Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3334.pdf: 1496166 bytes, checksum: 3a4eedb248ddf40e227470438e4e94f5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-09-21 / The work of Thomas Hobbes, based on the Renaissance concepts, builds a new political philosophy which results in original concepts of the state, rights and justice. This thesis focus on Thomas Hobbes most relevant political works: The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic; De Cive and Leviathan to show that the use of a contract, or an agreement enforceable by law, results in a new law concept which the sovereign power is established by the wishes of the individuals. The analysis starts with Hobbes ideas as opposed to the Aristotelic thinking of the politics and the human nature. A critical examination is performed on how Hobbes thinking approached the mechanistic theses, the actual need of these theses to the foundation of his work and finally the main impacts of Hobbes s political works. The examination also explores the concept of honor, prudence, the individual-state relationship and the controversies about justice in the Theory of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Christian. It is concluded that Hobbes's work is among the greatest legacy to the modern States and has a deep influence on the political organizations. / Neste trabalho são desenvolvidas algumas considerações acerca da obra de Thomas Hobbes, e como ela, rompendo com o modelo aristotélico, constroi a filosofia política sob um novo modo de pensar, embuindo-a dos caracteres da filosofia renascentista, resulta numa nova concepção do Estado, do direito e da justiça. Tomando como foco as três principais obras políticas de Thomas Hobbes, a saber, os Elementos de Lei Natural e Política , Do Cidadão e o Leviatã , procurase mostrar que na construção da sociedade política, a utilização do artifício do contrato, resultará numa nova concepção do direito, que se reduzirá aos comandos editados pelo poder soberano, instituído por meio das vontades dos indivíduos. Desta forma, tomando como paradigma, mostra-se inicialmente o entendimento fundamental de Aristóteles acerca da política, considerada, especialmente a natureza humana; depois mostra-se a oposição de Hobbes às teses aristotélicas. Para tanto, empreende-se uma análise da aproximação de Hobbes das teses mecanicistas, a real necessidade dessas teses para a fundamentação e desenvolvimento da obra e, por fim, quais foram as principais implicações da obra política de Hobbes. São explorados aqui também os conceitos de honra, prudência, relação Indivíduo-Estado e das controvérsias sobre justiça nas na Teoria de Platão, Aristóteles, Cristã e de Hobbes. Conclui-se que se obra de Hobbes está entre os maiores legados a serem aproveitados pelos Estados modernos, ela está entre aquelas que mais lançaram influências para os rumos da humanidade, pensada esta enquanto composta por organizações políticas.

Compelling research in international relations and international political economy on global warming suggests that one part of any meaningful effort to radically reverse current trends of increasing green house gas (GHG) emissions is shared policies among states that generate costs for such emissions in many if not most of the world’s regions. Effectively employing such policies involves gaining much more extensive global commitments and developing much stronger compliance mechanism than those currently found in the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, global warming raises the prospect that we need a global form of political authority that could coordinate the actions of states in order to address this environmental threat. This in turn suggests that any serious effort to mitigate climate change will entail new limits on the sovereignty of states. In this book I focus on the normative question of whether or not we have clear moral reasons to bind ourselves together in such a supranational form of political association. I argue that one can employ familiar liberal arguments for the moral legitimacy of political order at the state level to show that we do have a duty to support such a global political project. Even if one adopts the premises employed by the most influential forms of liberal scepticism to the ideas of global political and distributive justice, such as those advanced by John Rawls and Thomas Nagel, it is clear that the threat of global warming has expanded the scope of justice. We now have a global and demanding duty of justice to create the political conditions that would allow us to collectively address our impact on the Earth’s atmosphere.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Josete Soboleski.pdf: 743392 bytes, checksum: a8051d1524c0e3212c4784984798ce82 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-12-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present work aims to investigate the role of fear in the unfolding of the political theory of Thomas Hobbes. It is known that men are equal by nature. This equality is also an equal fear, since an individual can not be characterized as stronger than others and this makes them fearful. This fear is not any fear, but fear of losing his life, his greatest asset, so violent. Because they are equal, it may happen that men want the same thing at the same time and that leads to violent confrontation, as Hobbes called a state of war of all against all. From this perspective, men find themselves unprotected and insecure and seek the formation of the body politic the solution to the problem of insecurity. The goal here is to demonstrate that the fear of violent death is a major cause of the state institution, or a political passion motivating the state also has a very important role: to be an ally of the sovereign power in law enforcement and education of subjects. