This dissertation explores the interaction between modality and aspect in Makkan Arabic (MA). There is some consensus in the semantic literature regarding the treatment of modal expressions that may obtain various flavours, such as epistemic, deontic, bouletic, ability, necessity or teleological. These various modal flavours can be captured by a unified lexical entry, and are identified by contextual factors Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012). There is some debate regarding the structural location of modal elements, some of which have been argued to be high (the case of epistemic modals) and others low (the case of root modals) (e.g. Cinque (1999)). The relative scope of modals has been subject of much recent work on modality, in particular in relation to their interaction with temporal categories such as aspect. This thesis investigates this topic on the basis of novel data from MA. I observe that the flavour of modality can change depending on how it is inflected with different types of aspect in MA. This observation is in line of Hacquard; Hacquard; Hacquard’s (2006; 2009; 2014) proposal for French and Italian. In MA, when the root modal \gdr\ “can” is inflected with the perfective, the combination yields entailments that have come to be known in the literature as ‘actuality entailments’ (AEs) (see Bhatt (1999, 2006)). In this case, the speaker gives rise to the inference that the proposition expressed by the complement holds in the actual world (instead of merely in some possible but not actual world). My thesis integrates the case of \gdr\ to current cross-linguistic debates on this topic. Building on Hacquard’s work, I argue that AEs are generated when perfective aspect scopes over root modals. Perfective aspect links events to the actual world. Imperfective aspect scoping over the modal fails to generate AEs. My thesis ex- ii tends the investigation of AEs to non-perfective cases. I argue that in addition to the contrast between perfective and imperfective, MA also distinguishes perfect aspect (e.g. an auxiliary plus a modal participle like gaadir). I suggest that the perfect in MA has several shapes, including the choice between two auxiliaries: kaan and saar. I link the different shapes of the perfect to the different types of interpretation identified by Portner (2000, 2003) for the English perfect. I suggest that in MA, different forms of the perfect are linked to distinct interpretations (which in English are grouped together under one form). In addition I show that, contrary to what has been argued by Hacquard for French, the perfect in MA can give rise to AEs in the case of the saar auxiliary. I develop an analysis of the saar perfect that is inspired by Hacquard’s proposal for perfective: in the case of saar, contrary to kaan, the perfect links the eventuality to the actual world. While the discussion of AEs in relation to the modal \gdr\ are linked to the proposal that aspect scopes over the modal, I also examine the case of a modal expression that scopes over aspect: qad “might”. I show that in spite of the fact that aspect scopes below the modal, the contrast between perfective and imperfective in the embedded clause can still give rise to differences in the generation of AEs. This case is interesting because much previous literature on AEs has focused on languages in which aspect scopes over the modal. MA qad provides an example where the modal scopes over aspect, and it is still the case that AEs appear to be generated. In spite of the structural differences with \gdr\, my analysis of qad builds on Hacquard’s proposal for AEs with the perfective, appealing to her proposal for the ‘preservation of event description’ to account for the fact that properties of eventualities can remain stable across worlds. The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the empirical domain, situating aspect and modality in the description of MA; in addition it iii provides an introduction to key theoretical concepts to be used in later chapters. Chapter 2 discusses AEs in the case of the root modal \gdr\, comparing perfective and imperfective. Chapter 3 extends the discussion of the modal to examples with the perfect, distinguishing between the kaan- and saar- perfects. Chapter 4 investigates the behaviour of qad and its interaction with perfective and imperfective complements. Chapter 5 offers a brief summary and concluding remarks.

Advisory Bodies and Expertise in the Czech Politics - Epistemic Communities and the Influence on the Reforms of Higher Education and Pension System Master thesis Bc. Kateřina Merklová The Master thesis Advisory Bodies and Expertise in the Czech Politics - Epistemic Communities and the Influence on the Reforms of Higher Education and Pension System concerns with the relation between politics and expertise. So-called epistemic community represents the knowledge interpreter that we consider an independent actor in the political process. In the theoretical part of the text, we have explained the original definition of the concept as well as its critics and case studies that cover various contexts. Following most of the authors, we have applied a looser definition of the concept and deconstructed its rigid criteria. The empirical part of the thesis presents a case study (N=4) based on comparative methods that analyzes variable influence of four particular epistemic communities (the authors of the White Paper on Tertiary Education, Bezdek's Committee, Bezdek's Committee II, and the National Economic Council) on policy-making process and its sources. Regarding our intention and research questions, we have chosen two qualitative methods - in-depth interviews and content analysis of relevant texts. We have...

