Zugl.: Vallendar, Wiss. Hochschule für Unternehmensführung, Diss., 2003.

This diploma thesis is about oligopolistic competition of major retail chain operating on czech market in the food retail sector. Except mathematical prediction of the current retailers revenue-per-square meter growth, this work also mentions companies that decided to leave the Czech market for various reasons, like bad profits and wrongly determined business goals, change of strategy, etc. Main focus of this paper is the development of the retail sales market and examining if there is forming or already is, an oligopol with a dominant company. The market development is analysed based on freely available sources (published profits and annual reports). Total revenues of each retail chains are compared with details about disponible sales area and are displayed in graphs for better image; in the notes there are also details about individual acquisitions. Based on this development, the possible future development of revenue-per-square meter of sales area is mathematically derived.

The Diploma Thesis is focused on the issue of protection of economic competition. It deals with its politics, structure, distorting competition and last but not least its protection. The objective of the work is to analyze and describe the importance of the Office for the Protection of Competition, its influence and work in relation to the most important cases of the distorting competition in the Czech Republic, mainly in case of cartel agreements, abuse of dominant position, specifically in the period 2010-2015. Fundamental part of the work was based on the research that was crucial for the work. The research collected data in the Czech as well as English language in order to gain theoretical basis. It was necessary to gain and study all available professional information concerning to the topic. Analytical part of the work was based primarily on the description and comparison method. Sources for the analytical part were gained from the regularly published reports of the Office for the Protection of Competition. These data are publicly available information. Conclusion of the work deals with assessment of work of the Office for the Protection of Competition and its influence. Therefore there was confirmed one of the main thesis that had initiated the research. The author of the diploma thesis came to the conclusion that imposing sanctions is not only the most effective tool of the economic protection but also serves as a significant preventive measure.

Författaren undersöker och analyserar den ökade regleringens effekter på svenska banker och risken för ett bankernas myopia. Det görs dels avseende ökad konkurrens mellan banker och med icke-reglerade aktörer, dels avseende regleringens påverkan på processer och ledarskap. Ökande reglering är ett högaktuellt ämne i bankerna då affärsförutsättningarna förändras. Regleringen syftar till att skapa finansiell stabilitet och har på tio år flyttats från Sverige till Basel och EU. Fokuset är på stora internationella banker, men gäller likväl för lokala mindre banker. Bankerna har därmed fått betydligt fler regulatorer att följa och en ökad mängd resurskrävande detaljregleringar att implementera. En kvalitativ metod valdes då studien beskriver bankernas perspektiv på aktuellt nuläge och deras framtidssyn. Datainsamlingen gjordes med en expertpanelvaliderad webbenkät till 126 personer verksamma i banksektorn, där 89 svarade. Det teoretiska ramverket består av branschanalysmodeller; Porters fem krafter, tre generiska strategier och SWOT samt processanalysmodellen VRIO och teorier kring chefs- och kommunikationsstilar. Resultatet är att regleringen är mycket detaljerad och oöverskådlig samt har en otillräcklig proportionering mellan större och mindre banker. Det medför högre inträdesbarriärer och begränsningar i bankernas kunderbjudanden. Konkurrensen från icke-reglerade aktörer väntas öka genom deras kundanpassningsförmåga och banksektorns bristande priskonkurrens. Bankoligopolet stärks då mindre banker slås ut som resultat av de skalfördelar som stor volym ger. Den ökade regleringen ställer krav på processorienterad styrning vilket inte är i linje med bankernas produktfokusering. Bankernas framtida chefer behöver vara administrativa stjärnor med utpräglad affärsorientering, så att både kundernas behov och regleringens krav uppfylls. Förändringstakten i regleringen kommer fortsätta allt snabbare och med kortare implementeringstid. Bankerna behöver utöka sin utvecklingskapacitet samt öka flexibiliteten för att simultant kunna anpassa sig till ändrade kundbeteenden, ny konkurrens och tillkommande reglering. När kunderna blir mindre banklojala och istället använder icke-reglerade aktörers tjänster kommer bankernas kostnadsökningar inte längre kunna vältras över på kunderna utan kräva ökade rationaliseringar istället. Bankerna riskerar ett myopia, de ser förändringarna men har inte förmågan att genomföra nödvändiga anpassningar till nya affärsförutsättningar. Den anpassningsbare överlever.

