Esta dissertação tem como objetivo central reconstituir a trajetória do poeta brasileiro Nilton Rosa da Silva, enfocando seu período como exilado político no Chile, entre 1971 e 1973. Em Santiago, Nilton da Silva estudou castelhano no Instituto Pedagógico da Universidade do Chile, publicou o livro de poesias Hombre América, e passou a militar na Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios (FER), um dos grupos estudantis do Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). O jovem brasileiro seria morto aos 24 anos de idade, em junho de 1973 (três meses antes do golpe de Estado liderado por Augusto Pinochet), por membros da Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad, milícia de ultradireita que lutava pela derrubada do presidente Salvador Allende. Defendendo a revolução armada para colocar o Chile no caminho do socialismo, mesmo durante o governo democrático da Unidad Popular (UP), o MIR era visto com reservas por setores moderados da esquerda. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, a organização procurava – desde fora – radicalizar os partidos da UP. A partir da análise da vida de Nilton da Silva, e das repercussões da sua morte, é possível discutir as disputas entre as estratégias “rupturista” e “sistêmica” da esquerda chilena durante o governo Allende, as possibilidades de acordo que se desenharam entre esses setores, e as maneiras como o MIR procurou conquistar esferas mais amplas para sua retórica em favor da necessidade de pegar em armas. Os usos políticos do assassinato de Nilton da Silva estão relacionados a essa busca: através da análise das apropriações do episódio, apreende-se o uso imediato que o MIR fez de sua morte, tentando construir o jovem militante como um mártir revolucionário em um período de crescente temor frente a um golpe reacionário. Discute-se, ademais, a forma como a vida e a morte de Nilton da Silva seriam eventualmente ressignificada nas décadas seguintes, passando a incluí-lo em uma narrativa mais ampla, ao lado de outras vítimas das ditaduras brasileira e chilena. / This thesis aims to recreate the trajectory of the Brazilian poet Nilton Rosa da Silva, focusing on his time as a political exile in Chile, from 1971 to 1973. In Santiago, Silva studied Spanish at the Pedagogical Institute of the University of Chile, published his poetry book Hombre América, and became a member of the Revolutionary Students Front (FER), one of Revolutionary Left Movement’s (MIR) groups in the student movement. The young Brazilian was killed at the age of 24 in June 1973 (three months prior to the coup led by Augusto Pinochet), by members of the Fatherland and Liberty Nationalist Front, a far-right militia that fought to overthrow the president, Salvador Allende. Advocating the need of an armed revolution to place Chile in the path of Socialism, even during the Popular Unity’s (UP) democratic administration, MIR was seen with hesitations by the moderate left. At the same time, however, MIR sought to radicalize the UP parties. By analyzing Nilton da Silva’s life and the impact of his death, it is possible to discuss the disputes between the “rupturist” and “systemic” strategies of the Chilean left during the Allende administration, the chances of agreement between these sectors, and the ways in which MIR sought to conquer wider segments to its rhetoric in favor of the need to take up arms. The political uses of Nilton da Silva’s murder are related to this goal: by examining the appropriation of his death, we are able to see the immediate use that MIR did of this episode, trying to construct the young activist as a revolutionary martyr in a period of growing fear towards a reactionary coup. This work discusses, moreover, how the life and death of Nilton da Silva would eventually be re-signified in the following decades, now being included in a broader narrative, along with other victims of the Brazilian and Chilean dictatorships.

Esta tese propõe um estudo do discurso de planejamento econômico nas décadas de 1950 e 1960, considerando dois momentos fundamentais: a constituição de um projeto para o desenvolvimento dos países periféricos ou subdesenvolvimentos por meio do planejamento, no âmbito da ONU e, mais precisamente, da CEPAL, no início do anos 1950; e as tentativas de planejamento no Brasil da primeira metade da década de 1960 como resposta à crise econômica, política e institucional que o país experimentava, com o Plano Trienal e o PAEG. Teoricamente, partimos da noção de positividade do discurso (enunciado e formação discursiva) na Arqueologia do saber foucaultiana, mas requalificando-a, a partir de Hegel e Derrida, de modo a atender a algumas insuficiências que tal noção apresenta quanto a uma concepção mais ampla de linguagem como sistema simbólico. Nesse sentido, nossa análise pauta-se pela reconstituição dos enunciados nos textos, tendo como horizonte quatro categorias que se demonstraram fundamentais desde os primeiros documentos: desenvolvimento, planejamento, perspectiva do desenvolvimento e posição técnica da autoridade planejadora. Os resultados mais relevantes da análise podem ser sintetizadas nos seguintes pontos: (1) o planejamento econômico justifica-se recorrentemente em nome do desenvolvimento; (2) os documentos apresentam constante a dificuldade em definir o par desenvolvimento/subdesenvolvimento, o que se revelou não uma idiossincrasia dos textos, mas um aspecto sistemático, simbólico o desenvolvimento, antes de ser um fundamento, é um problema em si a que as práticas de planejamento procuram responder; (3) o desenvolvimento projeta uma perspectiva do desenvolvimento, capaz de identificar um modo ótimo, ideal de progresso econômico para além do que se daria pela evolução espontânea da economia via livre empresa ou livre