The inadequacy of the usual possible world semantics of modal languages when the meaning of 'belief' is attached to the modal operator is discussed. Three other approaches are then investigated. In the case of Moore's autoepistemic logic it becomes possible to compare an agent's beliefs to 'reality', which cannot be done directly in the possible world semantics. Levesque's semantics makes explicit in the object language the notion of 'this is all the information the agent has', which plays an important role in nonmonotonic reasoning. Both of these approaches deal with ideal reasoners. The third approach, Konolige's deduction model, is based on a semantics capable of describing the beliefs of one or more resourcebounded agents. Finally, the AGM postulates for belief revision are discussed. / Computer Science / M.Sc. (Computer Science)

This dissertation takes an interest in learning and literacy in everyday interaction in the middle year classroom. It is based on a view of learning as emically construed in social interaction. Conversation Analysis (CA) and the concept of epistemic stance are used as a theoretical framing for describing in what way, and with what verbal and non-verbal resources, learning is achieved in desk interaction, i.e. when students work individually at their desks while the teacher moves around to support them. Almost without exceptions, these interactions involve the use of texts. Hence, they are viewed as situated literacy events that are part of the institutionally shaped literacy practices as described in the field of New Literacy Studies. The empirical data for this study comes from a video-ethnographic study in two middle year classrooms in grade four and five. Out of a total of 70 hours of video documentation, a selection of interrelated desk interactions was made. These were analyzed as learning trajectories and compared from two perspectives. Firstly, learning trajectories when a teacher repeatedly interacts with the same student about the same learning content were analyzed. Secondly, the changes in the teacher’s epistemic stance when interacting with different students about the same learning content in repeated desk interactions were studied. The analysis shows that the teacher’s trajectories through the classroom build infrastructures for learning, enabling differentiation between students within the constraints and possibilities of evolving routines. Learning in desk interaction mainly relies on the use of text references to index previously shared knowledge. Epistemic topicalizations and recurring semiotic fields are shown to be crucial resources for both maintaining and changing the epistemic stance of the participants towards the learning content constituted in interaction. A conclusion is that the shared experiences of teachers and students in collective literacy events serve as important resources for learning in individual desk interaction. / Baksidestext: Den här avhandlingen handlar om bänkinteraktioner på mellanstadiet. Med hjälp av videoanalyser utforskas lärares och elevers sociala samspel när elever arbetar enskilt med skriftliga uppgifter i sina bänkar, medan läraren rör sig runt i klassrummet för att hjälpa dem. Avhandlingen visar hur lärande i bänkinteraktioner sker till följd av lärares och elevers ömsesidiga samordning av tal, gester, blickar och texter. Längs lärarens väg genom klassrummet skapas möjligheter till skilda lärandeförlopp för olika elever, inom ramen för de rutiner som samtidigt formas. Instruktioner, lärobokstexter och bilder är viktiga resurser i dessa lärandeförlopp. De används i huvudsak för att uppmärksamma och påminna om sådant man tidigare läst och diskuterat tillsammans i klassen. En slutsats blir därför att lärares och elevers gemensamma erfarenheter från olika tillfällen har stor betydelse för lärande i bänkinteraktioner. Sammantaget framstår bänkarbetet som mera socialt än individuellt.  Avhandlingen bidrar till en nyanserad förståelse av bänkinteraktioners pedagogiska potential, vilket diskuteras i relation till senare decenniers politiska individualiseringssträvanden. Den vänder sig till forskare, lärare och andra som är intresserade av lärande och skriftspråkande i klassrummets interaktion.

This thesis is on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) and its relevance for the rationality of religious beliefs. An epistemical model for rationality is developed according to which: a person (or group of persons) is rational to hold a certain belief a) if this belief can be assumed to have been generated by one or more reliable cognitive mechanisms, b) applies whether or not she is aware of what these mechanisms are, but c) only as long as it does not exist or arise some reasons (defeaters) to question the belief; if they occur, she must d) reflect on it and find other reasons or grounds to hold the belief in question.      Two different positions are examined, namely: 1) negative relevance: the findings and theories in CSR undermines the rationality of religious beliefs; 2) positive relevance: religious beliefs need not be irrational in the light of CSR, in fact CSR may actually support the rationality of religious beliefs.      Two lines of argument can be distinguished among those who argue for a negative relevance: a) the natural explanations that are provided by CSR are preferable; and b) religious beliefs are irrational because they are caused by unreliable cognitive mechanisms.      Among those who argue for positive relevance two arguments can be distinguised: a) religious beliefs seem to come naturally to humans and therefore are probably true; and b) CSR confirms empirically that we are equipped with a "divine mechanism" that there are reasons to believe is reliable.      The conclusions are: CSR has negative relevance to beliefs in "finite supernatural agency", but not for the faith of "infinite supernatural agency". First, the first type of beliefs is easier to explain by being generated by unreliable cognitive mechanisms; secondly they are difficult to integrate with what we otherwise know about the world. A category that falls outside the scope of CSR and thus not even potentially can be affected, is beliefs in "supernatural non-agency". / The Impact of Religion – Challenges for Society, Law and Democracy

Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime. Toutefois, d’autres philosophes soutiennent que malgré son omniprésence dans la vie de tous les jours, le blâme doxastique n’est jamais approprié. En effet, selon l’argument à partir de l’involontarisme doxastique, nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances puisque (1) nous pouvons être blâmés pour une croyance seulement si elle est sous notre contrôle volontaire et (2) nos croyances ne sont jamais sous notre contrôle volontaire. Le but de ce mémoire est de déterminer si les déontologistes peuvent répondre de manière convaincante à cet argument. Autrement dit, pouvons-nous parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances malgré ce qu’en disent les anti-déontologistes, ou faut-il leur donner raison et rejeter la pratique du blâme doxastique ? Pour répondre à cette question, je commence par clarifier l’argument anti-déontologiste en précisant la teneur de sa thèse centrale : l’involontarisme doxastique. Par la suite, je passe en revue différentes stratégies qui ont été proposées par des représentants du déontologisme pour défendre le blâme doxastique contre cet argument. Devant l’échec de ces réponses, je suggère une défense alternative du déontologisme selon laquelle l’involontarisme doxastique n’est pas incompatible avec le blâme doxastique. Si cette réponse est concluante, alors nous n’avons pas à donner raison aux anti-déontologistes : nous pouvons parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances. / Can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs ? According to epistemic deontologism, the ordinary practice of blaming and criticizing people for their beliefs is a legitimate one. However, some philosophers argue that despite its pervasiveness in everyday life, doxastic blame is never appropriate. According to the argument from doxastic involuntarism, we can never be blamed for our beliefs since (1) we can be blamed for a belief only if it is under our voluntary control, and (2) our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether deontologists can reply convincingly to this argument. In other words, can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs despite what anti-deontologists claim, or do we have to accept the argument from doxastic involuntarism and reject the practice of doxastic blame ? In order to answer that question, I first clarify the anti-deontologist argument by making more precise the nature of its central thesis: doxastic involuntarism. I then review different strategies proposed by deontologists to defend doxastic blame against this argument. Given the failure of these replies, I propose an alternative defense of deontologism according to which doxastic involuntarism is not incompatible with doxastic blame. If this reply is sound, then we do not have to accept the anti-deontologist argument: we can sometimes be blamed for our beliefs.

Ce mémoire s'inscrit dans la constellation de questions regroupées sous l'étiquette de l'éthique de la croyance. Plus spécifiquement, il cherche à analyser la viabilité des jugements tout bien considéré portant sur les croyances lorsque des raisons de types distincts (raisons épistémiques et raisons pragmatiques) entrent en conflit. Cette analyse se fera à l'aune d'une recherche portant sur l'instrumentalisme de la croyance, la position avançant que les croyances sont instrumentales à nos intérêts et que, par conséquent, la normativité de la croyance se jauge en fonction de nos objectifs. L'instrumentalisme de la croyance est tombé sous le coup de plusieurs critiques dans les dernières années et se mémoire se donne comme mission d'en évaluer la portée. Si d'aventure l'instrumentalisme de la croyance devait être une position viable, il y a lieu de penser qu'il existe une commensurabilité possible entre raisons de différents types. / This thesis is part of a larger group of philosophical inquiries usually placed under the label of "Ethics of Belief". Specifically, my aim is to examine the possibility of all things considered judgments concerning beliefs for which there is a conflict between reasons of distinct kinds (epistemic reasons and pragmatic reasons). This inquiry will mostly concern epistemic instrumentalism, the position holding that one's beliefs are instrumental to one's own objectives and thus, that the rationality of beliefs must be an instrumental rationality. It appears that this position has been the aim of a few criticism in the recent years and my goal is to evaluate the strength of such criticism. If epistemic instrumentalism ends up being a viable thesis, we can expect that there may not be any incommensurability between reasons for belief of different kinds.

This diploma thesis examines functions of the modal verb should in nominal content clauses introduced by the conjunction that. The Czech counterparts of the English sentences are considered as well. The research focuses on the so-called putative should which occurs after main clauses with directive, epistemic, attitudinal, evaluative and volitional expressions. Should expressing intrinsic (root) modality (expressing permission, obligation or ability) is left out of account. The work pays attention to the basic classification of nominal content clauses deriving from a verbal form alternating with putative should. Two kinds of putative should will be dealt with, namely should after directive and volitional expressions which could have its alternative form in the present subjunctive and should after epistemic, attitudinal and evaluative expressions which could possibly alternate with the indicative. The work examines these verbal forms in relation to the intentional modality of the sentence in an independent form (e.g. declarative, interrogative or imperative sentence). The work is divided into two parts: theoretical and practical. The theoretical part of the work describes the basic classification of all central modal verbs in English and putative should in terms of its relation towards the...

