The principles of war have been questioned for a long time. Many scientists and military officers believe that they are too wide-ranging, contradictory or even invalid. Nonetheless, the principles of war have been institutionalised in several military doctrines and are used in military education. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the principles of war can explain the outcome of modern maritime warfare. Since the principles of war cannot be regarded as one theory, Liddell Hart’s theory of the principles of war is chosen for this analysis. Using a case study method, the Battle of Baltim in the Yom Kippur War and the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano in the battle of the Falklands Islands are analysed against the theory. Although Liddell Hart’s theory was developed by analysing land warfare, the principles of war are regarded as universal and generally applicable and therefore may be used for analysing maritime warfare. The result of the analysis shows that Liddell Hart’s principles of war can explain the outcome of modern maritime warfare. The principlessecurity, mobility, concentration and surprise are observed in both cases to varying degrees and they are significant in explaining the outcome of the event. Even though Liddell Hart’s theory can explain the outcome, it is shown that the principle of mobility rarely will be fully achieved in submarine operations because of the lack of self-defence systems against enemy weapons.

<p>De klassiska sjökrigsteorierna har åtskilliga år på nacken. Fortfarande anses emellertid Julius S. Corbetts och Alfred T. Mahans idéer äga sin giltighet – trots att den tidigare var verksam under första halvan 1900-talet och den senare under framförallt den andra halvan av 1800-talet. Syftet med arbetet har varit att undersöka huruvida dessa teoretikers syn på strategier i sjökriget som fenomen kan anses relevanta i det moderna sjökriget. Slaget om Falklandsöarna i början 1980-talet har betecknats som en av de första drabbningarna till sjöss som utspelats i en modern telekrigsmiljö. Utgångspunkt har varit att studera i vilken utsträckning Corbetts och Mahans teorier kan skönjas i utförandet av den brittiska operationsplanen i Falklandskriget. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys av Mahans och Corbetts litterära verk, och litteratur om dessa, har adekvata indikatorer tagits fram. Dessa har jämförts med en fallstudie som utgjorts av Falklandskriget. Slutsatsen blev att teorierna – och då framförallt Corbetts tankar – äger sin giltighet, om än inte bokstavligen och i varje detalj, men som en övergripande förklaring på vilket sätt framgång i modern sjökrigsföring kan uppnås.</p> / <p>The classic naval theories have been around for a considerable sum of time. Despite of these circumstances the ideas of Julius S. Corbett and Alfred T. Mahan are still regarded to be obligated their validity – even though that the foremost of them was active under the first part of the 1900 and the latter active particularly during the second part of the 1800. The purpose of the paper has been to examine whether these naval thinker view on strategy in naval warfare could be considered to be relevant in the modern naval warfare. The battle for the Falklands islands in the beginning of 1980 have been designated as one of the first encounters on the high seas that was situated in a modern electronic warfare environment. The starting point has been to study in which extension Corbett’s and Mahan’s theories could be notices in the execution of the British campaign plan in the Falklands war. Through a qualitative text study of Mahan’s and Corbett’s literary creation, and literature about them, adequate indicators have been brought forward. These have been comprehended with a case study consisting of the Falklands war. The conclusion where that the theories – particularly Corbett’s thoughts – still posses, if not figuratively and in every aspect, but as an overlooking clarification through in which way the success in modern navel warfare ought to be accomplished.</p>

