Guerrilla marketing is a relatively new way of doing marketing. It is initially used by small companies and/or individuals allowing them to act like large companies. However, more and more large companies use Guerrilla marketing these days. The usage of Guerrilla management can bring advantages but can also increase risks. At this moment little research is done about the way how large companies manage the reputational risk associated with Guerrilla marketing. This is a problem in both science and practise. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to contribute to the understanding of how large companies manage the possible reputational risk that Guerrilla marketing and the communication of Guerrilla marketing brings along. This research is based on several theories, both emerging and dominant about Guerrilla marketing, Viral Marketing, Buzz marketing, Reputational risk and Reputational Risk Management. To do the research, in-depth interviews were held with experts when it comes to managing reputational risk and new marketing tools of four large companies based in Sweden. The analyses show that large companies manage the increasing reputational risks in some extend. Main findings are that the companies do not monitor Guerrilla marketing processes and do not have a central coordination for reputational risk management. This shows that not all companies are really aware of the risk that new marketing tools bring along and do not have a solid reputational risk management.

Esta investigación presenta una perspectiva sobre la cuestión de la violencia del ámbito de lo político, tanto de aquélla orientada a la conservación del orden instituido como de aquella que intenta subvertirlo, esto es, de la violencia vigilante y de la violencia insurgente. La exposición transita por tres núcleos temáticos: las dificultades que conlleva ubicar la violencia como protagonista de la crítica filosófica, la discusión sobre el significado de la violencia política en el discurso hegemónico del poder instituido y en los contra-discursos políticos de resistencia y, finalmente, la reflexión sobre la violencia insurgente cuando se articula con un ideal revolucionado y con una lucha armada. El propósito ulterior del estudio reside en argumentar que los discursos de justificación de la violencia insurgente, cuando forman parte de proyectos revolucionarios que se levantan, como extrema ratio, en contra de una violencia sistémica o represiva, deben advertirse como modelos de razonamiento que pueden ser ética y políticamente fundamentados. Se razona, en este sentido, que, si la praxis revolucionaria pretende ser un acto político legitimo, debe acompañarse de un discurso también revolucionario que reconozca unos límites de actuación, que reflexione sobre la transgresión ética que representa el empleo de la violencia y que no desfigure lo concreto del sufrimiento que siempre entraña la violencia.

Problem Investigated. This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power. Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority. Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author???s initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare. The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect? Procedures Followed. The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principle case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999. Principle research tools were: ??? Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews. ??? Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK. ??? Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques. ??? Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery. ??? Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys. Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000). General Results Obtained. The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974. The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis ??? the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels. This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means ??? most often military or insurgent leaders. Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis ??? particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation ??? tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level). Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated. Major Conclusions Reached. Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus: The command and control (C2) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military???s, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant. The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows: A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C2 structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders. The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures. The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events. Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the trigger for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then determined by contextual variables.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Kalev I. Sepp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-96). Also available online.

