Cette thèse interroge l’idée, fondamentale dans la philosophie juridique française, qui consiste à opposer formellement le droit et la science du droit. Cette opposition est l'application à la recherche en droit du dualisme sujet/objet, importée de la philosophie scientifique. Elle a conduit l'épistémologie juridique positiviste à déterminer des règles strictes en vue d'accéder à une véritable recherche scientifique sur le droit. Cependant, les théories sémantiques qui poursuivent les lignes de l'opposition du droit et de la science du droit reposent sur des bases fragiles et contestables. En particulier, la dissociation entre le langage juridique et le langage de la science du droit semble avoir été forcée par l'épistémologie juridique en vue d’entretenir l'idée d'une science du droit. Il semble toutefois possible de concevoir la recherche en droit autrement qu'en ayant recours aux fondamentaux de la philosophie scientifique. La philosophie herméneutique, fondée sur le rapport sujet/sujet, a été approfondie pour concevoir l'idée que le droit, pour les chercheurs en droit, consiste en une discussion à laquelle il leur importe de participer. Dans ce cadre, les prétentions à la scientificité par les chercheurs en droit doivent être interrogées, ainsi que les règles épistémologiques qui encouragent à la dissimulation d'un engagement dans la discussion juridique. Il importe au contraire de reconnaître la liberté des chercheurs en droit dans leur participation à la résolution de problèmes juridiques, ainsi que de saisir l’éclectisme de la recherche en droit au sein d’une épistémologie juridique démocratique. L’idée de science du droit est un obstacle à ces interrogations / The broad questions this work is addressing focus on the stringent opposition between law and legal science. Such a distinguishing is crucial for french philosophy. It assume the application to legal research of a subject/object dualism imported from scientific philosophy. It has led legal positivist epistemology to determine strict rules in order to access a genuine scientific legal scholarship. But the semantic theories which justifie the opposition of law and the science of law are based on tenuous and questionable bases. The dissociation between legal language and the language of legal science seems to have been forced by legal epistemology in order to preserve and maintain the idea of a legal science. It seems possible, however, to conceive of legal scholarship without any help from the fundamentals of scientific philosophy. The hermeneutic philosophy, based on the subject/subject relationship, has been helpful to conceive that the legal scholars’ law is a discussion, and not an object, and that they participate in. In this context, claims to scientificity from legal scholars must be questioned, as well as epistemological rules that encourage the concealment of commitment in legal discussion. On the contrary, it is important to recognize the freedom of legal scholars to participate in the resolution of legal issues, as well as to conceive this participation through a democratic legal epistemology. It seems that the idea of the science of law is an obstacle to these questions

This essay will focus on the psychosocial work environment, harassment and bullying at the workplace. As the essay is written as a part of the human resources program, the topics are discussed from a human resource management perspective. Harassment and bullying are highlighted on the basis of a labor law perspective where the focus is on the prevention work. The essay is based on analysis of law, the preparatory work for new laws and regulations, rules and regulations from the Swedish work environment authority, case law and doctrine, and is supplemented by interviews.   Harassed and bullied can in everyday speech sometimes be used as synonyms for one another. From a labor law perspective, the concepts, however, are not at all equivalent. Harassment and bullying are treated in different ways in the Swedish labor law. The essay examines how the cases of harassment are distributed on the different grounds of discrimination and why the Swedish legislator by law has chosen to provide an additional protection for groups with certain attributes and characteristics. The essay examines the question of why the Swedish legislators have chosen to regulate harassment and bullying in different laws as the psychological and social consequences for the individual as well as the working group are often the same.   The study also examines how the employer's obligations differ in situations of harassment and bullying. Methods and a checklist for preventing harassment and bullying in the workplace are presented. The essay shows that employer' obligations for preventing, investigating and attending to cases of harassment and bullying are equivalent but when these obligations are not met, the implications will be different. The consequence for the individual will be that he or she in some cases of bullying won’t have any option but to rely on the employer's goodwill and interest of having a workplace free from bullying.

