Práce popisuje hlavní principy a myšlenky guerrilla marketingu, jeho různé styly a odnože a rozdíly oproti marketingu tradičnímu. Důraz je kladen na rozdílnost přístupu a stylu myšlení. Součástí jsou i aplikace jednotlivých myšlenek nebo nástrojů guerrilla marketingu na reálné nebo hypotetické situace, doplněné rozborem případových studií.

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This research explores cult formation and sect-like worship in the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), around the figures of both the priest and guerrilla fighter Camilo Torres (1929-1966), and Fabio Vásquez, leader and founder of the group in 1963-1978. I examine the relationship between authority and obedience that shaped political leadership in Colombia since the late 19th century. In particular, I consider how collective moral and individual values become ritualized in daily practices and moral discourses fostered by leaders that promoted drastic social change along Colombian history. This analysis of authority and obedience facilitates interpretations into how leaders create allegiances and legitimize violence as a strategy to bring about change in Colombian politics. I argue that the politics of magnicidio demonstrates how the formation of leadership is hampered by the use of selective violence, as a strategy to dismantle or deter political opponents from participation. This happens in both mainstream politics and within insurgent groups. In this vein, I argue that by approaching the figure of Camilo Torres and the reverence to his memory, it is possible to understand the importance of leadership and authority both in a guerrilla group, and in social mobilization, particularly the student movement, intellectual sectors, and the youth. I sustain that reverence to Camilo Torres has been fostered primarily outside the ELN. Although the ceremonies around his figure and the revolutionary project progressively furnished the group with a consistent pattern of belief for individual and group interaction, his leadership in the groups was not substantial. I demonstrate how Camilo Torres surrendered to the leadership of Fabio Vásquez in an attempt to become a suitable guerrillero. I argue that beyond claims for Camilo Torres' political legacy, guerrilla fighters in the ELN used his thought to challenge and undermine Fabio Vásquez' personalistic leadership in 1967-1974. Although the figure of Camilo Torres created internal cohesion, the ELN‘s re-conceptualization of the revolutionary project used his life only as a paradigm of commitment, sacrifice and revolutionary redemption, ignoring the priest's political ideals and assertions on social justice, charity and love. I conclude by exploring Camilo Torres' thought and actions in order to demonstrate how the ELN selectively interprets his legacy, and thereby justify the last months of his life to legitimize radical left leaning fighting. / Ph. D.

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / The level of violence has not only increased constantly over the last decades, but has also shifted in nature from conventional to unconventional. Given these circumstances, Romania's national interests call for the development of unconventional capabilities that are necessary in order to deal with current and future low intensity conflicts. This thesis analyzes the influence of language training and cultural understanding on the overall success of counterinsurgency campaigns. Examining some situations where the U.S. and British forces carried out counterinsurgency operations, this project reveals that ground troops with foreign language skills and cultural training were able to work more efficient with the local population. Cultural awareness facilitated communication and developed interpersonal trust. Additionally, language and cultural training enhanced military personnel's ability to understand the operational environment and to make a more selective use of force. The purpose of this thesis is not to promote a departure from conventional military training, but rather to propose the development of new Romanian military capabilities, the performance of which will increase through a better exploitation of language and cultural resources. / Captain, Romanian Army

Syftet med denna studie var att genom semistrukturerade djupintervjuer, med särskild fokus på visuella gerillakampanjer, kartlägga de av byråerna benämnda karaktärsdragen för gerillakampanjer samt byråernas arbetssätt för dessa kampanjer.Fem semistrukturerade djupintervjuer genomfördes på respektive respondents arbetsplats utvalda genom ett kombinerat strategiskt och bekvämlighetsurval.Resultaten visade tydliga karaktärsdrag för en gerillakampanj. Utifrån dessa har följande definition tagits fram: en gerillakampanj kännetecknas av att den saknar köpt medieexponering och ofta karaktäriseras av en kreativ, ofta situations- och miljöanpassad, utformning som på egen hand väcker stort intresse eller uppmärksamhet relativt mot den nyttjade budgeten i syfte att skapa djupare relationer med mottagaren.Arbetssätten för en visuell gerillakampanj och vanliga gerillakampanjer skiljer sig inte nämnvärt mot arbetssätten för en traditionell reklamkampanj. Vid framtagandet av en gerillakampanj görs juridiska överväganden om huruvida lagöverträdelser kan komma att krävas. Det framkom även att spridningen i efterhand av en gerillakampanj var viktig för att få så stort genomslag som möjligt genom nyttjandet av traditionell media. / The aim of this study was to identify the advertising agencies considered characteristics of guerrilla campaigns and agencies' working process on guerrilla campaigns, with the particular focus on the visual guerrilla campaigns, using semi-structured interviews.Five semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted. Respondents were selected strategically.The results showed distinct characteristics of guerrilla campaigns. Based on these, the following definition were conducted: a guerrilla campaign is characterised by the lack of bought media exposure, a creative, often situational and environmentally adapted design, that without assistance from other sales promotions produce high interest or attention relative to the utilized budget, in order to create a deeper relationship with the recipient.The working methods of a visual guerrilla campaign and a regular guerrilla campaign do not differ remarkably from a traditional campaign. The study also showed that the spread of a guerrilla campaign was important for its effectiveness.

Diss. Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2008.

The aim of work is to aply theory of political terorism and guerrilla to Brother's Masin resistence group activities. This work offers a new view to research issues of Brother's Masin resistence group. Besides the theory of political terorism and guerila we have to account contemporary context. Each group action will be assign to one of the theory. Masin's father had a great influence to resistence group activity. He has to have his own place in this work. It is also necessary to introduce historical context of the time and give the most important reasons to the group activities. Because it is important to look at the contemporary context we have to describe what Czechoslovakia, East German and West German press wrote about it. In conclusion are the most important facts about theory of political terorism and guerrilla. To this theories will be assigned each resistence group activities. The conclusion provides an overview of Brother's Masin resistence group activities using theory of political terorism and guerrilla.

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Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN Doctrine or to follow the correct methods within current doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and governments in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, therefore requires a Counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the Counterguerilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Therefore, not only is the COIN doctrine is inadequate, it also requires an overall governing strategy which must include the engagements of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, as well as counterforce operations against the guerillas. The entire hierarchy of COIN Doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under Support and Stability Operations, as do Counterguerrilla Operations in doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development [IDAD] Programs). The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and commanding these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations. / Major, United States Army