De klassiska sjökrigsteorierna har åtskilliga år på nacken. Fortfarande anses emellertid Julius S. Corbetts och Alfred T. Mahans idéer äga sin giltighet – trots att den tidigare var verksam under första halvan 1900-talet och den senare under framförallt den andra halvan av 1800-talet. Syftet med arbetet har varit att undersöka huruvida dessa teoretikers syn på strategier i sjökriget som fenomen kan anses relevanta i det moderna sjökriget. Slaget om Falklandsöarna i början 1980-talet har betecknats som en av de första drabbningarna till sjöss som utspelats i en modern telekrigsmiljö. Utgångspunkt har varit att studera i vilken utsträckning Corbetts och Mahans teorier kan skönjas i utförandet av den brittiska operationsplanen i Falklandskriget. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys av Mahans och Corbetts litterära verk, och litteratur om dessa, har adekvata indikatorer tagits fram. Dessa har jämförts med en fallstudie som utgjorts av Falklandskriget. Slutsatsen blev att teorierna – och då framförallt Corbetts tankar – äger sin giltighet, om än inte bokstavligen och i varje detalj, men som en övergripande förklaring på vilket sätt framgång i modern sjökrigsföring kan uppnås. / The classic naval theories have been around for a considerable sum of time. Despite of these circumstances the ideas of Julius S. Corbett and Alfred T. Mahan are still regarded to be obligated their validity – even though that the foremost of them was active under the first part of the 1900 and the latter active particularly during the second part of the 1800. The purpose of the paper has been to examine whether these naval thinker view on strategy in naval warfare could be considered to be relevant in the modern naval warfare. The battle for the Falklands islands in the beginning of 1980 have been designated as one of the first encounters on the high seas that was situated in a modern electronic warfare environment. The starting point has been to study in which extension Corbett’s and Mahan’s theories could be notices in the execution of the British campaign plan in the Falklands war. Through a qualitative text study of Mahan’s and Corbett’s literary creation, and literature about them, adequate indicators have been brought forward. These have been comprehended with a case study consisting of the Falklands war. The conclusion where that the theories – particularly Corbett’s thoughts – still posses, if not figuratively and in every aspect, but as an overlooking clarification through in which way the success in modern navel warfare ought to be accomplished.

This study examines how Great Britain fared so well against the Fuerza Aérea Argentina during Operation Sutton of the Falklands war in 1982. This operation is problematic and interesting due to the fact that despite being severely outnumbered, the British managed very well and emerged victorious. The purpose of the operation was to land British materiel and personnel on the beach of San Carlos. Since the Argentines could only contest using its aerial forces, the battle was decided in the air. The study was conducted using the newly-released Underdog’s Model, a theory of asymmetric air power, as a theoretical lattice. The theory consists of six categories in which the underdog should seek to outperform its opponent in order to maximize its chances of winning. The purpose of the study is to gain a deeper understanding of how the British managed to win against a numerically superior opponent. There exists a research gap regarding the topic of the air war over the Falklands, and rarely has it been examined using a pair of theoretical spectacles. Therefore, this study would contribute to the current research field of military studies regarding asymmetric air power and the Falklands war. The general results of this study imply that the British managed to outperform the Argentines in basically all the categories. The category in which this was perhaps most evident was in “Engage vulnerable military targets”, while the one category where it was unclear was the one of “Creativity”.

Nell’aprile 1982, l’Argentina – un Paese alleato degli Stati Uniti attraverso il Patto di Rio – invase le isole Falkland, un Territorio d’Oltremare del Regno Unito, rivendicato da Buenos Aires sin dal XIX secolo. Margaret Thatcher, l’allora Primo Ministro britannico, rispose con vigore. Alla fine la Gran Bretagna – alleato NATO degli USA – riuscì a riconquistare le isole e a ristabilire lo status quo ante. Il conflitto va inquadrato nel framework della ‘seconda Guerra Fredda’. Il confronto tra gli Stati Uniti e l’Unione Sovietica fu particolarmente aspro nei primi anni Ottanta e la logica bipolare influenzò le dinamiche diplomatiche della guerra del 1982. Da un lato, l’Emisfero occidentale era al centro della rinnovata strategia americana anti-comunista e l’Argentina era il principale pilastro nel Cono Sud. Dall’altro lato, il rafforzamento della ‘speciale relazione’ anglo-americana costituiva la pietra angolare della grand strategy statunitense nel teatro europeo. Con questo sfondo, è naturale domandarsi quale ruolo Washington scelse di giocare nella guerra delle Falkland tra due dei suoi alleati. A causa di interessi divergenti, la ‘relazione speciale’ non fu infatti del tutto speciale. / In April 1982, Argentina – a country allied with the United States through the Rio Pact – suddenly invaded the Falkland Islands, a long-time Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom, disputed by Buenos Aires since the XIXth century. Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, vigorously responded and finally Britain – a US NATO ally – was able to regain the Islands and re-establish the status quo ante. The conflict needs to be contextualized in the ‘second Cold War’ framework. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was particularly tough in the first years of the 1980s and the bipolar logic strongly influenced the diplomatic course of the 1982 war. On the one hand, the Western hemisphere was at the core of the renewed anti-communist US strategy and Argentina was the main pillar in the Southern Cone. On the other hand, the strengthening of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ was the European cornerstone of the US grand strategy. Against this background, what kind of role the US chose to play in the Falklands war between two of their allies instinctively arises as the main question. Affected by diverging interests, the ‘special relationship’ was not indeed entirely special.

