Le contrôle juridictionnel sur les décisions des autorités de concurrence présente une intensité fortement changeante. Cela a engendré un effort de systématisation théorique et a demandé la solution d’une série de questions médianes. La nature technique de la matière économique a en effet justifié un modèle institutionnel spécifique (celui d’autorité administrative indépendante), un certain type de norme (par concepts juridiques indéterminés), une forme particulière de pouvoir discrétionnaire (qu’on peut définir mixte : au même temps pur et technique). Sur la base de tous ces éléments, on a individué l’ampleur idéale du contrôle. Le premier élément, le caractère indépendant des autorités, impose de se questionner sur les limites entre administration en formes contentieuses et juridiction, mais aussi sur les limites entre administration et politique. Le deuxième élément, relatif à la structure de la norme, a engendré une réflexion sur l’exigence que l’administration puisse intégrer la prescription légale, à l’acte de son application, de façon qu’elle participe en quelque sorte à la définition des conditions d’exercice de son propre pouvoir. Le troisième des éléments rappelés, la nature mixte du pouvoir discrétionnaire, a permis de redéfinir les raisons de l’analogie du contrôle juridictionnel sur l’opportunité et de celui sur la pluralité des solutions techniques . L’instrument utilisé pour mener cette analyse est le principe de proportionnalité, instrument d’action de l’administration mais aussi instrument de contrôle du juge, qui a permis de relever l’affinité entre les formes de l’action administrative et forme du contrôle qui sont à l’origine des incertitudes relevées. / Judicial review of antitrust authorities’ decisions shows as extremely variable. This justified an effort of theoretical explanation and demanded the elucidation of several intermediate questions. The technical nature of the economic subject accounts for a specific institutional model (the independent agencies one), a given type of norms (through standards and indeterminate concepts), a peculiar form of discretionary power (defined mixt: both pure an technical). Considering all these elements, we defined the ideal reach of judicial review. The first element, the independent nature of authorities, dictates to wonder on the boundaries between confrontational administration and trial, but also on the boundaries between administration and politics. The second element, related to the structure of the norm, provokes a reflection on the necessity that the administration completes the legal prescription while applying it, somehow participating to the definition of her own power’s legitimacy requirements. The third element recalled, the mixt nature of discretionary power, led to redefine the reasons of the analogy between jurisdictional control on opportunity and on technical administrative evaluations. The instrument used to carry out the described analysis is the principle of proportionality, tool of administrative action but also instrument of judicial review, that permitted to reveal the affinity between administrative and jurisdictional paradigms that founds the observed uncertainties.

Le contentieux administratif de la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat sous la IIIe République est un objet ancien de curiosité doctrinale. Un renouvellement de l’approche traditionnelle était cependant possible. Alors que les études classiques insistent sur l’apport du Conseil d’Etat à la réussite de la Séparation et à la protection des libertés de conscience et des cultes, il est envisageable d’étudier la jurisprudence sous l’angle des interactions entre les institutions républicaines et le contrôle juridictionnel de l’administration. Soumise à cette problématique, l’oeuvre du Conseil d’Etat permet une approche monografique de l’histoire de la juridiction administrative républicaine révélant les influences réciproques entre le juge administratif et les institutions républicaines. Dans le cas du contentieux de la Séparation, la jurisprudence administrative a ainsi joué un rôle décisif dans la mise en oeuvre et l’approfondissement des grands principes de la loi du 9 décembre 1905, contribuant à donner une consistance à la notion juridique de laïcité de l’Etat. Dans le même temps, et spécialement dans le cadre du contentieux de la police des cultes, le contexte politique et juridique de la Séparation a contribué à la construction du recours pour excès de pouvoir républicain. Cet apport s’est manisfesté par la modernisation des techniques de contrôle juridictionnel et par un encadrement plus étroit du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’autorité de police. En abordant ces deux aspects du contentieux de la Séparation, cette étude voudrait éclairer la transformation d’une justice administrative d’inspiration impériale en une justice administrative démocratique et républicaine. / Law scolars are traditionnally interested in the implementation of the separation of church and state by the administrative courts during the Third Republic. However, a renewal of the classic understanding was possible. While classic studies focus on the contribution of the Conseil d’Etat to the success of the Séparation and the protection of freedom of thought and religion, it is conceivable to study administrative case law from the angle of interactions between republican institutions and judicial review of administration. This methodological framework allows to underline mutual influences between the judiciary and republican institutions in the history of the administrative jurisdiction. Thus, as the Séparation is concerned, case law has played a