Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-06-30T11:55:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1535462 bytes, checksum: 687de72e828e46b218bdfeac98271fb9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-30T11:55:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1535462 bytes, checksum: 687de72e828e46b218bdfeac98271fb9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-11-03 / This work intends to present an overview of the medieval Quarrel of Universal. The debate about the status of universals has its conceptual basis in the thought of the ancient philosophers and traditionally opens with the formulation of Porphyry. During the Middle Ages there were several hypotheses about what state of universal, among which we highlight the realism of Duns Scotus and Bonaventure, the extreme nominalism of Roscellinus and the anti-realism of Peter Abelard. Finally, we present the William of Ockham’s solution to the problem of universals. With a nominalist position, which is against the existence of any universal entity out of mind, Ockham develops an theory of supposition in which universals are taken as mentally that according to a semantic function, take the place of individuals referred to in a propositional context. Thus, we try to show how Ockham's perspective brings the problem of universal from the ontological scope for the logical. / Este trabalho pretende apresentar um panorama geral da Querela dos Universais do medievo. O debate acerca do estado dos universais tem suas bases conceituais no pensamento dos filósofos antigos e se inaugura tradicionalmente com a formulação de Porfírio de Tiro. Durante a Idade Média surgiram várias hipóteses acerca de qual estado dos universais, dentre as quais destacamos o realismo de Duns Scotus e Boaventura, o nominalismo extremo de Roscelino e o anti-realismo de Pedro Abelardo. Finalmente, apresentamos a solução de Guilherme de Ockham ao problema dos universais. Com um posicionamento nominalista, que é contrário a existência de qualquer entidade universal fora da mente, Ockham desenvolve uma teoria da suposição na qual os universais são tomados como termos mentais que, de acordo com uma função semântica, ocupam o lugar dos particulares a que se referem num contexto proposicional. Deste modo, procuramos mostrar como a perspectiva de Ockham traz o problema dos universais do âmbito ontológico para o lógico.

[pt] Não obstante o reconhecimento de que a lógica desenvolvida por Guilherme de Ockham é consideravelmente interessante tanto do ponto de vista histórico quanto filosófico, pouca atenção foi dada àquelas doutrinas lógicas que envolvem aspectos temporais. Este fato, por sua vez, constitui um obstáculo à compreensão integral da lógica ockhamista, já que acarreta uma série de controvérsias motivadas basicamente por interpretações parciais que menosprezam o papel desempenhado pelo tempo na lógica medieval. Com efeito, o presente estudo analisa o caráter temporal da lógica de Ockham a fim de contextualizá-lo junto às teorias lógicas do referido autor. Para tanto, reservou-se uma parte da investigação ao esclarecimento das noções fundamentais da lógica ockhamista e, em seguida, destinou-se outra parte à determinação da interação entre o tempo e tais noções. Neste contexto, evidenciou-se que a lógica concebida por Ockham é essencialmente temporal, pois o fato dela concentrar-se na análise da estrutura da língua latina, aliado ao reconhecimento de que a doutrina das proposições temporalmente flexionadas e a silogística temporal desenvolvida pelo referido autor apóiam-se numa teoria da suposição capaz de lidar com uma concepção ampla de significação, cujo domínio dos objetos significados encerra o que é ou poderia ser tanto no presente, quanto no passado ou no futuro, indica que até as noções fundamentais da lógica ockhamista presumem o caráter temporal da linguagem ordinária. / [en] Although the logic developed by William of Ockham is regarded as having considerable interest, both from a historical and from a philosophical point of view, little attention has been paid to the temporal aspects of his doctrines. This creates a barrier to the full understanding of Ockham´s logic because it leads to many controversies that are due to partial interpretations which underestimate the role of time in the logic of the Middle Ages. In the present study, the temporal character of Ockham´s logic is analyzed in order to contextualize it within his general theories. The first part of our investigation is concerned with the basic notions of Ockham´s logic, and the second part studies their interaction with temporal notions. It becomes clear that Ockham´s logic is essentially temporal. This is mainly due to the fact that it concentrates on the analysis of the latin language, and that the doctrine of temporal propositions and of temporal syllogism are based on a conception of supposition that must be able to deal with a broad conception of signification. The domain of objects signified includes what is, or what could be, in the present as well as in the past and in the future. This shows that fundamental notions of Ockham´s logic presuppose the temporal character of ordinary language.

