Os mecanismos de proteção aos acionistas e credores surgiram prometendo às empresas que realizam investimentos em governança corporativa obter valorização da organização. Isto se daria porque os financiadores estariam menos expostos à expropriação do seu capital por meio de mecanismos de governança corporativa que assegurassem os seus direitos, o que facilitaria a comercialização de suas ações e títulos, o acesso ao mercado de capitais e uma redução do custo de capital, levando, assim, à valorização da empresa. Dentro deste contexto, este trabalho busca analisar a relação entre governança corporativa e o custo de capital próprio em empresas brasileiras de capital aberto. O presente estudo investiga se as empresas que adotam práticas de governança corporativa, medida pelos níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa da Bovespa, possuem um menor custo de capital próprio associado quando comparadas às empresas que não adotam tais práticas. Para o cálculo do custo de capital próprio foram utilizados o CAPM e o Modelo de Três Fatores com o intuito de verificar se a relação com as práticas de governança independe do método adotado. Utilizou-se a regressão linear múltipla para as análises estatísticas tendo como variável dependente o custo de capital próprio e as variáveis independentes de governança corporativa, grau de alavancagem financeira, grau de alavancagem operacional, os setores, o grau de intangibilidade da empresa e o tempo que a empresa está presente na Bovespa. Foi encontrada uma relação positiva do custo de capital próprio, medido pelo CAPM, com as empresas que adotam qualquer um dos níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa, ou seja, o custo de capital próprio é maior para empresas que aderiram a tais práticas. Nas demais análises, a governança corporativa não foi significativa. Dentro deste contexto, não se confirma a hipótese apresentada de menor custo de capital próprio associado à governança corporativa. Assim sendo, a valorização das empresas poderia se dar pelo incremento do fluxo de caixa esperado e não pela diminuição do custo de capital próprio. Pode-se considerar também que a adoção das práticas de governança corporativa estaria relacionada às empresas que possuem um maior risco associado, e que pretendem reduzi-lo adotando medidas de proteção ao acionista minoritário, ou ainda que o beta da empresa que representa o CAPM estaria mostrando um desempenho superior da empresa com relação ao mercado e dentro deste contexto não estaria sinalizando o risco associado, mas sim um melhor comportamento da ação da empresa se comparada ao mercado. / Protection mechanisms to shareholders and creditors were created promising that companies that invest in corporate governance would be appreciated. This would be possible because investors would be less exposed to the expropriation of their own capital by means of corporate governance mechanisms that ensure their rights and, accordingly, this would facilitate the sale of their shares and securities, the access to the capital market and a decrease in the cost of capital, appreciating thus the company. In this context, this paper has the purpose of analyzing the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of capital in Brazilian publicly-traded companies. This study determines whether the companies that adopt corporate governance practices, measured by Bovespa\'s (São Paulo Stock Exchange) corporate governance different levels, have a lower cost of capital when compared to companies that do not adopt these practices. To calculate the cost of capital, the CAPM and the Three-factor model were used to verify whether the relationship with corporate governance practices depends or not on the method adopted. The multiple linear regression was used to analyze statistics and the dependent variable was the cost of capital and the independent variables were the degree of financial leverage, the degree of operating leverage, the industries, the company\'s degree of intangibility and the time the company is listed on Bovespa. A positive relationship between the cost of capital, measured by the CAPM, and companies that adopt any of the corporate governance different levels was found, namely, the cost of capital is higher for companies that adhered to these practices. In the other analyses, the corporate governance was not significant. In this context, the hypothesis determining that a lower cost of capital is related to corporate governance is not confirmed. Therefore, the companies could be appreciated by increasing the expected cash flow and not by decreasing the cost of capital. We may also consider that corporate governance practices would be adopted by companies subject to a higher risk and that intend to reduce it by adopting protection measures to the minority shareholder, or that the company\'s beta that represents the CAPM would show a higher performance in relation to the market and, in this case, this would not highlight the risk, but a better performance of the company\'s shares when compared to the market.

