Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Este estudo tem como objetivo analisar a disciplina da execução por quantia certa contra os entes públicos no Direito brasileiro e sua compatibilidade com o direito à execução das decisões judiciais. Inicialmente, buscou-se definir o conteúdo do direito à execução das decisões judiciais. Posteriormente, foi analisado o direito francês, com o escopo de comparar esse sistema com o vigente no Brasil. Também foram objeto de nossa análise os fundamentos da execução contra os entes públicos, como a igualdade, separação de poderes, impenhorabilidade dos bens públicos e interesse público, tendo concluído que apenas o primeiro é idôneo à justificar a ausência de poderes sub-rogatórios do juiz sobre o patrimônio estatal. Por fim, analisamos as regras que compõem a execução contra os entes públicos no Brasil, em especial aquelas introduzidas pela Emenda Constitucional n. 62 de 2009. Estes dispositivos, em sua maioria, são violadores do direito à execução das decisões judiciais, na medida em que não permitem o cumprimento das sentenças em um tempo razoável, como ocorre com o art. 97, 1, do ADCT. / This study aims to provide the introduction of the execution of money judgments against the government in Brazil and its compatibility with the right of enforcement. At first, the paper focus on the content of the right of enforcement. Then, was analyzed the french law, with the target to compare this system with the effective one in Brazil. Also the theorical background of the enforcement of judicial sentences against the government through precatórios had been object of our analysis, as the equality, separation of powers, immunities and public interest, having concluded that only the first one is idoneous to justifying the absence of direct means of enforcement against public property. Finally, we analyze the rules of the execution against the government in Brazil, in special those introduced by the constitutional amendment n. 62 of 2009. These devices, in its majority, violate the right of enforcement, because they do not allow the fulfillment of the judgments in a reasonable time, as it occurs with art. 97, 1, of the ADCT.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T14:38:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO Ariadne.pdf: 1821005 bytes, checksum: ddbdff7dddf66e435194f917f99f51a1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Reflecting on the importance of virtues in moral development, our goal was to investigate the children love concepts. We interviewed 40 students, 6 and 9 years old, in a private school in Vila Velha-ES, according to the clinical method proposed by Piaget. We analyzed the cited examples of love, what would be the most and least important, the judgment about the possibility of loving a child of the opposite sex, of same sex, a friend, an enemy and a stranger. We found that children have an ample concept; including mainly giving love to others‟ and love for (a) particular person/people, which increased with age, and actions with love‟, which showed a decrease. These examples were also considered most important by participants, and love for (a) particular person/people increased with age. On the least important examples of love, mostly students aged 9 said they did not exist, and the 6-years old elected the actions with love‟. Most respondents stated the possibility of loving a child of the opposite sex and same-sex friend. However, a minority has confirmed the relationship of love for an enemy, and still less with a stranger. In general, the justifications referred to the existing ties, the positive consequence for oneself, positive feature of the love object and observation of lived experience, and tended to increase with age. We emphasize the importance of love in development and hope to encourage further discussion on this virtue, contributing to proposals for education in moral values / Refletindo sobre a importância das virtudes no desenvolvimento moral, nosso objetivo foi investigar a concepção de amor em crianças. Entrevistamos 40 escolares, de 6 e 9 anos, em uma escola particular de Vila Velha-ES, de acordo com o método clínico proposto por Piaget. Analisamos os exemplos de amor citados, qual seria o mais e o menos importante, o juízo sobre a possibilidade de amar uma criança do sexo oposto, do mesmo sexo, amigo, inimigo e desconhecido. Verificamos que a concepção de amor que as crianças têm é ampla: incluem principalmente ações de amor para outrem‟ e o amor por determinada(s) pessoa(s)‟, que aumentaram com a idade, e ações com amor‟, que apresentaram um decréscimo. Estes exemplos também foram considerados os mais importantes pelos participantes, sendo que amor por determinada(s) pessoa(s)‟ aumentou com a idade. Quando perguntados sobre os exemplos de amor menos importantes, os escolares de 6 anos elegeram as ações com amor‟, ao passo que os escolares de 9 anos afirmaram não existir exemplo menos relevante. A maioria dos entrevistados afirmou a possibilidade de amar uma criança do sexo oposto, mesmo sexo e amigo. Entretanto, a minoria confirmou a relação de amor para com o inimigo e, menos ainda, para com o desconhecido. De forma geral, as justificativas se referiram aos vínculos existentes, à consequência positiva para si próprio, à característica positiva do objeto de amor, bem como à observação de experiência vivenciada, e tenderam ao aumento com a idade. Ressaltamos a importância do amor no desenvolvimento, e esperamos incentivar outras discussões sobre essa virtude, contribuindo para propostas de educação em valores morais

