This research aims to fill an important gap in focusing on why individuals are able to take part in and/or support activities that have effects on economic, environmental, and social dimensions that are not consistent with their sense of right and wrong. The research focuses on the relationship between supply chain management and moral disengagement, and how this relation affects social responsibility. After observing individuals avoiding responsibility for misconduct an explanatory concept, moral decoupling, was proposed. Moral decoupling considers moral responsibility a flow in the supply chain. Moral decoupling occurs when the flow is restricted. If moral decoupling occurs at an identifiable point it is called a moral decoupling point. The concept was developed by identifying and linking specific supply chain activities and structures with moral disengagement, a theory that explains the deactivation of self regulation. Moral decoupling was able to suggest how to reduce moral disengagement and improve social responsibility. To validate the suggestions a literature review on social responsibility was conducted and identified sixteen elements of social responsibility in supply chain management. The suggestions based on moral disengagement were compared with elements of social responsibility and a large overlap was found. Lastly, suggestions on how to reduce moral disengagement and map moral responsibility in a supply network are proposed, links between elements of social responsibility are presented, and moral coupling is added as a complementary term to moral decoupling. A model explaining the relationship between ethical guidelines, moral responsibility, moral decoupling, and social responsibility is proposed. In relation to current theoretical knowledge the thesis has contributed to the field of socially responsible supply chain management with an application of a new theoretical lens that gives one explanation as to why identifed elements of social responsibility are important. The understanding of social responsibility has reached an increased explanatory depth following the identification of moral disengagement as a generative mechanism, subject to conditions in supply chain management. The research has also applied moral disengagement in a context not identified in earlier research, and shows some of the complexity of applying it to a real-world global context. The elements of social responsibility and moral (de)coupling help practitioners identify what they should focus on to increase social responsibility and also offer an explanation for `why?'. The findings can be used to construct supply chains that are less prone to misconduct and to identify where in the chain it is important to be aware of immoral behavior. The value and originality of this research is centered on the application of a new theoretical lens for socially responsible supply chain management. It is the only identified research in the area which identifies mechanisms on a generative level that explains human behavior and conditions to which those mechanisms are subject. This is also in itself a novel application of moral disengagement in a new research context. / <p>Doctoral thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Textile Management at the University of Borås to be publicly defended on Wednesday, December 10, 2014, at 1:00 p.m.,in room M404, University of Bor as, Allégatan 1, Borås</p>

Le débat sur le libre arbitre continue depuis des siècles, réfractaire à toute tentative de solution positive. Cette thèse présente une contribution visant à dissoudre le problème plutôt qu’à le résoudre. L’approche négative et « thérapeutique » du travail est d’inspiration largement wittgensteinienne : son noyau réside dans la thèse selon laquelle les problèmes philosophiques – y compris le problème du libre arbitre – ont pour origine une confusion dans l’usage des mots. Dans les deux premiers chapitres, j’examine le débat analytique sur le libre arbitre et l’approche récente de la philosophie expérimentale. Je montre que la difficulté d’arriver à un niveau d’accord même minimal sur les questions principales du débat rend déraisonnable de vouloir le poursuivre. Dans le troisième chapitre, je présente l’approche négative des problèmes philosophiques défendue par Paul Horwich dans son travail sur Wittgenstein et dans ses échanges avec Timothy Williamson et Richard Rorty. Dans le quatrième chapitre, j’applique la thèse wittgensteinienne de la confusion linguistique à la question du libre arbitre. Au centre du cinquième chapitre se trouve la position défendue par Peter Strawson dans son article « Freedom and Resentment » (1962), dont je présente une lecture pragmatique. Selon cette interprétation inspirée par Rorty, Strawson montre que le scepticisme à l’égard de la responsabilité morale représente une forme de politique culturelle vouée à l’échec. / Philosophical attempts to solve the free will conundrum have proven unsuccessful across the centuries. In this work I aim at dissolving rather than solving the problem. The negative and “therapeutic” approach I adopt is inspired by Wittgenstein, its core being the thesis that such philosophical problems as free will stem from linguistic confusion. In the first and second chapter I examine the contributions on free will provided within analytic philosophy and within the so called experimental philosophy. I argue that it is not reasonable to pursue this debate, insofar as it is by now clear that its main questions admit of no shared solutions. In the third chapter I present the negative approach to philosophical problems defended by Paul Horwich in his work on Wittgenstein and in his exchanges with Timothy Williamson and Richard Rorty. In the fourth chapter I apply to the free will issue an approach focused on Wittgenstein’s thesis concerning linguistic confusion. In the fifth chapter I provide a pragmatic reading of the position defended by Peter Strawson in his « Freedom and Resentment » (1962). According to this interpretation inspired by Rorty, Strawson shows that scepticism about moral responsibility comprises an unfruitful form of cultural politics.