La Constitution argentine de 1853, comme toutes les constitutions de l'Amérique latine du XIXe siècle, a établi un rôle central du président dans le système politique. Mais ce système, bien que potentiellement démocratique, limitait la participation populaire. Les constituants de 1853 croyaient que la démocratisation du régime se produirait par le Congrès, ayant le pouvoir de représentation. Mais ce qui est arrivé était différent: la présidence étant le centre du système, lorsque les réformes démocratiques du XXe siècle se produisent, une relation entre le président et le public a été institué. Et donc, la présidence a été transformée en quelque chose de très différent de ce que les fondateurs des institutions argentines avaient envisagé. Le président moderne, ou populiste, a un pouvoir électoral incontesté et est devenu le sujet de la représentation populaire. Et en conséquence, le président est devenu aussi l'agent principal du changement dans les politiques publiques. Dans cette thèse, nous proposons de conceptualiser la relation entre le président et le public, appelé «présidentialisme populiste» comme l'un des trois dimensions institutionnelles du pouvoir présidentiel. Cette transformation structurelle de la présidence a également impliqué un certain nombre de changements dans le système politique. La centralité électorale de l'exécutif, en particulier la présidence, a fait que des processus institutionnels comme les élections législatives, les stratégies de nouveaux partis politiques ou les interprétations de l'opinion publique soient trop orientées vers la présidence. La centralité de la présidence est donc en augmentation. La conclusion de cette thèse, qui ouvre un programme de recherche, c'est que le système présidentiel ne doit pas être abandonné, mais que le législateur devrait envisager des mécanismes pour réglementer et équilibrer les effets du présidentialisme populiste. / The Argentine Constitution of 1853, like most Latin American constitutions of the nineteenth century, established a central role of the president in the political system. But this system, although potentially democratic, was limiting popular participation. The framers of 1853 believed that the democratization of the regime would occur by Congress, which was designed with representational powers. But what actually happened was different: being the presidency the center of the system, when the democratic reforms of the XXth century took place, a new relationship between the president and the public was established. And so, the presidency has been transformed into something very different from what the founders of Argentine institutions might have thought. The modern, or populist, president has an undisputed electoral power and became the subject of popular representation. And as a result, the president has also become the main agent of change in public policy. In this thesis, we propose to conceptualize the relationship between the president and the public, called "populist presidentialism" as one of the three institutional dimensions of presidential power. This structural transformation of the presidency has also involved a number of changes in the political system. The electoral centrality of the executive power, mainly the presidency, that some institutional processes such as elections, the strategies of new political parties or public opinion beliefs are too oriented towards the presidency, and therefore its centrality is still increasing. The conclusion of this thesis, which opens a research agenda on presidential powers in Latin America, is that the presidential system should not be abandoned, but that the legislator should consider mechanisms to regulate and balance the effects of the populist presidentialism.

De tre skandinaviska länderna Danmark, Norge och Sverige har samtliga ett högerpopulistiskt parti i de nationella parlamenten. Inflytandet som partierna har fått över den nationella politiken skiljer dem åt, i Danmark agerar Dansk Folkeparti stödparti till regeringen och i Norge sitter Fremskrittspartiet i regeringen. I Sverige däremot har Sverigedemokraterna inte fått något direkt inflytande över regeringens politik, trots att partierna är lika stora.  Studien har tittat på tre olika variabler utifrån teorin om att högerpopuistiska partier som närmar sig mitten har lättare att samarbeta med andra partier än de som väljer ena sidan, vilket har varit den beroende variabeln. Genom att analysera partiernas politiska program från två tidpunkter går det att se om partierna har anpassat sin politik för att ligga närmare de andra partierna. Även ländernas historia av politiska koalitioner och andra partier i parlamenten har undersökts, vilka har varit de oberoende variablerna.  Studiens resultat visar att partierna inte har närmat sig mitten. Dansk Folkeparti har en stark högerprofil i sociokulturella frågor och står i mitten i socioekonomiska frågor. Fremskrittspartiet har haft och har en tydlig högerpolitik i både socioekonomiska och sociokulturella frågor. Sverigedemokraterna har haft ett stort fokus på de sociokulturella frågorna där de står till höger, men har även fått en större socioekonomisk politik, där de står i mitten. Därför går det inte att säga att partier som närmar sig mitten lättare kan samarbeta och få ett större politiskt inflytande.

