Ce travail propose une interprétation d’ensemble de la théorie du droit et de la théorie du contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité des lois de l’auteur canadien contemporain Wilfrid Waluchow, à partir d’une étude de la manière dont elles s’inspirent de la conception classique de la common law. La partie préliminaire présente de façon synthétique la conception classique de la common law et la critique que lui adresse Thomas Hobbes, pour montrer comment elles font apparaître, dès les origines de la modernité, deux façons opposées de concevoir le droit, qui sous-tendent la pensée contemporaine. La première partie étudie le rapport que les conceptions du droit des inspirateurs plus immédiats de Wilfrid Waluchow entretiennent avec la conception classique de la common law. Elle explique comment H. L. A. Hart contribue à rapprocher le positivisme juridique de la vision coutumière des common lawyers à l’aide de la notion de règles secondaires et comment Ronald Dworkin associe plutôt l’approche de la common law à une méthode d’interprétation centrée sur la dimension argumentative du droit. La deuxième partie examine le positivisme juridique inclusif de Wilfrid Waluchow et la théorie de common law du contrôle judiciaire qu’il élabore à partir de celui-ci et elle montre comment l’effort de l’auteur canadien pour conjuguer dans sa pensée les influences des conceptions du droit de Hart et de Dworkin, à l’aide en particulier de la notion de moralité constitutionnelle, l’amène à développer une vision qui possède des affinités importantes avec la conception classique de la common law. / This work offers a general interpretation of the theory of law and the theory of judicial review of Canadian contemporary author Wilfrid Waluchow, through the study of their relation to classical common law jurisprudence. The preliminary section offers a summary of classical common law jurisprudence and of Thomas Hobbes’s critique of classical common law jurisprudence, and shows how they define two opposite ways of conceptualizing law that still underlie contemporary jurisprudence. The first section studies how the jurisprudence of H. L. A. Hart and of Ronald Dworkin, which directly inspire Wilfrid Waluchow’s theory of law, relate to classical common law jurisprudence. It shows how Hart, with his concept of secondary rules, moves legal positivism closer to classical common law’s customary understanding of the law and how Dworkin defines the common law approach otherwise, by proposing an interpretive method concentrating on the argumentative character of law.The second section studies Wilfrid Waluchow’s inclusive legal positivism and his common law theory of judicial review. It shows how Wilfrid Waluchow’s effort to reconcile Hart’s theory of the law with Dworkin’s jurisprudence, notably through the idea of constitutional morality, leads him to develop an understanding of the law which has important affinities with classical common law jurisprudence.

L’observation de l’invocabilité des accords internationaux devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne et leConseil d’Etat français permet de constater une convergence des jurisprudences des deux juridictions en la matière.D’une part, les conditions constitutionnelles d’incorporation de la norme conventionnelle sont semblables en raison del’orientation moniste des ordres juridiques français et de l’Union européenne. D’autre part, l’effet direct –c’est-à-direl’aptitude de la norme à produire un droit subjectif – est le principal filtre de l’invocabilité du droit conventionneldevant les juridictions de Paris et de Luxembourg. La dévolution de l’effet direct à une norme conventionnelle procèded’un choix du juge. Et il apparaît que les méthodes d’interprétation employées par le Conseil d’Etat pour opérer cechoix, mêlant téléologie et formalisme, tendent à s’aligner sur celles prônées par la Cour de justice. Dans le cadre ducontrôle de légalité, la subordination de l’invocabilité à l’effet direct est toutefois contestable, dans la mesure où lerequérant n’appelle pas le juge à statuer sur un rapport entre la norme conventionnelle et le particulier, mais sur unrapport entre la norme conventionnelle et la norme interne. La Cour de justice et le Conseil d’Etat ont certes développédes palliatifs au principe du défaut d’invocabilité des règles conventionnelles dépourvues d’effet direct. Ellespermettent par exemple que celles-ci soient employées comme référentiels d’interprétation du droit interne. Maisl’angle mort de l’État de droit que constitue l’impossibilité de contester la violation des