Il est souvent arrivé que, par le passé, les scientifiques affirment l'existence d'objets inobservables dont ils rejettent aujourd'hui l'existence. Quelle leçon tirer de ce fait ? On est tenté d'en conclure que les méthodes qu'emploient les scientifiques pour connaître l'inobservable ne sont pas fiables, de sorte que cette connaissance serait située hors de leur portée. Cette thèse identifie et rejette deux présupposés qui conduisent à cette conclusion, à savoir que la méthode de l'hypothèse serait la seule manière de produire des connaissances des inobservables, et que cette méthode se déploierait de manière instantanée. Si, au contraire, les modalités concrètes de l'activité expérimentale et la dimension diachronique de la recherche théorique sont prises en compte, chacun de ces deux présupposés doit être rejeté comme abstrait. La connaissance des effondrements théoriques passés légitime alors la croyance en la vérité des théories actuelles. / History of science presents us with numerous cases in which scientists conclude that an unobservable entity previously posited as real actually does not exist. What the lesson is to be drawn from this fact ? One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the methods employed by scientists to produce knowledge of unobservable objects are not reliable: gaining this knowledge would be beyond their reach. This thesis identifies and rejects two presuppositions that lead to this conclusion: that the method of hypothesis is the only way to produce knowledge of unobservables and that it can be employed in an instantaneous manner. On the contrary, if the concrete modalities of the experimental activity and the diachronical dimension of theoretical research are taken into account, each of these two presuppositions appear to be too abstract and should be rejected. Knowledge of past theoretical collapses then legitimates the belief in the truth of current scientific theories.

Cette thèse se propose d’explorer les modalités de constitution d’un domaine de production de savoirs dits académiques dépendant du pouvoir politique. La première partie examine la convergence de trajectoires individuelles vers une activité relativement nouvelle, située au carrefour de champ professionnels et centrée sur l’analyse de la politique étrangère turque menée depuis 2003 par le gouvernement du parti AKP. Partant de là, la seconde partie s’attache plus particulièrement aux liens des acteurs de l’espace identifié avec les responsables gouvernementaux. Il apparaît que ce domaine constitue un champ d’activité dont la structure concentrique découle de la proximité d’une communauté épistémique en son sein avec le champ politique. Par voie d’institutionnalisation et de cooptation du reste du champ, les membres de cette communauté parviennent à imposer une conception utilitaire des sciences sociales permettant de produire des savoirs convergent avec les priorités politiques du moment. La troisième partie examine donc le contenu de ces savoirs de sorte à démontrer le rôle de médiateur joué par le champ expert. Il se confirme alors que sa vocation est de convaincre diverses parties-prenantes, en Turquie et à l’étranger, de la légitimité et l’opportunité du projet hégémonique du gouvernement turc en direction du Moyen-Orient arabe. En définitive, par l’étude de cette configuration experte, a été aussi posé la question de la profondeur de la rupture créée par l’AKP dans le mode de gouvernement et les orientations géopolitique de la Turquie. L’analyse conclut à une rupture dans la continuité / This Ph. D. research offers an opportunity to explore the form of dependency to political power maintained by a self-labelled academic knowledge production domain. This study is based on the case study of Turkish Middle Eastern policy expertise. The first part examines the convergence of individual trajectories towards a relatively new activity in Turkey, located at the intersection of various professional fields and centered on the analysis of the AKP government foreign policy since 2003. The second part then focuses on the links that exist between the previously identified actors and statesmanship. It soon appears that this knowledge production forms a field of activity which concentric structure derives from the proximity of the epistemic community at its very center with the political arena. Through institutionalization and cooptation with the State’s material support, the epistemic community members manage to impose its utilitarian conception of social sciences to the whole expertise field, thereby bringing its actors to design knowledge convergent with the time’s policy priorities. The last part of this work consists of a study of this expertise’s content in order to demonstrate the go-between function played by experts. It appears ultimately that their mission is to convince foreign policy stakeholders in Turkey and abroad of the legitimacy and opportunity of Turkey’s hegemonic project towards the Arab Middle East (2003-2013). Finally, through the study of this expert configuration, it is the question of policy change and geopolitical shift that has been examined. The thesis concludes on the hypothesis of change within continuity