Esta tesis consiste de tres ensayos. En el primero, documentamos la correlación imaginaria entre las decisiones de compensación de los ejecutivos (CEO) al demostrar que el hándicap de los ejecutivos que juegan al golf no está correlacionado con su desempeño en la empresa mientras que sí lo está con su compensación. Los golfistas ganan más que los que no juegan al golf, y las pagas se incrementan con la habilidad en este juego. En el segundo ensayo explicamos la reciente espiral de las compensaciones de los ejecutivos basados en el sesgo de atribución fundamental. El análisis de las series temporales agregadas y de datos de sección cruzada correspondiente a la burbuja del mercado accionario en los noventa sugiere que los accionistas exageran al atribuir las subidas y bajadas de los precios de las acciones corporativas a las aptitudes de liderazgo del ejecutivo mientras que subestiman el rol de las fluctuaciones del mercado accionario que se encuentran fuera del control de estos. En el tercer ensayo demostramos que un gran número de Ofertas Públicas Iniciales predice sistemáticamente, tanto dentro como fuera de la muestra, el subsiguiente bajo rendimientos agregado y ponderado, y la diferencia de rendimientos entre las pequeñas y grandes firmas. / This thesis consists of three essays. In the first, we document illusory correlation in CEO compensation decisions by demonstrating that golf handicaps of CEOs are uncorrelated with corporate performance, but related to CEO compensation. Golfers earn more than non-golfers and pay increases with golfing ability. In the second essay we propose a fundamental attribution bias-based explanation of the recent explosive growth in CEO pay. Analysis of aggregate time series data and cross sectional data from the late 1990s stock market bubble period suggests that shareholders overattribute prominent increases and decreases in the prices of corporate stocks to the leadership and skill of the CEOs and underestimate the role of stock market fluctuations that are beyond CEO control. In the third essay we show that increases in the number of Initial Public Offerings reliably predicts in-sample and out-of-sample decreases in subsequent equally weighted aggregate stock returns and the return differential between small and big firms.

This research investigates the relationship between innovation and leadership in First National Bank in South Africa. In an information age paradigm, innovation is a key driver of organisational success. Innovation allows an information age company to create a sustainable competitive advantage over its competitors. First National Bank (FNB) has recognised the need for innovation and measures the amount of innovation generated in each business unit on an annual basis. Leadership is a key factor influencing innovation in large, multi-segment organisations, particularly transformational leadership. Large multi-segment organisations often have multi-functional teams and transformational leadership of these teams more effectively promotes innovation. Large multi-segment organisations also often have complex decision making processes. Transformational leadership ensures optimal innovative decisions rather than adequate decisions are reached. FNB is a multi-segment organisation comprising ten business units each headed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The relationship between the level of innovation being generated annually by each business unit and the leadership style of the business unit CEO formed the focus of this research. The Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire was used to gather information on the leadership style of each CEO's. Data on the level of innovation within each of these business units was supplied by First National Bank. Data was statistically analysed against the innovation generated by each business unit using correlation analysis. Most of the results testing the relationship between transformational and transactional leadership and innovation were found not to be significant. This contradicts the theory which suggests a positive relationship between transformational leadership and innovation.