strategic part in the implementation and enrichment of the principles established by the 9 december 1905 Act, therefore contributing to provide substance to the legal concept of laïcité de l’Etat. In the same time, and especially concerning the case law relating to the administrative regulation of expressions of religious beliefs in the public space, the political and legal context of the Séparation has had a decisive influence on the construction of the republican recours pour excès de pouvoir. This contribution consisted in a modernization of the judicial review techniques and a more accurate control of discretionary powers of the administrative authority. Through the study of the two main aspects of administrative case law relating to the Séparation, this research would like to enlighten the transformation of the traditional imperial-type administrative jurisdiction into a democratic and republican one.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T18:17:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao_taciana_rocha.pdf: 1127356 bytes, checksum: 6713e21f076e27e087a1e3eed9330ef8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-08-01 / Nowadays there is much talk of the (in)efficiency of the judicial process in ensuring the consummation of fundamental rights incumbent on the State, such as the right to education, defined in the republic s constitution as a public subjective right at the level of basic education. Actual practice, as a result of the action of the Department for the Defence of Education of the Capital (Public Prosecution Service of Pernambuco), has shown that a civil public action, a judicial instrument for the protection of diffuse and collective rights, has not made possible the actual implementation of the fundamental right to education (provision of regular basic education by the State), as provided for in Brazil s juridical order. The fact is that the provision of regular basic education presupposes not only satisfying the demand for places in the public school system (quantitative aspect), but also the guarantee of minimum standards of quality of teaching (qualitative aspect), which involves the State making available the goods and services indispensable for meeting the educational needs and, as a result, the outlay of public resources. The judicial decision obtained in a civil public action (compelling the Treasury to comply with its obligation to provide regular basic education) does not satisfy the educational needs formally set out in Brazil s constitution by virtue of the political constraint on executing a such a decision against the Treasury, only executable in the form of a cash payment and, in addition, by virtue of the legal linkage of the appropriations to special funds established in law. Such a judicial decision is monetized, being the result of a cash payment execution, whereas the educational provision, intended to meet the educational needs, only satisfied by means of concrete provisions (educational goods and services), and therefore not linked to the judicial system, but to the economic one, in the setting of which the administration of scarce resources for the purpose of satisfying the needs to be met with public funds requires that the proposed expenditure be included in the State s budget. The failure to execute the constitutional right to education is the subject of this study, the problem being addressed by means of the dialectic hermeneutical method, which permits an understanding of the connection between the judicial and the economic systems, thereby making feasible the proposition of an efficiency route to the implementation of the fundamental right to education / Nos dias atuais muito se tem falado sobre a [in]eficiência do processo judicial para assegurar a realização de direitos fundamentais devidos pelo Poder Público como o direito à educação, definido na Constituição da República como direito subjetivo público em nível de ensino fundamental. A prática decorrente da atuação na Promotoria de Defesa da Educação da Capital [Ministério Público de Pernambuco] vem mostrando que a ação civil pública [instrumento processual de tutela dos direitos difusos e coletivos], não tem possibilitado a efetiva concretização do direito prestacional à educação [ensino fundamental regular ofertado pelo Poder Público] na forma prevista no ordenamento pátrio. Isto porque a oferta regular de ensino fundamental pressupõe não somente o atendimento à demanda por vagas na rede pública de ensino [aspecto quantitativo], mas também a garantia de padrões mínimos de qualidade de ensino [aspecto qualitativo], o que envolve disponibilização de bens e serviços pelo Poder Público para satisfação de necessidades educacionais e resulta, em conseqüência, no gasto de recursos públicos. O provimento judicial obtido em ação civil pública [condenação da Fazenda Pública à obrigação de ofertar ensino fundamental regular] não satisfaz as necessidades educacionais formalmente consagradas na Constituição Federal, em razão da limitação política à execução contra a Fazenda Pública [admissível apenas na forma de quantia certa] e, ainda, por força da vinculação das verbas condenatórias a fundos especiais previstos em lei. Tal provimento judicial é monetarizado, obtido em execução por quantia certa, enquanto o provimento educacional, objeto de satisfação de necessidades educacionais, somente é satisfeito por meio de provimentos concretos [bens e serviços educacionais] e, portanto, não vinculados ao sistema jurídico, mas ao econômico, no qual a administração de recursos escassos impõe que os gastos públicos para satisfação de necessidades sejam incluídos em orçamento [previsão orçamentária]. A inexequibilidade do direito prestacional à educação é o problema enfrentado na pesquisa mediante método dialético-hermenêutico, que permite a compreensão da conexão do sistema jurídico com o econômico, tornando, assim, possível a proposição de uma via de eficiência para o direito prestacional à educação