<p>This essay will focus on the psychosocial work environment, harassment and bullying at the workplace. As the essay is written as a part of the human resources program, the topics are discussed from a human resource management perspective. Harassment and bullying are highlighted on the basis of a labor law perspective where the focus is on the prevention work. The essay is based on analysis of law, the preparatory work for new laws and regulations, rules and regulations from the Swedish work environment authority, case law and doctrine, and is supplemented by interviews.</p><p> </p><p>Harassed and bullied can in everyday speech sometimes be used as synonyms for one another. From a labor law perspective, the concepts, however, are not at all equivalent. Harassment and bullying are treated in different ways in the Swedish labor law. The essay examines how the cases of harassment are distributed on the different grounds of discrimination and why the Swedish legislator by law has chosen to provide an additional protection for groups with certain attributes and characteristics. The essay examines the question of why the Swedish legislators have chosen to regulate harassment and bullying in different laws as the psychological and social consequences for the individual as well as the working group are often the same.</p><p> </p><p>The study also examines how the employer's obligations differ in situations of harassment and bullying. Methods and a checklist for preventing harassment and bullying in the workplace are presented. The essay shows that employer' obligations for preventing, investigating and attending to cases of harassment and bullying are equivalent but when these obligations are not met, the implications will be different. The consequence for the individual will be that he or she in some cases of bullying won’t have any option but to rely on the employer's goodwill and interest of having a workplace free from bullying.</p>

In this paper, the authors analyze the positions on the objectives of Comparative Law as an autonomous discipline, as well as the intersection between law and economics and its implications for future studies of law. this is studied in relation not only to what is Law, but with what it should be. ending the authors propose a new perspective for comparatists lawyers, seeking to revitalize legal research. / En el presente artículo, los autores analizan las posiciones acerca de los objetivos del Derecho Comparado como una disciplina autónoma, así como la intersección entre Derecho y la economía y sus implicancias en los futuros estudios del Derecho. todo ello se estudia a en relación no solo a lo que es el Derecho, sino con lo que debería ser. Finalizan los autores proponiendo una nueva perspectiva para los abogados comparatistas, buscando revitalizar la investigación jurídica.

This thesis deals with the personality of prominent lawyer and a political scientist Zdenek Mlynar during his tenure at the Institute of State and Law of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Mlynar was one of the leading figures and ideologues of the Prague Spring; in the first half of 1968 he was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and later he became its secretary. He was also one of the authors of the 'Action Programme' of the Communist Party, precisely of its political part. Nevertheless his ideological development was not straightforward; he started as a devoted ideologue and dogmatist in the 1950s to become a reformer in the second half of the 1960s. And during that whole time period Mlynar had been employed as a scientist at the Academy of Sciences in the field of the legal theory. For the purpose of this thesis was Mlynar's more than twelve-year long tenure at the Academy of Sciences is divided into three periods: a research assistantship between 1957 and 1959, his tenure as a head of the Department of Theory of State and Law between 1960 and 1966 and then the time of his work on the political reform in 1968, with a special attention being paid to the interdisciplinary team "Development of the political system in the socialistic society" which was initiated and...