mercado; (4) essa perspectiva do desenvolvimento permite, enfim, delimitar um domínio do discurso (uma formação discursiva) que pode ser chamada desenvolvimentismo, dentro do qual se inserem tanto o Trienal quanto o PAEG, mudando apenas a estratégia de solução para essa discrepância entre progresso ideal e progresso espontâneo o primeiro procurando ocupar tal espaço por meio da iniciativa econômica estatal, o segundo visando a reduzi-lo pelo reformismo do setor privado, de modo a fazê-lo operar espontaneamente da maneira mais próxima possível do ótimo. De modo que os projetos hegemônicos pré e pós-Golpe, tal como consubstanciados nesses planos, não se opõem totalmente, mas articulam-se como soluções opostas diante de um mesmo problema simbólico, cultural no sentido mais forte do termo. / This thesis proposes to study economic planning discourse in the 1950s and 1960s, concerning two very important moments: first, the constitution of a project for the development of periphery or underdeveloped countries through economic planning, in the UN and, more precisely, ECLAC, during the early 1950s; second, the attempts of economic planning in Brazil during the first half of the 1960s, with Plano Trienal and PAEG as a reaction to the economic, political and institutional crisis that this country experienced. Theoretically, we rely on the notion of positivity of discourse, regarding the concepts of statement (énoncé) and discursive formation, from Foucaults Archeology of Knowledge. On the other hand, we reconsider this notion, through Hegel and Derrida, trying to deal with some of its lacks regarding the broad conception of language as a symbolic system. In this sense, our analysis aims at the reconstitution of statements in the texts, based on four categories that appeared as essential since the first documents we analyzed: development, planning, point of view of development and technical position of planning authority. The most relevant results of the analysis may be summarized in the following topics: (1) economic planning recurrently legitimates itself on behalf of development; (2) the documents present a constant difficulty in defining the pair development/underdevelopment, which turn out to be not an idiosyncrasy of each text, but a systematic, symbolic issue development, less than a solid foundation, is itself a problem that the practices of planning try to deal with; (3) development projects a point of view of development, which would be the perspective able to identify an ideal, optimal way of economic progress beyond the economic progress that would happen in the spontaneous evolution of economy through free entrepreneurship or free market; (4) this point of view of development allows us to identify a discursive domain (a discursive formation) that we could call Developmentalism. Both Trienal and PAEG pertain to this category, differing only regarding the strategy they propose to solve this gap between optimal progress and spontaneous progress, the former trying to occupy this space through state economic initiative and the latter trying to reduce it reforming the private sector to make it spontaneously work as the optimal way. Consequently, the hegemonic projects before and after 1964 Brazilian Coup, as they appears in these plans, are not totally opposed, but are articulated as opposing solutions to a common problem that is symbolic, i.e., cultural in the strong meaning of the term.

本文擬探討塔信政權與泰國政治變遷的關係，從兩方面來分析泰國政黨政治體系的改變，一是從制度面討論1997年憲法的選舉制度對泰國政黨政治的衝擊與影響。二是從憲法的實踐和非制度化因素，分析塔信政權之興起與終結，來觀察泰國政治變遷的過程與意義。塔信政權是在1997年憲法下所運作的產物，最後卻被長達15年不見的軍事政變所終結。本文深入剖析塔信政權執政過程，探討為何會發生軍事政變的原因，以及分析這(場政變)對泰國民主產生什麼樣的意義與影響。 / This study examines the relationship between Thaksin's regime and political change in Thailand. It analyzes the change of the Thai party system from two respects. First, it discusses the impact which the new electoral system of the 1997constitution had on the Thai party politics. Second, it analyzes the rise and the fall of Thaksin’s regime from the constitution practice and the non-institutional factors in order to observe the process and the implication of political change in Thailand. Thaksin’s regime is the result of 1997 constitution. However, it was ended by a military coup which had not happened for 15 years. We discuss deeply the history of Thaksin’s regime, why the military coup took place to close this regime, and the influence of this military coup on Thai democracy.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-21T13:42:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Elaine Schmitt.pdf: 4844970 bytes, checksum: bfc8b9a4c146425a57179b7dfa4f06d3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-16 / The present research proposes to observe how the press of the interior approached the civil military coup that broke out in Brazil in 1964, through an analysis of the discourse produced by the newspapers O Comércio (União da Vitória / PR) and Caiçara (Porto União / SC). Based on the theoretical-methodological reference of the Discourse Analysis of French Line, which helped in the clipping and interpretation of the statements collected (during the period from january to december of 1964), it was possible to highlight the discursive formations that guided the journalism production, in which the senses around nationalism, anticommunism and religiosity contributed to the legitimation of the current ideology. The study, during the understanding aspects of the productive process of the press, defends an approach to journalism as a mechanism for social construction of reality and as a powerful apparatus to constitute the social imaginary, which contributes to crystallize certain meanings in the history of a country. / A presente pesquisa propõe- se a observar como a imprensa do interior