Tsang Chun Wing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [98-103]). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Acknowledgement --- p.i / Abbreviations --- p.ii / List of tables and figures --- p.iii / Chapter Chapter One --- Introduction --- p.1 / Plan of the Dissertation --- p.3 / Chapter Chapter Two --- Demonstrating The Electoral Decline --- p.5 / The Changing Hong Kong Electorate --- p.5 / The Electoral Decline of DP --- p.10 / Aggregate vs. Individual Changes --- p.14 / The DP Voters --- p.19 / Chapter Chapter Three --- Explaining The Electoral Decline: Hints From Literature --- p.29 / Electoral Change in Western Democracies --- p.29 / Factors of Voting Behavior --- p.35 / Voting Behavior Studies in Hong Kong --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter Four --- Explaining The Electoral Decline: A Speculation --- p.48 / Societal Changes in Hong Kong --- p.49 / Political Attitudes --- p.54 / Hypothesis --- p.64 / Chapter Chapter Five --- Explaining The Electoral Decline: Testing The Hypothesis --- p.65 / Measurement of Variables --- p.65 / Findings: Bivariate Analysis --- p.71 / Findings: Multivariate Analysis --- p.75 / Chapter Chapter Six --- Conclusion --- p.83 / The Electoral Decline of DP: The Story in Summary --- p.83 / Limitations --- p.87 / At the End --- p.93 / Bibliography --- p.98

Studies of political parties in Latin America have often been descriptive and not directed to link a theoretical foundation about political parties with qualitative or quantitative empiricism. This was in part because parties in the region were usually perceived as rather unimportant in the political arena. This study attempts to correct this often unjustified proposition by focusing on the development of political parties in five Central American countries: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The analysis focuses particularly on the relationship between party fragmentation, party polarization, the level of democracy, and socio-economic modernization. The quantitative analysis uses a cross-national longitudinal research design and tries to overcome shortcomings in prior descriptive approaches based on case studies. The overall findings show that party fragmentation and party polarization are positively related to the level of democracy in Central America.

Univ., Diss.--Frankfurt (Main), 2004.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed September 21, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 493-512).

La saisine de la Cour pénale internationale désigne l'ensemble des mécanismes d'ouverture de l'instance pénale internationale. Elle naît formellement de l'acte introductif d'instance qui peut être le fait des États parties au Statut, du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU et du Procureur. Les procédures diligentées à la suite des saisines ont pour finalité de situer la responsabilité pénale individuelle et de réprimer les violations massives des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire. L'évaluation de la pratique sélective des saisines permet de déceler la lenteur des procédures en cours. Si cette lenteur a des justifications endogènes, elle est explicable, au plan exogène, par les rapports complexes que la juridiction entretient avec les États au regard du principe de complémentarité. Il en est de même de l'emprise du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU sur la compétence de la Cour et le traitement des saisines. Par ailleurs, en raison de l'exécution discutable de l'obligation de coopération par les États, la CPI assure avec difficulté l'objectif de la lutte contre l'impunité des crimes graves. En tout état de cause, l'essor de la saisine est tributaire d'une application optimale des dispositions statutaires et d'un rééquilibrage des rapports entre les États, le Conseil de sécurité et la Cour / The referral to the International Criminal Court refers to all the opening mechanisms of the international criminal trial. It officially comes from the writ of summons which can be the fact of States parties in the Status, of the UN Security Council and the Prosecutor. The procedures undertaken following the Court referrals have for purpose to locate the individual criminal responsibility and to repress the massive violations of the human rights and the international humanitarian law. The assessment of the selective referrals allows to reveal the slowness of the current procedures. If this slowness has endogenous reasons, it is explained, in the exogenous plan, by the complex relationships that the jurisdiction maintains with States towards the principle of Complementarity. It is the same about the influence of the UN Security Council on the jurisdiction of the Court and the referrals processing. Moreover, because of the questionable performance of the obligation of cooperation by States, the ICC insures with difficulty the objective of the fight against the impunity for serious crimes. In any case, the development of the Court referral is dependent on an optimal application of the statutory disposals and a rebalance of relationships between States, Security Council and Court