Pionniers des études jurisprudentielles contemporaines, fondateurs des plus célèbres maisons d'éditionjuridique française, inventeurs de nouveaux genres littéraires et doctrinaux, les arrêtistes du XIXe siècledemeurent néanmoins encore largement méconnus. Au sein de leurs recueils de jurisprudence, Jean-BaptisteSirey, Désiré Dalloz et leurs nombreux collaborateurs, concurrents et successeurs, ont pourtant été des acteursà part entière d'une pensée juridique française trop souvent réduite aux seuls auteurs de la doctrine. Entrethéorie et pratique, l' « arrêtisme » contemporain a ainsi formé, de la Révolution jusqu'aux années 1870, unmouvement majeur de la littérature et de la pensée juridiques. Sur cette période, arrêtistes et commentateursde la doctrine se sont en effet âprement affrontés sur le terrain épistémique et éditorial, opposant travaux etdiscours sur la jurisprudence, et luttant pour le monopole des études jurisprudentielles. A partir des années 1880toutefois, l'arrivée massive des universitaires au sein des recueils de jurisprudence va marquer la fin del'arrêtisme des praticiens. A la Belle Epoque, les auteurs de l' « Ecole scientifique » qui entendent renouvelerl'étude et la science du droit s'emparent à leur tour activement de la jurisprudence ; présenté comme unrapprochement salvateur entre l'Ecole et le Palais, le « projet jurisprudentiel » des professeurs va toutefoiscontribuer à détacher les recueils d'arrêts de la culture praticienne dont ils étaient originellement issus. Il ressortde cette étude une relecture de l’histoire intellectuelle des recueils d’arrêts et des arrêtistes, dontl’historiographie classique en a dressé un portrait partiel, sinon partial. / Pioneers of contemporary case law studies, founders of the most famous French legal publishing companies,inventors of new literary and doctrinal genres, the arrêtistes of the nineteenth century still remain largelyunknown. In their casebooks, Jean-Baptiste Sirey, Désiré Dalloz and their many collaborators, competitors andsuccessors, were actors in their own right on the stage of French legal thinking, a stage too often reduced to theonly authors of the doctrine. Between theory and practice, the contemporary "arrêtisme" formed, from theRevolution to the 1870s, a major movement of literature and legal thought. Over this period, the arrêtistes andthe authors of legal doctrine clashed on epistemic and editorial grounds, opposing work and discourses on caselaw, and fighting for the monopoly of judicial analyses. However, from the 1880s onwards, the influx of universityprofessors in casebooks marked the end of the practitioners’ arrêtisme. During the Belle Epoque, the authors ofthe "Ecole scientifique", who intended to renew the study and science of law, took possession of case law;presented as a salutory reconciliation between the School and the Court, the professors’ "jurisprudential project"nevertheless contributed to separate case law reports from the culture of practitioners they were originallyderived from. What emerges from this study is a re-reading of the intellectual history of casebooks and arrêtistes,of which classical historiography gave a partial –if not biased -picture.

La iuris prudentia ou « prudence du droit » désignait le savoir des jurisconsultes romains. Bien que son importance soit capitale pour l’histoire de notre droit, nous n’en connaissons qu’une seule et unique définition inscrite aux Institutes et au Digeste de l’empereur Justinien. L’auteur originaire en serait Ulpien qui définit cette « jurisprudence » comme « la connaissance des choses divines et humaines, la science du juste et de l’injuste » (iuris prudentia est diuinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia). Face à cette définition, les commentateurs ont souvent considéré que seul le second élément (« la science du juste et de l’injuste ») formait le véritable critère épistémologique de la science juridique en cause, diminuant ainsi la fonction de la connaissance des choses divines et humaines (diuinarum atque humanarum notitia). Or, nous pensons qu’au contraire cette rerum notitia n’est pas un simple accessoire rhétorique mais qu’elle réfère à une forme éminente du savoir antique : la sagesse. Forme suprême de l’intelligence et du vécu antique, elle n’est pas le fruit particulier d’une école philosophique ou d’une pensée religieuse. Relative à un savoir générique, la référence à la « sagesse » dans la définition de la iuris prudentia désigne la pensée même du jurisconsulte. Car comment abstraire les règles (regulae) depuis les cas (res) sans une médiation intellective entre les choses et le droit ? Comment opérer le choix entre le juste et l’injuste sans une forme de savoir conceptuel ? Toute science a besoin d’une théorie de la connaissance pour fonder sa méthode. Toutefois, la iuris prudentia dont l’objet était le droit d’une cité devenu empire, ne pouvait faire reposer sa pensée sur une doctrine philosophique déterminée. De même, léguée par les jurisconsultes païens aux princes législateurs chrétiens, elle ne pouvait se définir à travers le prisme d’une religion particulière. Or, la référence à la sagesse, but suprême de la connaissance, permet de neutraliser les différences dogmatiques pour faire ainsi de la « prudence du droit » la seule connaissance antique véritablement universelle. Ce qui explique selon nous que cette fameuse iuris prudentia connaîtra une longue postérité qui fera la fortune historique de la sagesse du droit d’origine romaine dont nous ressentons encore aujourd’hui les échos dans notre propre système juridique. / The iuris prudentia or wisdom in matters of law referred to Roman jurists’ knowledge. Even though its importance was primordial for the history of our law, we only know one and unique definition written in the Institutes and inside Emperor Justinian’s Digest. The original author could be Ulpian who defines this jurisprudence as “the awareness of divine and human things, knowledge of what is just or unjust” (iuris prudentia is diuinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia). Faced with this definition, many critics have often considered that only the second element (knowledge of what is just and unjust) formed the genuine epistemic criteria of the legal science in question, thus decreasing the duty of the knowledge in divine and human things (diuinarum atque humanarum notitia). On the contrary, we believe that this rerum notitia is not only a simple rhetorical accessory but it refers to an eminent antique knowledge: wisdom. As the ultimate form of the antique intelligence and background, it is not the particular result of a philosophical school or a religious thought. Relating to a generic knowledge, reference to “wisdom” in the definition of iuris prudentia refers to Roman jurist real thinking. Indeed how to allow for abstract rules (regulae) for cases (res) without a spiritual mediation between things and the law? How to operate a choice between just and unjust without a kind of ideational knowledge? Every science needs a theory of knowledge to have a basis for its method. Nevertheless, the iuris prudentia (whose purpose was the law of a city-state which became an empire) was not able to base its way of thinking on a determined philosophical doctrine. Likewise, bequeathed by pagan Roman jurists to Christian Imperators, it could not define itself through the prism of a particular religion. Yet reference to wisdom, the ultimate goal of knowledge, allows neutralizing dogmatic differences. Wisdom in matters of law is the only truly universal antique knowledge. This therefore makes it clear to us why iuris prudentia will continue to have such an influence in posterity and why we still hear echos today of a legal system established by the Romans. [Tr. PHILIPPE JULLIEN]