There has been a significant decline in instant food market. I investigate the determinants of demand for instant food in this thesis. Oligopoly market structure motivates me to investigate the demand for instant food produced by particular firm. I use yearly and quarterly scanner data for instant food sales on the retail market in Czech Republic in the empirical part of the thesis. The yearly data analysis finds healthy diet trend as a possible cause of instant food market decline. According to quarterly data analysis I find instant food as an inferior good with income elasticity -0,6295. Both these factors can affect stagnant or decreasing revenues of instant food producers. Analysis of demand for instant food produced by particular firm illustrates strong relation between demanded quantity of producer's instant food and prices of his own and competing production. This indicates that price increase is not an optimal strategy in order to stabilize revenues of instant food producer.

This thesis deals with gathering of private information when company tries to enter on concentrated markets. Aim of the thesis is to show how much private information will company require and how is its output and profit affected by private information. Thesis uses standard optimalization tools of microeconomic analysis.

Zugl.: Hamburg, Univ., Diss., 2009

An analysis of the market conditions in the press and media monitoring field in Croatia and Slovenia. Industry analysis, business strategy and competition analysis. Oligopoly models of and a hypothesis of the future development in the field. Labour market conditions, threats and opportunities for a new firm. Assessment of chances for entry.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus zwei Teilen, die durch eine Einleitung zu Auktions- und Oligopolmärkten und durch eine kurze Diskussion über die erzielten Resultate am Ende der Arbeit miteinander verbunden sind. Der erste Teil diskutiert die Literatur zu Auktionen und analysiert das Verhalten von Bietern in Österreichischen Rinderauktionen. Das Ziel der Untersuchung ist es zu bestimmen, ob es Unterschiede im Verhalten der Bieter gibt und ob diese die Möglichkeit eines späteren Kaufes in Betracht ziehen. Der zweite Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Strategien von Firmen in der Halbleiterindustrie. Im besonderen werden die strategischen Effekte von "learning-by-doing" und "spillovers" betrachtet. Des weiteren werden die Konsequenzen der Aggregation von firmenspezifischen Preisverhalten zu einer industriespezifischen Presigleichung empirisch untersucht. In beiden Teilen wird schwerpunktmäßig auf der Frage eingegangen, ob das Vernachlässigen von Asymmetrien unter den Marktteilnehmern und/oder das Vernachlässigen dynamischer Effekte die geschätzen Parameter beeinflußt. / This thesis consists of two parts, which are connected by an introduction on auction and oligopoly markets and a short discussion about the obtained results at the end. The first part provides a literature review on auctions and analyzes bidders' behavior in Austrian cattle auctions. The aim is to investigate whether there are differences among bidders and whether bidders take the possibility of buying later into account when bidding for objects. The second part analyzes firms' strategies in the semiconductor industry. In particular, the strategic effects of learning-by-doing and spillovers are considered. Further, the consequences of aggregating firms' pricing behavior to an industry level pricing equation are empirically investigated. In both parts emphasis is put on the question, whether neglecting asymmetries across market participants and/or neglecting dynamic effects influences the estimated parameters.

A competitive electricity market has been established in many European countries including the Czech Republic. The electricity market includes a limited number of significant producers and traders, which can be described by oligopoly model. Since the electricity transmission and distribution are regulated, I consider two types of players performing in the electricity market: producers of electricity and traders, who buy electricity from producers and sell it to final customers. I derive oligopoly model with producers and traders "a la Cournot" and calculate a formula of equilibrium strategies. I use these theoretical findings to build a dynamic oligopoly model Ele. Ele is formulated as a mixed complementary problem and calibrated on data for the Czech Republic and neighbor states for several scenarios. The model was specified and calculated in GAMS software by the PATH solver. The results represent a Nash equilibrium. That means for individual producers: electricity generation, investment in new power plants construction and emission permits purchases. For traders the results are: equilibrium purchases, sales and cross-border transfers of electricity in each particular time period. Ele derives also equilibrium regional wholesale and retail electricity prices, emission permit prices and prices of cross-border auctions. Ele results point to an economic profitability of new nuclear power plants constructions. Further, I formulate a game in short-term electricity market, where I advise to Czech market participants, subjects of settlement, how much and in which circumstances to buy or sell electricity. Equilibrium results obtained through simulations based on the principle of a fictive game show that the current payment system of imbalance in the Czech Republic does not increase the risk of instability of electricity networks.