Cette thèse a l’allure d’une géographie de l’historial visant à cartographier le site où la philosophie atteint sa fin. Une telle géographie obéit à, au moins, deux contraintes matricielles. La première contrainte exige de décrire le site en vue de le localiser : notre thèse consistera alors à poser que le site en question ne pourra être occupé que par la finitude infinie car c’est seulement en elle que résiderait son avoir-Lieu matinal ; avoir-Lieu par où la finitude devra pousser son originarité créatrice jusqu’à libérer en elle une infinité affectée en retour d’un sens inédit. La seconde contrainte exige de défricher des territoires textuels permettant d’exhiber le système de coordonnées conceptuelles susceptible de cartographier le site de la FI : notre thèse consistera alors à poser que c’est le territoire élaboré par Derrida qui héberge en lui la cartographie natale de la FI en raison de l’intervention à la fois inaugurale et structurale de la FI sur ce territoire. Dès lors, séjourner dans l’unité articulée de ces deux contraintes exigera d’endurer l’installation spéculative dans la proposition cardinale suivante : la finitude infinie est la déconstruction. Cette endurance se donnera pour tâche de re-Marquer la FI sur le territoire derridien en (re)construisant d’une part le plan d’intelligibilité de la FI à travers l’agencement de ces deux lignes directrices (phénoménologico-Transcendantale et thanatologico-Transcendantale) et d’autre part, en montrant que si la FI confronte le territoire derridien à une charge aporétique opérant comme un pharmakon, cette pharmacologie pourrait libérer des figures inédites de la finitude infinie – figures herméneutiques (Heidegger) et spéculatives (Hegel). / We set out to construct a geography of historical aiming to cartograph the site where philosophy reaches its end. In so doing, two main constraints at least have to be taken into account. We first have to describe the site in order to locate it. We argue that the site in question can only be occupied by infinite finitude, for it is our assumption that only infinite finitude holds its inaugural taking-Place, a taking-Place wherein infinite finitude will have to push its creative originarity so far as to release in itself an infinity that will be affected in return by a novel meaning. Secondly, we have to break new ground in textual territories, which will enable us to uncover the system of conceptual coordinates that will make it possible to cartograph the site of infinite finitude. We argue that it is the territory constructed by Derrida that hosts the native cartography of infinite finitude because of the intervention, both inaugural and structural, of infinite finitude on that territory. It follows that, in order to dwell in the articulated unit of these two constraints, we have to maintain a speculative posture in the following cardinal proposition: infinite finitude IS deconstruction. This posture makes it possible to delineate and re-Inscribe infinite finitude on the Derridean territory by (re)constructing a plane of intelligibility through the combination of both the phenomenologico-Transcendental and thanatologico-Trancendental axes on the one hand; by showing, on the other hand, that if infinite finitude confronts the Derridean territory with an aporetic charge operating as a pharmakon, that pharmacology could release novel figures of infinite finitude - hermeneutic (Heidegger), as well as speculative (Hegel), ones.

