Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate. / This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate.

Trabalhando sobre as bases do paradigma metodológico atual do processo civil brasileiro, a presente tese propõe uma abordagem antiformalista moderada sobre a interpretação das decisões judiciais e aplica-a para reconstruir a faceta metodológica da teoria dos precedentes judiciais no contexto do direito brasileiro. A tese central alvitrada está em que as decisões judiciais, em geral, sofrem de um problema de tríplice indeterminação (limitada potencialidade normativa, equivocidade e vagueza), que se apresenta em três dimensões (respectivamente, nos percursos que vão do texto decisório ao enunciado normativo; do enunciado normativo, à norma; e da norma ao caso) e que pode ser minimizado por meio da interpretação. A tese específica está em que os principais problemas metodológicos de que se ressente a teoria tradicional dos precedentes judiciais decorrem dessa tríplice indeterminação e podem ser melhor compreendidos e encaminhados, especialmente no contexto brasileiro, por meio da reconstrução de conceitos clássicos da teoria dos precedentes a partir de instrumentos metodológicos lato sensu interpretativos destinados à redução das causas de indeterminação da decisão-precedente fornecidos pela metodologia proposta para a interpretação das decisões judiciais. / Working on the bases of the current methodological paradigm of the Brazilian civil procedural law, this thesis proposes a moderate anti-formalist theory of interpretation of judicial decisions and applies it in order to reconstruct the methodological facet of the theory of judicial precedents within the Brazilian legal framework. The central thesis proposed is that, generally, judicial decisions suffer from a problem of triple indetermination (limited normative potentiality, ambiguity and vagueness) which appears in three dimensions (respectively, on the way from the judicial decision to the normative provision; from the normative provision to the norm; and from the norm to the case) and that may be minimized by means of interpretation. The specific thesis is that the main methodological problems that the traditional theory of judicial precedents resents derive from this triple indetermination and may be better understood and approached, specially under the Brazilian context, by means of the reconstruction of the classical concepts of the theory of judicial precedents using interpretative methodological instruments intended to reduce the causes of indetermination of the precedent-decision provided the proposed methodology for the interpretation of judicial decisions.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-05-09T11:39:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Simone Schuck da Silva_.pdf: 2512697 bytes, checksum: 4218730136d9da1b3e534b8cd4c70cea (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-09T11:39:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Simone Schuck da Silva_.pdf: 2512697 bytes, checksum: 4218730136d9da1b3e534b8cd4c70cea (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-28 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / PROEX - Programa de Excelência Acadêmica / O trabalho analisa as demandas de retificação de nome e sexo no registro civil de travestis e transexuais e a sua expressão pela gramática jurídica a partir de uma pesquisa empírica quantitativa e qualitativa nos processos judiciais do projeto “Direito à Identidade: Viva seu nome!”, do G8-Generalizando, grupo de direitos sexuais e de gênero do Serviço de Assessoria Jurídica Universitária da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (SAJU/UFRGS). Foram utilizados o método de procedimento de estudo de caso e as técnicas de pesquisa documental, em relação aos processos do grupo, e de pesquisa de campo, com a aplicação de entrevistas semiestruturadas aos agentes envolvidos nas ações. Com base na Teoria Crítica do Direito, observou-se a configuração de uma disputa dogmática sobre a forma regulatória do nome e do sexo civis e, por sua avaliação crítica, concluiu-se pela possibilidade de elaboração de outro modelo de regulação desses institutos jurídicos, uma regulação social e autônoma, capaz de oferecer maior legitimidade à operação do direito e maior autonomia para travestis e transexuais sobre suas identidades. / This thesis analyzes name and sex demands of rectification in the civil registry of travestis and transgenders and its expression on legal grammar, by means of a quantitative and qualitative empirical research of legal cases raised by Direito à identidade: Viva seu nome!, a project from G8-Generalizando – sexual and gender rights group of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) clinic legal program. It uses case study procedure method and techniques of documentary research, in relation to the group processes, and field research, with the application of semi-structured interviews with agents involved in the lawsuits. Based on the Critical Legal Theory, it is observed the configuration of a dogmatic dispute on the regulatory form of civil name and sex. By its critical evaluation, it was concluded that is possible to design another regulatory framwork of these legal institutes, a social and autonomous regulation capable of offering greater legitimacy to the operation of law and also greater autonomy for travestis and transgenders on their own identities.

