This dissertation examines how confusion and lack of access to information about subsurface property rights facilitates the rapid acquisition of mineral rights by mining interests, leaving those who live 'above the surface' to contend with complicated corporate and bureaucratic apparatuses. The research focuses on the first proposed state-run large scale mining project in Ecuador, believed to contain copper ores, and on the natural gas hydrofracking industry in three counties in north central West Virginia. Qualitative and visual methods, including mapping, are employed to determine (i.) how the geography of subsurface ownership patterns is changing, (ii.) links between changes in subsurface ownership and surface ownership, and (iii.) how these changes are facilitated or impeded by institutional and governance practices. Rights and permit acquisitions are facilitated by state institutions, which often have strategic interests in mineral development. Accordingly, this research also considers the role of state strategy with respect to the establishment, bureaucratic management, and enforcement of vertical territory, which reflects the state’s interest in and sovereign claim over subterranean resources to benefit the nation. The research finds that the historical separation of subsurface property rights from the surface is associated with a persistent weakening of surface holder claims to land in favor of mining development, and that this weakening has contributed to the long-term persistence of absentee ownership and control over land in Ecuador and West Virginia. Viewing subsurface land deals from the perspective of those whose lives are disrupted on the surface, I conclude from this work that mundane practices such as deed transfers and local micropolitics about land use are significant factors in the lead up to larger scale violences and silences, such as forced displacement and even political imprisonment of activists opposed to extraction.

Le présent mémoire est consacré à l'étude de l'obligation faite à l'État canadien de consulter les autochtones lorsqu'il envisage de prendre des mesures portant atteinte à leurs droits et intérêts. On s'y interroge sur le sens que peut avoir cette obligation, si elle n'inclut pas celle de s'entendre avec les autochtones. Notre étude retrace d'abord l'évolution de l'obligation de consulter dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada, pour se pencher ensuite sur l'élaboration d'un modèle théorique du processus consultatif. En observant la manière dont la jurisprudence relative aux droits ancestraux a donné naissance à l'obligation de consulter, on constate que c'est en s'approchant au plus près de l'idée d'autonomie gouvernementale autochtone - soit en définissant le titre ancestral, droit autochtone à la terre elle-même - que la Cour a senti le besoin de développer la consultation en tant que véritable outil de dialogue entre l'État et les Premières nations. Or, pour assurer la participation réelle des parties au processus de consultation, la Cour a ensuite dû balancer leur rapport de forces, ce qu'elle a fait en admettant le manque de légitimité du pouvoir étatique sur les autochtones. C'est ainsi qu'après avoir donné naissance au processus de consultation, la jurisprudence relative aux droits ancestraux pourrait à son tour être modifiée substantiellement par son entremise. En effet, l'égalité qu'il commande remet en question l'approche culturaliste de la Cour aux droits ancestraux, et pourrait l'amener à refonder ces droits dans le principe plus égalitaire de continuité des ordres juridiques autochtones. Contrairement à l'approche culturaliste actuelle, ce principe fait place à la reconnaissance juridique de l'autonomie gouvernementale autochtone. La logique interne égalitaire du processus de consultation ayant ainsi été exposée, elle fait ensuite l'objet d'une plus ample analyse. On se demande d'abord comment concevoir cette logique sur le plan théorique. Ceci exige d'ancrer la consultation, en tant qu'institution juridique, dans une certaine vision du droit. Nous adoptons ici celle de Lon Fuller, riche de sens pour nos fins. Puis, nous explicitons les principes structurants du processus consultatif. Il appert de cette réflexion que l'effectivité de la consultation dépend de la qualité du dialogue qu'elle engendre entre les parties. Si elle respecte sa morale inhérente, la consultation peut générer une relation morale unique entre les autochtones et l'État canadien. Cette relation de reconnaissance mutuelle est une relation de don. / In this essay, we study the Canadian State's duty to consult Aboriginal peoples when it purports