The permissible use of defensive force is a central tenet of the traditional legal and philosophical justification for war and its practice. Just War Theory holds a nation’s right to resist aggressive attack with defensive force as the clearest example of a just cause for war. Just War Theory also stipulates norms for warfare derived from a conception of defensive force asserted to be consistent with the moral reality of war. Recently, these aspects of Just War Theory have been criticized. David Rodin has challenged the status of national defense as an uncontroversial just cause. Jeff McMahan has charged that Just War Theory’s norms that govern warfare are inconsistent with the norms of permissive defensive force. In this thesis I defend the status of national defense as a clear case of a just cause. However, my defense may require revision of Just War Theory’s norms that govern warfare.

This dissertation offers a new understanding about wartime decision making in the face of likely, but unintended, harm to foreign civilians. It empirically identifies conditions under which leaders in democratic nations are more or less likely to choose to attack a target when confronted with a dilemma between pursuing national security objectives and avoiding civilian casualties. An innovative targeting decision model was constructed that described both the theorized structure of the decisions inputs and the process by which these inputs are assembled into a choice. The model went beyond the normal target benefit and civilian casualty cost considerations of proportionality to also include the contextual input of prospect frame. Decision makers were expected to address the same benefit and cost differently depending on whether they were winning or losing the conflict. This was because the prospect frame would influence their risk attitudes, as predicted by prospect theory. This model was then tested via two decision-making experiments that used military officers and defense civilians as participants. Additionally, a statistical analysis of data collected from an extended period of the second Intifada was done to seek evidence that the model also applied in actual wartime decision making. All three tests supported portions of the targeting decision model. Higher target benefit and lower civilian casualty estimates increased support for the planned attack. Prospect frame influenced decisions in the cases where both target value and the civilian casualty estimates were high and the resulting dilemma was very difficult. In these situations, those told that their forces were losing the conflict were less sensitive to humanitarian harm and more likely to support the attack than when they were told their side was winning. Furthermore, the Intifada data analysis of attacks approved by Israeli officials against Palestinians found this same effect of prospect frame held generally across all six years of observations.

This paper revisits one of the more frequented stops at the crossroads of politics and morality in contemporary ethical theory, Michael Walzer’s essay “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands.” The aim is to provide a fresh assessment of Walzer’s project, and to evaluate the tenability of its core notion of “dirty hands.” In pursuit of this aim, the effort is made to reopen the paths which take Walzer to his celebrated impasse, from two directions. The first of these resituates Walzer’s analysis in the context of the debate within Anglo-American ethical theory in which it is originally expounded. The second route seeks to recapture the trail of thinkers who guide Walzer to his conclusions from more remote locations in intellectual history, in order to determine the reliability of his intriguing constellation of Machiavelli, Weber and Camus as lodestars. Writing thirty years later, one of Walzer’s friendliest interpreters, Jean Elshtain, in the midst of her enthusiasm for ‘dirty hands,’ renews doubts about his recommendation of “casuistry.” Hints from throughout Walzer’s essay, incompletely elaborated there, are parceled together into closing suggestions as to an alternative approach to so-called ‘dirty hands’ situations. / text

