The rise of right-wing populism has been identified as a major threat to multilateralism, and its negative consequences for climate policy have already materialised. However, its impacts on environmental policy have been less studied, especially so regarding policy outcomes. In this paper, I strive to narrow this research gap by investigating the impacts of right-wing populism on environmental protection expenditure. I employ a panel regression analysis to examine populist government participation in all European Union member states, and I also separate countries that have experienced a right-wing populist government to explore differences across the party family. The results show no profound effects, which is anticipated. Environmental concerns are more easily conveyed within the right-wing populist logic than climate change mitigation measures, and many European PRRPs express pro-environmental policy stances - they are so-called green patriotists. Based on previous studies, I expand on this concept. Finally, the results indicate green patriotism might be influential for policy outcomes, which is another contribution of this paper to the research field.

The diploma thesis is devoted to the analysis of the political communication of Czech populist politicians in the context of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in October 2021. It aims to map the communication activity of selected political representatives and to compare how these politicians use social networks for their political communication, what influence the proximity of the elections has on the activity and narrative of their communication strategy, what topics they focus on the most in their posts and to what extent they use attributes of populism and personalization. The theoretical part focuses on the definition and genesis of the term populism with a special emphasis on the perception of populism as a communication style. Afterward, the thesis pursues the issue of political communication in the context of the emergence and spread of the Internet and social media, in particular how political leaders take advantage of this transformation of the communication environment in their political strategy. The analytical part of the thesis then examines the communication activity of three selected populist politicians (Andrej Babiš, Tomio Okamura, Robert Šlachta) on Facebook in the pre- election period, the post-election period and the period of ordinary political struggle, for a total of...

William Jennings Bryan exercised great political power for thirty years in America. Through his efforts the Democratic Party power base was broadened to include Jews, Negroes businessmen, and farmers. Bryan's call for political and social reform found many supporters in the State of Utah.It is difficult to assess what actually caused William J. Bryan to lose the 1900 Presidential election in Utah. Yet, we must put to rest the conclusion that he lost solely because silver was an unimportant issue to the Utah electorate in 1900. The powerful influence of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints on Utah politics had much to do with Bryan's reversal.

With the rising tensions and strains created by modern America, historians have sought diligently to discover the answers to industrial America's problems. One answer lay in American reform movements, and as the New Deal reforms came under fierce attack in the 1950's, liberal historians sought diligently to give to reform movements historical authenticity.

European democracies have witnessed the progressive affirmation of populist parties in the last two decades. This thesis draws from the suggestions of the theoretical literature on populism to study why European citizens support populist parties. In doing so, the aim of this thesis is twofold: on the one hand, it applies the ideational approach to populism to investigate support for populism from a comparative perspective; on the other hand, it seeks to understand how demand-side and supply-side factors contribute to explaining the cross-country and temporal heterogeneity in their electoral performances. This thesis focuses on two demand-side factors (i.e., social marginalisation and sociotropic concerns about economy) and two factors of the supply-side (i.e., liberal institutional arrangements and party competition). The results show that, first, populist parties attract significant support from citizens perceiving socially marginalised, especially in wealthy and globalised contexts; whereas sociotropic concerns about economy do not lead to higher support for populism. Second, liberal institutional arrangements increase the anti-institutional appeal of populist parties; whereas party competition on a core element of the far-right populist ideology (nativism) does not affect support for far-right populism to a great extent. This thesis shows that an approach that integrates both demand and supply side perspectives is beneficial to understand the reasons underlying support for populism.

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In conjunction with the rise of populism all over the globe, social media has been acknowledged as an important arena for populist actors to disseminate their political ideas. This thesis aims to examine the relationship between social media and right-wing populism by exploring how an online platform mediates right-wing populist discourses. In contrast to the existing literature on this relationship, the social media platform TikTok is studied in this thesis. This study examines how online activists that are campaigning for the Sweden Democrats utilize the possibilities provided by TikTok’s material functions in relation to the social context in which they are used. Participant observation was conducted to study these dynamics, understood as platform affordances. The results show that the activists disseminate right-wing populist ideas on TikTok by utilizing functions for self-publication (of video). In terms of the proliferation of these videos, populist communication styles appear to be favored on this platform. A mapping of the social composition and available resources of these activists shows that their usage of the platform to conduct activism is affected by these factors, demonstrating different pathways to becoming an influential activist on TikTok.

This study aims to look closely at a sample of the rhetoric used in the political scene in Spain today. The purpose is to see what rhetorical strategies leaders from two opposing parties, namely Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) and Santiago Abascal (VOX), use to convince voters of their own ideologies and opinions concerning the society. In addition, this study aims to see if populism, as a growing global trend, also can be found in their discourses. As populations are constantly exposed to political manipulation, investigations of political rhetoric is a continuous relevant research. The discourses chosen for this analysis were of approximately the same length, performed in nearby locations and time. A quantitative analysis was made where a list of frequently repeated words and their significance were drawn up and compared between the politicians. In addition, a qualitative analysis where the rhetorical strategies and criteria that highlight the ideological identity have been applied. The results obtained show a clear presence of populist rhetoric in the speech of Santiago Abascal (right party). To create a sense of national identity and group belonging with his listeners he used words such as Spaniards and Spain to a higher degree but also negative descriptions of others. Pedro Sánchez (left wing) also resorted to negative descriptions of others but differed by using number games to create a sense of credibility and inclusive language regarding gender.