企業透明度高低對投資者與企業都有一定影響，對於透明度高企業，投資者比較不會因為資訊不對稱而遭受損失，且能夠有效監督管理者可能有的自利行為；而企業若是透明度較高，也能夠降低在市場募集資金的成本，因此本研究試圖找出對公司透明度能有一定反映程度的指標，藉此作為評價企業透明度參考依據，進一步對研究企業透明度與資金成本的關係有所助益；此外，以我國市場為研究對象，找出會影響本研究找出透明度衡量指標因素，探討可能影響我國企業透明度因素。 本研究以系統風險和一般股價評估模式推論認為系統風險應該對於企業透明度有一定解釋能力，因此本研究以系統風險做為透明度衡量指標，並探討可能影響其因素，可能影響因素則包括研究發展費用比率、公司規模、外資法人持股比率、營業費用比例以及家族企業等因素；由於過去文獻指出系統風險會受營運槓桿與財務槓桿影響，因此本研究將其做為控制變數，此外，股權集中度或許會影響股價的波動，進而影響系統風險，因此本研究也將此做為控制變數。 本研究採用迴歸分析方法研究，研究結果指出，研究發展費用比率以及家族企業對系統風險也就是公司透明度會有所影響，與預期相同，而營業費用比率則無相關，至於外資法人持股比率和公司規模則與預期方向相反，綜觀其原因或許是因為外資在台灣可能以短線進出為主，而規模較大公司又是外資青睞對象而使此兩個指標與預期相反。

Submitted by Maykon Nascimento (maykon.albani@hotmail.com) on 2015-12-14T18:37:06Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Essays on life cycle voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital of brazilian companies.pdf: 1743467 bytes, checksum: 506c8fe8bffb13d82c87125c7dd355fb (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Morgana Andrade (morgana.andrade@ufes.br) on 2016-01-07T11:31:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Essays on life cycle voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital of brazilian companies.pdf: 1743467 bytes, checksum: 506c8fe8bffb13d82c87125c7dd355fb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-07T11:31:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Essays on life cycle voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital of brazilian companies.pdf: 1743467 bytes, checksum: 506c8fe8bffb13d82c87125c7dd355fb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / CAPES / Esta dissertação investiga como os estágios do ciclo de vida impactam no disclosure voluntário, no custo de capital próprio e também na relação entre eles. Utilizando uma amostra de empresas não-financeiras entre 2008 e 2014, e seguindo o modelo de Gebhardt et al. (2001) para desenvolver o Custo de Capital Implícito (ICC), usando a base de dados I/B/E/S, da Thomson Reuters®, encontra-se que, em média, as empresas são beneficiadas com a redução do custo de capital por meio da melhora no nível de evidenciação voluntária. Usando a métrica de ciclo de vida de Dickinson (2001), encontra-se que o nível de disclosure voluntário cresce até atingir o estágio de maturidade e então esse nível decresce. Ainda, o ICC se difere significativamente entre os estágios de ciclo de vida. Contudo, não são encontradas diferenças significativas entre os estágios de crescimento, maturidade e shake-out, embora o nível de ICC diminua depois de sair do estágio inicial e ele cresça novamente no estágio de declínio. Finalmente, encontra-se que a melhora no nível de disclosure voluntário nos estágios de crescimento e maturidade é mais bem compensada com uma redução maior no nível de custo de capital. Os resultados para o disclosure voluntário são robustos usando uma série de testes de sensibilidade, muito embora os resultados não tenham se mantido para o custo de capital usando proxies diferentes. / This thesis investigates how life cycle stages impact on voluntary disclosure, cost of equity capital and also on the relationship between them. Using a sample of non-financial Brazilian listed firms covered by analysts between 2008 and 2014, and following the model by Gebhardt et al. (2001) to develop the Implied Cost of Capital (ICC) using I/B/E/S database, from Thomson Reuters®, I find that companies on average are benefitted by the reduction of the cost of capital via improvement in voluntary information level. Using Dickinson’s (2001) life cycle measure, I find that voluntary disclosure level grows until reaching the maturity phase and then it declines. Moreover, the ICC significantly differs across life cycle stages. However, I do not find differences among growth, maturity and shake-out, although the level of the ICC fades out after leaving the initial stage and it increases again in decline stage. Finally, I find that the improvement of voluntary disclosure level in growth and maturity stages is better compensated with more reduction in cost of capital. The results for voluntary disclosure are shown to be robust using a series of sensitivity tests, however the expectation about cost of capital did not hold using different proxies.