abordou o golpe civil militar que eclodiu em 1964 no Brasil, por meio da análise do discurso produzido pelos jornais O Comércio (União da Vitória/PR) e Caiçara (Porto União/SC). Com base no referencial teórico-metodológico da Análise do Discurso de linha francesa, que auxiliou no recorte e na interpretação dos enunciados coletados (no período que compreende os meses de janeiro a dezembro de 1964), foi possível evidenciar as formações discursivas que orientaram a produção jornalística, em que os sentidos em torno do nacionalismo, do anticomunismo e da religiosidade contribuíram para a legitimação da ideologia vigente. O estudo, ao compreender aspectos do processo produtivo da imprensa, defende uma abordagem do jornalismo como mecanismo de construção social da realidade e como um potente aparato para constituir o imaginário social, que contribui para cristalizar determinados sentidos na história de um país

Si les grandes coalitions gouvernementales sont parvenues à stabiliser la trajectoire politiquemalienne, les interventions militaires au Niger (1996, 1999, 2010) ont en revanche marqué leshésitations politico-prétoriennes à l’oeuvre et leurs conséquences sur le processus transitionnelglobal. Parce qu’elles répondent à plusieurs facteurs, les « formules » politiques et militaires derégulation des champs appellent par conséquent une réflexion plus générale sur : (i) le rôle del’histoire, des ressources et des stratégies dans la fixation des choix (institutionnels) despossibles ; (ii) les contextes globaux qui ordonnent les « logiques et mythologiques »d’interaction et participent à une délimitation, objective (i.e. « spontanée ») et subjective (i.e.stratégique), des solutions adaptées de gestion politique. Ce travail visera plus spécifiquement àcomprendre les « décloisonnements » stratégiques qui, dans des conjonctures non routinières,appellent la mobilisation de ressources objectivées et valorisées d’action, autorisent de largesregroupements (coalitions post-transitionnelles au Mali, collusions « transectorielles » oupolitico-militaires au Niger) et permettent finalement de tranquilliser la trajectoire politique deces Etats. / Whereas oversized coalitions successfully stabilized the Malian political path, the recurrentmilitary Coups in Niger (1996, 1999 and 2010) focused more on the politico-praetorianwonderings and their consequences for the transitional process. Then, the political and militarymodes of administration in Mali and Niger question: (i) the role of history, strategic resources andpolitical strategies in defining the institutional means of regulation; (ii) the general contextsshaping the “logics and mythologies” of interaction and defining the well-suited models ofpolitical control. This work will more specifically aim at understanding the strategic“decompartmentalization” which, first, orders the mobilization of objectivised and valorisedresources, then allows oversized groupings (post-transitional coalitions in Mali, “transectorial” orpolitico-military collusions in Niger) and finally reassure the political trajectories of those Stateswithin uncertain conjunctures.

[pt] A dissertação Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Arte e Intervenção Pública pretende estabelecer um diálogo entre design / comunicação visual, arte política e história do período ditatorial no Brasil, tendo como base empírica o Relatório da CNV (especificamente o Volume III: Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos). A partir da análise do Relatório da Comissão Nacional da Verdade, criamos oficinas de estratégias de comunicação visual no âmbito da intervenção no espaço público, com a participação de jovens na faixa etária de 18 a 22 anos. Nessa pesquisa de campo, a metodologia desenvolvida propõe-se a provocar um debate ético e estético com o público alvo. O processo criativo desenvolvido com os alunos de graduação em design da disciplina de Linguagem e Comunicação Visual II, ministrada pela professora Simone Formiga - 2017.1 - PUC-Rio, proporcionou a construção de narrativas imagéticas sobre questões morais relativas às gravíssimas violações de direitos humanos deflagradas pelo regime ditatorial e expostas no Relatório. Ou seja, a partir dos conteúdos discursivos gerados nesta disciplina, desenvolvemos narrativas visuais ocupando o espaço público, com a finalidade de provocar questionamentos e reflexões na população acerca das vítimas do período do regime militar brasileiro. / [en] The dissertation National Commission of Truth, Art and Public Intervention intends to establish a dialogue between design - visual language -, political art and history of the dictatorial period in Brazil, with empirical basis on the CNV Report (specifically Volume III: Political Dead and Disappeared). Analyzing the work of the National Commission of Truth, we created workshops on visual communication strategies in the framework of artistic intervention in public space, with the participation of a group aged from 18 to 22 years. In the field research, the methodology developed aims to provoke an ethical and aesthetic debate with the target audience. The creative process developed with the undergraduate design students at Language and Visual Communication II discipline, given by Professor Simone Formiga - 2017.1 - PUC-Rio, provided the construction of imaginative narratives on moral issues about the severe violations of human rights triggered by the dictatorial period and exposed in the documents of the National Commission of Truth. So, from the discursive contents generated in this discipline, we developed visual narratives occupying the public space, with the purpose of provoking questions and reflections about the victims of the Brazilian military coup.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.