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Denna forskningsrapport har som mål att undersöka och analysera de omfattande etiska faktorer som påverkar beslutsprocessen vid ingripande i naturen. I synnerhet undersöker vi de moraliska och praktiska dilemman som kan uppstå vid sådana beslut och som ofta är komplexa och svåra att hantera.  Syftet med rapporten är att öka förståelsen för hur etiken spelar och bör spela en roll inom miljövården, specifikt i relation till synen på naturens värde och beslutsfattarnas etiska ställningstaganden. Genom att genomföra en vetenskaplig studie med hjälp av systematisk litteraturstudie och intervjuer, har vi kunnat få en bredare bild av svaret på vår undersökningsfråga: " Var bör gränsen för hur långt människan får påverka naturen? " Det finns en skillnad i fokus mellan innehållsanalysen och intervjun, där den första utvecklas i riktning mot att ha en mer praktisk inriktning medan den andra har en mer etisk inriktning. Detta skapar en uppfattning av olika riktningar i det skrivna materialet. De olika metoderna som användes i forskningen, nämligen systematisk litteraturstudie och intervjuer, genererade olika insikter. Snarare än att hitta en entydig lösning, har vi dock funnit att olika metoder och kunskapsläget kring ämnet genererar olika insikter, vilket tyder på att det inte finns ett enkelt svar.  Genom att analysera och diskutera de erhållna resultaten i denna rapport hoppas vi kunna bidra till en mer nyanserad och informerad debatt kring de etiska aspekterna av ingripande i naturen. Vi betonar vikten av att fortsätta forska och utveckla kunskapen inom detta område för att bättre kunna hantera de komplexa och ibland motsägelsefulla frågorna som uppstår vid beslutsfattandet kring naturens bevarande och användning. / This research report aims to investigate and analyze the extensive ethical factors that influence the decision-making process in nature intervention. Specifically, we examine the moral and practical dilemmas that can arise in such decisions, which are often complex and difficult to manage.  The purpose of this report is to enhance understanding of the role that ethics plays and should play in environmental conservation, particularly in relation to perspectives on the value of nature and the ethical positions taken by decision-makers. By conducting a scientific study using a systematic literature review and interviews, we have been able to obtain a broader understanding of the answer to our research question: "Where should the limit be placed on human intervention in nature?" There is a difference in focus between content analysis and interviews, with the former tending to have a more practical orientation and the latter having a more ethical orientation. This creates an impression of divergent directions in the written material. The various methods used in the research, namely the systematic literature review and interviews, yielded different insights. However, rather than finding a definitive solution, we have discovered that different methods and the state of knowledge in the field generate different insights, indicating that there is no simple answer.  By analyzing and discussing the obtained results in this report, we hope to contribute to a more nuanced and informed debate on the ethical aspects of nature intervention. We emphasize the importance of continued research and knowledge development in this area to better address the complex and sometimes contradictory issues that arise in decision-making regarding the conservation and utilization of nature.

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This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.

The overall aim of this thesis is to look at some philosophical issues surrounding autonomous systems in society and war. These issues can be divided into three main categories. The first, discussed in papers I and II, concerns ethical issues surrounding the use of autonomous systems – where the focus in this thesis is on military robots. The second issue, discussed in paper III, concerns how to make sure that advanced robots behave ethically adequate. The third issue, discussed in papers IV and V, has to do with agency and responsibility. Another issue, somewhat aside from the philosophical, has to do with coping with future technologies, and developing methods for dealing with potentially disruptive technologies. This is discussed in papers VI and VII. Paper I systemizes some ethical issues surrounding the use of UAVs in war, with the laws of war as a backdrop. It is suggested that the laws of war are too wide and might be interpreted differently depending on which normative moral theory is used. Paper II is about future, more advanced autonomous robots, and whether the use of such robots can undermine the justification for killing in war. The suggestion is that this justification is substantially undermined if robots are used to replace humans to a high extent. Papers I and II both suggest revisions or additions to the laws or war. Paper III provides a discussion on one normative moral theory – ethics of care – connected to care robots. The aim is twofold: first, to provide a plausible and ethically relevant interpretation of the key term care in ethics of care, and second, to discuss whether ethics of care may be a suitable theory to implement in care robots. Paper IV discusses robots connected to agency and responsibility, with a focus on consciousness. The paper has a functionalistic approach, and it is suggested that robots should be considered agents if they can behave as if they are, in a moral Turing test. Paper V is also about robots and agency, but with a focus on free will. The main question is whether robots can have free will in the same sense as we consider humans to have free will when holding them responsible for their actions in a court of law. It is argued that autonomy with respect to norms is crucial for the agency of robots. Paper VI investigates the assessment of socially disruptive technological change. The coevolution of society and potentially disruptive technolgies makes decision-guidance on such technologies difficult. Four basic principles are proposed for such decision guidance, involving interdisciplinary and participatory elements. Paper VII applies the results from paper VI – and a workshop – to autonomous systems, a potentially disruptive technology. A method for dealing with potentially disruptive technolgies is developed in the paper. / <p>QC 20130911</p>

