C’est à travers une succession de crises rapprochées : le phylloxéra, les deux Guerres mondiales, la prohibition, la crise de 1929, les grèves de 1936, que s’est constitué dans le champagne un modèle social original. Celui-ci forme le fondement sur lequel l’ensemble des professionnels ont pu bâtir ensuite, dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, leur prospérité. La Maison Veuve Clicquot de 1908 à 1964 représente une bonne illustration de ce phénomène. Au cours de cette période, elle met en place un large système de protection sociale pour ses ouvriers. Cette politique s’inscrit alors dans une stratégie de gestion de la main-d’œuvre visant à stabiliser une aristocratie ouvrière au sein de laquelle la culture du métier constitue un élément central. Cette politique sociale sait évoluer et s’adapter à la fois aux changements de la société et de la production. Ainsi, lorsque la mécanisation, mais aussi l’émancipation des travailleurs remettent en cause ce modèle établi, les dirigeants abandonnent le paternalisme pour se tourner vers des relations plus paritaires grâce à l’institution d’un système d’intéressement.Parallèlement à cette politique interne, les négociants développent des politiques sociales vers l’extérieur, au bénéfice de leurs fournisseurs. Il s’agit de fidéliser les vignerons livreurs en leur garantissant une stabilité économique en dépit des aléas importants sur la période des expéditions de champagne. On observe dans ce domaine la même évolution des relations du paternalisme vers une nouvelle forme de paritarisme que manifeste la constitution d’institutions interprofessionnelles de type corporatif. Dans leur genèse, la Maison Clicquot joue un rôle déterminant. / It is throughout a great number of consecutive crises : the phylloxera, the two World Wars, Prohibition, the 1929 crisis, the 1936 strikes, that champagne built its original social model. This social model is the foundation on which the professionals were able to develop their business during the second part of the twentieth century. From 1908 to 196, Veuve Clicquot is a good illustration of this phenomenon. During this period, the firm created a social protection for its workers. This policy was part of a management plan which tried to maintain the stability of workers elite for whom the trade culture was a central aspect. This social policy was able to follow society and production shifts. For instance, when mechanization and workers emancipation appeared, throwing the model back into question, the executive gave away paternalism to introduce new joint relationships (between labor and management) thanks to the institution of a profit-sharing system.At the same time, the champagne houses developed external social policies that were beneficial for their suppliers, the wine growers. The stakes of these social policies were to secure their loyalty and to warrant them an economic stability despite the great variations of the market during the period of champagne sales. The same evolution from paternalism to a new kind of classless relationships, that can be observed in this field of activity, is demonstrated with the constitution of corporate interprofessional institutions. Veuve Clicquot played a decisive part in this setup.

Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo principal discutir os programas de participação nos lucros ou resultados (PLR) no setor bancário brasileiro, sob a ótica da flexibilização das relações entre capital e trabalho, no contexto das mais recentes transformações promovidas pelo capitalismo avançado. A investigação compreendeu, primeiramente, uma pesquisa documental e bibliográfica sobre o processo de regulamentação da PLR no Brasil e a posterior generalização de seu uso. Após o que, foram descritos os modelos de PLR adotados pelo setor bancário brasileiro e também em um caso específico, desde sua instituição nos moldes contemporâneos em 1995, até 2011, comparando-os e evidenciando sua transformação. Através de entrevistas com representantes sindicais e especialistas, destacaram-se as posições e as estratégias adotadas pelos diferentes atores sociais em relação ao tema. Em seguida, empreendeu-se uma observação participante em uma grande empresa do setor, que se concentrou na operacionalização concreta da PLR no cotidiano, o que ocorre por meio dos programas de metas de resultados que vinculam seu pagamento ao desempenho. Os resultados da pesquisa apresentaram elementos despóticos, como diversas formas de controle que garantem a execução de tais programas, ao mesmo tempo em que se observou uma natureza hegemônica, tanto nos espaços estabelecidos de negociação sobre as regras da PLR como no apoio dos trabalhadores e na participação dos sindicatos, assinalando-se características de um regime despótico-hegemônico. A interpretação dos dados com base na teoria sobre a construção do consentimento de Burawoy permitiu uma identificação dos programas de PLR ao estado interno, com relação às instâncias de conciliação de interesses e de participação. Ao final, a articulação da adesão subjetiva a tais programas é compreendida pela inserção cada vez mais individualizada no processo de trabalho. / The present research aimed to discuss the Profit Sharing (PS) plans of the Brazilian banking sector using the perspective of a more flexible capital/labor relationship considering the most recent transformations caused by advanced capitalism. At first, a document and bibliographical investigation about the implementation of PS in Brazil and its subsequent generalization was carried out. Later, PS models adopted by the Brazilian banking sector as well as a specific case are described, since their implementation according to the modern standards in 1995, until 2011 and then compared thus revealing their changes. Interviews with specialists and trade union representatives evidenced the different positions and strategies concerning the theme adopted by the different players involved. Subsequently, participant observation was conducted at a large banking institution, focusing on how PS works on a daily basis, showing that it takes place using targets and results plans linking remuneration to performance. Research results point to despotic elements, such as different forms of control that guarantee that such programs be enforced. It also shows the hegemonic nature of such programs, not only during established arenas for negotiations with regards to PS rules but also concerning employees support and their participation in unions, which reveal traits of a hegemonic-despotic regime. The interpretation of the data on the basis of the Burawoys theory about the manufacturing of consent made it possible to identify PS plans with an internal state, as far as instances of interest and participation conciliation are concerned. Lastly, subjective compliance with such programs is understood by the increasingly individualized features of the labor process.

Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo principal discutir os programas de participação nos lucros ou resultados (PLR) no setor bancário brasileiro, sob a ótica da flexibilização das relações entre capital e trabalho, no contexto das mais recentes transformações promovidas pelo capitalismo avançado. A investigação compreendeu, primeiramente, uma pesquisa documental e bibliográfica sobre o processo de regulamentação da PLR no Brasil e a posterior generalização de seu uso. Após o que, foram descritos os modelos de PLR adotados pelo setor bancário brasileiro e também em um caso específico, desde sua instituição nos moldes contemporâneos em 1995, até 2011, comparando-os e evidenciando sua transformação. Através de entrevistas com representantes sindicais e especialistas, destacaram-se as posições e as estratégias adotadas pelos diferentes atores sociais em relação ao tema. Em seguida, empreendeu-se uma observação participante em uma grande empresa do setor, que se concentrou na operacionalização concreta da PLR no cotidiano, o que ocorre por meio dos programas de metas de resultados que vinculam seu pagamento ao desempenho. Os resultados da pesquisa apresentaram elementos despóticos, como diversas formas de controle que garantem a execução de tais programas, ao mesmo tempo em que se observou uma natureza hegemônica, tanto nos espaços estabelecidos de negociação sobre as regras da PLR como no apoio dos trabalhadores e na participação dos sindicatos, assinalando-se características de um regime despótico-hegemônico. A interpretação dos dados com base na teoria sobre a construção do consentimento de Burawoy permitiu uma identificação dos programas de PLR ao estado interno, com relação às instâncias de conciliação de interesses e de participação. Ao final, a articulação da adesão subjetiva a tais programas é compreendida pela inserção cada vez mais individualizada no processo de trabalho. / The present research aimed to discuss the Profit Sharing (PS) plans of the Brazilian banking sector using the perspective of a more flexible capital/labor relationship considering the most recent transformations caused by advanced capitalism. At first, a document and bibliographical investigation about the implementation of PS in Brazil and its subsequent generalization was carried out. Later, PS models adopted by the Brazilian banking sector as well as a specific case are described, since their implementation according to the modern standards in 1995, until 2011 and then compared thus revealing their changes. Interviews with specialists and trade union representatives evidenced the different positions and strategies concerning the theme adopted by the different players involved. Subsequently, participant observation was conducted at a large banking institution, focusing on how PS works on a daily basis, showing that it takes place using targets and results plans linking remuneration to performance. Research results point to despotic elements, such as different forms of control that guarantee that such programs be enforced. It also shows the hegemonic nature of such programs, not only during established arenas for negotiations with regards to PS rules but also concerning employees support and their participation in unions, which reveal traits of a hegemonic-despotic regime. The interpretation of the data on the basis of the Burawoys theory about the manufacturing of consent made it possible to identify PS plans with an internal state, as far as instances of interest and participation conciliation are concerned. Lastly, subjective compliance with such programs is understood by the increasingly individualized features of the labor process.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att studera om Handelsbankens vinstandelsstiftelse Oktogonen ger upphov till motiverade anställda samt om Oktogonen och bankens låga personalomsättning har ett samband. Studien bygger på en fallstudie. Datainsamling har skett genom främst intervjuer och tidigare forskning i form av böcker och artiklar. Resultatet har visat att viktiga faktorer för att uppnå en låg personalomsättning inom banken bland annat är en decentraliserad organisation samt att anställda känner en trygghet till sin arbetsgivare. Oktogonen påverkar i begränsad utsträckning, dock främst äldre medarbetares rörlighet. / The purpose of this paper is to study if Handelsbanken’s profit- sharing foundation Oktogonen creates motivated employees and if Oktogonen and the bank’s low employee turnover are connected. The study is based on a case study. The data comes primarily through interviews and previous research in books and articles. The results showed that key factors in achieving a low turnover of staff is a decentralized organization and that the employees feel a sense of security to their employer. Oktogonen affects a limited extent, but mainly the older employees mobility.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the employers¡¦ perception of monthly bonus profit sharing mechanism on the ratio of job quitting, job morale and job performance of a selected company. We set up testing hypotheses based on the selected company and collect data through questionnaire. The following three testing hypothesis are examined in the thesis. They are whether monthly bonus profit sharing mechanism can effectively decrease job quitting ratio, increase job morale and job performance. Our empirical results support employers¡¦ perception that the profit sharing mechanism is helpful to decrease job quitting ratio as well as to increase job morale and performance.

