台灣的社區發展推行至今，從傳統由上而下的硬體支持，轉為時下由下而上的全方位發展。社區自主發展是自發性的治理行動，藉由信任、溝通、相互尊重等意識建構當地的社會網絡雛形，進而累積龐大的社會資本，以為社區發展的基礎。社區發展並非是終點，而是個連續的過程。因此，於社區發展的集體行動過程中，需提供相當的誘因以維持集體行動的運行。 然而，依台灣社區發展推行至今的經驗觀之，不少案例顯示政府機構所提供的誘因機制，經常排擠了地方社區的自發性集體行動以及自主制度的建立。這樣的結果推翻了以往「引進物質性誘因以激勵合作行為時，既有存在的非物質性誘因並不會受到影響」的假設。 有鑑於此，本研究以珍珠社區案例為研究對象，透過文獻分析與深度訪談的方式，檢視珍珠社區於社區發展過程中，外部各項誘因的挹注對社區發展歷程產生的排擠效果，包括影響社會網絡的強健與社會資本的積累。研究成果發現，一旦涉及利益分配，不同誘因類型間的排擠效果愈明顯。同時，容易造成不同參與者間的信任網絡的崩解、裂痕，進而削弱原有設區社會資本的存量。 惟誘因導入對於維持社區發展的集體行動持續不衰實有舉足輕重之影響，故結合案例觀察成果，誘因導入社區發展之集體行動需建立於下列前提：1.培養社區認同、調整社區願景、消弭宗教衝突以充實社區社會資本2.進行跨區整合，減低對政府的依賴 3.建立獎懲及監督機制，減少搭便車情形4.領導者風範的調整與包容或可促進社區發展持續有效的集體行動運作，達成社區永續發展的目標。 / Taiwan's community development carrying out until now, the community development the infrastructure which leads from the traditional government, transfers development. The community self-development is the spontaneous government motion, because of the trust, communication, mutual respect etc. which constructs local the social network and accumulate social capital. Because community development is a process, to maintain collective action continually needs provide suitable incentives. However, according to the experience of community development in Taiwan, many cases demonstrated a phenomenon: incentives that government provides usually crowds out the community collective actions and establish independent system. Such result has overthrown the assumption : to encourage cooperation actions by lead in incentives, the existence of non-material incentives will not be affected. In view of this, a case study of Jenju Community, we will survey the crowding-out effect which injecting external incentives during the community development. Include strong social networks and social capital accumulation. Research found that when it comes to the distribution of benefits, crowding-out effect between the different types of incentives is more apparently. At the same time, it is likely to cause network of trust between different actors collapse of cracks, which would weaken the existing stock of social capital in the community. However, incentives for the maintenance of community development into collective action has a significant continuing decline of the real impact, Therefore, the results observed with the case, incentives for collective action in community development into the need to establish the following premise:1. to enrich social capital by foster community identity, community vision to adjust, to eliminate the religious conflict. 2. for cross-integration, to reduce dependence on government. 3. the establishment of incentive and monitoring mechanisms to reduce the free rider situation. 4. leadership style and tolerance of adjustment. This may facilitate sustainable community development and effective operation of collective action, to achieve sustainable community development objectives.

<p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan lönsamhet och storlek på rörlig samt total VD-ersättning i de största svenska aktiebolagen. I uppsatsen diskuteras även funna samband samt bakomliggande teoretiska förklaringar till VD-ersättningens storlek. För att undersöka om VD-ersättning och företags lönsamhet korrelerar utförs kvantitativa undersökningar med hjälp av regressionsanalyser för respektive år mellan 2002 och 2007. Populationen som undersökningen baseras på är de företag som i september 2009 var registrerade på Stockholmsbörsens segment Large och Mid Cap.</p><p>Undersökningen resulterade i slutsatsen att inget samband mellan vare sig rörlig eller total VD-ersättning och lönsamhet kunde styrkas. Istället gavs indikationer om andra faktorer som påverkade VD-ersättningens storlek. Studien visade en tydlig koppling mellan företagsstorlek och VD-ersättning. Andra trender indikerade att det marknadsjämförande synsättet är det vanligaste vid fastställande av VD-ersättningsnivåer. Dessutom diskuterades andra faktorers inflytande på VD-ersättningars storlek utifrån tidigare forskning.</p> / <p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether a relationship between CEO compensation and organizational profitability exists in the largest Swedish companies. Both the total and the variable compensation schemes’ dependence on organizational compensation are analyzed. The objective is moreover to discuss the observed relationships in the study as well as the theoretical explanations to the level of the CEO compensation. In order to examine if CEO compensation correlates with organizational profitability quantitative research methods are applied via regression analyses for each separate year between 2002 and 2007. The population our research is based on is the companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in September 2009 within the segments Large and Mid Cap.</p><p>It was concluded that no relationship between neither variable nor total CEO compensation and organizational profitability existed. However, indications of other factors affecting the compensation were indicated. The regression confirmed a relationship between organizational size and CEO compensation. Other trends indicated that the market-based approach was the most common when determining CEO compensation levels. In addition we discussed how other previously proved relationships as well as further theoretical research related to our study.</p>