to infringe on their rights and interests. We start with the following question: What meaning, if any, does the duty to consult have, if it does not include a duty to reach a consensus ? Our study is divided in two parts. First, we trace the evolution of the duty to consult in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Secondly, we discuss a theoretical model for the consultation process. Our study of the genesis and subsequent evolution of the duty to consult reveals that this duty gains some ambit when the Court is called upon to define the notion of aboriginal title - the type of aboriginal right that cornes closest to full aboriginal self-government on a piece of land. In its effort to construct the consultation process, the Court soon realizes that if it wants both parties to really engage in it, it has to balance their relationship, something the Court does by admitting the State's lack of legitimate authority over the Aboriginals. But affirming the equal status of both parties in the consultation process leads to further consequences than the mere effectiveness of that process. Aboriginal equality does not fit weIl within the Court's cultural approach to aboriginal rights. The common law doctrine of continuity of the aboriginal legal orders is more congenial to that equality, as it leads naturally to the legal recognition of a measure of aboriginal autonomy within Canada. Thus, after giving birth to the consultation process, the law of aboriginal rights could itself be substantially modified through the logical implications of its own offspring. Having exposed the egalitarian logic inherent to the consultation process, we proceed to study that logic in further detail. We ground our quest for the inherent structure of consultation in a larger understanding of the law itself, which proceeds from Lon Fuller' s view of law as facilitating human interaction. We then discuss the principles that give content to a consultation process directed to achieve reconciliation. Effective consultation depends on the quality of the dialogue that it generates. Appropriately conceived and implemented, the consultation process between Aboriginal peoples and the State embodies a unique moral relationship, one of mutual recognition, capturing the' spirit of giving'.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit LL.M. (2-325-1-0)" / Le Québec est la seule province canadienne à ne pas imposer d'obligation légale quant aux rapports interpersonnels entre les membres de couples non mariés. Pourtant, leur nombre augmente considérablement et, en 2001, il y avait 1 158 410 couples en union libre au Canada, dont 508 525 vivaient au Québec. Les conjoints de fait des autres provinces canadiennes ont revendiqué un statut juridique d'égalité de droits avec les couples mariés, ce qui a donné lieu à plusieurs décisions de la Cour suprême du Canada et à la mise en vigueur de lois visant l'encadrement juridique de la rupture de ces conjoints de fait. C'est ainsi que toutes les provinces canadiennes, sauf le Québec, imposent une obligation alimentaire entre conjoints de fait à la rupture. La présente étude utilise les méthodologies d'analyse proposées par les théories légales féministes pour aborder la situation juridique de la famille québécoise dans un contexte historique et social afin de suggérer la mise en place d'un cadre légal des rapports interpersonnels des conjoints de fait. Afin de favoriser une plus grande égalité et une solidarité familiale, l'auteur propose l'établissement d'une obligation alimentaire compensatoire entre les membres des couples québécois non-mariés, avec enfants. / Quebec is the only Canadian province that does not impose legal obligations regarding interpersonal relations between the members of unmarried couples. In 2001, there was 1 158 410 unmarried couples in Canada, of which 508 525 were living in the province of Ouebec. Common law spouses from other provinces have claimed equal legal status with married couples, which lead to many decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada and to provincial legislations regarding their separation. Thus, ail Canadian provinces except Ouebec impose alimentary support on common law spouses at separation. This study uses the methodology of feminist legal theories to approach the legal situation of Quebec families in a historical and sociological context to propose a legislation regarding interpersonal relations within unmarried couples. According to the author, there should be a compensatory obligation of support between the members of unmarried couples with children to favor equality and familial solidarity.

