This essay seeks to evaluate whether or not  the war in Crimea, conducted by the Russian Federation, is to be considered “just”. This is done in accordance with the theory of Just war, which demands that there be two separate evaluations of the war. Firstly the reasons and actions that lead up to the war must be evaluated if they fulfill the demands set up by the theory, this is called “Jud ad bellum”. Next, the conduct once in the war must be evaluated if it fulfills the demands set up in the theory, this is called “jus in bello”. The Russian occupation of Crimea was not following a declaration of war, was against several international agreements and the war was not a last resort after attempts of diplomatic solutions  all of these actions violate key demands of jus ad bellum. Going through reports by various human rights organizations on the matter, the demands set up by “jus in bello” are determined to not be satisfied, mostly due to the Russian use of torture on prisoners to subtract incriminating information for use in court against prisoners of war.

The day of September 11, 2001 which was primarily seen like an ordinary day was significantly written into the world's history. The worst terrorist attack of all ages were commited in the United States, nearly 3.000 people were killed during the attacks. American administration in response to the attacks declared the "war on terorr", which was mainly represented by military interventions to Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. Inseparable part of Bush's foreign policy was National Security Strategy, which is the strategic basis for invasion to Iraq, approved on September 2002. This concept of this analysis is dealing with these three concrete events of american foreign policy which are specified on the background of Just War Theory JWT. Concretely on the basis of category jus ad bellum - right to war. The main aim of this work is to explore compatibility of these missions with the principles of just war and find out whether operations were launched justly according to JWT. National Security Strategy NSS - which is discussable in the current international system with the regard of the controversial concept of preemption - is important part of the research too. Pre-emptive strategy is confronted with the just war theory, primarily in the sence whether it is possible to consider preemption like just cause...

This thesis focuses on the issue of drone strikes as a means of targeted killing of high value targets suspected of terrorist activities or affiliations. The United States of America has been using this method of elimination since the year 2001 as part of the Global War on Terrorism. However this practice raises a series of moral questions. It creates a new environment of alienation of the target and the person pulling the trigger. This thesis examines the compliance of drone strikes and the Global War on Terrorism as such with the Just War Theory. This theory is the leading concept in warfare ethics and offers a comprehensive research pattern. The finding of this thesis is that the use of drones, as it is employed today, is in conflict with the principles of this theory and therefore unjust. This finding is demonstrated by the research of two concrete drone strikes. Additionally, the Global War on Terrorism is also assessed to be an unjust war and therefore this thesis offers a comprehensive insight into the topic as it assesses both the practice and the overall context of drone strikes.

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Som ett resultat av attackerna mot USA den 11 september 2001 förklarade dåvarande president George W Bush krig mot terrorismen den 20 september samma år. Sex dagar senare undertecknade Bush ett direktiv vilket auktoriserade den civila amerikanska underrättelsetjänsten Central Intelligence Agency att utföra riktat dödande mot fördefinierade individer i syftet att förhindra nya attacker från terroristnätverket Al Qaeda, talibanerna och associerade styrkor. Bush initierade det amerikanska bruket av så kallade ”drone strikes” i anslutning till krigsförklaringen med intentionen att eliminera misstänkta terrorister utan möjlighet till en rättvis rättegång, Obama-administrationen har valt att fortsätta utöva policyn. Syftet med studien är att fastställa huruvida USA:s juridiska rättfärdigande och bruk av folkrätt i relation till genomförandet av riktat dödande och användandet av obemannade luftfarkoster i kriget mot terrorismen kan betraktas vara förenligt med doktrinen för just war theory och gällande internationell rätt. Vidare undersöker studien effekterna av det amerikanska bruket av folkrätten i relation till civilbefolkningen och den internationella humanitära rätten. Relevant lagtext och krigsetikens sedvanerättsliga principer jämförs med USA:s bruk av folkrätt för att fastställa agerandets legalitet. Vidare påvisar studien att programmet för riktat dödande inte kan anses vara förenligt med just war theory och gällande internationell lag och att bruket av drönare hamnar i konflikt med gällande internationell rätt i relation till hur de används under kriget mot terrorismen. / As a result of the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 then President George W Bush declared a war on terror. Six days later, Bush signed a directive which authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out targeted killings against predefined individuals with the purpose to prevent any future attacks from the terrorist network Al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces. In conjunction with the declaration of war president Bush initiated the American practice of so-called "drone strikes" with the intention to eliminate suspected terrorists without access to a fair trial, the practice has continued under the mandate of the Obama-administration. The aim of this study is to examine whether the US legal justification for the use of targeted killings and unmanned aerial vehicles in the war against terrorism can be regarded as compatible with the doctrine of just war theory and applicable international law. Furthermore, the study examines the effects of the US practice on international humanitarian customary law in relation to the civilian population. The U.S. justification of targeted killing is compared with international law to determine the lawfulness from a legal perspective. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the practice is not compatible with the doctrine of just war theory and applicable international law. The use of drones violates international customary law in relation to how they are used under the current conflict.