Poderíamos sintetizar a nossa intenção nesse trabalho como uma tentativa de compreender uma interpretação da questão da realização proposta por Hegel no prefácio à Fenomenologia do espírito de 1807, quando faz referência à uma filosofia que se torna saber, ou seja, de uma filosofia que abandona a partícula \"filo\". Questão herdada da segunda formulação do Imperativo categórico, ganha uma dimensão que não tinha em Kant. Para Lukacs, essa realização é a Revolução e a efetivação da consciência de si de um para-nós (proletariado). Hyppolite, por outro lado, interpreta essa realização como um fato que caberia tratar em toda sua amplitude de significação, ou seja, de forma que essa efetivação não poderia ser concebida sem uma valoração positiva da singularidade. Esse trabalho procura ressaltar os pontos de contato entre Hegel e Kant, seguindo a leitura de Hyppolite, onde uma consciência natural segue um caminho da desilusão até se tornar consciência de si (filosófica e singular). Essa opção existencial de ler Hegel implica definir alguns significados e termos. O para-nós deve ser entendido como o ponto de vista filosófico do trajeto da consciência natural em direção à consciência-de-si e não o ponto de vista final da história que cabe à dialética, como movimento real, efetivar. Da mesma forma, para Hyppolite, a história universal, na Fenomenologia do espirito, deve ser compreendida como um termo médio da ascensão do espírito e não como movimento necessário da consciência de si do proletariado. A leitura de Hyppolite não é indiferente ao ponto de vista subversivo-revolucionário da Fenomenologia, mas como condição cognitivo-filosófica do surgimento do espírito como efetivação da razão na filosofia e não como referência exclusiva da razão na história. Não se trata de defender a incompatibilidade do materialismo histórico com a Fenomenologia, pois ela não existe, mas apenas de notar que toda a questão da singularidade não precisa ser abandonada como resquício conservador em Hegel. / We could abbreviate our intent in this work as an attempt to understand an interpretation of the question of achievement proposed by Hegel in the preface to the Phenomenology of the Spirit, when he refers to a philosophy that becomes knowledge or a philosophy that discards the prefix \"philo\". Question inherited from the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, it gains a dimension that it did not have in Kant. For Lukacs, this realization is the Revolution and the realization of self-consciousness of a for-us (proletariat). Hyppolite, on the other hand, interprets this realization as a fact that would be dealt with in all its amplitude of signification, that is, this realization could not be conceived without a positive valuation of singularity. This work intends to highlight the points of contact between Hegel and Kant, following the reading of Hyppolite, where a natural consciousness follows a path of disillusionment until it becomes an selfconsciousness (philosophical and singular). This existential option of reading Hegel implies defining some meanings and terms. The for-us must be understood as the philosophical point of view of the path of the natural consciousness towards the self-consciousness and not the final point of view of the history that the dialectics, as a real movement, should consummate. Likewise, for Hyppolite, universal history in the Phenomenology of the spirit must be understood as a middle term of the ascension of the spirit and not as a necessary movement of self-consciousness of the proletariat. Hyppolite\'s reading is not indifferent to the subversive-revolutionary point of view of Phenomenology, but as a cognitive-philosophical condition of the emergence of the spirit as the actualization of reason in philosophy and not as the exclusive reference of reason in history. It is not a question of defending the incompatibility of historical materialism with the Phenomenology, because it does not exist, but only to note that the whole question of singularity need not be abandoned as a conservative remnant in Hegel.

This study argues that the dialectic and the metamorphosis of the basso del tema and tema in Beethoven’s Eroica Variations, Op. 35 mirror the stages of the philosophical thought of German Idealism. The philosophical systems of the post-Kantian generation were housed in the values of the Goethezeit, in which the concept of self was regarded as fundamental for the worldview. In Germany these systems generated a new intellectual ethos that merged cultural nationalism with the glorification of the self (Burnham). Beethoven’s music gave reliable expression to the values of the Goethezeit, depicting the self as a spiritual entity with a constitutive autonomy, a possibility for self-transcendence, and a fundamental condition of struggle for freedom. While research has focused on Beethoven’s heroic style (Broyles) and the philosophy of his music (Adorno), there is very little literature on the relationship between Beethoven’s music and the philosophical thought of the time. In 1930 Schenker discussed the use of the Eroica theme in the Eroica Variations (Marston): first, the material is stated in its simple form; then, rhythmic structure, dynamics, tempo, texture, and key transform it. Schenker considers the large-movement form rather than the theme, giving emphasis to the basso del tema. This study proposes an analysis of Op. 35–focusing first on the first fourteen variations and then on the fifteenth variation and on the fugue individually–as the musical statement of the philosophical thought of the Goethezeit and offers a discussion on the historical perspectives in Op. 35. Then, the study applies the proposed philosophical and historical analysis of the Eroica Variations to explain how an interpretation based on critical theory can help concert performers develop a deeper understanding of such a demanding piece of repertoire. Finally, the study examines the Eroica Variations as one of the most substantial concert pieces for piano by Beethoven and of the beginning of the nineteenth century, and offers suggestions on how to meet the musical and technical challenges of the piece. / Music Performance

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京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(人間・環境学) / 甲第25369号 / 人博第1111号 / 新制||人||259(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院人間・環境学研究科共生人間学専攻 / (主査)教授 安部 浩, 教授 戸田 剛文, 教授 青山 拓央, 教授 上原 麻有子 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Human and Environmental Studies / Kyoto University / DGAM