Os mecanismos de proteção aos acionistas e credores surgiram prometendo às empresas que realizam investimentos em governança corporativa obter valorização da organização. Isto se daria porque os financiadores estariam menos expostos à expropriação do seu capital por meio de mecanismos de governança corporativa que assegurassem os seus direitos, o que facilitaria a comercialização de suas ações e títulos, o acesso ao mercado de capitais e uma redução do custo de capital, levando, assim, à valorização da empresa. Dentro deste contexto, este trabalho busca analisar a relação entre governança corporativa e o custo de capital próprio em empresas brasileiras de capital aberto. O presente estudo investiga se as empresas que adotam práticas de governança corporativa, medida pelos níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa da Bovespa, possuem um menor custo de capital próprio associado quando comparadas às empresas que não adotam tais práticas. Para o cálculo do custo de capital próprio foram utilizados o CAPM e o Modelo de Três Fatores com o intuito de verificar se a relação com as práticas de governança independe do método adotado. Utilizou-se a regressão linear múltipla para as análises estatísticas tendo como variável dependente o custo de capital próprio e as variáveis independentes de governança corporativa, grau de alavancagem financeira, grau de alavancagem operacional, os setores, o grau de intangibilidade da empresa e o tempo que a empresa está presente na Bovespa. Foi encontrada uma relação positiva do custo de capital próprio, medido pelo CAPM, com as empresas que adotam qualquer um dos níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa, ou seja, o custo de capital próprio é maior para empresas que aderiram a tais práticas. Nas demais análises, a governança corporativa não foi significativa. Dentro deste contexto, não se confirma a hipótese apresentada de menor custo de capital próprio associado à governança corporativa. Assim sendo, a valorização das empresas poderia se dar pelo incremento do fluxo de caixa esperado e não pela diminuição do custo de capital próprio. Pode-se considerar também que a adoção das práticas de governança corporativa estaria relacionada às empresas que possuem um maior risco associado, e que pretendem reduzi-lo adotando medidas de proteção ao acionista minoritário, ou ainda que o beta da empresa que representa o CAPM estaria mostrando um desempenho superior da empresa com relação ao mercado e dentro deste contexto não estaria sinalizando o risco associado, mas sim um melhor comportamento da ação da empresa se comparada ao mercado. / Protection mechanisms to shareholders and creditors were created promising that companies that invest in corporate governance would be appreciated. This would be possible because investors would be less exposed to the expropriation of their own capital by means of corporate governance mechanisms that ensure their rights and, accordingly, this would facilitate the sale of their shares and securities, the access to the capital market and a decrease in the cost of capital, appreciating thus the company. In this context, this paper has the purpose of analyzing the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of capital in Brazilian publicly-traded companies. This study determines whether the companies that adopt corporate governance practices, measured by Bovespa\'s (São Paulo Stock Exchange) corporate governance different levels, have a lower cost of capital when compared to companies that do not adopt these practices. To calculate the cost of capital, the CAPM and the Three-factor model were used to verify whether the relationship with corporate governance practices depends or not on the method adopted. The multiple linear regression was used to analyze statistics and the dependent variable was the cost of capital and the independent variables were the degree of financial leverage, the degree of operating leverage, the industries, the company\'s degree of intangibility and the time the company is listed on Bovespa. A positive relationship between the cost of capital, measured by the CAPM, and companies that adopt any of the corporate governance different levels was found, namely, the cost of capital is higher for companies that adhered to these practices. In the other analyses, the corporate governance was not significant. In this context, the hypothesis determining that a lower cost of capital is related to corporate governance is not confirmed. Therefore, the companies could be appreciated by increasing the expected cash flow and not by decreasing the cost of capital. We may also consider that corporate governance practices would be adopted by companies subject to a higher risk and that intend to reduce it by adopting protection measures to the minority shareholder, or that the company\'s beta that represents the CAPM would show a higher performance in relation to the market and, in this case, this would not highlight the risk, but a better performance of the company\'s shares when compared to the market.