The aim of this thesis is to answer the question whether the U.S. policy on targeted killings with combat drones is compatible with the legal doctrine of just war theory, applicable international law, and human rights law. Moreover, this paper intends to examine the legal issues arising from the U.S. practice of international law in relation to the justification of targeted killings. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the practice of targeted killings can be considered lawful and, if not, to provide knowledge about how the method violates applicable international law and the ethics of war. The focus is placed on relevant treaties and customary international law, and just war theory is used as a theoretical complement to explain the meaning and purpose of selected laws in order to determine their applicability to the research problem. Furthermore, this procedure has been conducted by using a legal method to identify the legal problem and interpret relevant sources of law in order to determine their applicability to the research problem. The thesis has determined that the U.S. policy on targeted killings with combat drones is not consistent with applicable international law and fundamental human rights law. In particular, the practice of targeted killings violates the principle of distinction.

The aim of this thesis is to discuss the ethical issues which arise by nuclear deterrence. I have taken the position that the use of nuclear weapons is morally wrong. Nuclear deterrence is kind of a preventive measure, but not a way of fighting a war. Therefore, I used the ‘just war theory’ as a starting point to formulate analytical questions through which I have interpreted my material. The analytical questions are based on proportionality, utilitarianism, deontology and the ‘Doctrine of double effect’. I have used contemporary material by political scientists which form a symposium where they discussed on the topic of ‘just deterrence’. In my thesis, I argue that the liberty, life and happiness must be defended, but not to any price. I argue that we must see the value life itself has, because if our life, liberty and happiness is threatened, we have nothing to defend. The question that arises is whether there is an ethical approach which can help us understand these questions.

Réalisé en cotutelle avec le Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) de Paris, pour un doctorat en études politiques. / L’intervention militaire justifiée par des raisons humanitaires est une constante de l’ordre international, désignée par différentes appellations : intervention d’humanité au XIXe siècle, intervention humanitaire (humanitarian intervention) dans la tradition anglophone, droit ou devoir d’ingérence en France, responsabilité de protéger depuis quelques années. L’objectif de cette thèse interdisciplinaire est de comprendre ce phénomène complexe dans toutes ses dimensions – historique, juridique, éthique et politique – et d’élaborer une théorie réaliste de l’intervention par l’analyse de cinq critères : cause juste, autorité légitime, bonne intention, dernier recours et proportionnalité. Nous montrons que le réalisme n’est pas une conception amorale de la politique étrangère mais une exigence épistémologique d’analyser les relations internationales comme elles sont plutôt que comme l’on voudrait qu’elles soient. Que l’intervention dite humanitaire n’est pas, contrairement à un préjugé répandu, un phénomène récent, ni même hérité du XIXe siècle, mais qu’on peut en retracer la généalogie sur plusieurs millénaires dans plusieurs civilisations. Qu’aucune des terminologies employées n’est satisfaisante. Qu’il faut abandonner le critère de bonne intention car l’Etat intervenant n’est pas, ne peut pas et ne doit pas être désintéressé. Qu’il est possible de défendre un interventionnisme minimal, dans certains cas et à certaines conditions, tout en assumant cette absence de désintéressement, la sélectivité des interventions, le risque d’abus et l’incertitude du résultat. / Military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds is a constant of the international order, designated by different names: “intervention d’humanité” in the nineteenth century, humanitarian intervention in the English-speaking tradition, “droit” or “devoir d’ingérence” in France, responsibility to protect the last few years. The aim of this interdisciplinary dissertation is to understand this complex phenomenon in all its dimensions - historical, legal, ethical and political - and develop a realistic theory of intervention by the analysis of five criteria: just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort and proportionality. We show that realism is not an amoral conception of foreign policy but an epistemological commitment to analyze international relations as they are rather than as we would like them to be. That so-called humanitarian intervention is not, contrary to a widespread prejudice, a recent phenomenon, or even inherited from the nineteenth century. We can trace its genealogy in several millennia in many cultures. That none of the terminology used is satisfactory. That one must abandon the criterion of good intention because the intervening state is not, cannot and should not be disinterested. That it is possible to defend a minimal interventionism, in some cases and under certain conditions, while assuming the lack of disinterestedness, the selectivity of interventions, the risk of abuse and the uncertainty of the result.