Dans cette thèse, nous construisons un modèle épidémiologique de la dissémina- tion de normes juridiques. L’objectif est d’expliquer la transmission de normes juridiques américaines régissant les tests de dépistages pour drogues au travail vers le Canada ainsi que la propagation subséquente de ces normes à travers la jurisprudence canadienne. La propagation des normes régissant les tests de dépistages pour drogues au travail sert donc à la fois de point de départ pour une réflexion théorique sur la transmission de normes juridiques et pour une étude de cas empirique. Nous partons de la prémisse que les explications du changement juridique, telles celle de la transplantation et celle de l’harmonisation, sont essentiellement métaphoriques. Ces métaphores explicatives fonctionnent en invitant des comparaisons entre les domaines connus et inconnus. Quand ce processus de comparaison est systématisé, la métaphore devient un modèle. Dans la thèse, nous appliquons cette procédure de systématisation afin de transformer la métaphore de la propagation virale en modèle épidémiologique. Après une revue de la littérature sur les épidémies sociales, nous décrivons les éléments pertinents de la théorie épidémiologique pour, ensuite, les transposer au domaine juridique. Le modèle est alors opérationnalisé en l’appliquant à une base de données composée de la jurisprudence pertinente (n=187). Les résultats soutiennent les hypothèses du modèle. 90 % des décisions qui citent les sources américaines sont infectées selon les critères du modèle, alors que seulement 64 % des décisions qui ne citent pas de sources américaines sont infectées. Cela soutient l’hypothèse d’une épidémie dite de « réservoir commun ». Nous avons également démontré une corrélation positive entre la référence à ces décisions et l’état d’infection! : 87 % des décisions qui citent des décisions qui réfèrent aux sources américaines sont infectées, alors que le taux d’infection parmi la population restante est de seulement 53 %. Les résultats semblables ont été obtenus pour les décisions de troisième génération. Cela soutient l’hypothèse selon laquelle il y a eu propagation à travers la jurisprudence suite aux contacts initiaux avec le réservoir commun. Des corrélations positives ont aussi été démontrées entre l’état d’infection et l’appartenance à l’une ou l’autre de sous-populations particulières qui seraient, par hypothèse, des points d’infection. En conclusion de la thèse, nous avançons que c’est seulement après avoir construit un modèle et d’avoir constaté ses limites que nous pouvons vraiment comprendre le rôle des métaphores et des modèles dans l’explication de phénomènes juridiques. / In this thesis, I construct an epidemiological model to explain the transmission of legal norms governing drug testing in the workplace from the United States to Canada and their subsequent spread across the jurisprudence. Employment drug testing norms thus serve as both the starting point for a reflection on how norms spread and a case study for the empirical testing of a theoretical model. I begin with the premise that many explanations of legal change – such as transplant and harmonization – are grounded in metaphors, and then argue that such metaphors work by inviting the hearer to make comparisons between the familiar and the unfamiliar. When this process of comparison is systematized, the metaphor becomes a model. This process of systematization is applied; extending a viral metaphor into an epidemiological model. After reviewing the literature on social epidemics, I set out those aspects of epidemiological theory that may be profitably transposed to the domain of law. I then operationalize the model by applying it to a dataset composed of tribunal decisions (n=187) using computer assisted text analysis. The results support the hypotheses generated by the model. 90% of decisions that cited American sources met the model’s criteria for infection, compared to only 64% of those that didn’t cite American sources. This supports the hypothesis of a common reservoir epidemic. Citation to those infected decisions was also positively correlated to infection: 87% of the citing population was infected, compared to only 53% of the remaining population that cited neither an American source nor one of the infected decisions that cited an American source. Similar results were obtained for third generation decisions. This supports the hypothesis of a serial-transfer epidemic subsequent to contact with the reservoir. Positive correlation to infection was also demonstrated for particular sub-populations hypothesized to be act as points of infection and to a hypothesized vector. In the conclusion, I argue that it is only after we have gone through the process of constructing a model and seen the strengths and limits of its application, that we have access to the full scope of the insights into the role of metaphors and models in the explanation of legal phenomena.

This thesis deals with the personality of prominent lawyer and a political scientist Zdenek Mlynar during his tenure at the Institute of State and Law of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Mlynar was one of the leading figures and ideologues of the Prague Spring; in the first half of 1968 he was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and later he became its secretary. He was also one of the authors of the 'Action Programme' of the Communist Party, precisely of its political part. Nevertheless his ideological development was not straightforward; he started as a devoted ideologue and dogmatist in the 1950s to become a reformer in the second half of the 1960s. And during that whole time period Mlynar had been employed as a scientist at the Academy of Sciences in the field of the legal theory. For the purpose of this thesis was Mlynar's more than twelve-year long tenure at the Academy of Sciences is divided into three periods: a research assistantship between 1957 and 1959, his tenure as a head of the Department of Theory of State and Law between 1960 and 1966 and then the time of his work on the political reform in 1968, with a special attention being paid to the interdisciplinary team "Development of the political system in the socialistic society" which was initiated and...