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La présente recherche porte sur l'emploi des termes populisme et populiste lors de l'élection présidentielle française de 2012. Cette étude a été réalisée en traitant deux corpus : les discours politiques et complémentairement les discours journalistiques, recouvrant la période d'octobre 2010 à mai 2012. En se positionnant dans le cadre des théories de la sémantique discursive et de la praxématique, nous avons convoqué l'analyse du discours afin d'analyser la production de sens desdits termes.L'objectif étant de comprendre comment les candidats à la présidentielle de 2012 et les commentateurs dans la presse écrite emploient les termes en question dans leurs discours et de déterminer les procédés linguistiques qui interviennent dans ces discours afin de représenter ces termes.Les résultats obtenus illustrent qu'à partir du point de vue de la production de sens, il existe un jeu sur le sémantisme de ces termes : nous les recevons avec une production de sens majoritairement négative, même si certains locuteurs/écrivains essayaient d'injecter le sens positif dans son sens négatif antérieur. / This research focuses on the use of the terms populism and populist during the French presidential election of 2012. This study had carried out by treating two corpuses : political discourses and additionally journalistic discourses, covering the period from October 2010 to May 2012. By positioning in the theories of discursive semantics and of praxématique, we convened the discourse analysis to analyze the production of the meaning of those terms.The goal is to understand how the presidential candidates of 2012 and commentators in the press use the terms in question in their discourses, and to determine the linguistic processes involved in these discourses to represent these terms.The results show that from the point of view of the production of meaning, there is a semantic act on these terms, which we receive mostly with a negative meaning, although some speakers / writers was trying to inject the positive direction in their previous negative meaning.

In several countries of the Global North, right-wing parties are successfully mobilizing public support, influencing political debates and introducing arguments and rhetorics that draw on xenophobia, populism and ethnocentrism, ostensibly with a purpose to amplify the “national order of things” (Malkki 1992). This thesis addresses this development by providing an ethnography, based fieldwork, of the Swedish social movement Folkets Demonstration, which arranges anti-government manifestations on squares most usually in Stockholm. Drawing on classical theories on performance by Victor Turner and Erving Goffman, I investigate how the demonstrations of the movement facilitate the construction of a collective identity of “the people”, which also includes exploring the world view of the demonstrators. As I argue, through the socio-emotionality of the demonstrations, the movement conducts a cultural performance of national cohesion vis-à-vis the Swedish national community, cosmologically perceived as on the edge of an apocalypse due to immigration and the alleged cosmopolitanist agenda of the government. In addition, I argue that the demonstrations can be understood as strategically managed towards idealized performances of democracy. Hence, the demonstrations can be considered regressive-utopian performances of a national-democratic community, furthermore embedded in a polarization between “the people” and “the elite” and through which the collective identity of “the people” is constructed.

Le « phénomène Le Pen » désigne la somme constituée par l’élaboration d’une marquepolitique située à l’extrême droite et les réactions conflictuelles qu’elle suscite au sein de lasociété française. L’objectivation de ce phénomène réside dans l’analyse de l’idéologie duFront National en tant qu’elle est celle d’une marque politique devant produire un contenudoctrinal original pour se distinguer des autres partis mais également dans l’étude dumouvement social – ou du mouvement du social – dont elle est à l’origine. La catégorie dusacré vient éclairer les dispositifs discursifs qui sont décelables aussi bien dans les mots duFront National que dans ceux de ses adversaires politiques et associatifs. La recherche sepoursuit avec l’analyse des principaux schèmes idéologiques de l’extrême droite française,qui est basée sur une histoire des idées qui commence avec la pensée contre-révolutionnaire.La méthodologie durandienne du bassin sémantique permet d’identifier les étapes cardinalesde la formation idéologique du nationalisme d’extrême droite. L’examen de cette idéologies’achève avec l’analyse du discours contemporain du Front National et la comparaisonmythanalytique des candidatures de Jean-Marie Le Pen et Marine Le Pen lors des électionsprésidentielles françaises de 2007 et de 2012. / The “Le Pen phenomenon” designates the sum constituted by the elaboration of a politicalbrand located at the far-right and by the conflictual reactions that it provokes within theFrench society. The objectivization of this phenomenon lies in the analysis of the FrontNational ideology as it is this of a political brand which must produce an original doctrinalcontent in order to distinguish it from the others parties but also in the study of the socialmovement – or the movement of the social – which it is the cause of. The category of thesacred comes to shed the discursive sets which are discernible just as well in the FrontNational words as those of its political and associative opponents. The research is going onwith the analysis of the French far-right main ideological schemas, which is based on ahistory of ideas which starts with the counter-revolutionary thought. The Durandianmethodology of the semantic basin allows to identify the cardinal stages of the far-rightnationalism ideological formation. The examination of this ideology comes to an end with theanalysis of the Front National contemporary discourse and the mythanalytic comparison ofthe Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen candidacies at the time of 2007 and 2012 Frenchpresidential elections.