This dissertation consists of three essays on private landowners' response to incentives for carbon sequestration in forests. The first essay examines private landowner response to incentives for carbon sequestration through various combinations of intermediate management practices. The second essay focuses on agricultural landowners' willingness to participate in an incentive program for carbon sequestration through afforestation, and estimates the potential for carbon sequestration from afforestation, as well as its cost. The third study examines relative performances of incentive targeting strategies for forest carbon sequestration under asymmetric information given spatially heterogeneous land types. The first essay uses an econometric approach to analyze the factors affecting non-industrial private forest landowners' choice of forest management practices, and examines how these choices might change in response to the use of incentives for carbon sequestration. I use estimated parameters to simulate the carbon sequestration potential for different combinations of management practices, and compare the effectiveness and costs of performance-based and practice-based incentive payment schemes in the Western U.S. The results suggest that incentive payments can increase the probability that desirable combinations of management practices are adopted, and particularly that incentives targeting increased fertilization yield the highest carbon sequestration potential. I also find that a performance-based payment scheme produces higher carbon sequestration than a practice-based payments scheme. However, the annual sequestration potential of intermediate forest management in response to incentive payment is not as large as the sequestration potential of afforestation. The second essay uses a survey-based stated preference approach to predict landowners' willingness to participate in a tree planting program for carbon sequestration as a function of various factors affecting landowners' decision making and different levels of incentive payments. The estimation results show that the annual payment for carbon sequestration significantly and positively affects landowners' stated level of enrollment in a tree planting program. I use the estimated parameters to conduct regional level simulations of carbon sequestration in response to incentive payments. These simulations show that the carbon supply function in the Pacific Northwest region is steeper than in the Southeast region because of the lower adoption rate and less available lands. The national level carbon supply functions derived from this study are steeper than those obtained from bottom-up engineering approaches and optimization models, and are in the same range as those from revealed preference approach studies. The third essay uses both a conceptual analysis and a numerical analysis to examine the relative performances of incentive programs for carbon sequestration using alternative targeting criteria in the presence of asymmetric information and heterogeneity in costs and benefits. The results show that in the presence of asymmetric information, the combination of high cost-high benefit variability and negative correlation, which is the combination that achieves the greatest benefit gains under perfect information, can result in the greatest benefit losses. Additionally, a comparison of two targeting schemes shows that if cost variability is greater than benefit variability with negative correlation, the benefit achieved under benefit-cost ratio targeting can be lower than that under acreage targeting, so that an optimal targeting strategy under perfect information may no longer be optimal under asymmetric information. / Graduation date: 2013

Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan lönsamhet och storlek på rörlig samt total VD-ersättning i de största svenska aktiebolagen. I uppsatsen diskuteras även funna samband samt bakomliggande teoretiska förklaringar till VD-ersättningens storlek. För att undersöka om VD-ersättning och företags lönsamhet korrelerar utförs kvantitativa undersökningar med hjälp av regressionsanalyser för respektive år mellan 2002 och 2007. Populationen som undersökningen baseras på är de företag som i september 2009 var registrerade på Stockholmsbörsens segment Large och Mid Cap. Undersökningen resulterade i slutsatsen att inget samband mellan vare sig rörlig eller total VD-ersättning och lönsamhet kunde styrkas. Istället gavs indikationer om andra faktorer som påverkade VD-ersättningens storlek. Studien visade en tydlig koppling mellan företagsstorlek och VD-ersättning. Andra trender indikerade att det marknadsjämförande synsättet är det vanligaste vid fastställande av VD-ersättningsnivåer. Dessutom diskuterades andra faktorers inflytande på VD-ersättningars storlek utifrån tidigare forskning. / The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether a relationship between CEO compensation and organizational profitability exists in the largest Swedish companies. Both the total and the variable compensation schemes’ dependence on organizational compensation are analyzed. The objective is moreover to discuss the observed relationships in the study as well as the theoretical explanations to the level of the CEO compensation. In order to examine if CEO compensation correlates with organizational profitability quantitative research methods are applied via regression analyses for each separate year between 2002 and 2007. The population our research is based on is the companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in September 2009 within the segments Large and Mid Cap. It was concluded that no relationship between neither variable nor total CEO compensation and organizational profitability existed. However, indications of other factors affecting the compensation were indicated. The regression confirmed a relationship between organizational size and CEO compensation. Other trends indicated that the market-based approach was the most common when determining CEO compensation levels. In addition we discussed how other previously proved relationships as well as further theoretical research related to our study.