People can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-regulation in order to perform immoral behaviour by using different Moral Disengagement mechanisms. These mechanisms within media have a positive effect on immoral behaviour. However, Moral Identity activation is said to counter arguments of Moral Disengagement. In this study, both concepts are applied to the context of war. An additional assumption took into account in how far participants’ internalized moral standards consider war as immoral. This is important since Moral Identity and Moral Disengagement are based on internalized moral standards. To test the hypotheses, this study employed a 2 x 2 RO between-subjects factorial design. The trait variable called Moral Consideration of War was supposed to reflect participants’ internalized moral standards with regard to war. It was used to operationalize the additional assumption. Factor 1 varied the activation of Moral Identity (Moral Identity activation versus control group) and factor 2 varied the depiction of the war scenario (Permissive Scenario versus Prohibitive Scenario). Scenarios were fictive newspaper articles. A Permissive Scenario comprised a higher number of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms than a Prohibitive Scenario. Main outcome measures were the support of war and war-related Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). In total 86 participants (f=45, m=41) were randomized into four cells and completed the online experiment. The Permissive Scenario failed to increase support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the assumption that war is considered immoral. Moral Identity activation had a negative effect on Moral Disengagement only on the assumption that war was considered moral. Moral Identity activation had no significant effect on support of war, on the premise that war was considered immoral. The interaction term of Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario had no significant effect neither on support of war nor on Moral Disengagement, no matter if additional assumption was taken into account or not. Results are discussed with regard to methodological limitations measuring internalized moral standards. Their measurement implied already individual Moral Disengagement. Interaction effect failed, supposedly because Moral Identity activation was not specifically targeted at immoral behaviour and because mediating effects of Moral Identity centrality were not considered. / Die Mechanismen der Moralischen Entkopplung lösen das Selbst von internalisierten moralischen Standards und verhindern damit die Selbstregulierung des moralischen Verhaltens. Diese Mechanismen kommen auch in Medien vor und tragen zu unmoralischem Verhalten bei. Die Aktivierung der Moralischen Identität wirkt jedoch den Mechanismen der Moralischen Entkopplung entgegen. In dieser Studie werden beide Konzepte auf das Thema Krieg übertragen. Dabei ist wichtig zu beachten, dass internalisierte moralische Standards Krieg als unmoralisch bewerten. Schließlich basieren sowohl Moralische Entkopplung als auch die Aktivierung der Moralischen Identität auf dieser zusätzlichen Annahme. Zur Überprüfung der Hypothesen wurde ein 2 x 2 RO Between-Subjects Design verwendet. Faktor 1 variierte die Aktivierung von Moralischer Identität (Aktivierung Moralische Identität versus Kontrollgruppe). Faktor 2 variierte die Permissivität eines Kriegsszenarios in einem Zeitungsartikel (Permissives Szenario versus Prohibitives Szenario). Dabei wurde Permissivität hinsichtlich der Anzahl der Moralischen Entkopplungsmechanismen operationalisiert (Viele versus Wenig). Als Organismusvariable ist die Moralische Bewertung von Krieg zur Überprüfung der zusätzlichen Annahme notwendig gewesen. Abhängige Variablen waren die Unterstützung von Krieg und Moralische Entkopplung (Fragebogen). Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer (N=86, f=45, m=41) des online Experiments wurden in vier verschiedene Versuchsbedingungen randomisiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die Permissivität des Kriegsszenarios keinen Effekt auf Moralische Entkopplung (Fragebogen) oder die Unterstützung von Krieg hatte, unter Berücksichtigung der Zusatzannahme. Moralische Identitätsaktivierung verringerte Moralische Entkopplung (Fragebogen) aber nur unter der Bedingung, dass Krieg als moralisch bewertet wurde. Moralische Entkopplung hatte keinen Effekt auf die Unterstützung von Krieg, unter Berücksichtigung der Zusatzannahme. Die Interaktion von Moralischer Identitätsaktivierung mit der Permissivität des Kriegsszenarios war nicht signifikant, unabhängig davon ob die Zusatzannahme berücksichtigt wurde oder nicht. Die Ergebnisse werden in Bezug auf die methodischen Probleme bei der Messung internalisierter moralischer Standards diskutiert. Es fanden vermutlich Prozesse der Moralischen Entkopplung bereits während der Messung dieser Standards statt. Der fehlende Interaktionseffekt kann an der schwachen und unspezifischen Aktivierung der Moralischen Identität liegen, sowie nicht berücksichtigter Mediatoren, wie z.B. die Zentralität von Moralischer Identität.

In 1936 the founders of PAX aimed at 'resistance to modern warfare on grounds of traditional morality'. Believing that 'just war' criteria could no longer be met, they called themselves pacifists. Although most members were Roman Catholic Pax did not claim to be a 'Catholic society' because the RC Church at that time took an opposing view, particularly of conscientious objection. Church authorities attempted to censor Pax literature and instructed clergy to resign from the society. Pax supported conscientious objectors during the Second World War. When membership declined afterwards it continued to publish the Pax Bulletin and to provide a forum where Catholics could debate theological and practical questions of war and peace. By the 1960s Pax had gained some distinguished sponsors and a branch in the United States - support which enabled it to influence debate at the Second Vatican Council in 1965. The Council endorsed the right to conscientious objection. In 1971 Pax merged with Pax Christi, the international Catholic peace organisation which began in France in 1944/45. This is the first detailed historical study of the Roman Catholic element in the British peace movement. The story of Pax demonstrates the part that even a small pressure group can play in changing public opinion through patient work. Eventually, despite apathy and opposition, Pax helped bring the RC Church to a recognition of the right to conscientious objection and played a crucial role in the development of a more widespread peace movement within the Church

In this thesis,it has been aimed to evaluate the claims of which argue that the human rights thought has been firstly formulated by Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de Las Casas in the early sixteenth century Spain.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Wien, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [334]-352).