règles conventionnellesdépourvues d’effet direct par un acte interne doit être comblé. C’est pourquoi, il apparaît nécessaire de fonder sur laprimauté une forme d’invocabilité, autonome de l’effet direct, qui permettrait d’obtenir la sanction des violationsmanifestes de ces règles. / This thesis analyses the invocability of International Agreements before the European Court of Justice and the French“Conseil d’État”. A convergence of the Case-Law of these Courts exists on this matter. On one hand, the constitutionalconditions for incorporation of Treaty rules are similar, owing to the common monist orientation of EU and FrenchLegal Orders. On the other hand, Direct Effect – ie the ability of a rule to grant substantive Right – is the main filter ofthe invocability of Agreements before the Courts of Paris and Luxembourg. The recognition of Direct Effect isdecided by a judge’s choice. And it appears that the methods of interpretation used by the French “Conseil d’État”,combining exegesis and teleology, are coming close to those advocated by the ECJ. In the Judicial Review, theconnection between invocability and Direct Effect can however be criticized, because the claimant doesn’t call for theapplication of one of his individual Rights, but for the legality control of a norm on the ground of another norm. TheECJ and the French “Conseil d’État” have indeed given some limited effect to the non-directly effective rules ofInternational Agreements, for example by interpreting domestic law in conformity with this kind of Rules. Howeverthe impossibility to contest the violation of these Rules breaches certainly the Rule of Law. Then, it is necessary tocreate a form of invocability based on the primacy, independent of the direct effect filter, allowing domestic Courts tostrike down legislation in cases of clear-cut, manifest breaches of these Rules.

The Swedish government is legally obliged to conduct climate policy work that will protect nature and humanity from the harmful effects of climate change. Obligations related to the environment arise under Swedish domestic law, European law and international law. This thesis investigates the possibilities for the Swedish public to initiate climate change litigation against the Swedish government due to insufficient climate actions. I examine three climate change litigation approaches from selected jurisdictions, including Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. By transposing the three litigation approaches into the Swedish legal order I seek to discuss the possibilities for the public to challenge the Swedish state's responsibility in climate matters. This thesis claims that the possibilities for the concerned public to address climate change are restricted. International obligations derived from the European Convention on Human Rights and the Aarhus Convention have given individuals substantive rights and procedural rights in matters related to the environment. However, the implementation of the international obligations are not always enshrined in the national law.

L’existence du devoir général de respecter les délais des procès est reconnue par les systèmes juridiques de nombreux pays. L’exigence du délai raisonnable à l’égard de la Juridiction constitutionnelle doit néanmoins faire face à des obstacles d’ordre conceptuel et matériel. L’absence d’une définition précise du Délai Raisonnable et l’indétermination de sa nature juridique constituent des réelles difficultés, auxquelles s’ajoutent les facteurs identitaires du contrôle de constitutionnalité exercé par les Cours constitutionnelles, le caractère contraignant de leurs décisions, et la position hiérarchique que celles-ci occupent dans l’ordre juridico-politique de l’État. Ces contraintes créent souvent des exégèses divergentes du Délai Raisonnable et par conséquent, entraînent des exigences variées. Le propos de cette thèse est d’analyser, à partir de la jurisprudence des juridictions constitutionnelles française, brésilienne, et espagnole, les effets juridiques issus des multiples approches et signifiants du Délai Raisonnable. Cette recherche s’inscrit dans le domaine du droit constitutionnel contemporain et comparé, et repose sur la théorie de la démocratie continue et du néoconstitutionnalisme marqués par l’émergence des nouveaux mécanismes et acteurs de la participation démocratique dans l’effectivité des Droits fondamentaux. Afin de comprendre les dimensions de l’exigence ou de la violation du Délai Raisonnable à l’égard de la Juridiction constitutionnelle, on confrontera ce droit avec deux des paramètres épistémologiques