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Executive Compensation, Incentives, and RiskJenter, Dirk 28 May 2004 (has links)
This paper analyzes the link between equity-based compensation and created incentives by (1) deriving a measure of incentives suitable for both linear and non-linear compensation contracts, (2) analyzing the effect of risk on incentives, and (3) clarifying the role of the agent's private trading decisions in incentive creation. With option-based compensation contracts, the average pay-forperformance sensitivity is not an adequate measure of ex-ante incentives. Pay-for-performance covaries negatively with marginal utility and hence overstates the created incentives. Second, more noise in the performance measure implies that the manager is less certain about the effect of effort on performance, which in turn makes her less willing to exert effort. Finally, the private trading decisions by the manager have first-order effects on incentives. By reducing her holdings of the market asset, the manager achieves an effect similar to "indexing" the stock or option grant, making explicit indexation of the contract redundant.
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Two essays in corporate financeLow, An Chee 23 August 2007 (has links)
No description available.
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Do Voting Rights Matter: Evidence From the Adoption of Equity-based Compensation PlansWeber, Joseph, Joos, Peter, Balachandran, Sudhakar 13 February 2004 (has links)
Recent corporate scandals and subsequent regulatory actions have heightened both the academic communities and the public's interest in corporate governance issues. Academics have long argued that voting rights constitute a critical component of a system of corporate governance. We provide evidence on the importance of one aspect of the firm's corporate governance system, namely shareholders' voting rights, by examining the determinants of the decision to grant equity-based compensation to the employees of the firm with or without shareholder approval. We find that poorly-performing firms and poorly-governed firms are more likely to adopt equity-based compensation plans without shareholder approval. Furthermore, when we examine financial performance subsequent to adoption of equity-based compensation plans, we find that poorly-governed firms that adopt equity-based compensation plans without consulting shareholder do not appear to gain any significant benefits associated with the incentives the plans are supposed to provide. In fact, in the year after an equity-based compensation plan is adopted, these firms perform worse than firms that have good systems of corporate governance or firms that place equity-based compensation plans to a shareholder vote. Overall, our results suggest that shareholder voting rights are an important tool of corporate governa
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經理人權益基礎薪酬與策略聯盟之關聯性研究 / An Empirical Study of the Association between Executive Equity-based Compensation and Strategic Alliances陳襄瑋, Chen, Hsiang Wei Unknown Date (has links)
在經營權與所有權分離的企業經營環境中,權益基礎薪酬扮演著連結股東與經理人利益之重要角色。本研究旨在探討經理人權益基礎薪酬與企業策略聯盟行為間之關聯性,並進一步檢視權益基礎薪酬對於企業策略聯盟形成、策略聯盟數目、類別及跨產業聯盟與否之影響。本研究以2003年至2013年美國上市櫃公司為樣本,研究結果顯示經理人權益基礎薪酬對於企業策略聯盟形成有正向影響。給予經理人較高比重權益基礎薪酬之企業,不僅形成策略聯盟之機率較高,且形成策略聯盟之次數亦較多。再者,給予經理人權益基礎薪酬較高比重之企業,其形成研發聯盟之可能性較高,且更傾向於形成同產業間策略聯盟。
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權益薪酬會影響審計委員會監督關係人交易之效果嗎? / Does Equity-based Compensation Affect Audit Committee Supervision on Related Party Transactions?黃玉如, Huang, Yu Ru Unknown Date (has links)
本文主要探討權益薪酬對審計委員會監督關係人交易效果之影響。本研究從美國證券交易所公開資訊EDGAR資料庫以手動蒐集關係人交易資訊,以2010年至2013年間之中小企業為樣本進行實證分析。實證結果發現關係人交易與權益薪酬交乘項與企業價值呈現顯著負相關,意即發放權益薪酬使得審計委員會極大化個人利益而過度注重短期財務績效,選擇默許管理階層不當之關係人交易安排,進而造成企業價值不利之影響。額外分析亦指出審計委員會之權益薪酬對其監督關係人交易效果有負面影響,但未發現證據指出審計委員會之現金薪酬與其監督關係人交易效果有關聯性。 / This study investigates whether equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with the effectiveness of their supervision on related party transactions. We hand collect the data of related party transactions for small and medium-size firms from EDGAR database for the period 2010-2013. We find that the interaction effect between related party transactions and stock compensation for audit committee members is negatively associated with firm value. It suggests that in order to maximize short-term benefits, audit committee members with stock compensation are inclined to be more tolerable to earnings management through related party transactions that are unfavorable to shareholders. Additionally, we do not find any evidence indicating that cash compensation is associated with the effectiveness of audit committee’s oversight on related party transactions.
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Accounting for employee share options : a critical analysisSacho, Zwi Yosef 30 November 2003 (has links)
The main goal of this dissertation was to obtain an understanding as to the true economic nature of employee share options and the problems surrounding the accounting thereof.
The main conclusion of this study is that employee share options should be expensed in the income statement as and when the employee's services are performed. The reason is that employee share options are valuable financial instruments which the employer has used to compensate the employee for his services. It was also concluded that exercise date accounting and classification of outstanding employee share options as liabilities on the balance sheet is the most appropriate accounting treatment. Such accounting treatment trues up the accounting of employee share options with that of cash-settled share appreciation rights, which are economically equivalent transactions.
