fiscal par la concurrence réside dans la jurisprudence qui commande l’imposition au seul regard des distorsions de concurrence naissant de son absence, faisant de la concurrence une source d’imposition. / The relationship between competition and tax law, defined as a means of setting the tax burden for corporations, is far-reaching and complex. Competition is undoubtedly shaped by tax law, insofar as tax expenditures and regular tax provisions may adversely affect the outcome of competition on a given market. Specifically, competition may be distorted by tax criteria that unalign the tax burden from the competitive advantage which determines the market outcome, and which can be defined as the difference in added value between competitors. A more analytical expression of this would be that the criteria setting the tax burden distort competition - either de jure or de facto - when they provide for a specific tax treatment of certain competitors or competing operations. Furthermore, pursuant to the arm’s length principle, competition can be considered as an instrument for tax law, insofar as it is used as a tool for setting intragroup tax bases. The arm’s length principle, which falls under anticompetitive pricing rules, evidences the distorsion of competition that stems from disregarding taxpayers’ respective added values, thereby empirically confirming that tax capacity and added value should be aligned in order for tax law to be competition-neutral. Accordingly, tax distorsions of competition are a question of tax criteria; this legal dimension begs the question of whether such distorsions are characterized and regulated by statute and /or case law.A first observation would be that competition increasingly applies to tax law, marginally via competition law (which is a paradox), but more profoundly and widely as the defining influence behind a number of provisions and principles that govern tax law. That competition is accordingly instrumental for these norms would tend to make of competition a substantive norm for tax law. The French principle of equality before tax increasingly factors full-fledged competition analyses in the tax and constitutional courts’ appreciation of the competitive effects of tax provisions, but its scope is curtailed by an overly abstract conception of equality and, overall, a reluctance to challenge the legislator’s policy decisions. This influence, characterized in French law and conducive to tax being affected by the objective of free competition, also entails the instrumentalization of tax law in the field of economic law, which imposes on tax law its own competitive objectives. Indeed, EU law provides a wider and more explicit use of competition analysis in its appreciation of the lawfulness of tax law, by precluding provisions which, through discrimination on the grounds of nationality or unfair tax competition, conflict with the European economic integration. Specifically, tax provisions are tested for anticompetitive object and / or effects, with their fiscal objectives or methods being mostly disregarded in this respect, to the extent that anticompetitive effects can be viewed as the ultimate governing principle for tax law. This is conducive to the instrumentalization of tax law by competition, with far-reaching implications for tax policies and their underlying criteria. Ultimately, tax law is instrumentalized by competition in the case-law that warrants taxation on the grounds of the distortions of competition that would arise from its absence, effectively making competition a source of taxation

The aim of this thesis is to find out the answer to the question whether the state authorities influence the employment of debt financing of companies. First part of the work briefly summarizes the main economic theories engaged in the research on capital structure. Further are depicted approaches to thin capitalization in the European countries with focus on the Czech republic tax law dealing with the subject. The final part of the thesis demonstrates on the financial data of Czech companies from the period 2003-2008 that the state authorities influence the employment of debt in Czech companies by means of tax laws and so affect the capital structure of the companies.

This thesis deals with the issue of transfer pricing, current legislation and methods with emphasis on the creation of transfer pricing documentation. The importance of documentation is mainly to show that prices in transactions between related parties do not differ from the prices agreed between independent parties. The thesis is divided into two main parts, theoretical and practical. The first chapter of this part deals with the definition of the concept of transfer pricing. The second chapter describes the current legislation of transfer pricing, both from the perspective of international regulation, but also in terms of the requirements in the Czech Republic. The following chapters are dedicated to the definition of arm's length principle and methods that can be used in the creation of transfer pricing. The following describes the meaning and way of creating transfer pricing documentation. The practical part deals with creating transfer pricing documentation with application to a particular company in order to verify compliance with the arm's length principle.