Comment la critique hölderlinienne de la raison ouvre-t-elle la possibilité d'une habitation poétique de l'homme sur terre ? Quel est le rôle de la parole poétique et quelle est sa signification pour la modernité ? Ce sont pour nous deux faces de la même question chez Höderlin. Nous disons que la critique hölderlinienne de la rationalité est la plus radicale qui soit, tout simplement parce qu'il a quitté le chemin de la raison. Dans un premier temps de ce travail, nous examinerons la spécificité de la critique hölderlinienne de la raison en marge de l'idéalisme allemand, surtout sa différence d'avec Schelling et Fichte, à partir du texte "Urteil und Sein" ; dans un deuxième temps nous verrons la question de la poésie, à l'exemple de la spécificité de la poésie hölderlinienne, et le concept d'intuition intellectuelle dont il parle vaguement ; ensuite nous traiterons le rapport entre le temps et le langage poétique, plus généralement l'art, à l'aide du concept hölderlinien du souvenir, et poser la question de la possibilité d'une habitation poétique de l'homme à l'ère de la technologie. / How does Hölderlin's critique of reason open up possibility of a poetical dwelling of man on earth? What is the role of poetical language and what is its significance for the modernity? These are for us two sides of the same question by Hölderlin. We say that Hölderlin's critique of rationality is the most radical, simply because he left the path of reason. As a first step of this work, we shall examine the specificity of Hölderlin's criticism of reason in the relationship with German idealism, especially its difference from Schelling and Fichte from text "Urtheil und Seyn"; secondly we will consider the question of poetry, with the example of the specificity of Hölderlin's poetry, and the concept of intellectual intuition of which he spoke vaguely; and then we will discuss the relationship between time and the poetical language, or of art more generally, using help of Hölderlin's concept of "memory", and finally ask the question of the possibility of a poetical dwelling of man in the middle of the era of technology.

Hegel führt die traditionelle formale Logik, wie sie in Kants Konzept der reinen allgemeinen Logik ihre für ihn abschließende Gestalt erfahren hat, innerhalb seiner Systematik auf die Psychologie der produktiven Einbildungskraft und des Denkens zurück. Kants Konzeption der transzendentalen Logik, und mit ihr die neuzeitliche Erkenntnistheorie, wird aus gesamtsystematischer Hinsicht in der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes verortet, und insbesondere in der Phänomenologie des Geistes und der Psychologie der Anschauung und Vorstellung. In logischer Hinsicht leistet Kant nach Hegel nur eine Übersetzung phänomenologischer Inhalte der psychologischen Vorstellung in relativ unterentwickelte und isolierte objektivlogische Strukturen (reine Reflexions- und wesentliche Verhältnisbestimmungen), wodurch er über den psychologischen Reflex des Begriffs nicht hinauskommt. Der logische Inhalt bzw. der objektive Gedanke dagegen basiert in seiner formalen Dimension auf die Realisierung des Begriffs im Prozess der endlichen Teleologie, aus deren Perspektive auch phänomenologische und logische Dimensionen von Struktur- und Verhältnisbestimmungen differenziert werden können (Inhalte der kontemplative Erwägung der Konstruktionsbedingungen des unausgeführten subjektiven Zwecks im ersten Fall, Funktionalität von Strukturverhältnissen im Prozess der Ausführung des subjektiven Zwecks im zweiten Fall). Der logische Inhalt ist konkret im Vergleich zum phänomenologischen Inhalt der psychologischen Vorstellung und abstrakt im Vergleich zum realsystematischen Inhalt als Korrelat der absoluten Methode. / Within his system Hegel relegates traditional formal logic, as it found its fulfillment in Kant´s concept of pure general logic, to the psychology of productive imagination and thought. Kant´s conception of transcendental logic, and with it a modern epistemological standpoint more generally, is also allocated in the philosophy of subjective spirit, and more specifically in the phenomenology and the psychology of intuition and representation. From a logical standpoint Kant does not, according to Hegel, go beyond translating phenomenological contents of the psychological representation into the relatively simple structures of the determinations of reflection and essential relations, thereby staying within the realm of the mere psychological reflex of the concept. Determinate logical content or objective thought on the contrary is based in its formal dimension on the actualization of the concept in the process of finite teleology. From this perspective it is possible to coherently distinguish between phenomenological and logical dimensions of structural and relational determinations (contents of the contemplative assessment of the conditions of construction of the yet unexecuted subjective finite end on the one hand, functionality of structural relations in the process of executing this end on the other). The logical content is concrete compared to the phenomenological one and abstract compared to the content of the real parts of the system as the correlate of absolute logical method.