Comment le Conseil constitutionnel appréhende-t-il la famille ? Cette question conduit à s’intéresser aux relations entretenues par le droit constitutionnel et la famille, dont l’ignorance mutuelle semble acquise. Une approche positiviste du droit et analytique de la jurisprudence du Conseil montrent néanmoins que ce désintérêt réciproque n’est que de façade. La famille apparaît en effet comme une institution à la fois protégée et obligée par le droit constitutionnel : celui-ci prescrit de protéger la famille et prescrit à la famille de protéger. Le droit constitutionnel prescrit en définitive de construire la famille. La question conduit ensuite à s’intéresser à la concrétisation législative des normes constitutionnelles relatives à la famille. L’étude met ainsi en évidence les techniques contentieuses utilisées par le Conseil. Elle met aussi et surtout en évidence le fait que cette concrétisation tantôt protège, tantôt menace, la reconnaissance, le développement et l’unité de la famille. La réalisation du droit constitutionnel conduit en définitive à une construction législative de la famille. La question conduit enfin à constater que la famille consiste moins en la construction d’un objet juridique qu’en la construction juridique d’un objet. La concrétisation infra-législative des normes constitutionnelles témoigne en effet d’un pluralisme familial, qui contribue à révéler la dynamique de la construction juridique de la famille. / How does the Conseil constitutionnel apprehend the family? This question leads to study the relationship between constitutional law and family, whose mutual igorance seems acquired. A positivist and analytic approach of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel however illustrates that this apparent mutual disinterest is not grounded. Family is an institution protected and protective according to positive constitutional law; the latter prescribes to protect the family and also prescribes to the family to protect. Constitutionnal law prescribed after all to build family. This question leads to study the legislative concretizations of the constitutional norms concerning family. This study illustrates the techniques used by the Conseil constitutional in its judicial review. The study also emphasizes the fact that this concretization protects, but also sometimes threatens, the recognition, the development and the unity of the family. The realization of the constitutional law leads after all to a legislative construction of the family. This question leads finally to observe that family consists more in the legal construction of an object than in the construction of a legal object. The concretization of constitutional norms concerning family illustrates in effect a “familial pluralism”, which contributes to reveal the dynamics of the legal construction of the family.

Esta tese busca analisar a viabilidade do projeto de naturalização da teoria do direito defendido por Brian Leiter. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se o esforço da filosofia desde o fundacionismo de Descartes até Carnap para a solução da dúvida cética sobre o que é conhecimento e que conduziram ao que foi denominado fisicalismo, evidenciado nas obras de Kelsen e dos Realistas Escandinavos e Norte-Americanos. A virada linguística foi determinante para a reconstrução dos parâmetros cartesianos, sendo notável a influência de Wittgenstein e Quine. Com Quine, a proposta de naturalização da epistemologia ganhou corpo, tendo conduzido, entretanto, ao abandono do desafio cético e ao cientismo. O behaviorismo já apresentava sinais no Realismo Jurídico Norte-Americano e foi criticado por H.L.A. Hart. Hart se apropriou de elementos do naturalismo quineano e de Wittgenstein, estabelecendo uma nova objetividade para o direito. O projeto de Leiter, apresentado no segundo capítulo, nasce da discordância dessa crítica hartiana. Dois são seus objetivos: (i) resgatar o Realismo Norte-Americano, reconstruindo-o à luz do pragmatismo e do naturalismo quineano, ancorado no antifundacionismo e na substituição das teorias normativas por descrições causais-nomológicas das decisões judiciais para fins de previsibilidade do direito. Cabe ao dogma do positivismo estabelecer o critério de legalidade, excluindo a moral como parte do que é juridicamente objetivo; (ii) adotar uma postura cética externa, numa tentativa de minar o interpretativismo de Ronald Dworkin. É no terceiro capítulo discute a viabilidade do projeto de Leiter propriamente. É possível verificar que Leiter não consegue mostrar o naturalismo na teoria do direito sob sua melhor luz, uma vez que é incapaz de lidar com as questões normativas inerentes ao direito e, por conseguinte, de justificar as decisões judiciais sem recorrer a uma teoria substantiva, algo que Dworkin consegue realizar com maior proveito, especialmente no que tange ao tema da objetividade. Leiter aponta para um futuro em que a investigação empírica pode aumentar a confiança no direito, mas seu projeto teórico limitado à descrição causal-nomológica das decisões é inviável para os fins propostos por uma teoria do direito de