Text in Afrikaans / This study aims to analyze the conflict resolution process in Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House Agreement and the subsequent elections from March 4, 1980 up until 2002. The objective is to determine what effect this process has had on all the people in Zimbabwe, both nationally and locally. It also endeavours to evaluate their attempts to transform from a violent culture of guerilla warfare, to an all-inclusive sustainable peaceful environment and culture. The reason for this specific time period of the study lies in the fact that the peace building process of the Zimbabwean conflict resolution process was supposed to be introduced during this time. This is the era during which the root of historic conflict, according to the peace building theory, has had to be transformed. It also implies the start of the implementation of the radical land reform process. From this perspective the following 5 key questions form the raison d‟être of the study and will be analyzed in the different chapters: 1. The requirements for sustainable peace, according to the conflict resolution and peace building theory, as developed by Galtung, Mitchell, Lederach, Burton and Anstey. 2. The characteristics of the historical conflict structure to be transformed during the post-1980 period. 3. An evaluation of the development of an all inclusive, multi-faceted and integrated program for the transformation of the historical conflict structure. 4. An evaluation of the international managers‟ contributions for laying the foundation for the integration of peace-making and the subsequent phases of the peace building process. It also questions the degree of reconciliation and peace building. 5. The lessons learnt from the Zimbabwean experience and its implications for conflict resolutions and peace implementation processes in Southern African societies. Included in this question is to seek clarification and to develop proposals about the roles and contributions of internal and external role players on all levels of society in such processes. Hence the conclusive finding that conflict resolution and peace building is an integrated multi-dimensional process. This conclusion is confirmed in the Zimbabwean situation. Conflict involves the entanglement of needs, unappeased perceptions and codes of conduct during the period of negotiations. In Zimbabwe the escalation and de-escalation of these influences are clearly observed. The evaluation and manipulation of the history of Zimababwe, of which the manipulation is still continuing, is harming the process of reconciliation and peace building. The absence of an inclusive raison d‟être for all parties involved (regarding differences and diversities on ethnical, social, economical and other levels) implies a strong escalating and de-escalating factor in the irreconcilability in Zimbabwe. The initiation of an integrated and multi-dimensional process, mechanism and framework of reconciliation and peace is strongly advised. This process, mechanism and framework has to have an integrated structure starting at international level (United Nations Peace Building Commission) decentralizing into regional, national, provincial and local government structures. The process and mechanism must be part of the establishment of conflict resolution and peace building as an generic management style and approach aimed at the political and governing processes of societies in transformation. This is especially important for the current Zimbabwean situation. / Die oogmerk van die studie is „n ontleding van die konflikresolusie-proses in Zimbabwe sedert die Lancaster House-ooreenkoms en die daaropvolgende verkiesings van 4 Maart 1980 tot en met die jaar 2002. Die doelstelling is om te bepaal in watter mate en op welke wyse, daar op alle vlakke van die gemeenskap nasionaal en op plaaslike vlak, gepoog is om die geweldskultuur, wat kenmerkend van die guerrilla-oorlog was, te transformeer tot „n volhoubare inklusiewe vredesomgewing en -kultuur. „n Primêre motivering vir die keuse van die bepaalde navorsingstydperk is dat dit veronderstel is om die vredebou-periode van die Zimbabwiese konflikresolusie-proses in te lui. Dit is die era waartydens die bronne van die historiese konflik, ooreenkomstig die vredebou-teorie, getransformeer moes word. Dit sluit ook die era in waartydens die eerste stappe van die radikale grondhervormingsproses geïmplementeer is. In die lig hiervan word die onderstaande 5 kernvraagstukke as raison d‟être van die studie op „n hoofstukbasis ondersoek: 1. Wat is die vereistes vir volhoubare vrede, ooreenkomstig die konflikresolusie- en vredebouteorie soos veral ontwikkel deur Galtung, Mitchell, Lederach, Burton en Anstey? 2. Wat was die kenmerke van die historiese konflikstruktuur wat in die post-1980- periode moes transformeer? 3. Het daar in die post-1980-periode „n inklusiewe, multi-vlakkige en geïntegreerde program vir die transformasie van die historiese konflikstruktuur, ontwikkel? 