Doctor Legum - LLD / The thesis considers the approaches followed by the European Union with the Brussels Regime, the federal system of the United States of America under the ‘full faith and credit clause’; the inter-state recognition scheme under the Australia and New Zealand Trans- Tasman judicial system; as well as the convention-approach of the Latin American States. It finds that the most suitable approach for the SACU is the negotiation and adoption by all SACU Member States of a multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, comparable to the 1971 Convention of the Hague Conference on Private International Law; the EU Brussels I Regulation and the Latin-American Montevideo Convention, as complemented by the La Paz Convention. It is imperative that a proposed convention should not merely duplicate previous efforts, but should be drafted in the light of the legal, political and socio-economic characteristics of the SACU Member States. The current legislative provisions in force in SACU Member States are compared and analysed, and the comparison and analysis form the basis of a proposal for a future instrument on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments for the region. A recommended draft text for a proposed Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments for the SACU is included. This draft text could form the basis for future negotiations by SACU Member States.

The dawn of democracy failed to bring legitimacy to the Police Service. Public and political debate seriously lambasted the Police Service for criminal offences committed on and off duty by police officials which pertained to the infringement on the individual rights regarding personal safety and the right to own property. The outcry against criminal offences by police officials forced the Police Service to deal decisively with criminality in the Police Service by means of fitness boards. While the government and public approved of the attempts to rid the Police Service of criminality it was met with union resistance in the Eastern Cape and defeat in the Labour Court. Different legislation, internal arrangements and case law were observed in this study. The purpose was to determine the strength or weaknesses if any of the applicable legislation and internal arrangements which contributed to a finding against the Police Service in the Labour Court.

The primary purpose of this treatise is to revisit and reconsider the development of the review test set out in the Constitutional Court judgment of Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) and consequently ascertain the correct approach to be adopted by our Labour Courts in the application of such test. The secondary purpose, entail the determination of the extent to which Labour Court judges interfere with the merits of awards and the resulting impact on the distinction between appeal and review. In order to establish whether the test for review was correctly developed and to determine whether our review proceedings deter recurrent interference by our judges, an edifying consideration of judicial review in South Africa, an extensive analysis of various judgements pertaining to such development, followed by a comprehensive comparison with the United Kingdom`s application of review proceedings and judicial composition are made. The research methodology is based on a contour of Sidumo, commencing with the Sidumo judgment, followed by three contentious Labour Appeal Court judgments and concluding with a Supreme Court of Appeal judgement, which clarifies the operation of the review test. The contour is interlinked with the notion of reasonableness. The primary research findings are identified in the judgment of Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA). The judgment, concluding the Sidumo contour, underlines the current position in our law and consequent narrower approach. A comparison made with the United Kingdom, differentiate between such approach implemented by our courts and the strict gross unreasonableness approach applied by Employment Appeal Tribunals, recognising the finding, that our Labour Court judges ardently interfere with the merits of awards. In the conclusion it is submitted that our labour law jurisprudence will constantly evolve, dictated by our courts interpretation of lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness.

Syftet med denna uppsats var att studera hur tingsrätten praktiserar uttryck av emotioner i de skriftliga domarna, avseende försök till mord och mord. Utöver det var syftet även att undersöka hur tingsrätten framställde förövaren och gärningen kopplat till känslouttryck, samt om det förekom några skillnader i framställandet av dessa. Studien har genomförts med kvalitativ innehållsanalys som metod och datamaterialet bestod av domar från en tingsrätt. Resultaten har visat att tingsrätten huvudsakligen exkluderar känslouttryck i de skriftliga domarna och uttryckt sakliga framställningar, men att det dock är förekommande till viss del. Resultaten har även visat att det förekommit skillnader i tingsrättens framställande av förövaren och gärningen. Våra slutsatser har bland annat blivit att tingsrätten i olika grad frångått sin neutrala ställning, där emotioner i relation till gärningen varit mest framträdande. Slutsatserna har stärkts genom kopplingen till det emotionssociologiska perspektivet och Garlands teori om straffets funktion. / The purpose of this paper was to study how the district court practices expression of emotions in the written judgments, regarding attempted murder and murder. In addition, the purpose was also to study how the district court presented the perpetrator and the act linked to emotional expressions, and whether there were any differences in the presentation of these. The study was conducted with qualitative content analysis as a method and the data material consisted of judgments from a district court. The results have shown that the district court mainly excludes emotional expressions in the written judgments and expressed factual representations, but that it does occur to some extent. The results have also shown that there have been differences in the district court's presentation of the perpetrator and the act. Our conclusions have, among other things, been that the district court to varying degrees deviated from its neutral position, where emotions in relation to the act were most prominent. The conclusions have been strengthened through the connection to the emotional sociological perspective and Garland’s theory regarding the function of punishment.