Les disciples de Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882) ont cherché, par la constitution d’écoles, àperpétuer l’oeuvre de leur maître. En matière juridique, ils tentent de refonder le droit sur l’espritsocial. Celui-ci, frontalement opposé à l’esprit classique des juristes, fait d’abstraction etd’idéalité, doit permettre de réinsuffler le social dans le droit, saturé par l’idéologie des Lumières.Cet objectif passe notamment par une réflexion méthodologique sur la science juridique, quidoit allier le classique procédé déductif à l’induction des sciences sociales. Une fois le droit assissur la neutralité du fait social, il peut enfin être assaini de l’idéologie rousseauiste qui l’imprègneet, somme toute, dépolitisé. Les leplaysiens en retrouvent in fine le fondement dans la tradition,mélange d’immanence et d’historicité. Les disciples de Le Play, qui entendent promouvoir desréformes en vue de l’avènement d’une société traditionnelle vectrice de paix sociale, utilisentalors les sources formelles du droit. Celles-ci apparaissent véritablement instrumentalisées : lesémules de l’ingénieur utilisent en effet, au gré de leurs besoins, tant la coutume et lajurisprudence que la loi pour faire aboutir leurs réformes. Il ressort de cette étude qu’ils ontsurtout exercé une influence méthodologique et intellectuelle sur la norme législative. / The followers of Frederic Le Play (1806-1882) sought by the establishment of schools, toperpetuate the work of their master. They indeed tried to reestablish social spirit as the true basisof legal science. The latter, frontally opposed to the classical spirit of Jurists, made of abstractionand ideality, must allow life to penetrate the field of legal science, saturated with the ideology ofthe Enlightenment. To achieve this objective, they develop a methodological reflection on legalscience, which must combine the classic deductive process to the induction of Social Sciences.Once seated on the neutrality of the social fact, legal science can finally be cleansed ofRousseau’s ideology and be, after all, depoliticized. The leplaysiens ultimately found the truebasis of law in tradition, defined as a mixture of immanence and historicity. The disciples of LePlay, who intend to promote reforms to the advent of a traditional society vector of social peace,then use formal sources of law. The latter appear truly manipulated : the followers of theengineer use indeed to suit their needs, both custom, jurisprudence and law to achieve theirreforms. It appears from this study that they have mostly influenced the Third Republiclegislation in a methodological and intellectual way.