本研究的目的在於探討企業的財務結構決策是否攸關市場價值。根據加權平均資金成本與企業評價模式相關文獻基礎，產生下列三個假設：(1)資本結構與平均資金成本存有關聯性；(2)最適資本結構必須存在，以使平均資金成本達到最低；(3)平均資金成本與企業價值也存有關聯性。故本研究之實證議題探討：(1)平均資金成本與資本結構的關聯性以及最佳資本結構是否存在(2)加權平均資金成本、權益資金成本與企業價值的關聯性(3)資本結構與平均資金成本之關聯性對企業價值的影響。 本研究使用民國80年至88年台灣證交所股票上市公司作為樣本資料，主要的實證結果如下。財務結構與平均資金成本具有顯著的負向關係，故實證結果並不支持M-M 的槓桿無關論。在十八個產業中，大約半數的產業存在最適資本結構。此外，相對於平均資金成本而言，權益資金成本與股價報酬呈現顯著的負向關係，且具有較高的解釋力；這個結果強調了權益資金成本在解釋股價報酬上的重要性。 本研究亦發現，企業經理人無法透過財務結構的調整來極大化企業的價值，經理人應該考量其他方式來極大化公司的價值。 / The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether financial structure decisions of a firm are relevant to its market value. Three assumptions underlie the literature on weighted average cost of capital and firm valuation models. First, the linkage exists between the capital structure and the average cost of capital. Second, in order to minimize the average cost of capital, the presence of optimal capital structure is required. And third, the relationship exists between the average cost of capital and firm values. The empirical issues explored in this thesis therefore include: (1) The relationship between the average cost of capital and the capital structure and the presence of optimal capital structure; (2) The association between weighted average cost of capital, cost of equity capital and firm values; and (3) The influence of capital structure-average cost of capital relationship on firm values. Using the listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period of 1991 to 1999 as the sample, major empirical findings are as follows. The empirical evidence indicates that financial structure is significantly negatively associated with the average cost of capital, which in turn may imply the M-M leverage irrelevance proposition is not supported by the sample firms examined. About half of the 18 industries examined in this study suggest the presence of optimal capital structure. Furthermore, compared to the average cost of capital, the cost of equity capital is found to be significantly and negatively associated with stock returns and has better explanatory power. This emphasizes the importance of the cost of equity capital in interpreting the behavior of stock returns. In addition, this thesis also finds that managers’ influence of maximizing firms’values through adjusting their firms’financial structures is limited. Managers may have to find avenues other than financial structure decisions to maximize the values of their firms.

本研究旨在探討管理當局自願性盈餘預測與權益資金成本之關聯性，檢視管理當局發布盈餘預測頻率之影響是否反應於權益資金成本上，並進一步檢視管理當局之聲譽是否為影響權益資金成本的因素之一。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現管理當局發布自願性盈餘預測之頻率與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，表示管理當局發布盈餘預測的次數越多時，權益資金成本越低。 在管理當局聲譽對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究實證分析結果發現，管理當局之聲譽與權益資金成本亦呈顯著負相關，管理當局聲譽以管理當局預測誤差和分析師預測誤差來衡量，當管理當局的盈餘預測誤差小於分析師盈餘預測誤差時，投資人認為管理當局對盈餘的預測有效且值得信賴，此時管理當局聲譽提高，投資人認為取得有用的資訊，進而降低企業權益資金成本。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to explore whether the frequency of management forecasts is related to the cost of equity capital. In addition, I further examine whether the association is stronger when management has better reputation. Basing on a sample of S&P 500 listed firms during 2000-2009, I find that, consistent with my prediction, cost of firm’s equity capital decreases with the frequency of management earning forecasts after controlling for other determinants well-documented to be related to cost of equity capital. Second, I find that cost of equity capital is negatively related to the reputation of management; however, I do not find that the association between cost of equity capital and the frequency of management systematically vary with the reputation of management.