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-10-02T12:24:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lincoln Sales Serejo_.pdf: 1173187 bytes, checksum: c34b8618964d3b0d68d9ef6ef302098d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-02T12:24:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lincoln Sales Serejo_.pdf: 1173187 bytes, checksum: c34b8618964d3b0d68d9ef6ef302098d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-27 / Nenhuma / A tese trata da responsabilidade moral e política em Hannah Arendt. Segue-se o itinerário da filosofa sobre a responsabilidade. Reconstrói-se inicialmente o debate entre Joel Feinberg e Hannah Arendt sobre o conceito de responsabilidade coletiva, tendo como objetivo específico o de apresentar o problema que será tratado ao longo da tese. Em seguida, procuramos examinar os pontos de contato e distanciamento entre as concepções de responsabilidade e culpa que são defendidas por Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers e Hans Jonas. Aborda-se a concepção de responsabilidade pessoal de Arendt a partir de sua reflexão sobre a “banalidade do mal”, circunstanciada ao julgamento de Adolf Eichmann. Analisa-se sinteticamente o julgamento de Eichmann. Investigam-se as concepções do fenômeno da liberdade em Hannah Arendt. Apresenta-se a concepção contemplativa de liberdade ou liberdade filosófica e a concepção política de liberdade política. Os objetivos destes subcapítulos são o de mostrar a distinção que a filósofa estabelece entre essas duas concepções de liberdade, uma relacionada à vida e interior e a outra relacionada ao exercício da virtude pública no espaço público. Examinam-se as atividades da vida espiritual na concepção de Hannah Arendt, a saber: o Pensar, o Querer e o Julgar. Apresentam-se os conceitos de Razão e Intelecto com objetivo de mostrar a distinção desses dois conceitos kantianos; Sócrates e o dois-em-um discutirá a faculdade espiritual do pensamento; A descoberta da Vontade refletirá sobre esta faculdade e, por fim, a faculdade juízo e sua conexão com a responsabilidade. / The thesis deals with moral and political responsibility in Hannah Arendt. It follows the Philosophy itinerary on responsibility. The debate between Joel Feinberg and Hannah Arendt on the concept of collective responsibility is initially reconstituted, with the specific objective of presenting the problem that will be dealt with throughout the thesis. Next, we will try to examine the points of contact and distancing between the conceptions of responsibility and guilt that are defended by Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers and Hans Jonas. To approach Arendt's conception of personal responsibility from his reflection on the "banality of evil," circumstantial to the judgment of Adolf Eichmann. The Eichmann judgment is synthetically analyzed. The conceptions of the phenomenon of freedom in Hannah Arendt are investigated. It presents the contemplative conception of freedom or philosophical freedom and the political conception of political freedom. The objectives of these subchapters are to show the distinction that the philosopher establishes between these two conceptions of freedom, one related to life and interior and the other related to the exercise of public virtue in the public space. The activities of the spiritual life are examined in the conception of Hannah Arendt, namely: Thinking, Willing and Judging. The concepts of Reason and Intellect are presented in order to show the distinction between these two Kantian concepts; Socrates and the two-in-one will discuss the spiritual faculty of thought; the discovery of the Will reflected on the faculty of Will and finally the faculty of judgment and its connection with responsibility.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-11-01T11:28:26Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tania Schneider da Fonseca_.pdf: 1196065 bytes, checksum: 6650454e54f549cdd2039dee6b94da86 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-01T11:28:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tania Schneider da Fonseca_.pdf: 1196065 bytes, checksum: 6650454e54f549cdd2039dee6b94da86 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-27 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Quais são as condições necessárias e suficientes para responsabilizar moralmente o comportamento do agente? Várias respostas a essa pergunta têm sido dadas na história recente da filosofia. De um lado, diversos filósofos acreditam que o critério especificando essas condições poderia ser compatível com a tese determinista. Por outro lado, há aqueles que negam que esse critério possa conciliar-se com a visão de um mundo determinista. Tradicionalmente, a liberdade enquanto uma capacidade para agir de outro modo é defendida como uma condição necessária para a responsabilidade moral. Com o seu artigo de 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt mudou o curso do debate sobre o problema da vontade livre. Ele forneceu exemplos hipotéticos, por meio de experimentos de pensamento, de agentes que, conforme ele argumentou, embora não pudessem ter agido de outro modo, ainda assim seriam moralmente responsáveis pelas suas ações. O artigo de Frankfurt entusiasmou muitos filósofos, destacadamente John Fischer, a repensar o problema da responsabilidade moral. Para Fischer, Frankfurt teria mostrado que o debate não diz mais respeito ao problema de demonstrar a compatibilidade entre liberdade e determinismo, mas, sim, à questão da compatibilidade da responsabilidade moral com o determinismo. Para lidar com essa questão, e qualificar a posição de Frankfurt, Fischer desenvolve o que ele denomina de uma posição semicompatibilista. Essa posição responderia às objeções incompatibilistas, assim mostrando a compatibilidade da responsabilidade moral com o determinismo. Esse trabalho é dedicado a um estudo dessa