4. Het die internasionale bestuurders van die proses die grondslag gelê vir „n integrering van vredevestiging met die verdere fases van vredebou? In watter mate was versoening en vredebou enigsins „n prioriteit? Indien nie, waarom nie? 5. Watter lesse kan vanuit die Zimbabwiese ervaring geleer word wat kan bydra tot 'n beter begrip van praktiese konflikresolusie en vredebou-implementeringsprosesse in veral Suider-Afrikaanse gemeenskappe? Watter bydraes kan en moet interne en eksterne rolspelers speel? Voortspruitend hieruit word daar ook aanbevelings aan die hand gedoen oor die integrasie van internasionale en nasionale (eerste, tweede en derde vlakke) rolspelers in hierdie verband. Teen hierdie agtergrond word samevattend bevind dat konflikresolusie en vredebou, „n geïntegreerde multi-dimensionele en multi-vlakkige proses is. Vanuit die Zimbabwe situasie word bevind en bevestig dat konflik uit „n geïntegreerde wisselwerking van behoefte- en doel-onversoenbaarheidspersepsies met voort-spruitende konflikterende gesindhede en gedragspatroon-verskynsels, bestaan. Daar word ook aangetoon dat daar duidelike eskalerende en de-eskalerende invloede teenwoordig is. Daar is ook bevind dat die wyse hoe die geskiedenis van Zimbabwe evalueer en hanteer is en steeds word, die bou van versoening en langtermyn vrede benadeel. Die afwesigheid van „n inklusiewe raison d‟être wat alle rolspelers inbind tot een Zimbabwiese sentiment, ten spyte van diepliggende verskille en diversiteite op etniese, stam, sosiale, ekonomiese, klas en ander terreine, is „n sterk eskalerende faktor en gevolg in hierdie verband. Die loodsing van „n diepliggende en veelvlakkige versoeningsproses, sal die identifisering van sódanige sentiment – die aorta van Zimbabwe se konstruktiewe, volhoubare voortbestaan – as primêre samebindende prioriteit moet neem. Teen hierdie agtergrond word „n geïntegreede versoenings- en vredebou meganisme en raamwerk ontwikkel en voorgestel. „n Meganisme en proses wat multi-vlakkige deelname vanaf „n internasionale (United Nations Peace Building Commission) tot en met „n streeks, nasionale, provinsiale en plaaslike fokusvlak, verseker. „n Proses en meganisme wat ook deel uitmaak van die meer prominente vestiging en institusionalisering van konflikresolusie en vredebou as „n generiese bestuurstyl en program in die politieke en regeerprosesse in oorgangsamelewings, maar veral ook in die Zimbabwe situasie. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Afrika-Politiek)

From the deployment of Roger's Rangers in the Seven Years War to the Sunni Awakening in the Second Gulf War, indigenous force cooperation has been a hallmark of significant armed conflicts in modern history. Indigenous forces are, by definition, recruited locally and are paramilitary in nature, as, for the most part, are their activities. They are not regular police, gendarme, or military forces. Rather, they represent a subset of a broader category of force that includes paramilitaries, unconventional forces, guerrillas, some militias, and auxiliaries. The focus of this dissertation is indigenous force cooperation. Indigenous force cooperation occurs when a metropolitan power (be it imperial or expeditionary) collaborates with one or more indigenous forces. Despite recurring employment, indigenous force cooperation remains largely ignored in historical literature and there has been no comprehensive study of the nature, structure, function, or experience of these forces. Using comparative case studies of indigenous force cooperation in Palestine Mandate and Ethiopia during the Second World War, this project seeks to identify whether successful indigenous force cooperation in war exists as a unified historical phenomenon and whether it was instrumental to theatres of operation in which it took place. The research supporting this dissertation includes personally conducted interviews with veterans of the indigenous forces and examinations of recently declassified documents. The comparative framework allows the project to determine what, if any, underlying patterns connect cases of indigenous force employment and govern the success or failure of cooperation. This dissertation consists of a comparative examination of four questions: why cooperation occurred, how cooperation was structured, what happened during cooperation, and whether cooperation was effective. Each chapter of this dissertation addresses one of the questions. Answering these questions will support a number of areas of study, including imperial history and contemporary strategic studies, by providing a theoretical framework by which to understand other cases of indigenous force cooperation.