The subject of this work is a long-term debate about the collective responsibility which occurs between two opposite opinions on social phenomenon above all. The methodical individualists interpret the social phenomenons with reference to individuals, whereas the methodical holists assert that these cannot be reduced to phenomenons of individuals without any rest. Methodical individualists lean on the classic conception of the moral responsibility which is based on the intended agency in causal connection with the moral wrong. This conception is connected with human beings in its nature, but there is countless of thinkers who bring arguments in favour of the collective moral responsibility which is thought to bring about more good in the world. We will try to introduce this debate in its complexity and its most interesting and important arguments. Within the frame of debate about moral responsibility of collectives, we can meet with the notion of shared responsibility, distributive collective responsibility, non-distributive collective responsibility connected with the organized collectives, the responsibility for historic injusticies and with the conception of moral taint. All of notions will be the subject of this work. The biggest interest is put on the responsibility of politic communities. In...

Le philosophe et théologien saint Anselme de Cantorbéry (1033—1109) offre une pensée riche de la liberté qui a été influente au Moyen Âge. Katherin A. Rogers a récemment jugé bon de mettre Anselme en dialogue avec la philosophie contemporaine par rapport au débat sur le libre arbitre. La présente étude approuve ce projet, mais rejette le rapprochement que Rogers opère entre Anselme et Harry G. Frankfurt (1929—) avec son Interprétation Hiérarchique. Cette étude se donne pour tâche, dans un premier temps, de reprendre à zéro une étude historique sur la liberté chez Anselme en l’abordant par différents angles d’approche dans chacun de ses cinq chapitres, et dans un deuxième temps et de manière secondaire, de mener à bien une conversation entre Anselme et la philosophie contemporaine analytique sur le libre arbitre. À travers ces chapitres sur la pensée anselmienne, l’on verra : ce qui constitue le fondement de la morale, de la causalité, de la possibilité, et de la nécessité ; les distinctions et les concepts autour desquels s’articule le problème de la liberté, notamment la distinction entre faire sponte et naturaliter ; qu’Anselme se classe parmi les penseurs libertariens par rapport au libre arbitre, mais avec d’importantes qualifications ; le concept de la liberté du choix et sa force insurpassable ; les différents sens du mot « volonté », soit la volonté-instrument, la volonté-usus, et les affections de la volonté ; ainsi que la solution qu’Anselme apporte au problème de la possibilité du mal. Dans une conclusion, plutôt que de rapprocher Anselme de Frankfurt, on l’associera avec la théorie nommée agent-causation, dont Roderick M. Chisholm (1916—1999) est un des plus grands représentants. / The philosopher and theologian Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033—1109) offers a rich framework for thinking about freedom that has been influential in the Middle Ages. Katherin A. Rogers has recently judged right to put Anselm in dialogue with contemporary philosophy with regard to the debate on free will. The present study approves this project, but rejects the attempt to link Anselm with Harry G. Frankfurt (1929—) that Rogers operates with her Hierarchical Interpretation. This study gives itself the task, firstly, to rework from scratch a historical study on freedom in Anselm by tackling the subject from different vantage points in each of its five chapters, and secondly as well as secondarily, to establish communication between Anselm and contemporary analytical philosophy on the topic of free will. Throughout these chapters on Anselm’s philosophy, the following will be seen: what constitutes the foundation of morality, causality, possibility, and necessity; distinctions and concepts around which the problem of freedom articulates itself, in particular the distinction between doing sponte and naturaliter; that Anselm can be classified as a libertarian thinker regarding free will, but with important qualifications; the concept of freedom of choice and its unsurpassable strength; the three different senses of the word “will”: instrument of the will, usus of the will, and the affections of the will; as well as the solution that Anselm gives to the problem of the possibility of evil. In a conclusion, instead of bringing Anselm closer to Frankfurt, it is with the so-called agent-causation theory that he will be associated with, of which Roderick M. Chisholm (1916—1999) is one of the main upholders.

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