posição. A tese defendida é a de que o semicompatibilismo proposto por Fischer de fato responde às principais objeções dos incompatibilistas, e é mais vantajosa se comparada à posição compatibilista tradicional, que defende que a capacidade para agir de outro modo seria uma condição necessária para a responsabilidade moral. / What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the moral responsible agency? Many answers to this question have been given in the recent history of philosophy. On the one side, some philosophers believe that the criterion specifying these conditions could be compatible with the determinist’s worldview. On the other side, there are those who deny that this criterion and the determinist’s position could be ever reconciliated. Traditionally, freedom as a capacity to do otherwise has been defended as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. In 1969, when “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (1969) was published, Harry Frankfurt changed the course of the discussion about the free will problem. Frankfurt showed, through some thought experiments, agents that, he argued, were moral responsible for their actions even though they could not have acted otherwise. Frankfurt’s essay pushed several philosophers, remarkably John Fischer, to rethink the problem of moral responsibility. For Fischer, Frankfurt showed that the debate should not be about the compatibility between freedom and determinism, but rather should address the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. To deal with this problem, and to further qualify Frankfurt’s position, Fischer develops, as he calls it, a semicompatibilist position. This position, he claims, successfully address the objections from the incompatibilists, thus showing that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. This study is an investigation of this position. The thesis defended is that the semicompatibilism proposed by Fischer does indeed answers the main incompatibilist’s objections, and it is better than the traditional compatibilist position, which argues that the capacity to do otherwise is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-08-22T19:42:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabrício José Rodrigues de Lemos_.pdf: 1128559 bytes, checksum: b0f111c3f1defefc8a80daa19003f118 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-22T19:42:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabrício José Rodrigues de Lemos_.pdf: 1128559 bytes, checksum: b0f111c3f1defefc8a80daa19003f118 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-30 / Nenhuma / O filósofo norte-americano John Rawls possui o grande mérito de revitalizar as discussões sobre justiça com a publicação de sua obra A theory of justice, de 1971. Nela, lançou base à teoria de justiça como equidade, sendo que, desde então, muito se comentou acerca das responsabilidades morais das entidades e indivíduos no plano doméstico. Em um artigo publicado em 1993 e, em 1999, transformado na obra Law of peoples and the public reason revisited, Rawls ampliou o escopo de suas preocupações e dissertou acerca das responsabilidades dos povos uns para os outros. Nas últimas duas décadas, a teoria de justiça global consolidou-se como um legítimo campo de indagações filosóficas, que visa possibilitar uma melhor compreensão das relações globais e do ambiente globalizado: as profundas modificações oriundas da mudança do paradigma westfaliano em razão da interconectividade e do aumento da complexidade das relações no plano global levaram críticos como Thomas Pogge a se questionar acerca da nova dinâmica mundial. A assunção de responsabilidades, tanto estatais e corporativas quanto as individuais, fazem parte da temática. Nesse sentido, com método de pesquisa eminentemente bibliográfico e documental, partindo da teoria rawlsiana, a dissertação visa demonstrar de que maneira essa mudança de paradigma ocorreu, tendo como referenciais teóricos tanto John Rawls quanto um dos maiores expoentes da teoria de justiça global, o filósofo alemão, atualmente radicado nos Estados Unidos, Thomas Pogge. Assim, a dissertação apresentará as mais recentes formulações teoréticas acerca do que pode ser chamado de justiça global e investigará as críticas e os avanços da obra de Pogge em relação ao pensamento de Rawls. / The American philosopher John Rawls has the great merit of revitalizing justice discussions with the publication of his 1971 work A theory of justice. In it, he gave base to theory of justice as fairness, and, since then, much was said about the moral responsibilities of organizations and individuals in domestic field. In an article published in 1993 and, in 1999, transformed in the work Law of peoples and the public reason revisited, Rawls expanded the scope of his concerns and lectured about the responsibilities of peoples to each other. In the last two decades, the global justice theory has established itself as a legitimate field of philosophical inquiry, which aims to enable a better understanding of global relations and the global environment: the profound changes arising from the change of the westphalian paradigm due to the interconnectivity and the increasing complexity of relationships globally, led critics like Thomas Pogge to wonder about the new world dynamics. The intake of responsibilities, both state and corporate, as well of the individual, are all part of the theme. In this sense, with the research method of eminently bibliographic research and documental, from the starting point of Rawlsian theory, the dissertation aims to demonstrate how this paradigm shift occurred, with the theoretical references of both John Rawls as of one of the greatest exponents of the global justice theory, the German philosopher, currently living in the United States, Thomas Pogge. Thus, the dissertation will present the latest theoretical formulations on what can be called global justice and will investigate the critiques and advances of Pogge's work in relation to Rawls‟s thinking.