qui prétendent lui donner support de légitimité : la théorie des Droits fondamentaux et la théorie de l’État constitutionnel démocratique. Dans une Première partie, le Délai Raisonnable est confronté aux facteurs identitaires de la Juridiction exercée par la Cour constitutionnelle afin de vérifier dans quelle mesure il est apte à servir de fondement aux décisions rendues par cette juridiction spéciale. Dans la Seconde, son contenu sémantique a priori indéterminé ainsi que ses multiples destinataires seront analysés à travers l’évolution conceptuelle que le Délai Raisonnable a connue en fonction des décisions des Cours constitutionnelles. / The existence of a general duty to respect the duration of proceedings is recognized by the legal systems of many countries. The reasonable length of proceedings demanded from constitutional Jurisdiction has none the less to face conceptual and material obstacles. The want of a precise definition of de reasonable length of proceedings and the indetermination of his legal nature are really difficulties, heightened by the identity factors of the judicial review wielded by the constitutional jurisdictions, the restraining nature of hers decisions and his hierarchical position held in the legal-political order of the State. These restraints often create divergent exegeses of the reasonable length of proceedings and, subsequently, involve various demands. The object of this doctoral thesis is to analyse the jurisprudence of the constitutional French, Brazilian and Spanish Jurisdiction and the legal effects produced by the multiple approaches and signifiers of the reasonable length of proceedings. This research fits into the field of modern and comparative constitutional law and is founded on the theory of continuous democracy and neoconstitutionalism bearing the marks of the new workings and actors of the democratic participation in the effectiveness of the fundamental Rights. In order to understand the implications of the demands or violation of the reasonable length of proceedings in relation to constitutional Jurisdiction, this right will be confronted with two epistemological parameters which claim to give it a legitimate support: the theory of fundamental rights and the theory of the democratic constitutional State. In a first part, the reasonable length of proceedings is confronted to identity factors of the jurisdiction wielded by the constitutional Court so as to ascertain if it is apt to serve as a foundation to the decisions pronounced by this special jurisdiction. In the second part, its semantic content a priori undetermined with its multiple recipients will be analysed through the conceptual evolution of the reasonable length of proceedings embodied by the decisions of the constitutional Courts.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

Over the last couple of decades or so, comparative public law scholars have been reporting a dramatic increase in the power and influence of judicial institutions worldwide. One obvious effect of this “judicialization of politics” is to highlight legitimacy concerns associated with the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, how do courts attain and retain their legitimacy particularly in the context of their increasing political relevance? To answer this question I develop a novel theory of strategic legitimacy cultivation. The theory is developed through an application of the institutionalist branch of the rational choice theory which suggests that institutional structures, rules, and imperatives provide behavioural incentives and disincentives for relevant actors who respond by acting strategically in order to attain favourable outcomes. The theory shows that courts cultivate legitimacy by exhibiting strategic sensitivities to factors operating in the external, political environment. In particular, legitimacy cultivation requires courts to devise decisions that are sensitive to the state of public opinion, that avoid overt clashes and entanglements with key political actors, that do not overextend the outreach of judicial activism, and that employ politically sensitive jurisprudence. The theory is tested in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada through a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative analysis of a large number of cases, case-study approaches, and cross-policy comparisons. One of the central findings of the dissertation is that understanding judicial institutions and judicial policymaking influence requires taking close accounts of external contexts within which courts operate.