Por meio de tradicionais e novos conceitos da Geopolítica, são analisadas as especiais circunstâncias que cercaram as relações entre a Argentina e os principais países do mundo desenvolvido, os EUA e parte da Europa, durante a Guerra das Malvinas, para, a partir desse mesmo ferramental conceitual, verificar como esse episódio teve seu impacto nas relações de Brasil e Argentina na América do Sul. Os principais acontecimentos políticos, táticos e logísticos desse conflito são descritos para auxiliar nessa análise feita. A partir desse ponto de inflexão na história sul-americana, utiliza-se o conceito de Medidas de Confiança Mútua (MCM) para se verificar como as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina intensificaram suas relações dentro do novo marco geopolítico acordado entre os dois países. São descritos os sucessos dessa política de aproximação em cinco fases históricas distintas, didaticamente elaboradas: duas anteriores à própria Guerra das Malvinas, e três posteriores. Destacam-se, neste estudo, justamente, as três últimas fases. Ou seja, a terceira fase, após a Guerra das Malvinas, onde são descritos, dentre outros aspectos, os encontros estratégicos organizados pelo EMFA (Brasil) e pelo EMCFA (Argentina) no final da década de 80 do século passado; a quarta fase, ao longo da década de 90, por ter sido o período em que as principais MCM de sucesso ocorreram; e a quinta fase, já na virada do milênio, onde são discutidos os limites atuais das MCM que vêm sendo adotadas e as possíveis perspectivas futuras. A primeira e a segunda fases situam-se ainda nos períodos iniciais e intermediários da Guerra Fria, mas, por já existirem ali algumas MCM embrionárias entre as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina, importantes para desdobramentos futuros, estas fases têm também discutidas as suas importâncias históricas. Enfatiza-se que, na primeira fase, os principais episódios ocorreram sob grande influência dos EUA, enquanto, na segunda fase, já se constatava uma ligeira autonomia regional nas medidas adotadas. / There are analyzede, by means of traditional and new concepts of geopolitics, the special circumstances that surrounded the relations between Argentina and the main developed countries, the United States and part of Europe, during the Malvinas War, in order to, based on such conceptual tool, exam, how such episode impacted the Brazil-Argentina relations on South America. The main political, tactic and logistic events are described to help with the analysis. As of this turning point in the South-American history, it is used the concept of Mutual Confidence Measures (MCM) to verify how the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies intensified their relations in the new giopolitics milestone agreed upon between both countries. There are described the successful events in such approaching policy and politics in five different phases, didactically worked out: two prior to the Malvinas War and three afterwards. This study high lights precisely the three last phases, i.e., the phases after the Malvinas War. In the third phase, there are described, among other aspects, the strategic meetings organized by the EMFA (Brazil) and the EMCFA (Argentina) at the end of the 1980s; in the forth phase, are highly emphasized the 1990s since this is the period during which most of the MCM succeeded; and, in the fifth phase, already at the turning of the millennium, the current limits of the MCM, that are being adopted, are discussed, as well as the possible perspectives for the future. The first and second phases are the ones still during the beginning and intermediate periods of the Cold War. These phases are also discussed because they already presented some embryonic MCM policies between the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies, important for the way the events unfolded later on. In the first phase, there are stressed the main episodes that took place under the influence of the US, while, in the second, one can already notice a slight regional autonomy in the measures adopted.