[pt] Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar as bases sociopolíticas e econômicas da ascensão do populismo de direita conservador-autoritário no Brasil, entre os anos de 2016 e 2022, personalizado e vocalizado pelo então candidato à presidência da República Jair Messias Bolsonaro. Para isso, identificamos e analisamos os fatores conjunturais e estruturais que possibilitaram a ascensão de um ex-deputado federal ao cargo máximo do país, até então sem expressividade política e disputando o pleito por um partido político sem capilaridade nacional. Argumentamos que a vitória do ex-capitão do Exército brasileiro faz parte do fenômeno global do populismo contemporâneo na esteira da crise da representatividade nos países democráticos, mas que no caso brasileiro tem especificidade própria. Uma vez que o Brasil apresenta, ao contrário de boa parte dos Países da Europa Ocidental e dos Estados Unidos, baixa institucionalização do sistema partidário e votos, majoritariamente, personalistas, o que favorece as aventuras populistas. Ainda assim, tivemos fatores conjunturais e estruturais que favoreceram a maior inserção e o crescimento da direita no país, após 13 anos de governos do Partido dos Trabalhadores em nível nacional, bem como fatores associados às Jornadas de Junho de 2013, a Operação Lava Jato, o processo de impeachment de Dilma Rousseff, a emergência da pauta conservadora e de costumes na esfera pública. Essas circunstâncias favoreceram, pela primeira vez na história política brasileira, através do voto popular, a eleição de um candidato diretamente identificado com o campo da direita. Dessa forma, a estratégia político-eleitoral populista se organizou ao redor de cinco pilares de sustentação sociopolítica e econômica: lavajatismo e antipetismo, militares, evangélicos, agronegócio e redes sociais. No exercício do Poder Executivo, a partir de 2019, o populismo de direita de Bolsonaro estabeleceu relações conturbadas com os outros poderes da República, especialmente com o Poder Judiciário, e com os governos subnacionais, além de apoiar manifestações antidemocráticas. Podemos concluir, assim, que o bolsonarismo, como movimento político, tem um caráter mais estrutural do que conjuntural pela sua capilaridade nos segmentos sociopolíticos e econômicos da sociedade brasileira. / [en] This work aims to analyze the socio-political and economic bases of the riseof conservative-authoritarian right-wing populism in Brazil between 2016 and 2022, personalized and vocalized by then-presidential candidate Jair Messias Bolsonaro. To do this, we identified and analyzed the circumstantial and structura lfactors that made it possible for a former federal deputy to rise to the country shighest office, until then without political expressiveness and contesting the election for a political party without national capillarity. We argue that the victoryof the former Brazilian Army captain is part of the global phenomenon of contemporary populism in the wake of the crisis of representativeness in democratic countries, but that in the Brazilian case it has its own specificity. Unlike many Western European countries and the United States, Brazil has a poorly institutionalized party system and a majority of votes are personalist, which favours populist adventures. Even so, there were conjunctural and structural factors that promoted the greater insertion and growth of the right in the country, after 13 yearsof Workers Party governments at the national level, as well as factors associated with the June 2013 protests, Lava Jato Operation, Dilma Rousseff s impeachment process, the emergence of the conservative and customs agenda in the public sphere. These circumstances favored, for the first time in Brazilian political history, through the popular vote, the election of a candidate directly identified with the right-wingmovement. In this way, the populist political-electoral strategy was organized around five pillars of socio-political and economic support: lavajatismo (Lava Jato Operation) and antipetismo (anti left-wing party), the military, evangelicals, agribusiness and social networks. In the Executive Branch, from 2019, Bolsonaro sright-wing populism has established troubled relations with the other branches of government, especially the judiciary, and with sub-national governments, as wellas supporting anti-democratic demonstrations. We can therefore conclude that bolsonarismo, as a political movement, has a more structural than conjunctural character due to its capillarity in the socio-political and economic segments ofBrazilian society.

Literature on climate policy of political parties’ points to an emerging congruence between populist radical right parties and scepticism toward climate change and climate policy. This thesis explores this nexus via a case study of the Sweden Democrats (SD) climate policy over a period of twelve years (2010-2022). It examines if the Sweden Democrats have expressed variations of climate scepticism and whether this has varied over time. Idea analysis and a taxonomy of three categories of climate scepticism are used for analysing official policy material of the Sweden Democrats. This thesis finds that the Sweden Democrats have outcomes on all three categories of climate scepticism: evidence (i.e., whether human caused climate change is happening), process (related to bureaucratic and scientific processes, e.g., scepticism against dominant research paradigms and bureaucratic decision making), and response scepticism (related to policy choices dealing with climate change). Over time there has been a gradual migration of scepticism from evidence and process related scepticism toward more policy-oriented forms of scepticism that concerns type of policy and attitudinal responses to climate change. Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is primarily anchored in arguments related to desired levels of national response and issues of trade/offs, with climate scepticism frequently constructed through frameworks of the potential harm that climate mitigation may do to national sovereignty, national economy, and industries. Another finding is that the Sweden Democrats overall have a lower salience and prioritization of climate issues compared to other parties represented in parliament whose climate policy they criticize, presenting their climate policy as alternative to these parties. This thesis concludes that the Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is closer to an unconvinced stance toward climate change rather than strictly denialistic, with evidentiary sceptic arguments over time becoming less frequent and decreasing in the degree of scepticism.