Dexter Morgan is a serial killer, but he may not be blameworthy for his actions There are two possible explanations that could absolve Dexter of moral responsibility: (1) His inability to empathize with others makes it so that he cannot make appropriate moral decisions. Or (2) his serial killing tendencies are determined in nature, set off by events of which he had no control. I conclude that Dexter is, in fact, morally responsible for his actions because he is capable of second order desires

Abstract - A business to change the world - An analysis of norms Textbooks for International Economics, in Upper-secondary Schools, Sweden 1994-2008   In this paper textbooks, for International Economics in Upper Secondary Schools in Sweden1994-2008, are analyzed with regard to norms related to taking moral responsibility for environment and society. A method for making discourse analysis, previously illustrated by Östman (2008), is used to deconstruct the knowledge content regarding norms about taking responsibility in relation to different social roles.   The first question is: what different norms about taking responsibility can be found, in relation to different social roles? Different social roles that can be found in the studied material are: business-people, consumers, politicians/civil servants and citizens. Norms of taking responsibility in relation to the environment and society are studied in this paper in relation to these different roles.   The second question is whether a discursive change in the material can be found. One case of discursive change can be found which is related to the role of a business. This discursive change implies that the scope of taking responsibility is slightly moved towards a norm that opens for a possibility of taking moral responsibility.   Thirdly, the different norms are discussed in relation to different functions of education (Biesta 2008 &amp; Säfström 2005) and Education for Sustainable Development (ESD). An argument is that a subjectifying function of education is vital for en education that wants to make change, which is assumed as a central component of ESD.   One argument, as a result of this study, is that a “window of opportunity” can be found when using this method of discourse analysis to discover the scope of different norms for different roles to take responsibility for environment and society.

In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions. The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism. Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism. / I den här avhandlingen argumenterar jag för en tes som jag kallar “praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism”. Enligt praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är det så att en agent med praktisk frihet är tillräckligt fri för att vara en moralisk agent och moraliskt ansvarig. Praktisk frihet är ett koncept vi ursprungligen hittar hos Kant. Det används också av en del nutida Kantianer. Kant argumenterade för att vi kan betrakta världen från antingen ett praktiskt eller ett teoretiskt perspektiv. Det teoretiska perspektivet är det vi har när vi gör förutsägelser och hittar kausala förklaringar, medan det praktiska är det vi har när vi väljer och handlar. Vi kan se att vi är fria när vi ser på tillvaron ur det praktiska perspektivet. Determinismen kan inte hota vår praktiska frihet, för vi måste välja våra handlingar oavsett om allting i slutändan är determinerat. I denna avhandling definierar jag praktisk frihet på följande sätt: En agent har minimal praktisk frihet om och endast om han måste välja sina handlingar, och han tror att hans vilja är effektiv när det gäller att realisera de handlingsalternativ han funderat över och väljer mellan. En agent har maximal praktisk frihet om och endast om han har minimal praktisk frihet, hans vilja verkligen är effektiv, han har full information om de alternativ han funderar över, och alla alternativ han inte tänkt på är sådana att hans egna värderingar inte ger honom ett övervägande skäl att välja ett av dessa alternativ snarare än det han faktiskt väljer. Jag argumenterar för att praktisk frihet så definierat är tillräckligt med frihet för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar eftersom moralen är handlingsvägledande. Det betyder att rätt och fel är koncept som ska användas i övervägning av olika handlingsalternativ och rådgivning. Tredje-persons-omdömen om ifall någon handlade rätt eller fel måste vara sådana att de hypotetiskt sett skulle kunna fungera som råd; egenskapen att vara rätt eller fel kan inte förändras beroende på om vi ger råd eller bara faller omdömen. Detta är ett starkt skäl för att betrakta faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare som irrelevanta när man faller omdömen om rätt och fel, och ifall någon hade en annan sorts frihet än den praktiska är irrelevant för övervägare och rådgivare. Vi har också prima facie skäl att betrakta moraliskt ansvar som knutet till rätt och fel, så att agenter är klandervärda när de gjorde fel (eller subjektivt fel, eller vad som skulle ha varit fel givet den