我國庫藏股制度於民國八十九年開始實施，當上市櫃公司宣告買回庫藏股後，造成了公司資產的重分配，其股東、債權人等利害關係人會以預期心理來評估自身權益所受到的影響，並將其反應在所要求的必要報酬率上，因此公司對股東所負擔的權益資金成本及對債權人所負擔的負債資金成本都將產生變動。 當公司宣告買回庫藏股後，實證結果顯示：(1)其負債資金成本將上升，而權益資金成本將會下降。(2)預定買回股份佔資本比愈大時，其負債資金成本增加愈多。(3)買回前獲利能力之不同，並未發現其會對宣告買回公司之負債資金成本有顯著影響。(4)依目的三買回將使該公司負債資金成本增加數小於依目的一或目的二買回之負債資金成本增加數、並使權益資金成本減少數大於依目的一或目的二買回之權益資金成本減少數。(5)公司內部人持股比率於宣告前一年淨增加愈多則權益資金成本降低程度愈大。(6)資訊愈對稱的公司其權益資金成本下降的程度愈少。 / Share repurchase system was formally implemented in Taiwan in 2000 , when the TSEC & OTC listed companies announce that they will repurchase shares , it changes the composition of assets held by the firm , revising the ownership proportions of each of their shareholders and interests of each of their creditors. Thus, their cost of equity capital and debt capital may change . When companies announce to repurchase shares , results show that : (1)their cost of debt capital will increase and their cost of equity capital will decrease. (2)the more percentage of shares companies expect to repurchase , the more their cost of debt capital increase. (3)the different profitability before announcement has no significant effect to companies’ cost of debt capital. (4)repurchase in order to conserve companies’ credibility and shareholders’ equity will increase less cost of debt capital and decrease more cost of equity capital than that in order to reach other two purposes .(5) the more increase of percentage of shares companies’ insiders’ hold before announce, the more their cost of equity capital decrease. (6) the more symmetrical information companies obtain , the less their cost of equity capital decrease.

Náklady vlastního kapitálu, jež jsou ovlivňovány řadou interních a externích činitelů, významným faktorem ovlivňujícím rozhodovací procesy v podnikové sféře. Cílem této disertační práce je na základě primárních a sekundárních dat formulovat původní metodiku řízení nákladů vlastního kapitálu. Zdrojem sekundárních dat je rozsáhlá literární rešerše zahrnující zahraniční a tuzemské vědecké studie a databáze. Primární data, na základě nichž byl zkoumán vztah mezi teoretickými přístupy řízení nákladů vlastního kapitálu a podnikovou praxí, byla získána formou dotazníkového šetření od finančních manažerů působících v podnicích se sídlem na území ČR. Data byla zpracována s využitím statistických metod. Výsledky disertační práce přispívají k hlubšímu porozumění vztahu mezi náklady vlastního kapitálu a jejich determinantů a odhalují rozdíly mezi teorií a manažerskou praxí. Navrhovaná metodika řízení nákladů vlastního kapitálu je určená k použití v podnikové praxi a lze předpokládat její další rozvíjení v rámci navazujících výzkumných aktivit.