Por meio de tradicionais e novos conceitos da Geopolítica, são analisadas as especiais circunstâncias que cercaram as relações entre a Argentina e os principais países do mundo desenvolvido, os EUA e parte da Europa, durante a Guerra das Malvinas, para, a partir desse mesmo ferramental conceitual, verificar como esse episódio teve seu impacto nas relações de Brasil e Argentina na América do Sul. Os principais acontecimentos políticos, táticos e logísticos desse conflito são descritos para auxiliar nessa análise feita. A partir desse ponto de inflexão na história sul-americana, utiliza-se o conceito de Medidas de Confiança Mútua (MCM) para se verificar como as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina intensificaram suas relações dentro do novo marco geopolítico acordado entre os dois países. São descritos os sucessos dessa política de aproximação em cinco fases históricas distintas, didaticamente elaboradas: duas anteriores à própria Guerra das Malvinas, e três posteriores. Destacam-se, neste estudo, justamente, as três últimas fases. Ou seja, a terceira fase, após a Guerra das Malvinas, onde são descritos, dentre outros aspectos, os encontros estratégicos organizados pelo EMFA (Brasil) e pelo EMCFA (Argentina) no final da década de 80 do século passado; a quarta fase, ao longo da década de 90, por ter sido o período em que as principais MCM de sucesso ocorreram; e a quinta fase, já na virada do milênio, onde são discutidos os limites atuais das MCM que vêm sendo adotadas e as possíveis perspectivas futuras. A primeira e a segunda fases situam-se ainda nos períodos iniciais e intermediários da Guerra Fria, mas, por já existirem ali algumas MCM embrionárias entre as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina, importantes para desdobramentos futuros, estas fases têm também discutidas as suas importâncias históricas. Enfatiza-se que, na primeira fase, os principais episódios ocorreram sob grande influência dos EUA, enquanto, na segunda fase, já se constatava uma ligeira autonomia regional nas medidas adotadas. / There are analyzede, by means of traditional and new concepts of geopolitics, the special circumstances that surrounded the relations between Argentina and the main developed countries, the United States and part of Europe, during the Malvinas War, in order to, based on such conceptual tool, exam, how such episode impacted the Brazil-Argentina relations on South America. The main political, tactic and logistic events are described to help with the analysis. As of this turning point in the South-American history, it is used the concept of Mutual Confidence Measures (MCM) to verify how the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies intensified their relations in the new giopolitics milestone agreed upon between both countries. There are described the successful events in such approaching policy and politics in five different phases, didactically worked out: two prior to the Malvinas War and three afterwards. This study high lights precisely the three last phases, i.e., the phases after the Malvinas War. In the third phase, there are described, among other aspects, the strategic meetings organized by the EMFA (Brazil) and the EMCFA (Argentina) at the end of the 1980s; in the forth phase, are highly emphasized the 1990s since this is the period during which most of the MCM succeeded; and, in the fifth phase, already at the turning of the millennium, the current limits of the MCM, that are being adopted, are discussed, as well as the possible perspectives for the future. The first and second phases are the ones still during the beginning and intermediate periods of the Cold War. These phases are also discussed because they already presented some embryonic MCM policies between the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies, important for the way the events unfolded later on. In the first phase, there are stressed the main episodes that took place under the influence of the US, while, in the second, one can already notice a slight regional autonomy in the measures adopted.

<p>Den 26 maj 1982 påbörjas anfallet mot samhällena Darwin och Goose Green. Anfallande styrka är brittiska, 2 Paras, på plats och försvarsgrupperade är Taskforce Mercedes. Britterna vinner slutligen över en numerärt överlägsen och försvarsgrupperad argentinsk styrka. Hur kommer det sig att detta kan ske? Jag kommer, för att kunna besvara mina frågeställningar, i det här självständiga arbetet att med utgång i de grundläggande förmågorna, ledning, verkan, skydd, rörlighet, uthållighet och und/info, analysera slaget. Dessa frågeställningar är:</p><p> -          Vilken av de grundläggande förmågorna var avgörande för 2 Paras seger?</p><p>-          Vilken av de grundläggande förmågorna var avgörande för Taskforce Mercedes förlust?</p><p>Jag har kommit fram till följande; britterna kunde tack vare en kombination av förmågorna ledning och verkan avgöra striden till deras fördel. För argentinarna var det förmågan ledning som bäddade för deras förlust. Vill du veta hur jag kommit fram till detta och varför uppmanar jag dig att läsa detta arbete.</p> / <p>My name is Nicklas Nilsson. I’m a cadet studying at the Swedish Land warfare Centre. As a part of becoming a commissioned officer I’m obligated to write an essay at fundamental level. I have written about the Battle for Darwin – Goose Green. A battle between 2 Para and Taskforce Mercedes. I have used (de grundläggande förmågorna) six fundamental abilities as an analysis instrument. The questions I am going to answer with this essay are:</p><p> -What ability was decisive for 2 Para’s victory?</p><p>-What ability was decisive for Taskforce Mercedes defeat?</p><p> Initially I will conduct a literature study, followed by a comparative case study.</p><p>I have come to the following conclusions:</p><p>The Argentines lost due to their lack of a good leadership and</p><p>The British won due to the abilities, better trained, better motivated and with more experience. They also, contrary to the Argentines, had leaders that was present and tried to resolve the situations they’ve gotten in to. If you want to read more about this and how I’ve come to these conclusions, please read this essay.</p>