information agenten hade osv) och berömvärda när de gjorde rätt (subjektivt rätt osv). Att det finns prima facie skäl för att betrakta praktisk frihet som tillräckligt för moraliskt ansvar utesluter förstås inte att det finns övervägande skäl för den motsatta ståndpunkten. Jag visar dock att inga klassiska argument för inkompatibilism om determinism och moraliskt ansvar fungerar när man riktar dem mot praktisk-perpsektiv-kompatibilism. Alla sådana argument förutsätter vad som skulle bevisas, nämligen att faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare är moraliskt relevanta, och att pålitliga moraliska intuitioner uppstår när vi betraktar agenter från ett teoretiskt snarare än praktiskt perspektiv. Slutligen diskuterar denna avhandling relationen mellan metaetik och kompatibilism. Praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är kompatibel med samtliga metaetiska teorier, medan det finns flera metaetiska teorier som implicerar att inkompatibilismen är falsk, och åtminstone en som implicerar att vissa kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Enligt en speciell Kantiansk konstruktivistisk teori så finns det rätt- och felaktiga handlingar och moraliskt ansvar på grund av att det finns praktisk frihet. Om detta är den sanna metaetiska teorin, så följer det att praktisk frihet är tillräckligt för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar, och att inte bara inkompatibilism men andra kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Beroende på vilken metaetisk teori som är den sanna, kan det alltså vara så att de föregående argumenten är överflödiga för att bevisa praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism. Det kan vara så att denna tes helt enkelt följer från den sanna metaetiska teorin.

In this diploma thesis the conception of moral responsibility and the conception of conscience which are registered in the Ethical code of social workers in the Czech Republic are mapped, analysed and critically reflected. All these is done with regard to a social worker with an aim to find out what value the moral responsibility and conscience in the code of a social worker has and to see what role in pursuance of his/her performance these concepts play. The moral responsibility of a social worker in the Ethical code is not described properly. The responsibility is mentioned there all together seven times, however, in an undefined sometimes even in a misleading way. In most cases it is impossible to decide what is a social worker responsible for and who to. To be able to identify mutual relations within required responsibility the social worker must integrate his/her conscience which is a primary principle of responsibility. Nevertheless, the conscience is not mentioned in the Ethical code at all, therefore it would be appropriate to incorporate it to it.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This study seeks to address the relevance of moral sentiments for moral responsibility attribution through reactive theory of Peter Strawson and his critics. The central thesis which I try to hold onto is that the attribution of moral responsibility is something quite complex, it is related to how we respond the actions of the agents, but also involves the rational capacity of reflective self-control agent, being able to present reasons for his action and be able to control his desires. Thus, the morally responsible agent is one that is motivated by his desires, but he is able to reason morally on what the consequences of his action. In other words, be a responsible person involves having social competence to act in accordance with moral norms, but also be able to reflect on his practice, so a subject with normal cognitive powers and able to regulate his beliefs and desires. Given the cultural pluralism, we note that there is a symmetrical relationship between the moral sentiments and moral beliefs, so that the moral sentiments may be influenced by moral beliefs we form throughout our life as well as moral beliefs are formed from feelings. These moral beliefs may be revised or regulated, this review may come from the acquisition of new information, which may come from comparing our set of beliefs with the set of beliefs of another culture. But this regulation of moral beliefs is the result of an evolutionary process that our species suffered, which it has made over the years, people could improve their way of working with the others, and also be able to autonomously question whether certain beliefs are in fact true. What I propose is that science is an ally of ethics, and scientific explanations can contribute to a better understanding of what is morally right and wrong. Understanding our human nature we become more able to 'see' the world differently and realize that certain emotions can contribute to our social life. In this way, we can realize that it makes no sense to continue resentful of someone in a situation which the agent has good grounds for leaving to feel such a feeling. Realizing this we can notice the complexity of our human species and how much we still need to advance