sucesso. / This thesis aims to analyze the viability of the project of naturalization of jurisprudence championed by Brian Leiter. The first chapter presents the effort of philosophy from Descartes foundationalism to Carnap for the solution of skeptical doubt about what is knowledge and that led to what was called physicalism, evidenced in the works of Kelsen and Scandinavian and Americans Legal Realists. The linguistic turn was decisive for the reconstruction of Cartesian parameters, being remarkable the influence of Wittgenstein and Quine. With Quine, the naturalization of epistemology proposal gained momentum and led, however, to abandon the skeptical challenge and scientism. Behaviorism already showed signs in american legal realism and was criticized by H.L.A. Hart. Hart appropriated elements of Quinean naturalism and Wittgenstein, establishing a new objectivity to law. Leiters project, presented in the second chapter, was born of the disagreement with hartian criticism. Two are his goals: (i) redeem American Legal Realism, reconstructing it in the light of pragmatism and Quinean naturalism, supported by antifoundationalism and replacement of normative theories by causal-nomological descriptions of judicial decisions for predictability purposes. The dogma of positivism will establish the criteria of legality, excluding the moral as part of what is legally objective; (ii) adopt an external skeptical position in an attempt to undermine the interpretativismo of Ronald Dworkin. The third chapter discusses the feasibility of Leiters project properly. Leiter cannot show the naturalism in theory of law in its best light, since it is incapable of dealing with normative questions related to law and, therefore, to justify judicial decisions without resorting to a substantive theory, something that Dworkin can make more profit, especially with regard to the issue of objectivity. Leiters project points to a future in which empirical research can increase laws confidence, but its limitation to a theoretical project of causal-nomological description of decisions is not feasible for the purposes proposed by a successful theory of law.

Esta tese busca analisar a viabilidade do projeto de naturalização da teoria do direito defendido por Brian Leiter. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se o esforço da filosofia desde o fundacionismo de Descartes até Carnap para a solução da dúvida cética sobre o que é conhecimento e que conduziram ao que foi denominado fisicalismo, evidenciado nas obras de Kelsen e dos Realistas Escandinavos e Norte-Americanos. A virada linguística foi determinante para a reconstrução dos parâmetros cartesianos, sendo notável a influência de Wittgenstein e Quine. Com Quine, a proposta de naturalização da epistemologia ganhou corpo, tendo conduzido, entretanto, ao abandono do desafio cético e ao cientismo. O behaviorismo já apresentava sinais no Realismo Jurídico Norte-Americano e foi criticado por H.L.A. Hart. Hart se apropriou de elementos do naturalismo quineano e de Wittgenstein, estabelecendo uma nova objetividade para o direito. O projeto de Leiter, apresentado no segundo capítulo, nasce da discordância dessa crítica hartiana. Dois são seus objetivos: (i) resgatar o Realismo Norte-Americano, reconstruindo-o à luz do pragmatismo e do naturalismo quineano, ancorado no antifundacionismo e na substituição das teorias normativas por descrições causais-nomológicas das decisões judiciais para fins de previsibilidade do direito. Cabe ao dogma do positivismo estabelecer o critério de legalidade, excluindo a moral como parte do que é juridicamente objetivo; (ii) adotar uma postura cética externa, numa tentativa de minar o interpretativismo de Ronald Dworkin. É no terceiro capítulo discute a viabilidade do projeto de Leiter propriamente. É possível verificar que Leiter não consegue mostrar o naturalismo na teoria do direito sob sua melhor luz, uma vez que é incapaz de lidar com as questões normativas inerentes ao direito e, por conseguinte, de justificar as decisões judiciais sem recorrer a uma teoria substantiva, algo que Dworkin consegue realizar com maior proveito, especialmente no que tange ao tema da objetividade. Leiter aponta para um futuro em que a investigação empírica pode aumentar a confiança no direito, mas seu projeto teórico limitado à descrição causal-nomológica das decisões é inviável para os fins propostos por uma teoria do direito de sucesso. / This thesis aims to analyze the viability of the project of naturalization of jurisprudence championed by Brian Leiter. The first chapter presents the effort of philosophy from Descartes foundationalism to Carnap for the solution of skeptical doubt about what is knowledge and that led to what was called physicalism, evidenced in the works of Kelsen and Scandinavian and Americans Legal Realists. The linguistic turn was decisive for the reconstruction of Cartesian parameters, being remarkable the influence of Wittgenstein and Quine. With Quine, the naturalization of epistemology proposal gained momentum and led, however, to abandon the skeptical challenge and scientism. Behaviorism