Le Bodhicaryāvatāra de Śāntideva, rédigé sans doute au début du VIIIe siècle, représente l’un des textes majeurs du bouddhisme indien tardif. Cet ouvrage fondamental présente la voie ou la pratique d’un nouveau type d’être seulement tendu par le souci d’éveil : le bodhisattva. Cette voie ou cette pratique conduit à s’affranchir, via une éthique méditative et réflexive, de la double croyance illusoire en l’identité réelle, personnelle, intérieure et l’identité réelle des « pragmata » extérieurs – autrement dit du sujet, de l’objet et leurs relations. Cependant, l’éthique, comme la morale d’ailleurs, se fonde sur l’idée d’élévation de soi jusqu’à sa pleine essence. Son sol appartient à l’ontologie, c'est-à-dire à l’interprétation de l’être ou de la présence à partir de la notion d’identité. Comment dès lors comprendre la perspective du Bodhicaryāvatāra qui possède à coup sûr une dimension éthique, tout en récusant radicalement la réalité de quelque chose comme une « nature propre » (svabhāva) qui serait ou non à réaliser ou à actualiser ? C’est impossible tant que l’on se place dans l’horizon métaphysique qui pense à partir et en direction de l’ontologie. La première ambition de cette thèse consiste donc à ménager un espace interprétatif à partir duquel le texte de Śāntideva puisse être reçu et entendu. Cela exige une confrontation avec la tradition philosophique occidentale sous-tendue par cette perspective métaphysique ainsi, évidemment, qu’avec la linguistique comparée. Deux courants de pensée nous sont apparus particulièrement propices à la rencontre : la phénoménologie et la systémique. La seconde ambition de cette thèse est de proposer une nouvelle traduction française du texte sanskrit de Śāntideva, qui se fonde sur les avancées interprétatives mentionnées / The Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva, probably written in the early eighth century, is one of the major texts of late Indian Buddhism. This fundamental work presents the way or practice of a new type of being, only tensioned by the desire for awakening: the bodhisattva. This path or practice leads to a meditative and reflexive ethic able to eliminate the illusory double belief in the real, personal, inner identity and in the real identity of the external "pragmata" - in other words, the subject, the object and their relations. However, ethics, like morality, is based on the idea of elevation of the self to its full essence. Its ground belongs to ontology, that is to say: the interpretation of being or presence from the notion of identity. How then to understand the perspective of the Bodhicaryāvatāra which certainly has an ethical dimension, while radically rejecting the reality of something like a "self-nature" (svabhāva) that would or should not be realized or actualized? It is impossible, as long as one places oneself in the metaphysical horizon; which considers everything from and towards ontology. The first ambition of this thesis is therefore to provide an interpretative space from which the text of Śāntideva can be received and heard. This requires a confrontation with the Western philosophical tradition underpinned by this metaphysical perspective as well as, of course, with comparative linguistics. Two streams of thought appeared to us particularly conducive to the meeting: phenomenology and systemic. The second ambition of this thesis is to propose a new French translation of the Śāntideva’s text from Sanskrit, which is based on the mentioned interpretative advances.

Cette thèse examine la phénoménologie en tant que philosophie-en-travail, en tant que projet ouvert de recherche. Sa tâche principale consiste à déterminer la façon d'accomplir le travail phénoménologique. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous examinons les analyses de la doctrine phénoménologique de l'attitude (Partie I.), de la doctrine de la méthode (Partie II.) et de l'architectonique " flexible " (Partie III.) de la phénoménologie. Ces élaborations nous permettent de thématiser la dé-limitation de la conscience, l'enrichissement de sens et l'institution du nouveau en tant que traits caractéristiques de la manière phénoménologique d'opérer. Cette recherche exige une oscillation constante entre une systématique ouverte de la philosophie d'Edmund Husserl et des analyses phénoménologues particulières.