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2004-04-23Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:54:53Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 ferreira_al_me_assis.pdf: 528444 bytes, checksum: 0a4bf4b165aa6996d94d3c5d79a2361c (MD5) / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) / O advento da Revolução Cubana em 1959 representou um ponto de inflexão na trajetória dos movimentos sociopolíticos da América Latina no século XX. Inspiradas pela vitória dos rebeldes em Cuba, várias organizações de extrema esquerda do continente aderiram à luta armada e à teoria do foco guerrilheiro nos anos 60 e 70. No Brasil, após o Golpe de Estado de 1964, diferentes grupos promoveriam ações revolucionárias contra a ditadura militar instaurada. As idéias de Che Guevara, Fidel Castro e Régis Debray desencadeariam intermináveis debates político-ideológicos entre as diversas correntes de orientação marxista. No presente trabalho procuramos avaliar como a experiência da Revolução Cubana foi apropriada pelas organizações clandestinas brasileiras e, da mesma forma, como seu exemplo serviu para legitimar determinadas posições de setores do movimento comunista no país. / The Cuban Revolution advent in 1959 represented a point of inflection in the trajectory of sociopolitical movements in Latin America in the century XX. Inspired for the rebel's victory in Cuba, several extreme left wing organizations of the continent adhered to the armed combat and the theory of guerrilla focus in the 60's and 70's. In Brazil after the coup d'etat in 1964, different groups would promote revolutionary actions against the established military dictatorship. Che Guevara's, Fidel Castro's and Régis Debray's ideas would trigger endless political-ideological arguments among several groups of Marxist orientation. In the present work we try to evaluate how the experience of the Cuban Revolution was appropriate to the Brazilian clandestine organizations and, in the same way, how their example served to legitimate certain positions of the communist movement in the country.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-08-09T13:19:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1717181 bytes, checksum: daa1af0d8c4c828526f2c45a1a83b1e1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-09T13:19:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1717181 bytes, checksum: daa1af0d8c4c828526f2c45a1a83b1e1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-29 / This essay intends to contribute to the study of the historical, political and legal factors for which Brazil is the only country, among those of South America that lived under military dictatorships, in which state agents who commit serious violations of human rights during the authoritarian regime (including crimes against humanity) are not criminally punished. In order to achieve its objective this work takes the "Araguaia Guerrilla Case" as a basis for analyzing the conflicting ways in which four institutions – the highest Brazilian Justice court, i.e. the Supreme Court, and the Brazilian State, on one side, and the Brazilian Advocates Order and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, on the other side – comprehend the Brazilian Amnesty Law (Law n° 6.683/1979). Conflicting interpretations of the mentioned law put Brazilian Transitional Justice and Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection on opposite sides, specifically with regard to the issue of revision of the Amnesty Law for the purpose of criminal punishment. After examining in detail the postures assumed by the actors involved in the case and the principal legal aspects of the matter, one comes to the conclusion that Brazilian Government, by keeping its posture and not prosecuting and punishing those criminal State agents – obligation for which Brazil was convicted in the sentence issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights – became guilty by an international illicit, fact that puts in doubt one of the fundamental aspects of Brazilian Transitional Justice. / O presente trabalho pretende contribuir para o estudo dos fatores históricos, políticos e jurídicos pelos quais o Brasil é o único país, entre aqueles da América do Sul que viveram sob ditaduras militares, no qual os agentes do Estado que cometeram graves violações aos direitos humanos durante o regime autoritário (incluindo-se crimes contra a humanidade) não são criminalmente punidos. A fim de alcançar esse objetivo, o trabalho aborda o “Caso Guerrilha do Araguaia” como base para a análise do modo conflitante pelo qual quatro instituições – a mais alta corte de justiça brasileira, o Supremo Tribunal Federal, e o Estado brasileiro, de um lado, e a Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil e a Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, de outro – compreendem a Lei da Anistia brasileira (Lei nº 6.683/1979). As interpretações antagônicas da mencionada lei colocam a Justiça de Transição brasileira e o Sistema Interamericano de Proteção dos Direitos Humanos em lados opostos, especificamente no que se refere ao tema da revisão da Lei da Anistia para efeito de punição criminal. Após a análise minuciosa das posturas assumidas pelos atores em jogo e os principais aspectos jurídicos da questão, chega-se à conclusão de que o Governo brasileiro, por não processar nem punir aqueles agentes de Estado criminosos – obrigação pela qual foi condenado na sentença emitida pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos – tornou-se culpado por ato ilícito internacional, fato que põe em dúvida um dos aspectos fundamentais da Justiça de Transição brasileira.