Zugl.: Freiburg (Breisgau), Univ., Diss., 2009

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There was a long-standing consensus that Ockham was a Divine Command Theorist - one who holds that all of morality is ultimately grounded in God's commands. But contrary to this long-standing consensus, three arguments have recently surfaced that Ockham is not a divine command theorist. The thesis of this dissertation is that, contrary to these three arguments, Ockham is a divine command theorist. The first half of the dissertation is an analysis of the three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for virtuous action, whereas the second half is a response to the three contemporary arguments that Ockham isn't a divine command theorist. In a way, the first half of the dissertation gives a prima facie case that Ockham is a divine command theorist; the second half concludes so ultima facie.

Guillaume d’Ockham (v. 1285-1347) est un philosophe nominaliste. Il considère donc que les seules choses qui existent sont individuelles. Les universaux ne sont pas des choses, mais des noms. Cet ouvrage s’intéresse plus précisément à la possibilité d’une science métaphysique dans l’ontologie restreinte d’Ockham. En effet, c’est une question qui a été peu traitée par les commentateurs malgré sa présence dans les écrits du « Vénérable débutant ». Pour ce faire, notre analyse s’intéressera premièrement à l’existence d’une métaphysique chez Ockham avant de s’intéresser aux critères nécessaires pour qu’une discipline soit scientifique. De plus, l’intérêt de cet ouvrage est d’analyser le concept d’étant, car il est le sujet premier de la métaphysique. Dans ce contexte, nous allons analyser la conception occamienne du concept et les modes d’acquisition de ces derniers, à savoir l’intuition et l’abstraction. Nous allons ensuite nous intéresser à la conception occamienne de l’équivocité et l’univocité ainsi que sa distinction des termes absolus et connotatifs. Finalement, nous allons utiliser ces outils conceptuels pour répondre à la question suivante : est-ce qu’Ockham considère que le concept d’étant est univoque à Dieu et aux créatures et quels sont les impacts de l’univocité de l’étant sur la possibilité d’une connaissance de Dieu? / William Ockham (ca. 1285-1347) is a fervent nominalist. The only things that can possibly exist in his ontology are individual things. Universals do not exist, they are simply words. This work wonders about the possibility of metaphysics as a science in Ockham’s narrow ontology. In fact, it is a question that has been little discussed in the litterature on Ockham. To do so, our analysis will be interested in Ockham’s conception of scientific knowledge. Also, our principal goal is to question the concept of being which is the primary subject of metaphysics. In this context, Ockham’s conception of concept will be analysed and how our intellect obtains them by intuitive and abstractive cognitions. We will then focus on the Occamian conception of equivocity and univocity as well as its distinction between absolute and connotative terms. Finally, we will use these conceptual tools to answer the following question: does Ockham consider that the concept of being if univocal to God and creatures and what are the impacts of the univocity of being on the possibility of a knowledge of God?

No description available.

Dans ce travail de doctorat, nous avons pour objectif de reconstituer les présupposés et les conséquences de la thèse ockhamiste selon laquelle la quantité n’est pas réellement distincte de la substance ou de la qualité. Cette thèse est formulée dans les écrits philosophiques et théologiques de Guillaume d’Ockham, logicien et théologien anglais du début du XIVe siècle (1285-1349). La thèse est organisée en trois parties. La première partie a pour objet la question de savoir comment s’organise la catégorie de quantité si l’on admet que la quantité n’est pas réellement distincte de la substance ou de la qualité. La deuxième partie, consacrée à la physique de la quantité, traite de chacune des trois espèces de quantité, la quantité permanente continue (l’extension spatiale), la quantité successive (le mouvement et le temps) et la quantité discrète (le nombre). Enfin, la troisième partie consiste en une description et une évaluation de la théorie ockhamiste de la structure métaphysique de la substance / The aim of this PhD dissertation is to reconstruct the assumptions and consequences of the ockhamist thesis according to which quantity is not really distinct from substance or from quality. This thesis can be found in the philosophical and theological writings of William of Ockham, a logician and Franciscan theologian from the beginning of the 14th century (1285-1349).The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the question how the category of quantity is organised if one assumes that quantity is not really distinct from substance or from quality. The second part is dedicated to the physics of quantity. Each species of quantity is examined, that is permanent continuous quantity (spatial extension), successive quantity (motion and time) and discrete quantity (number). Lastly, the third part consists in a description and an evaluation of the ockhamist theory of the metaphysical structure of substance

