O presente trabalho tem como objetivo examinar a formação do senso de justiça das pessoas sob a perspectiva da teoria de justiça da escolha social e de rankings incompletos, de Amartya Sen (2009). Pretende também investigar algumas formas de educar o cidadão para a justiça a fim de se pensar políticas públicas nas escolas que estimulem o florescimento do sentido de justiça nas pessoas. Para tanto, a teoria de justiça de Sen (2009) é apresentada e relacionada a teorias sobre a formação do indivíduo e fases críticas de seu desenvolvimento, em específico a formação de aspectos cognitivos e não cognitivos e sua interação. Ao fim, são indicados caminhos para a educação voltada para a justiça. / This study aims to examine the development of the sense of justice following Amartya Sen’s (2009) social choice and incomplete rank justice theory. Alongside this, in order to present some alternatives about public policies in schools that could encourage the flourishing of a sense of justice, a reflection about ways to educate citizens towards justice is made. To do so, Sen’s Idea of Justice is introduced and related to theories about individual development, combined with an analysis of sensitive stages of human development. Particular attention is given on the interaction of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. At the end, some thoughts about public policies and the education system are made.

In Martha Nussbaum’s book Frontiers of Global Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, she presents the capabilities approach, a new theoretical framework that in her view better responds to the urgent problems of social inequality than existing theories of social justice. This thesis evaluates her descriptive claim by applying the capabilities approach to the French burqa ban and assessing whether the ban is unjust, and if so, what forms of intervention are most appropriate. In doing this, I will argue that Nussbaum’s theory is unsatisfactory unless she extends it to include the obligation to criticize in cases where we are certain that an injustice is being committed.

<p>The thesis <em>„Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy with regard to its feministic orientation” </em>represents Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the good life, demonstrates it as a feminist philosophy and locates it in the context of feminist theory. It is shown that Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach in connection with her reflections about the political liberalism and communitarianism is an important contribution for a feministic ethic of equality. Martha Nussbaum combines questions of justice with a theory of the good life. In her demand for the ethicing of the political, lies the relevance of her philosophy for feminism.</p><p> </p>

This thesis is an examination of the concept of human development and does a comparative study of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Sen rectifies the emphasis on income by welfare economics, and argues for the ‘equality of capability’; a goal that he says can be achieved by means of the intrinsic and instrumental role of democracy. However, the author notes that Sen’s development paradigm is inadequate as an account for what constitutes the kind of well-being that is fully human and asserts that Sen’s framework should be concretized politically. In view of this, the author argues that Nussbaum’s articulation of a ‘threshold of capabilities’, anchored on her reading Aristotle’s concept of human flourishing and Marx’s insight on human dignity, is a politically realistic human development framework. Nussbaum thinks that the essential human capabilities are entitlements that must be constitutionally guaranteed to ensure a decent and dignified human life for all. As a response to the reality of pluralism, Nussbaum says that the universality of these entitlements can be secured by means of an overlapping consensus. Furthermore, the extreme poverty in many nations which exposes women and children to much vulnerability has provoked the author to inquire about the applicability of Nussbaum’s framework to the global arena. As such, the thesis argues for the radical expansion of the Human Development Index used by the United Nations Development Program in measuring the quality of human life, notably the inclusion of political liberties and gender equality. In addition to this, the study puts forward the argument that global human development is best achieved through democracy, and asserts that global institutions have a moral duty to protect and promote the central human capabilities.

The thesis „Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy with regard to its feministic orientation” represents Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the good life, demonstrates it as a feminist philosophy and locates it in the context of feminist theory. It is shown that Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach in connection with her reflections about the political liberalism and communitarianism is an important contribution for a feministic ethic of equality. Martha Nussbaum combines questions of justice with a theory of the good life. In her demand for the ethicing of the political, lies the relevance of her philosophy for feminism.

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Le présent travail propose une réflexion sur l'aspect social des émotions par l'entremise d'un examen de la dimension conflictuelle de 3 émotions: le désir, la honte et le dégoût. L'aspect problématique de ces émotions se situe au niveau de leur hypertrophie, en ce qu'elle encourage une emphase sur le soi, sur l'autosuffisance et la toute-puissance de l'individu, ce qui se traduit par des répercussions interpersonnelles, notamment la réduction marquée de la diversité des relations humaines qu'entretient l'individu avec les autres, et intrapersonnelles, particulièrement la narcotisation de l'identité individuelle. Cette réflexion est animée par la pensée de 3 principaux auteurs: celle de René Girard et de Martha C. Nussbaum afin d'explorer, pour chaque émotion, les implications de leur hypertrophie chez l'individu, puis de l'incidence du contexte social sur l'hypertrophie de ces émotions; celle d'Hannah Arendt afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique des relations humaines et comme palliatif à ces répercussions interpersonnelles et intrapersonnelles.

Sen and Nussbaum generate very different degrees of obligation for the affluent under their theories of justice, despite each of them deriving their theory of justice from capability as a metric for quality of life. On one hand, Sen’s account of obligation seems very weak, while Nussbaum’s seems overwhelmingly robust. I argue that the sufficient/decisivereasons framework as put forth by philosopher Derek Parfit captures the nuances of their extremely different accounts of obligation. Further, I argue that this framework convincingly demonstrates that the accounts of obligation that Sen and Nussbaum offer in each of their versions of the capability approach are unsatisfying, as each approach occupies such extremes that they are unreasonable. In spite of this, supplementing the capability approach with a different and perhaps more centrist account of obligation can make the capability approach a more consistent and appealing theory of justice. To this end, I appropriate Thomas Pogge’s account of obligation.

Le présent travail propose une réflexion sur l'aspect social des émotions par l'entremise d'un examen de la dimension conflictuelle de 3 émotions: le désir, la honte et le dégoût. L'aspect problématique de ces émotions se situe au niveau de leur hypertrophie, en ce qu'elle encourage une emphase sur le soi, sur l'autosuffisance et la toute-puissance de l'individu, ce qui se traduit par des répercussions interpersonnelles, notamment la réduction marquée de la diversité des relations humaines qu'entretient l'individu avec les autres, et intrapersonnelles, particulièrement la narcotisation de l'identité individuelle. Cette réflexion est animée par la pensée de 3 principaux auteurs: celle de René Girard et de Martha C. Nussbaum afin d'explorer, pour chaque émotion, les implications de leur hypertrophie chez l'individu, puis de l'incidence du contexte social sur l'hypertrophie de ces émotions; celle d'Hannah Arendt afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique des relations humaines et comme palliatif à ces répercussions interpersonnelles et intrapersonnelles.

In this thesis I distinguish between two conceptions of naturalism that have been offered as possible starting points for a virtue based ethics. The first version of naturalism is characterized by Philippa Foot’s project in Natural Goodness. The second version of naturalism can be found, in various forms, among the works of John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Rosalind Hursthouse. I argue that neither naturalistic approach is entirely successful on its own, but that we can fruitfully carve a path between both approaches that points the way to a positive ethical account. I then conclude with a brief sketch of what such a positive account of a virtue ethics may look like.