It is easy to evaluate unfairly on performance of companies with stock-based rewards in Taiwan, so we use Incentive-Intensity and Mix to evaluate relationship between companies and stock-based rewards. Results documents that employees of 534 companies issuing on TSE and OTC can get NT$ 17.1834 per NT$ 1,000 change in market value of equity over 2002-04 period, and the average ratio of profit sharing and stock ownership rewards to cash compensation is 0.6594. We suggest that the more stocks companies grant, the better performance companies have, especially for electronics industry. The ratio of stock-based rewards to total compensation of employees of companies issuing on TSE is higher than employees of companies issuing on OTC.

This study is to investigate the relationship among profit sharing, sharing fairness, job involvement and working performance by the empirical research. The goal of this study is to suggest the company how to design more incentive system from the profit sharing and sharing fairness when the profit sharing will become the operation expense in Taiwan. 500 questionnaires were sent to the company which is based on the north of Hsin-Chu County. The valid questionnaires are 174 copies in total after the return. Upon the empirical analysis, the important findings are as the following: 1.Profit sharing system and sharing fairness are positive correlated. The more the employees are satisfied with the profit sharing system and feel the importance of the profit sharing system, the higher their awareness is on the fairness of the profit distribution and execution procedure. 2.Profit sharing system is not significant to job involvement and working performance. When the time goes by, the incentive effect from the profit sharing system will decrease. Therefore, the effect of profit sharing system is not significt to job involvement and working performance. 3.Sharing fairness is not significant to job involvement, but significant to the goal achievement of working performance and collaboration¡¦s satisfaction. If the employee doesn¡¦t understand the profit sharing system, it easily causes the unfair feeling and it might impact on the job involvement. But if the company can emphasize the fairness of the execution procedure, it can increase the possibility of the goal achievement and enhance the collaboration¡¦s satisfaction. 4.Profit sharing system can¡¦t affect the working performance and job involvement by the intermediate effect of sharing fairness. Since the profit sharing system has been implemented for a while and became part of salary, it can¡¦t draw more attraction as the beginning. In addition, if the employee starts to suspect the fairness of the profit sharing, it will result in the less influence on job involvement and working performance.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wyoming, 2008. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on Mar. 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis investigates the effect of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes on employee job attitudes and behaviours by taking into account the critical role of participation in decision making. The data were obtained from a large British retail organization operating profit sharing (PS) and save-as-you-earn (SAYE) schemes. This is a quantitative study in which the data were gathered through a questionnaire. The unit of analysis is the individuals who responded to the survey, and the study is cross-sectional. To analyse the data a variety of statistical techniques, namely frequency, Pearson correlation, partial correlation, t-test, chi-square (X2), reliability, multiple regression, hierarchical regression, and path analyses, were conducted using SPSS. The sample comprised 1,000 employees subdivided into groups of managerial and non-managerial employees, and participants in schemes and non-participants in schemes. The administration of the questionnaire resulted in 450 returns (430 usable), an overall response rate of 45%. This study addresses four main research questions: (1)What are the effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes (financial participation) on the job attitudes of individual employees in a large organization? (2) What are the effects of participation in decision making on employee job attitudes in a large organization? (3) What are the relative effects of financial participation in comparison to the effects of individual participation in decisions? (4) Does the combination of financial participation and participation in decision making produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes than does participation in decision making on its own? The aim of this study was to construct a more advanced model of profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes by reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature and testing two theoretical frameworks, those developed by Long (1978) and Florkowski (1989). After reviewing the employee participation literature and testing Long's and Florkowski's models, it was found that both financial participation and participation in decision making have separate effects on employee job attitudes and behaviours, even if financial participation has a small (not statistically significant) impact on some attitudes and behaviours. Since financial participation shows a negligible effect on some job attitudes, and participation in decision making has a stronger effect on job attitudes than has financial participation, the new model is constructed on the assumption that both (a) the combination of financial participation and participation in decision making and (b) participation in decision making produce favourable effects on employee job attitudes, such as integration, involvement, commitment, satisfaction, motivation, perceived pay equity, and perceived performance-reward contingencies. The test of the new model shows that both (a) the combination of fmancial participation and participation in decision making and (b) participation in decision making produce favourable effects on employee job attitudes and behaviours, but the combination of financial participation and participation in decision making does not produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes than does participation in decision making on its own. It should be noted that it is not known in this research whether financial participation changed employees' actual influence in decision making, as the study did not collect any data on this question. Therefore, there is the possibility that if the same study were conducted in organizations with financial participation schemes which increase employees' influence in decision making, the effect of the combination of financial participation and participation in decision making might be found to be stronger than that reported in this dissertation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-95).