Les présents travaux de thèse se proposent de réévaluer les rapports qu’entretiennent la nationalité et la souveraineté. Le lien entre ces deux notions s’est en effet longtemps exprimé autour de l’idée d’un pouvoir quasi absolu de l’État pour déterminer les individus qu’il tient pour ses nationaux. La nationalité est ainsi souvent citée comme l’exemple même d’une prérogative présentant un très haut (si ce n’est le plus haut) degré de liberté pour l’État. Ce « dogme » de la souveraineté en droit de la nationalité reflète-t-il encore l’état du droit positif ? Pour contribuer à répondre à cette question, cette étude entend interroger à lafois l’étendue de la compétence de l’État, mais aussi la discrétionnarité de son pouvoir, en prenant principalement appui sur le droit français, les droits européens et le droit international. Un résultat se dessine alors : le droit de la nationalité, produit d’une lente évolution historique et de profondes mutations contemporaines, ne peut plus s’exprimer sur le mode de la souveraineté. Le rapport de la nationalité au territoire, sa pénétration dans le champ des droits de l’homme, et la progression des contrôle juridictionnels font en effet reculer – jusqu’à l’effacer – la liberté de l’État pour octroyer, refuser ou révoquer lanationalité. / This work aims to review the relationship between nationality and sovereignty. The bond between these two legal notions has repeatedly expressed itself as an absolute power of the State to determine which individuals it considers to be its nationals. Accordingly, nationality is widely selected to exemplify a State’s power with a high (if not the highest) degree of liberty. However, does this sovereignty “dogma” in nationality law still reflect current positive law? To further contribute to the debate, this thesis needs to examine – through a study of French domestic law, European laws, and International law – both the scope of the State’s jurisdiction and the discretion of its power. Then, results show that nationality law, because ofhistorical developments and contemporary transformation, is no longer able to express itself as a sovereign power. The connexion of nationality with the territory, its integration in the field of human rights, and the growth of judicial review are altogether eroding and erasing the State’s freedom to grant, deny or revoke nationality.

In the period from 2009-2020, South Africa has witnessed the rise of "lawfare". Lawfare is understood as the judicialisation of politics - turning to the courts and the use of the law to resolve broadly political matters. This thesis explores the unfolding implications of the judicialisation of politics for judicial legitimacy. In the displacement of the political into the judicial the reach of the courts is expanded and the legitimacy of courts engaging in a "political" role is questioned. Situated in the field of judicial-political dynamics, the interplay between law and politics is observed through the adoption of a historical-institutionalist model. This thesis identifies the causes of the judicialisation of politics and then traces its consequences for broader constitutional stability and the impact on the judicial institution. Guidelines for the Court to navigate lawfare to achieve institutional resilience and maintain judicial legitimacy are then proposed. Judicialisation of politics is caused primarily through the failures of the other branches of government to fulfil their assigned constitutional role. Institutional imbalance in a dominant party democracy means that opposition parties and civil society organisations are left with little recourse but to appeal to the Court to be a constitutional bulwark. The Court is then compelled to step into the breach and fill the accountability vacuum. In identifying the causes of judicialisation, a fuller understanding of Lawfare emerges, expanding current scholarship beyond its traditionally abusive characterisation. It posits a duality to Lawfare in that it can be both an abuse of law and a last line of defence. Through observing the judicial political interactions, a trajectory from the judicialisation of politics to the politicisation of law is mapped. The politicisation of law sees political power refocused on the courts, exposing them to political aggression and attack by the dominant party. The judicialisation of politics that seeks accountability from recalcitrant political actors asks much of the courts, at a time when ensuring executive oversight is the most dangerous, because of the ease with which a hostile executive in a dominant party democracy can implement measures that may undermine the independence of the judiciary. The Constitutional Court has shown a remarkable ability to navigate this era of Lawfare, remaining resolute under fire. However, the more successful the Court is in holding the line against executive abuse of power, the more the judicial route is identified as a powerful weapon to achieve more abusive political objectives. The relationship between Lawfare and legitimacy is identified as a wicked problem that demands expanding boundaries to observe the courts influence on the political environment, and the political environment's influence on the judicial role and its legitimacy. Through advancing a multi-dimensional paradigm of judicial legitimacy, the dialectics of judicial legitimacy are shown