Skandaler orsakade av bristande bolagsstyrning har kontinuerligt uppmärksammats i flera svenska börsnoterade bolag. Bolagsstyrning syftar till att skydda ägarnas intresse och kapital från verkställande direktörens (VD) opportunism. Ägarnas osäkerhet har bidragit till en ökad efterfrågan på information om hur bolag styrs och verkar. Ett sätt för ägarna att hantera osäkerheten är att använda sig av olika kontrollmekanismer för att få ökad information om bolaget. Kontrollmekanismen Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning (Koden) har använts för att bedöma informationsasymmetrin mellan ägare, styrelse och VD i svenska börsnoterade bolag. Samtliga 317 svenska börsnoterade bolag studerades för att sedan urskilja 122 bolag som hade avvikelser från Koden år 2018, vilka utgjorde studiens urval. Informationsinnehållet i förklaringarna till avvikelserna från Koden har tolkats utifrån agentteorin. En metodtriangulering i form av både en kvantitativ samt en kvalitativ metod har genomförts för att uppfylla studiens syfte. En kvantitativ metod har använts för att samla in data om bolagen och dess förklaringar. Den kvalitativa metoden har medfört att informationsinnehållet i de insamlade förklaringarna till avvikelserna kunde tolkas. Studiens resultat visar att 78% av förklaringarna till avvikelser från Koden år 2018 inte har ett godtagbart informationsinnehåll. Sju förklaringar till det låga informationsinnehållet i förklaringarna har identifierats:  <ul type="disc">Antalet avvikelser Alternativa kontrollmekanismer Okunskap Ägarstruktur VD:n sitter i styrelsen Undanhålla information VD:ns opportunism Studien visar att det finns informationsasymmetri mellan ägare, styrelse och VD och att det fortfarande finns brister i bolagsstyrningen i Sverige. Det går att ifrågasätta Koden som kontrollmekanism för att hantera informationsasymmetri. / Scandals caused by insufficient corporate governance have been continuously noticed in several Swedish publicly listed companies. Corporate governance aims to protect the interests and capital of the owners from the opportunism of the chief executive officer (CEO). The insecurity of the owners has contributed an increased demand for information regarding how the companies are managed and operated. A way for the owners to handle the insecurity is to use mechanisms of control to increase the flow of information from the companies. The control mechanism Swedish code of corporate governance (The Code) has been used to assess the information asymmetry between owners, board of directors and the CEO in Swedish listed companies. All 317 Swedish listed companies were studied to distinguish a sample of 122 companies that had deviations from The Code in 2018, which constituted the study’s selection. The information content of the explanations for the deviations from The Code has been interpreted based on the agency theory.  A triangulation of methods of both a quantitative and a qualitative method has been used to fulfil the purpose of the study. A quantitative method has been used to collect data about the companies and their explanations. The qualitative method has been used to interpret the information content of the collected explanations for the deviations. The result of the study shows that 78% of the explanations for deviations from The Code in 2018 does not have sufficient information content. Seven explanations for the low information content of the explanations has been identified: <ul type="disc">Number of deviations Alternative mechanisms of control  Ignorance Ownership characteristics The CEO being a part of the board of directors  Withhold information The opportunism of the CEO The study indicates that there’s information asymmetry between owners, board of directors and management. In conclusion there are still shortcomings in corporate governance in Sweden and it is questionable if The Code is a well-functioned control mechanism to handle information asymmetry.

No description available.

The purpose of this research was to study the lived experience of being a strategic leader, described as the black box of leadership, and to extend the limited research in this field. The researcher utilised the qualitative ethnographic methodology of direct observation, observing 138 discrete critical incidents that made up the lived experience of the five strategic leaders in the sample. The researcher further utilised observation tools from the field of Neuro Linguistic Programming, personal experiences, metaphors, allegories, analogies as well as deep personal introspection to make sense of the lived experience of the five CEOs. The primary research objective was to answer the question: What do CEOs do and how do they do it? A further related objective was to explore how they think about what they do. The research answered these questions by prising open the 'black box' of the lived experience of the strategic leader. The result of the research is the pure leadership spider web model. The pure leadership spider web model breaks down the lived experience of the strategic leader, the content of the black box, into eight dimensions: the pillars that make up the personal leadership philosophy; emotional states of mind brought to bear in meetings; kinaesthetic patterns used during meetings; meeting dynamics; emotional states brought to bear on day-to-day shop-floor engagement; emotional states brought to bear on leadership engagement sessions with other like business leaders; frames of mind governing the day-to-day experiences; and The Magic Language Box. / Business Management and Entr / DBL