Este trabalho procura investigar a revitalização da teoria da guerra justa nas suas formas tradicional e na Filosofia Política Contemporânea. Assim como a sua influência, dentro de um fenômeno amplo de moralização do Direito Internacional Público, acerca dos casos polêmicos sobre o uso da força armada, em especial as intervenções humanitárias e a legítima defesa antecipatória. Analisa a recepção destas idéias na doutrina do Direito Internacional, da Filosofia do Direito Internacional e nas Comissões Internacionais que trataram do uso da força armada nos últimos anos. / This work wants to investigate the revitalization of the theory of just war in its traditional way and in Contemporary Political Philosophy. As such as its influence, inside the matter of moralization of International Law, on the polemical cases about the use of armed force, especially humanitarian interventions and anticipatory self-defense. Analyses the reception of these ideas on the doctrine of International Law, Philosophy of International Law, and International Commissions which dealt with the use of armed force in the last years.

The aim of this paper is to assess the applicability of the Just War Tradition to a declaration of war on terrorism. The specific content that the paper will be analysing is the U.S. decision to declare war on terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. I will be focusing on three conditions used to justify preemptive attacks, which are essential to the Just War Tradition. (i.e. the scope of the self, the existence of evidence, and military intervention as a last resort). The method used, will be discourse analysis, focusing on how the United States justified their decision to go to war on terror. This study suggests that the U.S. justification was built upon their knowledge and use of the principles of the JWT. The findings shows that the conditions of a justified preemptive attack can be applied to the U.S. justification to declare war on terror. However, when the three conditions are applied, some important questions and implications arise. The main interpretation of the findings is that problems arise when the scope of the self is defined too widely. This, in combination with further implications, indicates that there is a need for a more structured framework in which terrorism can be analysed.

La responsabilité internationale est un ensemble de conséquences liées à laviolation des obligations internationales, soit le lien juridique par lequel un sujet de droitinternational est tenu, envers un ou plusieurs autres sujets, d’adopter un comportementdéterminé ou de s’en abstenir. S’il y a un comportement illicite, la Communautéinternationale peut intervenir, c’est ce que l’on dénomme souvent « droit d’ingérence ». Cedernier a évolué récemment vers une nouvelle terminologie introduite dans le rapport de laCIISE : « responsabilité de protéger ». C’est un concept selon lequel les Etats souverains ontl’obligation de protéger leurs propres populations contre des catastrophes de grande ampleur.Dans la dynamique du dépassement de l’antagonisme entre souveraineté et intervention, nousanalyserons le comportement de la Communauté internationale face à la « responsabilité deprotéger », le rôle qui lui incombe lorsque l’Etat faillit à ses obligations. Au-delà de cesauteurs, il reste encore à définir quels sont les bénéficiaires de cette protection, sa mise enœuvre et ses limites. Si la notion de « responsabilité de protéger » ne constitue pas seulementune nouvelle terminologie, garantit-t-elle un degré de protection plus élevé par rapport au« droit d’ingérence ». / International responsibility is a set of consequences connected to the violation ofinternational obligations, this being the legal ties which bind a subject of international law toadopt a defined way of behaving towards another or others or to abstain. If there is illicitconduct the International Community can intervene, which is often named “right ofintervention”. The latter hasrecently developeda new terminology introduced in the (ICISS)report: “responsibility to protect”. It is a concept according to which the sovereign states havethe obligation to protect their own populations against large-scale catastrophes.From theperspective of going beyond the opposition between sovereignty and intervention we willanalyse the behaviour of the International Community faced with the “responsibility toprotect”, its incumbent role when the state fails in its obligations.Aside from its creators itremains to be seen who will benefit from this protection, its implementation and its limits. Ifthe notion of the “responsibility to protect” not only constitutes new terminology, does itchange an issue already raised by the “right of intervention”: military deployment with aimswhich are not purely military?