La recrudescence des conflits internes dans le contexte post-guerre froide a permis de propulser à l’avant-plan la préoccupation pour les individus. Alors que la paix et la sécurité internationales ont historiquement constitué les piliers du système institutionnel international, une porte s’ouvrait pour rendre effectif un régime de protection des droits de l’homme par-delà les frontières. Pour les humanistes, l’intervention humanitaire représentait un mal nécessaire pour pallier aux souffrances humaines souvent causées par des divergences ethniques et religieuses. Pourtant, cette pratique est encore souvent perçue comme une forme de néo-colonialisme et entre en contradiction avec les plus hautes normes régissant les relations internationales, soit les principes de souveraineté des États et de non-intervention. La problématique du présent mémoire s’inscrit précisément dans cette polémique entre la préséance des droits de l’État et la prédilection pour les droits humains universels, deux fins antinomiques que la Commission internationales pour l’intervention et la souveraineté des États (CIISE) a tenté de concilier en élaborant son concept de responsabilité de protéger. Notre mémoire s’inscrit dans le champ de la science politique en études internationales mais s’articule surtout autour des notions et enjeux propres à la philosophie politique, plus précisément à l’éthique des relations internationales. Le travail se veut une réflexion critique et théorique des conclusions du rapport La responsabilité de protéger, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le critère de la juste cause et, dans une moindre mesure, celui d’autorité appropriée. Notre lecture des conditions de la CIISE à la justification morale du déclenchement d’une intervention humanitaire – critères issues de la doctrine de la guerre juste relativement au jus ad bellum – révèle une position mitoyenne entre une conception progressiste cosmopolitique et une vision conservatrice d’un ordre international composé d’États souverains. D’une part, la commission se dissocie du droit international en faisant valoir un devoir éthique d’outrepasser les frontières dans le but de mettre un terme aux violations massives des droits de l’homme et, d’autre part, elle craint les ingérences à outrance, comme en font foi l’établissement d’un seuil de la juste cause relativement élevé et la désignation d’une autorité multilatérale à titre de légitimateur de l’intervention. Ce travail dialectique vise premièrement à présenter et situer les recommandations de la CIISE dans la tradition de la guerre juste. Ensuite, il s’agit de relever les prémisses philosophiques tacites dans le rapport de la CIISE qui sous-tendent le choix de préserver une règle de non-intervention ferme de laquelle la dérogation n’est exigée qu’en des circonstances exceptionnelles. Nous identifions trois arguments allant en ce sens : la reconnaissance du relativisme moral et culturel; la nécessité de respecter l’autonomie et l’indépendance des communautés politiques en raison d’une conception communautarienne de la légitimité de l’État, des réquisits de la tolérance et des avantages d’une responsabilité assignée; enfin, l’appréhension d’un bouleversement de l’ordre international sur la base de postulats du réalisme classique. Pour finir, nous nuançons chacune de ces thèses en souscrivant à un mode de raisonnement cosmopolitique et conséquentialiste. Notre adhésion au discours individualiste normatif nous amène à inclure dans la juste cause de la CIISE les violations systématiques des droits individuels fondamentaux et à cautionner l’intervention conduite par une coalition ou un État individuel, pourvu qu’elle produise les effets bénéfiques désirés en termes humanitaires. / The increasing number of internal conflicts in the Post-Cold War era propelled to the foreground the concern for individuals. Though international peace and security historically constituted the pillars of the world institutional system, the opportunity arose to establish an effective and cross-boundary human rights protection regime. According to humanists, humanitarian intervention was the necessary evil to bring an end to the human sufferings caused by ethnic and religious differences. Nevertheless, this kind of interference is still nowadays perceived as a neo-colonialist action and goes against the highest international relations norms, namely the state sovereignty and the non-intervention principles. This thesis’ issue lies within the controversy between states’ rights and universal human rights, which are two conflicting ends the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) tried to reconcile along with elaborating its responsibility to protect concept. The field of this paper is political science in international studies, but the focus is above all on political philosophy notions and stakes, particularly on ethics of international relations. The goal is to build a critical and theoretical thinking about the Responsibility to Protect conclusions, particularly regarding the just cause and appropriate authority criteria. In accordance with our interpretation of the ICISS moral justification conditions for humanitarian intervention – criteria derived from the just war theory’s concern for jus ad bellum – the commission’s stance is split into a progressive cosmopolitan view and a more conservative one that promotes a world order constituted by sovereign states. On one hand the commission separates itself from international law, putting forward an ethical duty to stop the massive human rights violations beyond borders. At the same time it is afraid of excessive interferences, as shown by the establishment of a relatively high just cause threshold and the appointment of a multilateral body in charge of legitimizing the intervention. This dialectical paper’s first objective is to describe and place the ICISS recommendations into the just war tradition. Then, the purpose is to sum up the tacit philosophical premises of the ICISS report in relation to its choice to preserve a firm non-intervention norm from which no derogation is permitted, except in case of exceptional circumstances. From that we identify three arguments: the acceptance of moral and cultural relativism; the requirement of respecting political communities’ autonomy and independence on account of a communitarian conception of state sovereignty, the prerequisites for tolerance and the assigned responsibility advantages; finally, the fear of an international order disruption on the basis of classical realism postulates. Ultimately, we challenge each one of these ideas adopting a cosmopolitan and consequentialist reasoning. Adhering to the normative individualist discourse, we propose to broaden the ICISS just cause so that it includes systematic fundamental human rights violations and to support coalition or individual state intervention, insofar as it produces the desired humanitarian benefits.