Les gauches de la gauche à l´épreuve des mutations des classes populaires. À travers l'étude des gauches de la gauche des années 2010-à savoir le PCF, le PG, le NPA et LO-, cette thèse s'emploie à prolonger et discuter les travaux portant sur le divorce de la gauche et des classes populaires. À la croisée de la sociologie des partis politiques et de la sociologie des classes populaires notre thèse se propose d'apporter un éclairage sur la manière dont les transformations ayant affecté les classes populaires depuis les années 1980 et les représentations dominantes qui en ont été véhiculées ont renouvelé les liens entre les gauches de la gauche et leur traditionnel groupe social de référence. Nous entendons repérer le caractère populaire des formations partisanes des gauches de la gauche en dépassant l'analyse des propriétés sociales du personnel politique et en nous arrêtant sur les grilles de lecture partisanes du monde social, le travail partisan de propagande et d´enrôlement et les normes régissant le militantisme. Postulant une déclinaison localisée des « cultures partisanes » selon les configurations sociales et partisanes, les liens qui unissent les gauches de la gauche des années 2010 et les mondes populaires ont été mis en lumière à l'issue d'une enquête de terrain menée dans quatre espaces locaux : Villejuif, Saint-Brieuc, Saint-Étienne et Nantes. L'exploration des « gauches de la gauche » des années 2010 donne à voir comment les mondes populaires persistent à être un enjeu problématique mais central pour une partie de la gauche partisane. Loin de n'être que des porte-parole rationnels autoproclamés des classes populaires, les gauches de la gauche sont porteuses de « cultures partisanes » imprégnées de populaire. Elle ne font pas que parler des dominés, elles s'adressent à eux sur un ton populaire. Elles peinent néanmoins à voir aboutir ou à pérenniser leurs idylles avec les classes populaires notamment avec les franges pluri-dominées de ce groupe social. L'insertion des gauches de la gauche, héritières d'un modèle d'investissement efficace de la classe ouvrière, dans des contextes populaires renouvelés et largement défaits (éclatés, réfractaires à l'unité, indisposés à se mobiliser) permet d'apporter un éclairage sur ce bilan contrasté. Resserrer la focale sur les militants « produits de socialisations multiformes » et donc inégalement sensibles au populaire permettra de compléter l'analyse de rencontres des collectifs partisans et des classes populaires inégalement inabouties. / The « Lefts of the Left » confronting lower classes. This PhD thesis is dedicated to the study of the Lefts of the Left Parties in the 2010s in France, namely PCF, PG, NPA and LO. It aims to extend and discuss the scientific research regarding the divorce between leftist parties and the lower classes. This research work is therefore rooted in political sociology and lower class studies. It sheds light upon how the transformations that affected the lower classes since the 1980s and its related representations have modified the connections between the Lefts of the Left and their traditional reference group. We intend to identify the lower classes-related component of the Lefts of the Left political parties, beyond a focus on social properties of the political staff. We rather pay attention to the political parties' interpretative frameworks of the social world, partisan propaganda and enlistment work, and militancy norms. In this view, the connections between the Lefts of the Left in the 2010s and the lower class, based on a research survey conducted in four local spaces: Villejuif, Saint-Brieuc, Saint-Etienne and Nantes, are to be underlined. Exploring “the Lefts of the Left” of the 2010s allows us to understand how the lower classes remain a problematic and central stake for a part of the left parties. The Lefts of the Left are not only rational self-proclaimed spokespersons for the lower classes, they also convey partisan cultures draining a lower classes-related component. They do not only speak about the dominated, they also try to speak to them with their words. However, they hardly succeed in formalizing and perpetuating this positive relationship, particularly regarding the pluri-dominated parts of the lower class. The Lefts of the Left inherited an effective model of promotion of the working class. The context in which these parties' political action takes place is a renewed context characterized by the division and unwillingness to mobilize of the lower classes, which seem to be now largely defeated and fragmented. Analyzing the Lefts of the Left's insertion in this context contributes to shed light upon this contrasted assessment. We shall then put the emphasis on political activists who are embedded in multiform socialization contexts, and therefore unequally sensitive to lower classes' stakes. In doing so, we shall complete this analysis of unequally unaccomplished meetings between partisan organizations and the lower classes.