Den 26 maj 1982 påbörjas anfallet mot samhällena Darwin och Goose Green. Anfallande styrka är brittiska, 2 Paras, på plats och försvarsgrupperade är Taskforce Mercedes. Britterna vinner slutligen över en numerärt överlägsen och försvarsgrupperad argentinsk styrka. Hur kommer det sig att detta kan ske? Jag kommer, för att kunna besvara mina frågeställningar, i det här självständiga arbetet att med utgång i de grundläggande förmågorna, ledning, verkan, skydd, rörlighet, uthållighet och und/info, analysera slaget. Dessa frågeställningar är:  -          Vilken av de grundläggande förmågorna var avgörande för 2 Paras seger? -          Vilken av de grundläggande förmågorna var avgörande för Taskforce Mercedes förlust? Jag har kommit fram till följande; britterna kunde tack vare en kombination av förmågorna ledning och verkan avgöra striden till deras fördel. För argentinarna var det förmågan ledning som bäddade för deras förlust. Vill du veta hur jag kommit fram till detta och varför uppmanar jag dig att läsa detta arbete. / My name is Nicklas Nilsson. I’m a cadet studying at the Swedish Land warfare Centre. As a part of becoming a commissioned officer I’m obligated to write an essay at fundamental level. I have written about the Battle for Darwin – Goose Green. A battle between 2 Para and Taskforce Mercedes. I have used (de grundläggande förmågorna) six fundamental abilities as an analysis instrument. The questions I am going to answer with this essay are:  -What ability was decisive for 2 Para’s victory? -What ability was decisive for Taskforce Mercedes defeat?  Initially I will conduct a literature study, followed by a comparative case study. I have come to the following conclusions: The Argentines lost due to their lack of a good leadership and The British won due to the abilities, better trained, better motivated and with more experience. They also, contrary to the Argentines, had leaders that was present and tried to resolve the situations they’ve gotten in to. If you want to read more about this and how I’ve come to these conclusions, please read this essay.

Denna undersökning har studerat ett lätt infanteriförbands användning av kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan under en amfibieoperation samt vilka aspekter som påverkade möjligheten till kombinerad bekämpning p.g.a. operationens amfibiska karaktär. Fallet har utgjorts av Parachute Regiments två bataljoner som under Falklandskriget utkämpade tre slag vid Darwin – Goose Green, Mount Longdon och Wireless Ridge. Som analysverktyg har använts Robert Leonhards teori om den kombinerade bekämpningens tre principer. Indikatorer på principerna har varit syften med verkan hämtade ur teorin om de grundläggande förmågorna. Två av slagen befanns endast delvis kännetecknas av Leonhards två första principer, principerna om kompletterande system och dilemman. Den tredje principen om fördelaktig terräng uppfylldes inte. Det tredje slaget regementet utkämpade kännetecknades helt igenom av Leonhards två första principer medan den tredje delvis beaktades. Undersökningen konstaterar att kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan kan utvecklas av ett lätt infanteriförband under en amfibieoperation. Dock ledde ofördelaktig disponering av förbandet i de aktuella fallen till att kombinerad bekämpning tidvis omöjliggjordes. Leonhards tredje princip tenderade att förringas. De specifikt amfibiska aspekterna avseende möjligheten till kombinerad bekämpning utgjordes främst av tillgången till fartygsartilleri, kraven på helikoptertransporterbart fältartilleri samt bristen på lätta trossfordon. / This dissertation has investigated how a light infantry force has used combined arms during an amphibious operation, specific factors related to the operations character affecting the possibility to develop combined arms have also been highlighted. The case chosen for the study was Parachute Regiments actions during the three battles of Darwin – Goose Green, Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge during the Falklands War. As a analytical tool Robert Leonhard’s theory about the three principles of combined arms was used together with indicators borrowed from the theory about the warfighting functions purposes of fires. Two of the battles were found to be only partially characterized by Leonhard’s first two principles, complementary systems and dilemmas. The third principle about favorable terrain was neglected. The third battle was throughout characterized by the first two principles and to a larger extent than the former by the third principle. The dissertation concludes that light infantry can use combined arms during amphibious operations. The battles studied were, however, often characterized by unfavorable disposition of the force which affected the possibilities to use combined arms. Leonhard´s third principle was usually neglected. The most important amphibious aspects affecting the possibilities to combined arms were found to be naval gunfire support, light field artillery and the scarcity of light all-terrain vehicles.