already showed signs in american legal realism and was criticized by H.L.A. Hart. Hart appropriated elements of Quinean naturalism and Wittgenstein, establishing a new objectivity to law. Leiters project, presented in the second chapter, was born of the disagreement with hartian criticism. Two are his goals: (i) redeem American Legal Realism, reconstructing it in the light of pragmatism and Quinean naturalism, supported by antifoundationalism and replacement of normative theories by causal-nomological descriptions of judicial decisions for predictability purposes. The dogma of positivism will establish the criteria of legality, excluding the moral as part of what is legally objective; (ii) adopt an external skeptical position in an attempt to undermine the interpretativismo of Ronald Dworkin. The third chapter discusses the feasibility of Leiters project properly. Leiter cannot show the naturalism in theory of law in its best light, since it is incapable of dealing with normative questions related to law and, therefore, to justify judicial decisions without resorting to a substantive theory, something that Dworkin can make more profit, especially with regard to the issue of objectivity. Leiters project points to a future in which empirical research can increase laws confidence, but its limitation to a theoretical project of causal-nomological description of decisions is not feasible for the purposes proposed by a successful theory of law.

The emergence of the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa as a legal theory, which is a purposive approach to the law in which the main purposes of the law are considered as deriving elements of the legal rulings, has occurred in a particular socio-political and cultural context for the Shīʿa and within a particular epistemological construction. Given the lack of a historical reading of Shīʿī jurisprudence and the limitations of the methodological approaches which have to date been employed, this research applies a holistic approach. “The Bahbahānian paradigm” is identified as the overarching epistemological paradigm in modern and contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudence. The Bahbahanian paradigm was formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and is arguably characterised as being a combination of Aristotelian epistemologically, formalist methodologically and soft utilitarianism. Within this paradigm in the context of the twentieth century, maqāṣid al-sharīʿa emerged in Shīʿī thought, especially in its systematic and comprehensive theorisation by Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī - a contemporary Shīʿī scholar. The introduction of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa approach represents a paradigm shift that departs epistemologically, methodologically and functionally from the Bahbahānian paradigm. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa paradigm is characterized as pragmatic epistemologically, more accessible and dynamic methodologically and employing a virtue ethic. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa reflects the eclipse of the quietist character of the previous paradigm and the ambition of the contemporary Shīʿī religious institution. This ambition comprises a more significant role in the public sphere, which is embodied in the application or renewal of the sharīʿa in reality on one hand, and confronting the systematical secularization of the modern nation-state of the public sphere on the other. Mudarrisī’s version of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is obligated to challenge three intellectual enterprises; that is, the classical Shīʿī jurisprudential reasoning by embracing hermeneutical tools which are more accessible to religious knowledge; the Sunnī soft utilitarian maqāṣidī approaches by providing virtue ethical jurisprudence; and the secular nation-state by providing a flexible legal system.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T15:25:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao frederico g pinheiro pdf.pdf: 1053097 bytes, checksum: 6f0ee4ee4237b0eb17f994add6d6b911 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-07-28 / This dissertation aims to present an overview of the legal theory adopted by the enterprise in Brazilian Enterprise Law, and thereafter, further studies specifically the agrarian enterprise, mainly to assess what were the legal innovations that appeared with the validity of the Civil Code of 2002, as well as the corresponding consequences for the Brazilian Agrarian Law that currently has in undertaking its primary agrarian institute. / A presente dissertação visa apresentar um panorama geral sobre a teoria jurídica da empresa conforme adotada pelo Direito de Empresa brasileiro e, a partir daí, aprofundar os estudos especificamente da empresa agrária, principalmente para aferir quais foram as inovações jurídicas que surgiram com a vigência do Código Civil de 2002, bem como os correspondentes reflexos para o Direito Agrário brasileiro que, atualmente, tem na referida empresa agrária o seu principal instituto