The master thesis deals with the issue of transfer price of a controlled transaction between associated enterprises. Part of the master thesis is definition of basic theoretical concepts associated with the issue of transfer pricing with a focus on domestic, international, and European Union law. The master thesis deals with the analysis of case law, whose subject matter is transfer pricing. The theoretical starting points of the thesis are applied to a practical example, which deals with the issue of determining the transfer price for specific controlled transaction between associated enterprises.

Master thesis deals with the issue of international taxation of transfer prices between related parties. Diploma thesis defines the basic theoretical concepts of transfer pricing with a focus on international and domestic law. The analytical part of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of the case law, the subject of which is transfer pricing. The practical part is based on acquired knowledge to elaborate a methodological tool to transfer pricing. The present findings are applied to a model example.

臺灣現有移轉計價之規範未有明確的罰則(Penalty)，因而衍生許多稅負規避的問題。本文採用動態最適化(Dynamic Optimization)的模型來觀察跨國企業移轉計價的行為，在面臨懲罰與兩國稅差時企業會如何利用移轉價格及數量來進行獲利移轉以規避稅負，進而分析政府調降稅率以降低稅差並吸引獲利移轉的稅率政策對企業移轉計價的影響，最後再探討罰則在法規制定上的必要性。結果顯示，預料到的稅率政策在長期能有效減少企業從事移轉價格操弄(Transfer Price Manipulation)，但在短期﹝除了宣告那一刻之外﹞反而更助長移轉價格操弄的發生，特別是當政策宣告至執行之期間過長時更為嚴重。此外，由先前的文獻可知無罰則下的最適移轉價格為一邊界解(Boundary Solution)，本文也證明了此邊界解亦可能出現於有罰則的情況下。然而，罰則的存在創造了內部解(Interior Solution)的可能性，此內部解較邊界解更趨近於常規交易價格，因此我們仍建議政府制定罰則。 / This paper employs a dynamic optimization model to determine the equilibrium price and quantity in a multinational firm (MNF) faced with a threat of a penalty. We analyze the impact on transfer pricing that arises from the unanticipated and anticipated permanent taxation policy of home country and host country. Anticipated taxation policy for reducing tax differentials can reduce transfer price manipulation in the long term. However, except for the moment of announcement, such reduction of transfer price manipulation does not occur in the short term, especially in the case of a large time lag of policy. We also show that the boundary solution is possible even though transfer price penalty exists and suggest that governments impose penalty which creates the possibility of interior solution.

Le terme de « prix de transfert » désigne le prix des transactions conclues entre les filiales d’une même entreprise multinationale. La thèse traite, sous un angle essentiellement normatif, de la problématique de réglementation de ces prix, c'est-à-dire de la détermination du mode de partage optimal du profit d’un groupe entre ses filiales. La thèse s’attache tout d’abord à montrer l’effet de la réglementation des prix de transfert sur les décisions de production et d’investissement des entreprises, puis sur le bien-être mondial. Sur la base des résultats obtenus, les objectifs qu’un dictateur bienveillant international devrait assigner à ce type de réglementation sont ensuite établis. Ce double travail permet de tracer le contour d’un projet de réglementation optimale, fondé sur le concept d’équité inter-nations, et dont l’application conduirait à attribuer à chaque filiale sa valeur de Shapley dans un jeu préalablement défini. La thèse éclaire également le débat contemporain en proposant un protocole permettant de comparer le principe de pleine concurrence avec la méthode d’allocation forfaitaire. / The prices of the transactions set between subsidiaries of a multinational corporation are usually called « transfer prices ». The dissertation deals with the normative questions raised by the regulation of such prices, particularly the optimal way of distributing the profit of a multinational between its subsidiaries. The dissertation first shows how the transfer prices regulation can influence corporate production and investment decisions, thereby impacting worldwide welfare. Based upon these results, the objectives that an international benevolent dictator would pursue through such a regulation are then identified. This program allows for the sketching of an optimal transfer prices regulation, which relies strongly upon the inter-nation equity concept, and which application would grant each subsidiary its Shapley value in a certain game. The dissertation also makes a contribution to the current debate by proposing a protocol to compare the arm’s length principle with the formulary apportionment method.