Uppsatsen utgår ifrån Sara Ahmeds bok “Queer Phenomenology – Orientations, Objects, Others”. I uppsatsen diskuteras  hur vi människor upplever världen genom föremålen som omger oss och hur detta orienterar oss på olika sätt. På samma sätt som vissa förmål orienterar oss och gör att vi följer normativa linjer så kan andra föremål, eller föremål i andra situationer bryta dessa linjer och desorintera oss. Konst skulle kunna ses som sådana desorienteringsföremål som låter oss se världen på nya sätt. Uppsatsen innehåller också en diskusion kring induktiva resonemang i realtion till att förstå och navigera sig i välden och hur dessa år både nödvändiga och otillräckliga.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Ce présent mémoire porte sur la conception historique de la phénoménologie dans le dernier ouvrage de Husserl, La crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale (1937). Le chapitre 1 avance, qu’il n’y a pas, du point de vue de ses motifs internes, de « tournant historique » de la phénoménologie. Le projet d’une théorie transcendantale de l’histoire doit se comprendre comme étant l’aboutissement nécessaire de la pensée husserlienne. Le chapitre 2 s’intéresse à la manière par laquelle la phénoménologie serait censée renouveler l’identité collective de l’Europe et résoudre la séparation entre la pensée et l'action. La phénoménologie, à partir d’une critique de l’objectivisme des sciences, serait la réalisation du telos de la pensée moderne. Cependant, l’exigence d’authenticité de Husserl s’avère insuffisante pour parvenir à une juste compréhension des implications de la responsabilité. Bien que cette visée humaniste soit d’un intérêt évident, elle s’avère trop rudimentaire. / This thesis is concerned with Husserl’s historical understanding of phenomenology in his last work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1937). In chapter 1, we examine David Carr’s account of the historical turn of Husserlian phenomenology. The idea of the historical turn of phenomenology is inaccurate. The transcendental theory of history represents the necessary outcome of Husserl’s philosophy. In chapter 2, we examine the manner by which Husserlian phenomenology is supposed to re-establish European cultural identity. Husserl, through his criticism of the objectivistic prejudice of modern science, claims that phenomenology represents the teleological accomplishment of philosophy. We finally examine Husserl’s attempt to reunite the Modern schism between thought and action. We conclude that Husserl’s main ethical principle, the notion of authenticity, is in itself insufficient to explain the implications of responsibility.

Este trabajo desarrolla la motivación fenomenológica de las vanguardias musicales del siglo XX y parte del interés por proponer una nueva escucha en conexión con el nuevo paradigma sistémico de la vida. Para lograr este propósito, en primer lugar, se presenta la crítica de Edmund Husserl al viejo paradigma de la ciencia, asociado este con la actitud cientificista moderna y su modelo matemático. A continuación, se retoma el aporte de la fenomenología husserliana a una teoría del conocimiento comprehensiva. Con estas herramientas, enseguida se describe y analiza brevemente algunas de las innovaciones musicales que propusieron las vanguardias de inicios de siglo XX al abrir las nociones tradicionales de “lo musical”, “lo sonoro” y “el tiempo musical”. Se describe, entonces, la ampliación del espectro de lo musical, la incorporación de nuevas organizaciones sonoras y la exploración de los límites de la rítmica y la temporalidad tradicionales, entre otras innovaciones que conducen a la apertura de nuevos horizontes para la escucha musical desde los frentes de la intencionalidad y la temporalidad husserlianas. A lo largo del texto se explicita las relaciones entre la revolución musical de las vanguardias y el novedoso paradigma actual de la ciencia. 3 / Tesis

Esta investigación comenzó como el intento de profundizar en las tesis de licenciatura de algunos estudiantes de la Facultad de Ciencias y Artes de la Comunicación en la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP). Esos trabajos de tesis presentaban y analizaban experiencias creativas y artísticas en poblaciones excluidas, al interior de las cuales se generaron espacios novedosos de reconocimiento entre sus participantes, a menudo con el apoyo de los jóvenes autores de esas investigaciones. Los procesos, las historias y las personas que se dejaban mostrar en sus páginas han informado en los últimos años mis preguntas como profesor, estudiante de doctorado y profesional interesado en temas de desarrollo, ciudadanía e interculturalidad. Me han confirmado también que la investigación académica puede seguir aportando a una comprensión más profunda de estos espacios de nuestra realidad actual y contribuir a su fortalecimiento. / Tesis

Law, Ki Fung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese.