The measurement of employee share options should be based on their fair value using an option-pricing model adapted for the specific features of employee share options. / Accounting / Thesis (M. Com. (Accounting Science))
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董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性之研究宋致皓 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究主要針對目前企業績效不佳,董事會成員坐領高額董監酬勞之情況進行研究。本研究首先從權力與監督兩構面分析目前影響董監酬勞水準之因素,並進一步從權力與監督構面探討執行業務董監領取員工分紅產生之激勵或稀釋效果對公司價值與股東權益之影響。
實證結果顯示,董事會成員之權力擴張會導致較高水準之董監酬勞,尤其是執行業務董監之員工分紅部分,且執行業務董監領取員工分紅對於公司股東權益及公司未來價值具有負向之影響。家族企業之董監酬勞並不會隨著權力擴張而有較高的水準。在內部監督機制方面,獨立董監之監督效果較不明顯;在外部監督機制方面,主動機構投資人相較於被動機構投資人,具有抑制董監酬勞自利行為之效果。 / Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 1996-2004, this thesis examines the determinans of compensation of board directors from the power and monitoring perspectives. In addition, this thesis investigates the effect of equity-based compensation of executive directors on firm value and return on equity.
The empirical result indicates that the entrenchment of managerial power determines the level of directors’ pay, especially on equity-based compensation. The more powerful the board of directors, higher the level of compensation, lower the company value and the return on stockholders` equity. However, as compared to non-family-controlled firms, the directors of family-controlled firms tend to have lower level of compensation. Moreover, we find that active institutional investors have greater monitoring effect on the compensation level of board of directors.
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審計委員會權益基礎報酬是否影響 公司之權益資金成本及信用評等? / Does Audit Committees’ Equity-based Compensation Affect Firms’ Cost of Equity Capital and Credit Rating?陳若晞 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究以權益基礎報酬占總報酬的比率來捕捉薪酬結構,並據以探討給予審計委員會的薪酬結構對於公司權益資金成本及信用評等之影響。利用 2006 至 2010 年間納入美國 S&P1500指數之公司 (排除金融服務與保險業) 為樣本,本研究發現,若權益基礎報酬佔審計委員會薪酬比率越高,其公司之權益資金成本越低,但該公司之信用評等卻越差。顯示權益基礎報酬之比重在二種財報使用者眼中具有不同涵義。投資人認為給予審計委員會較高之權益基礎報酬比重,可使監督更有效,投資人承擔之資訊風險降低,進而願意降低其要求報酬;信用評等機構則認為,給予較高的權益基礎報酬比重將傷害審計委員會獨立性,影響公司治理結構,並降低財務報導之品質,因而給予此類公司較差之信用評等。 / This study examines how investors and credit rating agents react to audit committees’ equity-based compensation. Based on a sample of S&P 1500 firms during 2006-2010, the empirical results show that firms who pay audit committees higher portion of equity-based compensation have lower cost of equity capital and lower credit rating. These results suggest different information users perceive and react to equity-based compensation in different ways. Particularly, investors appear to perceive that higher portion of equity-based compensation can align audit committee members’ interest with the shareholders’, leading to more effective monitoring and smaller information risk. Therefore, investors react by reducing their cost of equity capital. In contrast, credit rating agents appear to perceive that higher portion of equity-based compensation may harm audit committees’ independence, resulting in decreased quality of financial reporting. Therefore, credit rating agents react by downgrading firms’ credit ratings.
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Accounting for employee share options : a critical analysisSacho, Zwi Yosef 30 November 2003 (has links)
The main goal of this dissertation was to obtain an understanding as to the true economic nature of employee share options and the problems surrounding the accounting thereof.
The main conclusion of this study is that employee share options should be expensed in the income statement as and when the employee's services are performed. The reason is that employee share options are valuable financial instruments which the employer has used to compensate the employee for his services. It was also concluded that exercise date accounting and classification of outstanding employee share options as liabilities on the balance sheet is the most appropriate accounting treatment. Such accounting treatment trues up the accounting of employee share options with that of cash-settled share appreciation rights, which are economically equivalent transactions.
The measurement of employee share options should be based on their fair value using an option-pricing model adapted for the specific features of employee share options. / Accounting / Thesis (M. Com. (Accounting Science))
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審計委員會權益薪酬如何影響沙氏法301條之有效性? / How does audit committee equity compensation affect the efficacy of SOX Section 301?劉馨茗, Liu, Xin Ming Unknown Date (has links)
本文主要研究支付給審計委員會較多的權益薪酬會不會影響到審計委員會的獨立性,從而支付較低的審計公費,選擇非產業專家的會計師。以2007至2015年間美國的上市公司為樣本,本研究發現審計委員會獲得的權益薪酬與審計公費,產業專家的會計師選擇呈負相關。此結果與預期一致,權益薪酬會誘導審計委員會妥協獨立性,從而買較少,品質較低的審計服務。
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