The previous scholarship on British Columbia politics has mentioned but not adequately explained that province's populist culture. My paper responds to this deficiency by exploring the history of British Columbia populism. It examines the northwest (where populist culture was especially strong) as a case study of provincial politics and employs a political discourse analysis that compares language in the inter-war years with that of the post-war years. It also correlates voting and occupational statistics in polling districts in an effort to position language within a socio-economic context. The findings of this study emphasize the neighbouring northwest constituencies of Skeena and Omineca as representative of the dynamic nature of British Columbia political culture in the 1950s: in Skeena, a culture of class polarization dominated politics and led to an initial CCF provincial victory while Omineca had a culture of protest politics that supported Social Credit provincially and the CCF federally. These two differing kinds of politics (i.e. class versus populist politics) came from the same prodevelopment ethos that, while always dominating British Columbia culture, was especially significant in the post-war period. In Skeena, post-war corporate development attracted numerous unionized workers to the region and contributed to the CCF's class politics. The populism of Omineca was also a function of post-war development. It was not (like other populist traditions) connected to localistic or co-operative inclinations but in fact, was almost 1 exclusively anti-elitist. This populism integrated the anti-elite labeling of "the People" with a language that promoted the elite-controlled development of the 1950s, for the integration alleviated anxieties over that elite-control without actually threatening the existing pattern of development. The northwest's populist language was a function of a "non-populist" culture. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Tax-setting policy belongs to the main duties of politicians from time immemorial. Since those times, people are questioning whether politicians, while setting taxes, are pursuing mainly interests of publi or their own. In this thesis, I am studying this question in the industry of alcoholic beverages, regulation of it's consumption and production. I am using two statistical models, simple model of partial equilibria and AIDS model (Almost Ideal Demand System), to estimate own price elasticity of demand for beer, wine and spirits in selected post-soviet countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russian Federation. Linear model with mixed effects is estimated to uncover the strength and direction of dependency of alcohol policy on own price elasticity of demand for alcoholic beverages in the above mentioned countries. Results show, that politicians of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania and Russian Federation set the alcohol policy in accordance with maximization of tax revenue hypothesis, while Latvians seems to be rather vote maximizers. I have expected the politicians in Baltic states to behave similar and also least populistically from studied countries. But my expectations were not fulfilled.

abstract: Operational code analysis (OCA) is a common method of content analysis within the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature used to determine the “operational code” of state leaders and, by extension, the foreign policy behaviors of their respective state. It has been tried and tested many times before, on many different world leaders from many different time periods, to predict what the foreign policy behavior of a state/organization might be based on the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of their leader about the political universe. This paper, however, questions if there might be types of politicians that OCA, conducted using the automated Verbs In Context System (VICS), has problems delivering accurate results for. More specifically, I have theoretical reasons for thinking that populist leaders, who engage in a populist style of communication, confound VICS’ analysis primarily because the simplistic speaking style of populists obscures an underlying context (and by extension meaning) to that leader’s words. Because the computer cannot understand this underlying context and takes the meaning of the words said at face value, it fails to code the speeches of populists accurately and thus makes inaccurate predictions about that leader’s foreign policy. To test this theory, I conduct the content analysis on speeches made by three individuals: Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and Narendra Modi, before and after they became the executives of their respective countries, and compared them to a “norming “ group representing the average world leader. The results generally support my hypotheses but with a few caveats. For the cases of Trump and Johnson, VICS found them to be a lot more cooperative than what I would expect, but it was also able to track changes in their operational code - as they transition into the role of chief executive – in the expected direction. The opposite was the case for Modi’s operational code. All-in-all, I provide suggestive evidence that OCA using VICS has trouble providing valid results for populist leaders. / Dissertation/Thesis / Summary Statistics and Calculations of Indices / Masters Thesis Political Science 2020

The Sweden Democrats have gained considerable political success in recent years, as have many other right-wing populist parties in the West. We theorize that the economically weakest and least educated parts of native society are the ones who experience, real or imagined, the most pressure and competition from immigration. Skill level is divided into three different categories, depending on education. These are "low-skill", "medium-skill" and "high-skill". We expect that immigration should make the low-skilled and medium-skilled more prone to vote for the SD, when compared to the high-skilled natives. We use survey data from the SOM institute of Gothenburg University, as well as municipal data from Statistics Sweden, to test the hypothesis. Our results seem to show that the support for the SD among low-skilled natives increases when immigration increases, compared to high-skilled natives. No such effect is observed for the medium-skilled natives.