À la suite d’une décision orale rendue le 28 janvier 2009 par la Chambre de première instance I dans l'affaire Lubanga, la Cour pénale internationale a institué un nouvel acteur du procès pénal international : le témoin susceptible d'auto-incrimination qui, à ce titre, est assisté d'un conseil. Ce « témoin assisté » a en commun avec le suspect leur suspicion, et, avec le témoin ordinaire, leur comparution à l’audience ès qualité de témoins. Il n’est cependant ni totalement un suspect – parce que non poursuivable devant la Cour – ni totalement un témoin, parce que notamment impliqué dans la procédure principale. L’évolution de cet acteur singulier du procès pénal international aura eu le mérite de permettre à la Cour de revisiter des notions classiques du droit international pénal. Grâce à lui, la qualité de « parties » n’est plus une forteresse réservée à l’accusation et à la défense. Le témoin ordinaire, considéré comme tiers passif à l’instance, partage désormais la barre avec un « témoin » actif pouvant diligenter des procédures « détachables » de la procédure principale. En sept ans d’existence, le témoin assisté a tellement impacté la procédure pénale internationale qu’une révision des textes fondamentaux de la Cour s’impose pour mettre un terme à la cacophonie jurisprudentielle des chambres sur l’étendue de ses droits et obligations. / Following an oral decision given by the Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case, the International Criminal Court has introduced a new player into international criminal cases: the self-incriminating witness, who is assisted by a counsel. This "assisted witness", like the suspect, is under suspicion, and like an ordinary witness appears before the Court to testify. However, he is neither completely a suspect, since he cannot be convicted by the Court, nor completely a witness, since he is implicated in the criminal proceedings. The evolution of the role of this singular player in international criminal cases has given the Court the opportunity of reviewing traditional notions of international criminal law. Thanks to this situation, the status of the different parties is no longer restricted to prosecution and defense. The ordinary witness, considered as a passive third party in the trial, now shares the stand with an active witness who is able to speed up proceedings that are separable from the main proceedings. In seven years of existence, the assisted witness has had such an impact on criminal proceedings that it has become necessary to revise the core texts of the Court in order to put an end to the legal confusion among the different chambers regarding the extent of this witness's rights and obligations.