This study investigated the relationship between capital structure, performance and replacement of chief executive officer in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). Data was collected from a sample of 37 firms listed on the NSE over a period of 23 years, from 1990 to 2012. The analysis was conducted at three stages. The canonical correlation technique was employed to investigate the bi-directional relationship between capital structure and performance and to select competing indicators of performance and capital structure. Second, the general linear model (GLM) procedure was used to test the effect of performance and ownership structure and to test the effect of capital structure and ownership structure. Lastly, the generalised estimating equation (GEE) was used to assess effects of performance, capital structure and ownership structure on change in CEO. The results revealed that a bidirectional relationship exists between capital structure and debt capital. The indicators found to be useful in examining the relationship between performance and capital structure are asset turnover ratio and total debt to the total asset ratio. The findings support the efficiency hypothesis but not the franchise hypothesis. The results also indicated that firms with a low asset turnover are with a low asset turnover are 3.045 times likely to change CEO compared to firms with a high asset turnover. The results also indicated that firms with high leverage (debt) are he results also indicated that firms with high leverage (debt) are 3.430 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in low leverage, while the firms with medium leverage are are are are 6.491 times likely to change CEO. Therefore managers should not be passive when it comes to choosing between equity and debt capital played a disciplinary role on firms listed on the NSE. / Business Management / DCom (Business Management)

The purpose of this research was to study the lived experience of being a strategic leader, described as the black box of leadership, and to extend the limited research in this field. The researcher utilised the qualitative ethnographic methodology of direct observation, observing 138 discrete critical incidents that made up the lived experience of the five strategic leaders in the sample. The researcher further utilised observation tools from the field of Neuro Linguistic Programming, personal experiences, metaphors, allegories, analogies as well as deep personal introspection to make sense of the lived experience of the five CEOs. The primary research objective was to answer the question: What do CEOs do and how do they do it? A further related objective was to explore how they think about what they do. The research answered these questions by prising open the 'black box' of the lived experience of the strategic leader. The result of the research is the pure leadership spider web model. The pure leadership spider web model breaks down the lived experience of the strategic leader, the content of the black box, into eight dimensions: the pillars that make up the personal leadership philosophy; emotional states of mind brought to bear in meetings; kinaesthetic patterns used during meetings; meeting dynamics; emotional states brought to bear on day-to-day shop-floor engagement; emotional states brought to bear on leadership engagement sessions with other like business leaders; frames of mind governing the day-to-day experiences; and The Magic Language Box. / Business Management and Entr / DBL

This study investigated the relationship between capital structure, performance and replacement of chief executive officer in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). Data was collected from a sample of 37 firms listed on the NSE over a period of 23 years, from 1990 to 2012. The analysis was conducted at three stages. The canonical correlation technique was employed to investigate the bi-directional relationship between capital structure and performance and to select competing indicators of performance and capital structure. Second, the general linear model (GLM) procedure was used to test the effect of performance and ownership structure and to test the effect of capital structure and ownership structure. Lastly, the generalised estimating equation (GEE) was used to assess effects of performance, capital structure and ownership structure on change in CEO. The results revealed that a bidirectional relationship exists between capital structure and debt capital. The indicators found to be useful in examining the relationship between performance and capital structure are asset turnover ratio and total debt to the total asset ratio. The findings support the efficiency hypothesis but not the franchise hypothesis. The results also indicated that firms with a low asset turnover are with a low asset turnover are 3.045 times likely to change CEO compared to firms with a high asset turnover. The results also indicated that firms with high leverage (debt) are he results also indicated that firms with high leverage (debt) are 3.430 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in low leverage, while the firms with medium leverage are are are are 6.491 times likely to change CEO. Therefore managers should not be passive when it comes to choosing between equity and debt capital played a disciplinary role on firms listed on the NSE. / Business Management / DCom (Business Management)