Submitted by Setor de Tratamento da Informa??o - BC/PUCRS (tede2@pucrs.br) on 2015-07-20T20:45:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 472472 - Texto Completo.pdf: 3406909 bytes, checksum: 4126643681246529dd6f034f5299eef7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-20T20:45:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 472472 - Texto Completo.pdf: 3406909 bytes, checksum: 4126643681246529dd6f034f5299eef7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-06-16 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico - CNPq / This work deals with the issue of determining the position of Edmund Hesserl's philosophy in relation to the traditional philosophical opposition between realism and idealism. We argue that the German thinker, through the development of the phenomenological method, proposes a new kind of idealim that does not fit this antinomy as expressed by history in philosophy until the down of contemporaneity, which results in an original solution for the issue. In order to support this thesis we analyze focal concepts developed by Husserk after the so-called "idealist turn" of this ideas, among which we wmphasize the nations of phenomenological reduction, noesis, noema, lifeworld, body, and inter-subjectivity. Throughout this study we also aimed to show how Husserlian philosophy, especially during its later phases, was the precurso of many of the themes which are dear to other phenomenilogists, like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who are usually seen as thinkers who radically broke with the method proposed by Husserl. Thus, we position ourselves against interpretations which see Phenomenology as a philosophy qhich represents idealism similar to those by Kant or Berkeley, and we also deny that the innovation put forward by Husserl is due to the lack of ontology in his ideas. Besides, we critically analyse the Husserlian philosophy, briefly pointing the main difficulties we find in his project. / Este trabalho trata do problema de determinar a posi??o da filosofia de Edmund Husserl em rela??o ? tradicional oposi??o filos?fica entre realismo e idealismo. Defendemos que o pensador alem?o, atrav?s do desenvolvimento do m?todo fenomenol?gico, prop?e um novo tipo de idealismo que n?o se encaixa nessa antinomia tal como formulada pela hist?ria na filosofia at? o come?o da contemporaneidade, resultando em uma solu??o original para a quest?o. Para sustentar tal tese, analisamos conceitos centrais desenvolvidos por Husserl a partir da chamada ?virada idealista? de seu pensamento, entre os quais destacam-se as no??es de redu??o fenomenol?gica, noese, noema, mundo da vida, corpo e intersubjetividade. Ao longo desse estudo, tamb?m procuramos demonstrar como a filosofia husserliana, sobretudo em sua fase tardia, foi precursora de muitos dos temas caros a outros fenomen?logos, como Heidegger e Merleau-Ponty, os quais s?o usualmente compreendidos como pensadores que romperam radicalmente com o m?todo proposto por Husserl. Desse modo, nos posicionamos contra interpreta??es que tomam a Fenomenologia como uma filosofia representante de idealismos semelhantes aos de Kant ou Berkeley, assim como negamos que a novidade trazida por Husserl se deva ? falta de ontologia em seu pensamento. Al?m disso, analisamos criticamente o pensamento husserliano, apontando brevemente as principais dificuldades que identificamos em seu projeto.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-10-03T12:32:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucíola Maria de Sousa Brandes.pdf: 1006890 bytes, checksum: efac1c10aa9cf55e9628af6de3ad0ad0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-03T12:32:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucíola Maria de Sousa Brandes.pdf: 1006890 bytes, checksum: efac1c10aa9cf55e9628af6de3ad0ad0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present work tries to interpret the concept of intentionality treated in the Fifth Investigation of the work Logical Investigations, of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). In order to do so, it aims at three objectives: to show that intentionality is not an external relation; prove that intentionality does not presuppose the existence of two different entities; and explicit aspects necessary for the occurrence of intentionality. The development of this study is organized in three chapters. The first takes care of the conception of intentionality in Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938). In this section, questions about the structure of psychic phenomena and their classification are contemplated, including the characteristics of the representation, the represented object and the content. The second, which constitutes the core of the dissertation, exposes Husserl's concept of intentionality, elaborated in the Fifth Research, based on the central conceptual analyzes and distinctions of this author. This chapter clarifies the structure of intentional living; displays the classification of acts and their fundamental relationships; and provides the four senses of representation. The third examines Husserl's criticisms of Brentano and Twardowski's conceptions of intentional phenomena. The result of this philosophical study indicates that: intentionality, according to Husserl, is based on an inner moment of the experience itself. Husserl distinguishes consciousness from actual objects and representations of fantasy, predictions, memories, and so on; and the object intentionally visualized is neither part of consciousness and is not contained in it, i.e. intentionality is characterized by its independence from existence / O presente trabalho procura discernir o conceito de intencionalidade tratado na Quinta Investigação da obra Investigações Lógicas, de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Para tanto, tem em vista três objetivos: mostrar que a intencionalidade não é uma relação externa; provar que a intencionalidade não pressupõe a existência de duas entidades diferentes e; explicitar aspectos necessários para a ocorrência da intencionalidade. O desenvolvimento do estudo está organizado em três capítulos. O primeiro cuida da concepção de intencionalidade em Franz Brentano (1838-1917) e Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938). Nessa seção, estão contempladas questões sobre a estrutura dos fenômenos psíquicos e a classificação desses fenômenos psíquicos, assim como são assinaladas características da representação, do objeto representado e do conteúdo. O segundo, que constitui o núcleo da dissertação, expõe o conceito de intencionalidade de Husserl, elaborado na Quinta Investigação, alicerçado nas análises e distinções conceituais centrais desse autor. Esse capítulo clarifica a estrutura da vivência intencional; exibe a classificação dos atos e das relações de fundação entre eles e; fornece os quatros sentidos de representação. O terceiro examina as críticas de Husserl às concepções do fenômeno intencional concebidas por Brentano e Twardowski. O resultado desse estudo filosófico indica que: (1) a intencionalidade husserliana tem por fundamento um momento interior da própria vivência; Husserl distingue a consciência dos objetos efetivamente existentes e das representações da fantasia, predições, lembranças etc. (2) o objeto visado intencionalmente não é parte da consciência e nem está contido nela, ou seja, a intencionalidade é caracterizada por sua independência da existência