Le divin peut-il être à la fois mort et vivant ? Résonnant pour nous à partir de Nietzsche et de Heidegger, cette question traverse l’œuvre, d’abord poétique mais aussi pleinement philosophique, de Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843). Dès la querelle du panthéisme qui anime le débat intellectuel germanique au cours des années 1780, le dieu de la métaphysique identifié avec le dieu chrétien semble perdre son effectivité. Mais le divin n’est pas seulement pour Hölderlin un contenu dogmatique ou conceptuel : il désigne avant tout le lien qui s’établit avec la nature lorsque l’homme réfléchit le sentiment que celle-ci produit en lui-même. Dès lors, même s’il semble exposé à la mort en tant que Créateur transcendant du monde, Dieu ne cesse pas de pouvoir être approché comme la source vive de toute apparition. Il ne se manifeste toutefois comme tel qu’à condition de s’effacer comme antériorité et de donner lieu aux choses singulières, en une rupture de toute union prétendument originelle. Or, dire que le principe doit nier sa propre primauté, c’est dire que l’un tend à se séparer de soi pour accéder à sa propre unité, et qu’il doit nécessairement produire une image de lui-même. En défendant cette thèse héritière d’Héraclite et du néoplatonisme, Hölderlin s’oppose aux philosophes idéalistes subjectifs, qui identifient alors le principe de toute réalité avec le Moi, et il s’expose du même coup à l’objection d’être incohérent et exalté. Mais l’effet produit par ses poèmes, par son roman et par sa tragédie fait s’évanouir tout soupçon de Schwärmerei. La poésie hölderlinienne est réellement image de Dieu. L’étude de la méditation et de la mise en œuvre progressive d’une telle effectivité exige de distinguer trois périodes dans le développement de sa pensée. Entre 1785 et 1795, Hölderlin s’efforce de parvenir, après avoir lu Kant, Schiller, Fichte et Schelling, à une compréhension à la fois non subjective et non dogmatique de l’être. Entre 1795 et 1802, en nommant le principe à la fois « beauté » à partir de Platon et « un se différenciant en lui-même » à partir d’Héraclite, il conceptualise les moyens de traduire poétiquement la profusion de la vie divine. Entre 1802 et 1843, comme si la mort de Susette Gontard, l’isolement et la folie affrontés sur le plan biographique rejoignaient, sur les plans théorique et poétique, la méditation de Pindare, de Sophocle et de la figure du Christ, Hölderlin montre la dépendance de l’infini à l’égard de la finitude. Ainsi son œuvre entière donne-t-elle à voir, en sa tension interne entre le poème et la philosophie, la vie divine harmoniquement opposée. / Can the divinity be at once dead and alive? Resonating for us since the time of Nietzsche and Heidegger, this question runs all through the works of Hölderlin, in the first place poetic, but also, in the fullest sense, philosophic. From the time of the controversy over pantheism among German intellectuals in the 1780s the identification of the god of metaphysics with the Christian god seems to have lost its effectiveness. But the divinity for Hölderlin was not only a written dogma or concept ; it denotes above all the link established with nature when man reflects the feelings it arouses in him. From then on, god, even if he seems exposed to death as the transcendent creator of the world, continues to be approachable as the deepest source of all apparitions. However, god only manifests himself in this way if he effaces himself as anteriority, and breaking all union supposedly original, makes way for singular things. Now, to say that the principle denies its own primacy is to say that the one tends to separate from itself in order to reach its own unity, and that it must necessarily produce an image of itself. In defending this proposition, Hölderlin set himself in opposition to the subjective idealist philosophers, who identified the principle of all reality with the "I", and he exposed himself at the same time to the objection that he was incoherent and fanatical. But the effect produced by his poems, novel and tragedy dispels all suspicion of Schwärmerei. Hölderlin’s poetry really is the image of god. A study of his meditation and the progressive implementation of such a level of effectiveness makes it necessary to distinguish three periods in the evolution of his thought. Between 1785 and 1795, after having read Kant, Schiller, Fichte and Schelling, Hölderlin tried to achieve an understanding both non-subjective and non-dogmatic of Being. Between 1795 and 1802 he conceptualised the means of conveying through poetry the profusion of divine life, naming the principle both "beauty", after Plato, and "one differentiating in itself", after Heraclitus. Between 1802 and 1843, as if the death of Susette Gontard, isolation and madness confronted at a biographical level had conjoined, at a theoretic and poetic level, the meditation on Pindar, Sophocles and the face of Christ, Hölderlin showed the dependence of the infinite with regard to the finite. Thus, the whole body of his work, in its internal tension between poem and philosophy, reveals divine life in harmonic opposition.

In this thesis it is argued that Kant's Copernican turn depends on his doctrine of the imagination, and that by understanding the role of imagination as symbolic rather than schematic, the resources are provided to show that his critical philosophy has more radical possibilities than those of his post-Kantian critics. To display this, it is first pointed out that the crucial role the imagination plays in Kant's Copernican turn is not fully developed in his first Critique. Next, it is argued that Kant's doctrine of the imagination is not fully realized until the third Critique in which Kant radicalizes his notion of constructivism by introducing a distinction between determinative and reflective judgments. Finally, it is suggested that while Hegel believes that Kant?s idealism is not dynamic enough to support a full-fledged constructivism, in fact, when Kant?s mature doctrine of the imagination is taken into account, this is no longer the case because Kant believes that our particular experiences of the world unfold artistically and creatively according to the work of the imagination. It is suggested, therefore, that in many ways Kant anticipates the developments of thinkers such as Hegel and other post- Kantians and may even continue to lie beyond them.