Liest und verfolgt man die diversen in der jüngeren Vergangenheit ergangenen Pres­severlautbarungen und Stellungnahmen zum Thema Überschuldung im Allgemeinen und dem insolvenzrechtlichen Überschuldungsbegriff im Besonderen, drängt sich einem der Verdacht auf, dass ein wie auch immer geartetes Problembewusstsein zu diesem Thema gewollt in die Bedeutungslosigkeit geschrieben worden ist. Nach überwiegend herrschender Meinung seien die insolvenzrechtliche Überschuldung und der damit einhergehende Insolvenzantragsgrund mittlerweile obsolet. Dieser Meinungsstand verwundert doch stark angesichts der nach wie vor hohen Anzahl an Unternehmensinsolvenzen, insbesondere im Bereich mittelständischer Unternehmen. Obgleich bei einem Gutteil der betroffenen Unternehmen als Insolvenzantragsgrund die Zahlungsunfähigkeit angegeben worden ist, darf dies nicht darüber hinweg täuschen, dass einer Illiquidität in aller Regel eine Überschuldung vorausgeht. Dabei spielt es objektiv betrachtet keine Rolle, ob es sich um eine bilanzielle, rechnerische oder insolvenzrechtliche Überschuldung handelt; in allen Fällen vermag das Vermögen die Schulden nicht mehr zu decken, m.a.W.: die Schuldendeckungsfähigkeit ist nicht mehr gegeben. Die Erhaltung der Schuldendeckungsfähigkeit eines Unternehmens ist so gesehen der erste Schritt zur Insolvenzprophylaxe. Allerdings sind die normierten handelsrechtlichen Rechnungslegungsvorschriften aus vielerlei Gründen nur bedingt geeignet, die Schuldendeckungsfähigkeit eines Unternehmens verlässlich zu überprüfen. Insoweit erscheint es folgerichtig, gerade für die mittelständische GmbH eine Ergänzung der aktuellen Rechnungslegung durch eine permanente Schuldendeckungskontrolle, wie sie bereits durch die ältere Zerschlagungsstatik bzw. statische Interpretation der Bilanz gefordert wurde, vorzusehen und damit den organschaftlichen Vertreter der mittelständischen GmbH in die Lage zu versetzen, im Rahmen seiner Selbstinformationsverpflichtung den Bestand des Unternehmens zu sichern und die externen Gläubiger angemessen zu schützen. Die präventive Anwendung der insolvenzrechtlichen Überschuldungsprüfung nach § 19 InsO zur Schuldendeckungskontrolle ermöglicht dem organschaftlichen Vertreter zweierlei: In Abhängigkeit von der Frühzeitigkeit der Vornahme einer solchen Prüfungshandlung kann deren Informationsgehalt entweder insolvenzprophylaktisch im Sinne einer erfolgreichen außergerichtlichen Sanierung wirken oder aber zumindest den Weg zu einer rechtzeitigen und geordneten Insolvenzantragstellung weisen. Das Ergebnis der Überschuldungsprüfung kann so dazu beitragen, erste Indikatoren bestehender Fehlentwicklungen und Schieflagen bereits im Vorfeld einer sich abzeichnenden Krise aufzuzeigen. Anzeichen dieser Art sind in aller Regel schon lange vor Eintritt der Insolvenzantragspflicht im Zahlenwerk der betreffenden Unternehmen erkennbar.

This thesis examines the perceived importance by two-tiered management of Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) for managing a range of intellectual property issues. Fifty survey items are presented to the executive directors and commercialization managers of 62 CRCs. The survey items are categorized under four themes: relationships with collaborators, project management; design and implementation of agreements; and specific licensing issues. An analysis of the data, using a series of independent samples t-tests, repeated measures t-tests, chi-square tests for independence or relatedness and goodness of fit, shows a range of results. There are significant differences between executive directors and commercialization managers on a number of issues. There are particular emphases or trends about certain issues for the whole sample of managers. These findings are compared with text analyses of 23 CRC strategic planning documents. This is done in order to explore any similarity, difference or nuance between what the managers say in response to the survey items, compared with what is stated in the codified policies of the CRCs. While there is a high degree of consistency among certain themes between the two sets of findings, the overall analysis points to the need for the CRCs to have a better understanding and practice of commercialization opportunities, especially through the involvement of third party commercial interests. It is argued that accommodating third party commercialization interests involves the application of an important knowledge economy principle that has an important bearing on the future economic viability and competitiveness of the CRCs.