to be aggravated by the judicialisation of politics. In this respect it is argued that where the foundations and assumptions on which legitimacy is predicated shift, legitimacy must be re-examined. It is therefore argued that in a culture marked by an impunified disregard of non-judicial regulatory enforcement and increasing non-compliance with judicial orders, the impulse to preserve legitimacy through a detached, formalist stance will not be sufficient. Judicial legitimacy must be relocated in the ability of the Court to be responsive. Pulled into the role of judicial statesmanship, the Court must adopt a robust approach to assertively uphold the rule of law. In tracking the unfolding consequences of the judicialisation of politics, the Court is asked to resolve matters beyond its institutional capabilities. Absent the normative commitment to the rule of law, the internationalisation of constitutional norms, and the political interest to implement remedial orders, the Court is unable to effect workable relief. In tracing the dangers of the continued trend of Lawfare, the thesis sketches a downward spiral of reputational strength of the Court and a decline in democratic responsibility. This leads to an inability to achieve effective reform that ends in disenchantment, questioning the faith placed in the Constitution. It depicts how the Constitutional Court as 'constitutional saviour' can unravel into constitutional blame. The Constitutional Court has been able to hold the line in this era of Lawfare and repel assaults on its integrity and efforts to undermine its independence. However, without a broader culture of commitment to the rule of law, civil education and a suffusion of constitutional responsibility beyond the judiciary, the Court will not be able to continue to shoulder the weight of what is asked of it. This research depicts a circular model of Lawfare and legitimacy, where Lawfare is predicated on judicial legitimacy, but an overreliance on Lawfare will destroy judicial legitimacy.

<p>Canadian courts have struggled to develop a consistent and coherent approach for reviewing administrative decision-making. In particular, they have been unable to create a workable framework that will guide when the courts will show deference to administrative tribunal interpretations of law and when they will interfere with them, leading to a system of administrative law that is unpredictable and disorderly. This thesis develops a novel approach to administrative review centered on a conception of judicial due-deference that is correlated with a Razian account of legitimate authority. My argument is that administrative review is best understood as an exercise of inter-institutional decision-making in which diverse institutions within the meta-institution of government must work together to arrive at decisions that best secure government objectives. When reviewing courts recognize that administrative actors are better situated in particular circumstances to make decisions than the courts, they ought to show deference. On the other hand, when courts are better situated to handle these matters, deference is not to be shown. I begin in Part I by analyzing the history of Canadian administrative law jurisprudence through to the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in <em>Dunsmuir</em>, highlighting the competing principles of the rule of law and democracy that animate the ‘Diceyan Dialectic’. In Part II, I articulate a complex theory of inter-institutional reasoning that demonstrates the important role of deference and authority in good government decision-making. In Part III, I apply this model to the circumstances of Canadian administrative review. I show how there are certain institutional strengths, as well as key limitations, with respect to how our superior courts can play a role in upholding the Rule of Law and democracy. Ultimately, I argue that the superior courts must pay attention to the unique institutional placement of administrative actors relative to them in order to discern if these non-curial actors possess greater authority and hence ought to be shown deference.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Pas de résumé / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The theme running through this dissertation is intended to prove that the Supreme Court has a role to play in the promotion, enforcement and sustenance of a proper democratic system of government, good governance and fundamental human rights and freedoms in Ghana. The Study would therefore address the role of the Supreme Court in the development of Constitutional Law in Ghana, with particular emphasis on the court's contribution to the underlying concepts of the Fourth Republican Constitution of 1992; the guiding principles of constitutional interpretation and the vexed issue of whether the court should adopt a mechanical and literal approach to the interpretation of the Constitution or adopt a liberal, beneficent and purposive approach. The Supreme Court has asserted in the locus classicus decision: Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637 that the 1979 Constitution as the supreme law, must be construed as a living political document capable of growth. Is there any evidence now to support that claim? The study shall also investigate the question of the power of the Supreme Court to review legislative and executive action. We shall also examine the role of the Supreme Court in the interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution and Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms in relation to the rights and obligations of the individual and the State with the view to achieving good governance. The 1992 Constitution itself is founded on the premise that there are limitations to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms. What is the extent of such limitations as determined by the Supreme Court? What has been the Supreme Court's contribution to the sustenance of political stability and democratic governance and, especially, in matters relating to coup d'etats and to enforcement of the Constitution itself as distinct from the enforcement of fundamental human rights and freedoms? Has the Supreme Court power to enforce the Constitution and the existing law where there is proven case of injustice and illegality? Has the Supreme Court power to enforce Directive Principles of State Policy as formulated in chapter 6 of the 1992 Ghana Constitution? / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