本研究主要是探討公司治理結構與資訊透明度之間的關聯性，並進一步檢視公司治理結構與資訊透明度對於權益資金成本及分析師盈餘預測之影響。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現企業的資訊透明度確實會受到公司治理結構因素的影響。在股權結構方面，當控制股東所持有的現金流量權比率增加時，由於外部股東的持股相對減少，在監督成本大於效益的情況下，對於公司資訊的需求會降低，因此，管理當局會降低資訊的揭露水準，導致資訊透明度下降。在董事會組成方面，本研究的發現支持財富侵佔假說的論點，當控制股東所掌握的董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會提高控制股東剝奪外部股東財富的動機，使得控制股東傾向利用控制力以影響被投資公司的資訊揭露政策，造成被投資公司的資訊透明度下降。除此之外，研究結果也支持監督假說的預期，即獨立董監事的設置，能有效發揮監督管理當局與制衡控制股東的功能，有助於提昇公司的資訊透明度。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳確實會影響外部投資人對於企業風險的評價，進而影響投資人所要求的必要報酬率(即企業的權益資金成本)。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東的持股比率增加時，其與外部股東的目標會趨於一致，發生代理問題的風險會降低，投資人承擔較低的代理風險。因此，控制股東持股比率增加所傳達予投資人是一項有利的訊息，以致於投資人願意降低必要的投資報酬率，使得公司的權益資金成本降低。董監事持股質押的行為對於投資人而言，可能是一項風險的訊號，理性的投資人預期未來可能被董監事剝奪財富的風險，以致於要求的投資報酬率會提高，企業的權益資金成本會增加。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於分析師預測的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳會影響企業資訊環境的品質，進而影響分析師預測誤差與離散性。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東所掌握之投票權比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題，降低財務報導的可靠性，因而導致分析師對於公司未來績效與前景的瞭解程度相對較低，分析師之間對於公司未來的盈餘並無一致的看法，即預測的離散性會增加，但是並不影響預測的誤差；當控制股東所掌握之董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率的偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的利益不一致，使得控制股東有誘因剝奪外部股東的權益，操縱公司的會計資訊，使得會計資訊的可靠性降低，以致於分析師預測未來盈餘所面臨的不確定性會愈大，預測誤差與離散性也會愈高。 關鍵詞：公司治理結構；資訊透明度；權益資金成本；分析師預測；控制股東；獨立董監事 / This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, which in turn examines the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on the cost of equity capital and the analyst’s earnings forecasts including forecast error and forecast dispersion. On the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the transparency is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the transparency is lower with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Finally, the transparency is higher with higher percentage of independent directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on cost of equity capital, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the cost of equity capital is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the cost of equity capital is higher with higher percentage of cash flow rights pledged by directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on analyst’s forecasts, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the forecast dispersion is higher with higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Second, the forecast error and dispersion are higher with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Keywords: Corporate governance structure；Transparency；Cost of equity capital；Analyst’s forecasts；Controlled stockholder；Independent directors and supervisors.

Notre thèse traite des thématiques de la responsabilité sociétale des entreprises (RSE), de sa relation avec la performance économique et financière de l’entreprise, et de l’investissement socialement responsable (ISR). Ces thématiques ont récemment gagné en popularité, favorisées par un contexte de crise économique et environnementale. Notre thèse se compose de quatre principaux chapitres. Notre premier chapitre est une revue de la littérature académique sur la RSE et l’ISR. Nous proposons une revue interdisciplinaire de la littérature académique partagée entre l’économie et les sciences de gestion (éthique appliquée aux entreprises, stratégie et finance). Notre second chapitre est une analyse empirique de la relation entre RSE et performance financière de l’entreprise sous l’angle du coût du capital. Nous nous intéressons à l’impact de la publication d’une notation de la politique de RSE d’une entreprise sur la liquidité de ses titres et la taille de sa base d’actionnaires. Nos troisième et quatrième chapitres sont des analyses des propriétés de portefeuilles d’ISR construits à l’aide de nouvelles méthodes d’allocations. Ainsi nous analysons comment des stratégies d’allocations basées sur le risque modifient la performance des portefeuilles d’actifs financiers émis par des émetteurs ayant une politique de RSE, et réciproquement comment un univers d’investissement composé uniquement d’émetteurs ayant une politique de RSE modifie les propriétés de ces allocations alternatives. / Our thesis examines corporate social responsibility (CSR) and how it is linked to a firm’s economic and financial performance, as well as socially responsible investment (SRI). With the current environmental and economic uncertainty, these issues are attracting increasing interest. Our thesis is organized in four chapters. Chapter 1 is a literature review on CSR and SRI. We propose an interdisciplinary review of the academic literature in both economics and management sciences (ethics applied to business, strategy and finance). Chapter 2 is an empirical analysis of the relationship between CSR and a firm’s financial performance in terms of cost of capital. We look at the impact of publishing an evaluation of the firm’s involvement in CSR on the liquidity of its stocks and the size of its investor base. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are analyses of the characteristics of SRI portfolios built according to new allocation methodologies. We analyze how risk-based allocations impact the performance of the portfolios of financial products of issuers involved in CSR, and reciprocally, how a universe of investment composed of the financial products of issuers involved in CSR impacts the properties of these alternative allocations.