This thesis is a detailed examination of the logico-semantic system propounded by the English philosopher and theologian William of Ockham (c.1287 – c.1347). It provides a reinterpretation of Ockham's account of mental content and mental-language semantics, as well as of his theory of consequential goodness. It does so from the standpoint of an inferentialist theory of meaning, in rejection of previous attempts made from the standpoint of internalist and externalist theories of mental content. Chapter 1 ('The Scientic Status of Logic') provides an account of Ockham's understanding of logic as a rational, practical, ostensive science. Chapter 2 ('The Received Interpretation') presents and casts doubt upon the arguments put forward by the defenders of both externalist and internalist construals of Ockham's semantic theory. Chapter 3 ('An Inferentialist Construal') presents the central tenets of a inferentialist theory of meaning. In order to show how Ockham's system can be understood within such a semantic paradigm, we will have to set out at least three things. First, Chapter 4 ('Ockham's Propositionalism') argues that the mature Ockham actually embraced a propositionalist theory of meaning. Second, Chapter 5 ('Obligationes and the Normativity of Asserting') seeks to prove that such a theory of meaning can only be properly understood against the normative background provided by his theory of obligationes. Finally, Chapter 6 ('Consequences') argues that Ockham's theory of consequential goodness is materialist, not formalist. That is to say, that the goodness of a certain kind of consequence ultimately depends upon the meaning of its propositional parts, rather than upon its structure. It is then shown that all remaining kinds of consequences (syllogisms included) are to understood with respect to these material inferences. The main sources of this research are Ockham's Ordinatio, his Summa logicae, and his Quodlibeta septem. As regards the inferentialist theory of meaning, Robert Brandom's Making it Explicit (1994) and Wilfrid Sellars 'Inference and Meaning' (1953) were essential to this research.

This dissertation examines William of Ockham's theory of property rights in the Opus nonaginta dierum (1332) in the context of the other major Michaelist texts of the period. A corollary of the project is to examine to what extent Ockham, a theologian with no formal training in law, was able to exploit the resources of Roman and canon law to justify his theory of property rights. The first chapter outlines general methodological concerns. The second chapter describes John XXII's theory of property rights as it can be found in his major bulls of the 1320s. The subsequent chapters adopt a thematic approach. Chapters three through five analyse in turn the concepts of ius, dominium, and usus, which are hierarchically related concepts in the Michaelist texts. Chapter three examines ius in traditional legal discourse in order to provide a framework for understanding how the Michaelists employed the term; both the issue of positive and natural rights and the interaction of divine, natural, and positive law are examined. Chapter four examines dominium, here primarily understood as proprietary lordship, as it is justified in divine, natural, and positive law; the Franciscan position on the origin of private property also becomes clear. The fifth chapter deals with the Franciscan argument that usus must be understood not only in a legal sense. Franciscan use, they argue, is a rightless and legally indefensible sort of use because it lacks a connection to ius. The sixth chapter explores how the Michaelists explained that one may justly use something that is consumed through use without ever holding property rights over it, while the seventh explores the Franciscan theory of corporate rights in the face of Innocent IV's and John XXII's arguments about the supposedly fictive personality of corporations. A concluding chapter and three appendices round out the dissertation. The first appendix illustrates how Michael of Cesena adapted Bonaventure's theory of a 'fourfold community of temporal things'. The second compares the structural interrelationship of the Michaelist texts. The final appendix tabulates Ockham's use of canon and Roman law with respect to the writings of the pope and the other Michaelists.