the field of morality, seeking a moral improvement that does not happen only in the context of standards, but mostly at maturity that allows being able to analyze the circumstances and the reasons for the action with greater discernment. To defend such a position, I will use Strawson reactive theory, and criticism raised to such a theory by Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998), namely that Strawson fails to present a rational capacity guide the allocation of moral responsibility. The solution to this problem is to defend the rational capacity, as well as the social competence of the agent, it is a necessary condition to consider the morally responsible people, including the rational capacity of the agent is what allows him to reflect on his social practice. To better assess these issues it is necessary an analysis of the moral psychology and knowledge to know about the way people in their daily lives assess the actions of the agents and consequently assign moral responsibility to them. So my goal is to show how proposal of Strawson is still relevant to discussions about attribution of moral responsibility, as well as propose a progress in discussion on this topic by means of a moral realist naturalist position. / O presente estudo busca tratar da relevância dos sentimentos morais para a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, através da teoria reativa de Peter Strawson e de seus críticos. A tese central, a qual procuro sustentar, é que a atribuição de responsabilidade moral é algo bastante complexo, está relacionada à forma como reagimos frente às ações dos agentes, mas também envolve a capacidade racional do agente de autocontrole reflexivo, estando apto em apresentar razões para a sua ação e ser capaz de frear os seus desejos. Desse modo, o agente moralmente responsável é aquele que se sente motivado por seus desejos, mas é capaz de raciocinar moralmente sobre quais seriam as consequências da sua ação. Em outras palavras, ser uma pessoa responsável envolve ter competência social para agir de acordo com as normas morais, mas também ser capaz de refletir sobre a sua prática, ou seja, um sujeito com suas capacidades cognitivas normais e capaz de regular as suas crenças e desejos. Dado o pluralismo cultural, podemos notar que há uma relação simétrica entre os sentimentos morais e as crenças morais, de modo que os sentimentos morais podem ser influenciados pelas crenças morais que formamos ao longo de nossa vida, bem como as crenças morais serem formadas a partir dos sentimentos. Essas crenças morais podem ser revisadas ou reguladas, essa revisão pode vir da aquisição de novas informações, que podem vir da comparação de nosso conjunto de crenças com o conjunto de crenças de outra cultura. Mas também essa regulação das crenças morais é resultado de um processo evolutivo que sofreu a nossa espécie, que fez com que, ao longo dos anos, as pessoas pudessem aprimorar o seu modo de conviver com as demais e também ser capaz de autonomamente questionar se determinadas crenças são, de fato, verdadeiras. O que proponho é que a ciência é uma aliada da ética, sendo que as explicações científicas podem contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do que é correto e incorreto moralmente. Compreendendo a nossa natureza humana, tornamo-nos mais aptos a ver o mundo de maneira diferente e perceber que certas emoções podem contribuir para a nossa vida social. Dessa maneira, podemos dar-nos conta de que não faz sentido continuar ressentido com alguém numa situação em que o agente apresenta boas razões para que deixemos de sentir tal sentimento. Perceber isso faz com que notemos a complexidade de nossa espécie humana e o quanto ainda precisamos avançar no campo da moralidade, buscando um aprimoramento moral que não se dá apenas no âmbito de normas, mas principalmente na maturidade que permite sermos capazes de analisar as circunstâncias e as razões para a ação com maior discernimento. Para defender tal posição, utilizarei a teoria reativa de Strawson e a crítica levantada a tal teoria feita por Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) e Fischer e Ravizza (1998), a saber, que Strawson falha em apresentar uma capacidade racional que guie a atribuição de responsabilidade moral. A solução para tal problema é defender que a capacidade racional, assim como a competência social do agente, é uma condição necessária para considerar as pessoas moralmente responsáveis, inclusive a capacidade racional do agente é que lhe permite refletir sobre a sua prática social. Para avaliar melhor tais questões, faz-se necessária uma análise sobre questões de psicologia moral e de conhecimento moral, para saber como as pessoas, no seu cotidiano, avaliam as ações dos agentes e, consequentemente, atribuem-lhes responsabilidade moral. Portanto, o meu objetivo é mostrar como a proposta strawsoniana continua sendo relevante para as discussões sobre a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, mas também apresentar uma proposta de avanço na discussão sobre esse tema através de uma posição naturalista realista moral.