The topic of the thesis are moral judgments which are articulated in language by claims or speech-acts like, for example, “One ought to keep one’s promises” or “It is good to respect the beauty of nature”. According to the philosophical literature on moral judgments, they have two distinctive features. They are objective and practical: They purport to be correct in an objective sense and they tend to motivate us to act in certain ways. In light of these two features, I discuss the two most prominent accounts in the philosophical literature on moral judgments: cognitivism and noncognitivism. Cognitivism takes moral judgments to be acts of theoretical knowledge with a special normative content. Noncognitivism takes moral judgments to be desire-like acts of the mind. In part I., I argue that cognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality since it spoils the practical character of such judgments. In part II., I argue that noncognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality because it makes the objectivity of moral claims mysterious. In part III. of the thesis, I then aim at developing an alternative to cognitivism and noncognitivism that overcomes their shortcomings but also saves their insights. I call this alternative account 'practical cognitivism'. The core claim of practical cognitivism is that moral judgments are acts of a sui generis power for practical knowledge or cognition. The bulk of part III. is about developing this claim and showing that it allows us to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality. I end the thesis by responding to some objections that might be raised against practical cognitivism.:1. Approaching my topic: moral judgments 1 1.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ................... 5 1.2. The practicality of moral judgments................... 9 1.3. The task, the problem .......................... 11 1.4. Outlook .................................. 16 I. Cognitivism 21 2. Introduction 21 3. Cognitivism: the basics 22 3.1. Ordinary descriptive beliefs ....................... 22 3.2. Moral beliefs................................ 28 3.3. Scanlon’s and Smith’s cognitivism.................... 31 4. Cognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 35 5. Cognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 38 5.1. Attempt#1:Externalism ........................ 40 5.2. Attempt #2: The rationality-based account of practicality . . . . . . 44 5.3. Attempt#3: Volitionalism........................ 55 6. Conclusion 63 II. Noncognitivism 67 7. Introduction 67 8. Noncognitivism: the basics 69 8.1. Nondescriptivism ............................. 69 8.2. Intrinsic practicality ........................... 71 8.3. The desire-like account of intrinsic practicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 8.4. A standard of internal consistency.................... 79 8.5. Expressing vs. reporting ......................... 85 9. Noncognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 88 10.Noncognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 90 10.1. Noncognitivism vs. speakersubjectivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 10.2. Attempt #1: Horgan and Timmons................... 96 10.3. Attempt #2: Blackburn ......................... 99 10.4. Attempt #3: Gibbard ..........................103 11. Conclusion 112 III. Practical Cognitivism 115 12. Introduction 115 12.1. Diagnosis .................................115 12.2. Practical cognitivism ...........................125 13. The generic concept of form 130 13.1. Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 13.2. Applying the generic concept of form to moral judgments . . . . . . . 136 14.The practical character of practical knowledge 138 15.The cognitive character of practical knowledge 145 15.1. Universal validity as a feature of theoretical knowledge . . . . . . . . 146 15.2. Universal validity as a feature of practical knowledge . . . . . . . . . 148 16. The self-conscious character of practical knowledge 153 17. Moral judgments as acts of practical knowledge 160 17.1. Self-conscious practicality ........................161 17.2. Self-conscious validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 1 7.3. Self-conscious practical validity .....................167 18. Excursus: Thompson’s (Neo)Aristotelian practical cognitivism 172 19.The objectivity and intrinsic practicality of moral judgments 179 19.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ...................180 19.2.The intrinsic practicality of moral judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 19.3. Shared willing, public reasons and practical knowledge of the good . . 191 20.Conclusion 196 21.Objections 198 21.1. Moral error and practical irrationality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200 21.2. The formalism objection .........................208 22. Acknowledgement 219 References 220

The rhetorical core of adaptation studies is a comparison between two texts, and the type of comparison that has sparked the most reactions, whether in its use or in speaking out against it, is fidelity criticism. As David Johnson and Simone Murray point out, fidelity criticism has long been rejected as an unscholarly mode of interpretative analysis because it is caught up in subjective value judgments and imprecise conjectures of a text’s “essence.” I contend, however, that the understanding of essences is critical to understanding both fidelity and the adaptation experience because something like essence is fixed in the human consciousness. Recent research in neuro-studies suggests that the mind creates “essences” by recognizing networks of structural elements in objects (namely texts for the purposes of this paper). The essence then becomes an experienced-based abstraction that can be recalled whenever useful. The individual is able to use the abstraction the mind creates to interpret the world, including the object itself, other objects, and the relationship all those objects have with him/herself, the individual. That relationship, in turn, influences and changes both the object and the individual interpreting the object. Thus the concept of a text’s essence, though often disregarded, becomes a useful interpretative tool when understood through a combination of overlapping theoretical traditions. Combining a reception-based structural and Heideggerian utilitarianism with recent neuroscientific findings grants productive insights clarifying our understandings and definitions of essence, especially in regard to adaptations in particular.

No description available.

No description available.