This thesis will discuss the role of government in venture capital market and illustrate the national difference of that through a comparative study of government expenditure supporting policies of venture capital investment in the USA, Canada and China. Firstly, the prototype programs designed by Small Business Administration (SBA) of the United States and Canadian policies by the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) will be discussed. Secondly, the current Chinese government expenditure supporting policies will then be studied in the context of the Chinese venture capital market’s unique political, economical and legislative background. Ultimately, potential improvements in the future expenditure incentive programs in China will be explored.

This thesis will discuss the role of government in venture capital market and illustrate the national difference of that through a comparative study of government expenditure supporting policies of venture capital investment in the USA, Canada and China. Firstly, the prototype programs designed by Small Business Administration (SBA) of the United States and Canadian policies by the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) will be discussed. Secondly, the current Chinese government expenditure supporting policies will then be studied in the context of the Chinese venture capital market’s unique political, economical and legislative background. Ultimately, potential improvements in the future expenditure incentive programs in China will be explored.

The European natural gas market is characterised by higher demand than available supply from own resources. Therefore Europe is a gas net-importing region. The costs of potential problems or disruptions establish the need for an environment which stimulates sufficient investments in transmission line capacities. We examine the effects of the introduction of the recently developed Hogan, Rosellón and Vogelsang (HRV) incentive mechanism into the European natural gas market. In the simulations with GAMS we can confirm all results expected from theory. The validity of these simulation results is confirmed in a structural analysis, which comprised the variation of different exogenous input parameters. Therefore we conclude that the HRV incentive mechanism as a regulatory regime for the European natural gas market would be an advisable alternative, which should be considered in future discussions. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

In this thesis, two systems are analyzed in order to gain insight to the following issues: (i) Effect of incentive, subsidy and penalty designs on decentralized system, (ii) effect of using production facility as pooled capacity (pooled system) and dedicated capacity (unpooled system) on capacity utilization and system profit. Regarding the first issue, three models are defined / decentralized model, centralized model and decentralized model with incentive, subsidy, penalty designs. In all models, there are two dealers and one item is under consideration and lateral transshipments are allowed. Dealers operate with four inventory level decision (strategies) that consists of base stock level, rationing level, transshipment request level and customer rejection level. Under the decentralized system, a dealer sets its operating strategy according to the strategy of the other dealer and maximizes its own infinite horizon discounted expected profit. In the centralized system, a central authority (say manufacturer) exists, which considers the system-wide infinite horizon discounted expected profit, and makes all decisions. Under decentralized system with incentive, subsidy, penalty designs, manufacturer tries different designs on decentralized system namely revenue sharing, holding cost subsidy, request rejection penalty, transportation cost subsidy and commission subsidy in order to v align decentralized system with centralized system. According to the results obtained, this alignment works best with nearly 40% revenue sharing percentage, low rejection penalty, high transportation cost subsidy under low transportation cost and commission subsidy under very low or very high commissions. Holding cost subsidy, on the other hand, is not a good strategy since it declines decentralized system profit. Considering the second issue, two systems are examined / pooled system and unpooled system. Both systems are centrally managed. In the pooled system, all capacity is dynamically allocated to either dealer considering maximization of system profit. In the unpooled system, capacity is shared among dealers and dealers are always allocated same percentage of the capacity. Infinite horizon average expected profit is maximized in both systems. The dealer having lower holding cost is allocated higher capacity in both pooled and unpooled system / however, exceptions exist in the unpooled system under low arrival rate. Highrevenue dealer is always allocated higher capacity in both pooled and unpooled system. Arrival rate affects both systems such that total capacity utilization increases with increasing arrival rate. From the profit point of view, pooled system has great advantage under low demand rate in general.