En Chine, une communauté de juristes est en train d'éclore. Celle-ci commence à exercer une influence sur la « conscience juridique » de la société. Or, à la différence de leurs confrères français, les avocats chinois ne possèdent pas encore suffisamment le sentiment d'appartenance à leur corps. Leurs associations ne sont pas autonomes. Si la profession s'est beaucoup inspirée des expériences des pays « déontologiquement plus développés », des principes fondamentaux de la profession ne sont pas enracinés dans l'esprit collectif des avocats. En tant que profession libérale, la profession d'avocat éprouve un besoin inhérent de l'autonomie. Sans cette autonomie, elle ne pourra pas faire entendre sa voix par le public, ni protéger ses membres. De même, les activités des avocats ne pourront être surveillées de manière équitable par une institution ordinale muselée par les pouvoirs publics. L'autonomie de l'association des avocats, que ce soit en Chine ou en France, s'avère être une garantie pour la justice et le justiciable. Cette autonomie ne constitue pas une fin en soi. Elle n'est que le meilleur moyen d'assurer l'indépendance de l'avocat. L'essentiel de l'autonomie de la profession s'explique par sa mise en œuvre dans l'exercice professionnel des avocats. « À l'ongle on connaît le lion ». Cette étude comparative semble pouvoir révéler, au moins en une certaine mesure, le véritable paysage du fonctionnement de la justice, et aider à mieux comprendre la distance qui sépare la République populaire de Chine d'un « État de droit » au sens moderne. / In China, a lawyers' community is being formed. It begins to influence the "legal conscience" of the society. However, unlike their French colleagues, Chinese lawyers do not have yet enough sense of belonging to a common professional group. Their associations are not autonomous. Although the profession is much inspired by the experiences of "ethically more developed" countries, the fundamental principles of the profession are not yet rooted in Chinese lawyers’ collective concept. As a liberal profession, lawyers are experiencing an inherent need for autonomy. Otherwise, they cannot make their voice heard by the public, nor protect their professional rights. Similarly, lawyers' activities cannot be fairly supervised by a professional institution dependent on the public power. The autonomy of lawyers' association, whether in China or in France, should be considered as a guarantee for justice and all persons subject to trial. The autonomy is not an end in itself. It is the best way to ensure the independence of the lawyer. The essence of lawyers' autonomy is explained by its implementation in lawyers’ professional activities. From his foot Hercules. This comparative study aims to reveal, at least to some extent, the real landscape of Chinese justice, and to explore the distance between the People's Republic of China and a "rule of law" in its modern sense.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thiago Buschinelli Sorrentino.pdf: 3995173 bytes, checksum: bd95b32c746e3b64c8723cdce5cd1d48 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-06 / This paper examines the judicial review of how tax liability is ascribed to non-taxpayers, upon the Brazil Supreme Court point of view (Supremo Tribunal Federal). Studies, at first, the role of language, logic and Systems Theory as tools which will be used throughout the investigation. Then, rebuilds the syntactic and dynamic structures of the norms that ascribe tax liability. Searches for the constitutional and non-constitutional (National Tax Code) parameters of control. Emphasizes proportionality, reasonableness and the role of general taxation norms within the system. Scrutinizes some of the instruments available to the Brazil Supreme Court (the ação direta de inconstitucionalidade, the recurso extraordinário and the reclamação constitucional). At last, reckons scenarios in order to test some of the conclusions / Esta dissertação de mestrado examina o controle da atribuição de responsabilidade tributária, tomando por parâmetro os instrumentos disponíveis ao Supremo Tribunal Federal. Estuda, inicialmente, o papel da linguagem, da lógica e da Teoria dos Sistemas na formação do quadro. Reconstrói, então, as estruturas sintáticas e dinâmicas das normas de responsabilidade tributária. Procura pelos parâmetros de controle, constitucionais e infraconstitucionais (Código Tributário Nacional). Em especial, dá ênfase à proporcionalidade e a razoabilidade e ao papel das normas gerais em matéria tributária. Escrutiniza alguns dos instrumentos disponíveis ao Supremo Tribunal Federal para o controle da responsabilidade tributária (a ação direta de inconstitucionalidade, o recurso extraordinário e a reclamação constitucional). Por fim, elege cenários para testar alguns pontos das conclusões