O trabalho estuda a evolução da teoria geral dos contratos e os seus reflexos na teoria do risco contratual, tendo como ponto de partida o direito contratual clássico do século XIX e o paradigma da autonomia da vontade. No novo direito contratual do século XX em diante, a análise toma como fio condutor as obras de Emilio Betti e de Karl Larenz, dentro do que se pode considerar o novo paradigma do direito contratual: a regulação e a satisfação de interesses privados mediante critérios de autonomia e heteronomia. O objetivo específico desse estudo é verificar a hipótese de que a teoria atual tenha (ou não) enfrentado o problema econômico dos riscos imprevistos dentro da idéia de "economia interna do contrato", tratando o risco econômico imprevisto como um integrante do conteúdo do contrato com autonomia diante da prestação. O caminho percorrido pelo trabalho identifica que o direito contratual tem sua estrutura teórica construída sobre uma concepção formalista de contrato, segundo a qual essa figura jurídica é uma entidade com existência própria, a qual está centrada na noção jurídica-formal de "obrigação de prestar". Mesmo que, com a evolução do direito contratual, tal estrutura tenha passado a contar com uma função a ser desempenhada na vida real, o trabalho conclui que a teoria continua sem tratar adequadamente o risco econômico imprevisto, porque tal função permanece limitada pela noção jurídico-formal de "obrigação de prestar". / This dissertation studies the evolution of contract law theory and its influences on the legal theory of contractual risk. It begins with the classic theory of the 19th century and the will theory paradigm within it; from the 20th century onwards, the main analysis is based on the works of Emilio Betti and Karl Larenz, alongside with the new paradigm that pursues concrete interests through the combination of private autonomy and private heteronomy. The specific purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the current theory may have (or may have not) dealt with the economic problem of unforeseen risks by utilizing the idea of economic balance of contract, insofar as to consider the unforeseen economic risk as an autonomous factor in the content of contracts. The research identifies that the theoretical structure of contract law is built over a formalist conception of contract, according to which the contract is an entity with selfexistence, one that is exclusively centered on the notion of "duty to pay". Although the evolution of contract law has given a function to this structure to perform in society and between parties to a given contract, the dissertation concludes that the current theory is still limited by the notion of "duty to pay", and that the unforeseen economic risk has not yet been provided with an adequate legal treatment.

Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate. / This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate.

Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.

Our criminal justice system works very hard to prevent criminals from harming other individuals; however, unfortunately mistakes happen. One wrongful conviction is one too many. There are multiple factors that can be assumed to be the cause of wrongful convictions. However, due to the lack of directly related research, the determents are not well established. The following research addresses wrongful convictions as a result of public defender representation. Through the process of theory construction, the research uses critical race theory and social disorganization theory to show the relationship between court appointed representation and wrongful convictions. A new theory is also established that is referred to as the partial load reduction theory. This theory establishes the relationship that exists between wrongful convictions and public defender representation and provides solutions as well as new avenues for future research.

Since the passing of Proposition 47 in California in 2014, drug court programs across the state have invariably undergone changes. In my thesis, I evaluate the drug court programs of three counties in Southern California: Orange County, Los Angeles County, and Riverside County. Through a qualitative analysis of the drug court programs in these counties, via interviews, data collection, and courtroom observation, I provide insight into the functionality of each county's program, as well as an analysis of the effects of Proposition 47. This paper aims to address the key factors involved in maintaining a functional and successful drug court system.

Cette thèse porte sur la pensée juridique des comparatistes euro-américains. Elle analyse les travaux d’un nombre important de comparatistes, qui ont eu une place significative au sein de la discipline en Europe et aux Etats-Unis entre les années 1860 et le début des années 2000. En examinant les représentations du monde non-occidental, elle met en avant les tensions entre l’inclusion et l’exclusion des spécificités non-occidentales, tout en insistant sur la nécessité de développer une pratique critique de résistance. En s’inspirant des théories postcoloniales, ce travail aborde les questions suivantes: comment le savoir sur les sociétés non-occidentales est-il construit dans la pensée juridique des comparatistes euro-américains ? Quelles sont les préconceptions qui facilitent la production de ce savoir ? Quel est le fondement théorique qui anime ces constructions et quelles sont leurs implications politiques ? Dans quelle mesure la pensée juridique comparative alimente-t-elle les attitudes de domination ou bien les remet-elle en question ? De quelle manière les réponses à ces questions sont-elles reproduites ou modifiées d’une époque à l’autre, d’un auteur à l’autre ? / This dissertation focuses on Euro-American comparative legal thought. It analyses the works of an important number of comparatists operating in Europe and in the United States, roughly from the 1860s to the early 2000s. Examining their representations of non-Western societies, it puts emphasis on the tensions between inclusion and exclusion of particularism and it argues in favor of a critical praxis of particularism. Inspired from postcolonial theories, it addresses the following questions: how are non-Western societies constructed in Euro-American comparative legal thought? What are the preconceptions that make the production of such knowledge possible? What is the theoretical framework that animates these constructions and what are their political implications? What elements internal to comparative legal knowledge fuel attitudes of domination or/and challenge them? How do they change and how are they reproduced from one epoch to another, from one author to another?

Dr. Lenore Walker developed battered woman syndrome to address the issue of domestic violence and to give battered women a defense in situations in which they kill their abusive partners when they are not overtly threatening them. Self-defense law is based on male on male combat. Women are less able to protect themselves in an attack by a man, and so they may preemptively attack their sleeping partners to avoid a situation in which they cannot adequately protect themselves. Battered woman syndrome explains why these battered women act in a way that is irrational to a non-battered person. Walker's theory of learned helplessness explains why the woman does not leave the abusive relationship, and the cycle of violence theory explains why she perceives an imminent threat. Battered woman syndrome is problematic in its legal application because of problems with its scientific validity and reliability. It also furthers gender stereotypes and blurs the line between a justification and an excuse defense. While, Dr. Walker's intentions were good, battered woman syndrome is inadequate. Women's difference from men still have to be acknowledged in cases in which battered women kill their husband's, but social agency framework is a more effective way to acknowledge gender differences. This framework takes into account social circumstances that would explain a woman's actions rather than including pathology. This would explain why the woman did not leave an abusive relationship. To avoid the pathology of BWS while explaining why the woman felt an imminent threat, the defense can turn to a pattern of abuse that helps her reasonably recognize when violence is likely.