The paper studies the relationship between governments and political parties in Peru from 1980 to 2011 Specifically, it aims to analyze the partisanship of government: the participation at government of the political organization with the one the president won the elections First, it orders the Peruvian governments around four types of partisanship: (i) the governing party, (ii) the government without a party (or government of the Messiah), and the coalition government in any of its two versions; that is (iii) the government of hegemonic coalition and (iv) the pluralist coalition government Second, it aims to explain the two types of partisanship found in this country: on one hand, hegemonic coalition governments such as Fernando Belaunde (19801985) and Alan Garcia (1985-1990), and on the other hand, the non-party governments like those of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) and Alan Garcia (20062011) To do this, it discards explanations focused on the type of political regime and those who focus solely on party institutionalization or only on personalism In contrast, it suggests that the combination of the last two factors explains the type of partisanship found in each case / El artículo estudia la relación entre los gobiernos y los partidos de gobierno en el Perú entre 1980 y 2011 Específicamente, se propone analizar el partidismo del gobierno: la participación en el gobierno de la organización política con la que el presidente ganó las elecciones En primer lugar, ordena los gobiernos peruanos alrededor de cuatro tipos de partidismo: (i) el gobierno de partido, (ii) el gobierno sin partido (o «gobierno del mesías»), y el gobierno de coalición en cualquiera de sus dos versiones; es decir, (iii) el gobierno de coalición hegemónica y (iv) el gobierno de coalición pluralista En segundo lugar, se propone explicar los dos tipos de par- tidismo encontrados en el país: por un lado, los gobiernos de coalición hegemónica como los de Fernando Belaúnde (1980-1985) y Alan García (1985-1990) y, por otro lado, los gobiernos sin partido como los de Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) y Alan García (2006-2011) Para ello, descarta explicaciones enfocadas en el tipo de régimen político y aquellas que se centran únicamente en la institucionalización partidaria o únicamente en el personalismo Por el contrario, propone que la combinación de los últimos dos factores explica el tipo de partidismo encontrado en cada caso / O artigo estuda a relação entre os governos e os partidos de governo no Peru entre 1980 e 2011Especificamente, este artigo propõe analisar o partidismo do governo: a participação no governo da organização política com ao que presidente ganhou as eleições No primeiro lugar, ordena os governos peruanos ao redor de quatro tipos de partidismo: (i) o governo do partido, (ii) o governo sem partido («governo do messias»), e o governo de coligação em suas dois versões; que podem ser (iii) o governo de coligação hegemônica e (iv) o governo de coligação pluralista No segundo lugar, este artigo propõe explicar os dois tipos de partidismo encontrados no país: os governos de coligação hegemônica como o governo Fernando Belaúnde (1980-1985) e o governo do Alan Garcia (1985-1990) e, por outro lado, os governos sem partido como o governo de Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), o governo do Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) e Alan García (2006-2011) Para isso, descarta as explicações centralizadas no tipo de regime político e aqueles que só centralizam na institucionalização partidária ou só no personalismo Pelo contrario, este artigo propõe que a mistura dos últimos dois fatores explicam o tipo de partidismo encontrado em cada caso

The purpose of this dissertation was to address the problem expressed in the following question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" A qualitative approach was used. The researcher interviewed officials of twelve representative parties out of the total of eighteen parties. The responses of the interviewees are in appendix 5. This work reveals the problems of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Among others, the study addressed the following issues: the reform of the electoral system, political party funding, dominance of the ruling party, prohibitive legislation and party leadership. The potential strengths and weaknesses of the opposition parties have been noted. The MMP electoral model, introduced in 2001 and tested in 2002, created a more inclusive party system, but it is not the sole solution for the weakness of the opposition parties. Patronisation and lack of political party funding appear to be major factors. / Political Sciences / M. A. (Politics)

This paper addresses how political parties make decisions. Parties often have to choose between conflicting objectives such as influence on policy, control of the government, and support among the voters. This paper examines the behavior of the two Swedish parties on one of their particular policy positions: Swedish withdrawal from the EU. The aim is to describe why the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) and the Green Party (Miljöpartiet) retain this specific policy position when it on one hand seems damaging to their chances of getting into government, and on the other seems to be an unrealistic policy to realize. I undertake a twocase study of the two Swedish parties, which I assume to represent a population of Nordic parties critical to the EU. I employ a theory based on an analytical framework of three models of party goals and behaviors: office, policy or votes. The analysis seeks to identify the factors and the motives behind the parties’ stubborn policy. By studying material from two party congresses and interviewing representatives from each party, I conclude that the policy position is important mainly for reasons of principle and symbolism. The structure of the EU represents all that the Left and the Greens dislike and, together with the Swedish critical EU opinion, it becomes almost a duty for the parties to keep their strong aversion towards Swedish membership in the EU. And while the parties do not perceive that the keeping of the policy would be an obstacle for other party goals, it will not be cut out from the party program.