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo investigar o papel do medo no desdobramento da teoria política de Thomas Hobbes. É sabido que os homens são iguais por natureza. Essa igualdade também é uma igualdade no medo, uma vez um indivíduo não pode ser caracterizado como mais forte do que os outros e isso os torna temerosos. Este medo, não é um medo qualquer, mas o medo de perder a vida, seu maior bem, de forma violenta. Por serem iguais, pode acontecer de os homens desejarem a mesma coisa ao mesmo tempo e isso os leva ao confronto violento, que Hobbes denomina como sendo um estado de guerra de todos contra todos. Sob essa perspectiva, os homens vêem-se desprotegidos e inseguros e buscam na formação do corpo político a solução para o seu problema de insegurança. O objetivo aqui é demonstrar que o medo da morte violenta é uma das principais causas da instituição do Estado, ou seja, uma paixão política motivadora que tem no Estado também um papel muito importante: ser uma aliada do poder soberano na aplicação das leis e educação dos súditos.

Ce mémoire cherche à porter au jour les présupposés normatifs substantiels de la théorie de la justice comme équité (TJÉ) de John Rawls. Plus précisément, il tente de déduire puis de définir ses présupposés éthiques, c’est-à-dire ce qu’elle tient implicitement pour être des biens constitutifs de la justice. En supposant l’existence d’éléments normatifs se rapportant à la question du bien en amont des normes du juste, cette proposition de recherche contredit en elle-même le trait essentiel du déontologisme procédural rawlsien, soit la primauté du juste (right) sur le bien. Nous suivons en cela Paul Ricœur et réitérons sa thèse du primat de l’éthique, entendue comme visées à propos du bien, sur la morale, comprise comme normes à visées universelles définissant des obligations. Selon cette thèse, toute norme morale s’ancre nécessairement dans un sens éthique qui la précède ou, pour le dire dans les mots de Rawls, dans un sens de la justice. Nous tentons en premier lieu de démontrer que deux présupposés éthiques, en tant qu’idéaux non thématisés, règlent pourtant de bout en bout toute la modélisation théorique de la TJÉ. On pourrait ainsi dire qu’ils sont les points fixes normatifs les plus élémentaires du sens de la justice opérant l’équilibre réfléchi. Il s’agit des présupposés de l’autodétermination des personnes et de la réciprocité symétrique. Ensuite, à l’aide de ce que Ricœur nommait sa « petite éthique », laquelle se trouve en dialogue explicite avec Rawls, nous nous efforçons de préciser les visées originaires à propos du bien donnant force de norme à chacun des deux présupposés éthiques. Une fois la particularité du sens de la justice à l’origine de la TJÉ ainsi exposée et précisée, il sera possible de prendre la mesure des impasses théoriques et pratiques auxquelles se bute forcément une théorie politique dont l’ambition de fonder la légitimité politique sur l’entente mutuelle s’autorise de la prétention à éviter les questions controversées à propos du bien. / This thesis seeks to bring to light the substantial normative presuppositions of the theory of justice as equity (TJE) of John Rawls. More precisely, it tries to deduce and define its ethical presuppositions, that is to say what it implicitly considers to be constitutive goods of justice. In assuming the existence of normative elements that pertain to the question of the good prior to the norms of justice, this research proposal in itself questions the essential feature of Rawlsian procedural deontologism, namely the primacy of the right over the good. In this regard we follow Paul Ricœur, as we reiterate his thesis on the primacy of ethics, understood as ends relatives to the good, on morality, understood as universal norms defining obligations. According to this thesis, any moral norm is necessarily anchored in an ethical aim that precedes it or, to put it in Rawls' words, in a sense of justice. We first attempt to demonstrate that two ethical presuppositions, as non-thematized ideals, nevertheless govern from end to end all the theoretical ordering of the TJE. We could thus say that they are the most elementary normative fixed points of the sense of justice operating the reflective equilibrium. These are the assumptions of self-determination of people and symmetrical reciprocity. Then, using what Ricœur called his "petite éthique", which is in explicit dialogue with Rawls, we attempt to specify the original aims of the good which give normative potency to each of the two ethical presuppositions. Once the particularity of the sense of justice at the origin of the TJE is thus exposed and clarified, it will be possible to recognize the theoretical and practical shortcomings that a political theory that claims to avoid controversial questions about the good in order to justify the possibility of reaching mutual understanding will inevitably encounter.