Over the last couple of decades or so, comparative public law scholars have been reporting a dramatic increase in the power and influence of judicial institutions worldwide. One obvious effect of this “judicialization of politics” is to highlight legitimacy concerns associated with the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, how do courts attain and retain their legitimacy particularly in the context of their increasing political relevance? To answer this question I develop a novel theory of strategic legitimacy cultivation. The theory is developed through an application of the institutionalist branch of the rational choice theory which suggests that institutional structures, rules, and imperatives provide behavioural incentives and disincentives for relevant actors who respond by acting strategically in order to attain favourable outcomes. The theory shows that courts cultivate legitimacy by exhibiting strategic sensitivities to factors operating in the external, political environment. In particular, legitimacy cultivation requires courts to devise decisions that are sensitive to the state of public opinion, that avoid overt clashes and entanglements with key political actors, that do not overextend the outreach of judicial activism, and that employ politically sensitive jurisprudence. The theory is tested in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada through a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative analysis of a large number of cases, case-study approaches, and cross-policy comparisons. One of the central findings of the dissertation is that understanding judicial institutions and judicial policymaking influence requires taking close accounts of external contexts within which courts operate.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

本研究關注中科三期環評訴訟中行政與司法的互動，主要的研究問題是探究行政系統如何回應司法判決？從而分析司法判決對於行政系統產生什麼影響？綜觀中科三期環評爭議，隨著后里農民提起行政訴訟，讓行政與司法間的攻防與角力就此展開。最高行政法院於2010年判決撤銷中科三期環評結論確定，然而科學園區的開發早已如火如荼展開，面對廠商營運、量產在即，但開發行為的合法性基礎卻被撤銷，迫使行政系統必須做出因應。然而，行政系統並未遵守司法判決「依法行政」，反而持續以「選擇性的作為與不作為」來抵抗司法。 從行政系統的因應可發現儘管行政權強力抗拒司法，但顧及政策必須持續推行，所以實際上亦不可能完全無視判決指摘，仍必須做出「行為上的調整」，包含：重啟環評、加速通過環評，或者又重新決議要進行二階環評等。顯示面對司法審查的進逼迫使其必須「繞道而行」。後續儘管法院再裁定中科三期應停工，行政系統仍未就範，而修修補補、只做半套的環評，不僅仍無法通過法院合法性的檢驗，也致使中科三期演變成「邊施工、邊營運、邊環評」的窘況。本研究主要採取的研究方法包含：次級資料分析、參與觀察、訪談法。 總結而言，本研究將指出行政系統的態度與偏好是司法判決能否落實的關鍵。相反的，司法則沒有什麼權力影響判決如何被執行。然而，儘管司法顯露出侷限性，始終未能有效牽制住中科三期的開發，但中科三期環評訴訟對於行政系統仍產生相當的衝擊與影響，不論是對環評制度實務或對於往後環境運動的發展，這場運動仍是有深遠影響的一股動能。 / As more and more administrative litigations were filed, tensions between the executive and the judiciary branch have been on the rise. By using the environmental impact assessment (EIA) litigation of the 3rd phase expansion of Central Taiwan Science Park (CTSP) as a case study, this paper aims to understand the dynamic interaction between these two branches of the state. Particularly, it aims to shed light on how the executive reacts to judicial decisions, and whether judicial review influences bureaucratic practices and if so, its means and the extent of its impact. According to the separation of powers principle, the main function of judicial review is to monitor the legal reach of the executive power. Even as one of the landmark cases in Taiwanese legal history, however, it had been observed that not all judicial decisions are implemented by government agencies following the EIA litigation. Despite the fact that the conclusion of the EIA had been rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court, the executive resisted this judicial decision by being selective in its enforcement. Nevertheless, the executive must still respond to the judiciary albeit with some “behavioural adjustments” in order to make sure that the development of the 3rd phase expansion of CTSP can be completed as soon as possible. Research methods adopted in this paper is mainly literature review, participant observation and in-depth interview. This case study reveals three major findings. First, the enforcement of judicial decisions is not necessarily obligatory and hinges on the attitudes of the executive. Secondly, the judiciary has very limited powers when it comes to effecting the enforcement of its decisions but its decisions do engender some observable changes (or non-changes) in bureaucratic behaviour which can be attributed to judicial review. Thirdly, although these verdicts failed to stop the abuse of power and allowed the fulfillment of rights, for local residents, cause lawyers, and NGOs, there are still many positive lessons to be taken away from their efforts from which future environmental movements will also likely benefit.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.