This dissertation explores the issues of mixed oligopoly, restructuring, and M&A that occurs in turn on the stages of policy set-up, preparation, and performing when the government attempt to privatize the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). On the policy set-up stage, private firms in domestic market are not necessary confined to originate at home country. Foreign private firms may establish an oversea subsidiary and create a mixed oligopoly market structure at home country. In addition, those foreign private firms may not passively accept all the trade policies that came from the government decision of home country. Mixed oligopoly competition between one domestic public firm and one subsidiary of foreign private firm is been formulated to investigate the following questions: (1) how the agents compete under the cases that home country government adopts policies such as corporate tax rate, repatriation tax rate, and partial offering public stocks; and the foreign private firm implements strategies such as vertical integration and transfer pricing; (2) the impact on social welfare and the decision of optimal public stock-offering ratio while home country government¡¦s policies and foreign private firm¡¦s strategies have changed. New findings include (1) Home country government can not maximize social welfare by simply adopting strategic policies; (2) For home country government, the best strategy for privatizing SOEs maybe partial privatization; (3) For home country government, ¡§mass privatization¡¨ should be avoided as the means of manipulating domestic market shares. On the preparation stage, an incentive scheme model is designed to analyze the governance mechanism for improving SOEs¡¦ situation. First, different types of SOEs are classified according to their own ability and the employees¡¦ attitude for privatization. By offering a sound device of incentive scheme, the government is able to strengthen the SOEs¡¦ ability and employees¡¦ desirability. Within a one-stage symmetric information game framwork, it proves that SOEs with high ability and their employees with high privatization desirability can implement the highest amount of public stock offering ratio. Next, it utilizes a two-stage asymmetric game model for discussing how to improve the SOEs¡¦ ability and how to encourage the employees to support privatization. By providing an incentive contract, the government not only can coerce the SOEs but also can inspire their employees to reveal their true information. The due process of public stock offering is able to strengthen the abilities of SOEs via ¡§restructuring¡¨ on the one hand, and to facilitate the issue of ¡§training subsidies¡¨ for hatching the entrepreneurship of employees on the other hand. Finally, it investigates the impact on public stock offering ratio for the amount of specific grants, and found that the more generosity of incentive contract, the higher the public stock offering ratio. On the performing stage, it adopts the incentive theorem to analyze the outcome of SOEs¡¦ privatization by inviting a named firm. The named firm takes over the SOEs through M&A for the purpose of long-term operation. In order to encourage the employees of the privatized company working more aggressively, the named firm comes up incentive schemes including bonus-sharing and Employees Stock Ownership Plan, ESOP. It found that whether there exists information asymmetry or not between the named firm and the employees of the privatized company will affect the following decision-makings: the level of the employees¡¦ effort, the willingness of the employees¡¦ stock-holding, and the achievement of the named firm¡¦s profit maximizing objective. In particular, it shows that the change of the contents of the incentive schemes will affect the bargaining outcomes between the named firm and the trade union of the SOEs on the issue of working conditions after privatization.

Software Maintenance is becoming more and more challenging due to rapidly changing customer needs, technologies and need for highly skilled labor. Many problems that existed a decade ago continue to exist or have even grown. In this context organizations find it difficult to match engineer interest, skill to particular customer problem. Thus making it difficult for organization to keep the selfish and rational engineers motivated and productive. In this thesis we have used game theory and mechanism design to model the interactions among such selfish engineers to motivate truth revelation using incentive based allocation schemes for software maintenance problems, especially Ticket Allocation Problem. Ticket allocation or problem allocation is a key problem in the software maintenance process.Tickets are usually allocated by the manager or the technical lead. In allocating a ticket, the manager or technical lead is normally guided by the complexity assessment of the ticket as provided by the maintenance engineers, who are entrusted with the responsibility of fixing the problem.The rationality of the maintenance engineers could induce them to report the complexity in an untruthfulway so as to increase their payoffs.This leads to non-optimal ticket allocation. In this thesis we first address the problem of eliciting ticket complexities in a truthfulway from each individual maintenance engineer, using a mechanism design approach. In particular, we model the problem as that of designing an incentive compatible mechanism and we offer two possible solutions.The first one, TA-DSIC, a Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) solution and the second solution, TA-BIC, is a Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism. We show that the proposed mechanisms outperform conventional allocation protocols in the context of a representative software maintenance organization. In this thesis,we next address the incentive compatibility issue for group ticket allocation problem .Many times a ticket is also allocated to more than one engineers. This may be due to a quick customer delivery(time)deadline. The decision of such allocation is generally taken by the lead, based on customer deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer.The decision of allocation in such case should ensure that every individual reveals truth in the proposed group(or coalition) and has incentive to participate in the game as individual and in the coalition. We formulate this problem as Normal form game and propose three mechanisms, (1)Division of Labor, (2)Extended Second Price and (3)Greedy Division of Labor. We show that the proposed mechanisms are DSIC and we discuss their rationality properties.