Governmental sovereignty is created and maintained by mutual respect for the rule of law by the government and citizens. To maintain legitimacy, a government must act within the bounds of the contract that created it. Otherwise, the relationship founded by said contract would be nullified, as would the duties and obligations that flow from that relationship. Torture exemplifies an ultra vires act used by the United States to show the consequences of over-extended authority on political legitimacy and the rule of law. Founded on the philosophies of Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Christine Korsgaard, this research investigates the nature of a government, its authority, and the laws that it must obey. By considering the role of a government as an artificial man or a representative agent, I argue that regardless of the limits or lack thereof for governmental power, the self-interest of a government illegalizes any action that violates its founding documents. If a government does commit such an act, the rule of law is negatively affected, and political legitimacy and authority are damaged. This behavior, when repeated and unamended, will destroy the relationship between the people and their government, diminish the contract, and return the people to a state of nature.

<p dir="ltr">In my dissertation, “Scanlonian Contractualism and Animals,” I take T.M. Scanlon’s ethical contractualism, convert it into a political theory, and apply it to deriving the duties of justice we owe to nonhuman animals. Here is the narrative structure of my dissertation. First, I argue in chapter 1 that nonhuman animals should be included within the scope of morality, or justice, as contractualism construes this notion. Animals are some of the “others” to whom we owe duties, particularly duties of justice. To this effect, I defend a revised version of the argument from marginal cases. </p><p dir="ltr">Second, I tell the reader how contractualism works in detail in chapters 2 and 3, making modifications and conversions into political philosophy along the way. Crucial for my discussion will be the debate between Derek Parfit and Scanlon over issues such as how to take numbers into account within contractualism. Scanlon’s considered view is that personal reasons should be added up to determine what we ought to do, but this is not the aggregation of impersonal value, for example, as in utilitarianism.</p><p dir="ltr">In chapter 4, a major step taken is the conversion of political contractualism into a form of Rawlsian political liberalism. Political liberalism takes the fact of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines on life’s important questions as a permanent feature of liberal democracy. In order to address this pluralism, political liberalism seeks to provide a political conception of justice that can be endorsed by people who differ on fundamental ethical, philosophical, and religious matters. My version of animal rights contractualism adopts this framework, but it takes work to show how animal rights and political liberalism are compatible.</p><p dir="ltr">Third, in chapter 5, a neutral metric for the harm of death will be suggested, following the requirements of political liberalism to offer a political conception of various aspects of our theories. This needs to be done because the harm of death is a complex, contested philosophical issue. The contractors need this metric to figure out what burdens are imposed by death. A neutral metric is meant to be one that can be endorsed by adherents of different comprehensive philosophical viewpoints in an overlapping consensus.</p><p dir="ltr">Fourth, and finally, some of the specific political duties we have to nonhuman animals will be stated. I survey some of the most common topics that are usually explored here, such as factory-farming, medical research, and hunting. The hope is that at the end of the work, the reader will be convinced that contractualism provides a plausible account of what we owe to each animal.</p>