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This thesis provides new insight into the EMU’s impact on the Euro-area firms’ performance, by examining the firms’ accounting rates of return and financial cash flows. The impact is evaluated separately for the EMU formation and the physical Euro adoption, and over different time horizons. The existing literature does not directly examine these issues. This study uses the regression model of the difference-in-differences approach to examine 121 Euro-area and North American firms, covering 14 sectors, over the period from 1992 to 2008. The results indicate a positive impact of the EMU on the firms’ financial cash flows, especially after the Euro adoption, which support the related literature. However, the accounting rates of return suggest a mostly negative impact. The magnitude of the impacts declines over time. The results are robust with respect to GDP as a control variable. The study also reports the EMU’s impact on 4 major industrial sectors. / viii, 68 leaves : ill. ; 29 cm

This thesis consists of four self-contained studies in empirical labor economics. Micro data on both employers and workers are used to analyze the questions asked in the essays. By using disaggregated information, issues related to firm and individual heterogeneity can be studied.The first essay, The Impact of Temporary Contracts on Gross Job and Worker Flows (with Mahmood Arai), examines job and worker flow dynamics for temporary and permanent contracts. The micro approach to job flows concerns changes in employment at the plant or firm level. Data used in earlier research on gross labor flows do not allow for a distinction between different types of employment contracts (an exception is Abowd et al. (1999). This distinction is especially important in Europe since several European countries discriminate between permanent and temporary contracts in their employment legislation.The data contain quarterly information on the stock of permanent and temporary contracts, as well as direct information on hires and separations for permanent and temporary workers. The information is from a representative sample of around 10,000 Swedish private establishments.The results indicate that temporary contracts, covering only around 10 percent of all contracts, stand for half of all gross job (and worker) flows. This means that gross job (and worker) flow rates for temporary contracts are around 10 times larger than job (and worker) flows for permanent contracts. Our results imply that job reallocation associated with temporary contracts is acyclical in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. For permanent contracts, job reallocation only exhibits a countercyclical pattern in manufacturing, characterized by a low fraction of temporary contracts. Services employing a higher fraction of temporary contracts exhibit no cyclical pattern in job reallocation, implying that establishments in services use temporary contracts as an adjustment buffer and can adjust its labor input more smoothly.The share of temporary contracts varies with the industry structure and changes as a result of sectoral shifts. This implies that cross-country comparisons, as well as studies of the dynamics of job and worker flows, based on aggregated time-series data, can be distorted by the impact of the fraction of temporary labor on gross labor flows. This, in turn, makes the distinction between permanent and temporary contracts crucial in analyzing job and worker flows, especially when labor protection laws discriminate between short-and long-term employment contracts. The second essay, Wage Dispersion and Allocation of Jobs, investigates the relationship between job turnover and the distribution of wages. One possible explanation for similar labor reallocation rates across labor markets with very different employment-protection legislations is related to differences in wage setting institutions. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) argue that although job-security laws lead to lower job flows, their impact might be reduced if differences in wage-setting institutions have opposite effects. Bertola and Rogerson’s conclusion is that when labor protection laws and wages are jointly considered, the result might very well be that job flows in countries with high adjustment costs and a compressed wage structure mimic those in countries with low adjustment costs and decentralized wages.Using establishment data on job turnover and wages for a panel of around 10,000 establishments in the Swedish private sector, the relationship between wage compression and job reallocation is studied at the industry level.Estimating industry fixed-effects models for 14 two-digit industries yield results indicating large sector differences regarding the effect of the degree of wage dispersion on job reallocation. In accordance with the Bertola and Rogerson hypothesis, this effect is positive in the manufacturing sector. Running separate regressions for job creation and job destruction shows a negative and significant effect of wage dispersion on job destruction, whereas it is insignificant in the job-creation equation. These results are in accordance with wages being more rigid downwards than upwards. The quantitative effect of the impact of wage dispersion on job turnover is limited, however. A one standard deviation increase in wage dispersion reduces the total job reallocation by around 10 percent. Turning to the non-manufacturing sector, the Bertola and Rogerson hypothesis is not supported.Further results include (i) a strong positive effect of the industry-share of temporary employees on job reallocation and (ii) a negative relationship between the use of overtime and job turnover.In the third essay, Wages, Profits and Individual Unemployment Risk: Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data (with Mahmood Arai), the impact of firm performance on individual wages is studied. Several studies have found a positive and significant effect of profits on wages. The most widely suggested interpretation for this phenomenon is that employers and employees engage in rent-sharing, thereby splitting the profits created between themselves.The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of rent-sharing and the impact of individual and aggregated unemployment risk on wages of individual workers. We use a sample of over 170,000 Swedish employees for 1991 and 1995 matched with their employing firm’s profits and the unemployment registers. The matched data contain detailed information on individual characteristics, including their unemployment experience during 1992-1995 as well as annual profits as reported in the firms’ balance-sheet reports.The contribution of this paper is that it provides evidence on the wage determination, based on disaggregated individual and firm data dealing with the problems of firm and worker heterogeneity, and the endogeneity of profits. Our results imply positive effects of profits on wages, both in 1991 and 1995. The reported elasticities imply that the wage inequality in Sweden due to the spread in profits is as high as 13% of the mean wages in 1991, according to Lester’s range of pay. These correlations are robust for controlling for time-invariant unobserved individual- and firm characteristics.Using firm-reported short-term product market elasticity and the number of competitors as instruments for profits suggest Lester’s measure of wage inequality due to profits to be as high as 50% of the mean wages.Finally, we investigate the impact of individual heterogeneity with respect to unemployment risk that might also affect wages. We include the individuals’ unemployment event record in our regressions, and our results confirm that individuals with a higher unemployment risk also have lower wages. Including aggregated measures along with individual unemployment risk in our estimations show results suggesting that there exists a robust negative correlation between unemployment risk and wages at various aggregation levels.The final essay, Pay Inequality and Firm Performance: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data, tests several implications from tournament models on the same matched employer-employee data set as in essay 3.According to a variety of theories, the wage distribution both within and between firms can have important effects on individual productivity and firm performance. One argument for high wage differentials, based on incentive effects, is found in Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) tournament theory. Higher wage differentials lead to higher individual effort, and are therefore productivity enhancing. This, in turn, suggests that there is a positive relationship between wage dispersion and productivity. The opposite relationship is found in theories stressing fairness and cooperation between co-workers.For white-collar workers, the results show a positive effect of intra-firm pay spread on firm performance for 1991 and 1995. This applies to different measures of wage dispersion, capturing both raw differences and differences corrected for the fact that part of the wage spread is due to differences in human capital accumulation. To take firm heterogeneity into account, difference equations are estimated on a panel of firms. Once more, consistent with tournament theory, a positive and significant effect of wage dispersion on profits is found. The results for managers are based on information on about 10,000 managers. For various measures of wage dispersion and specifications, a positive and significant association between managerial pay and profits is found. No support is found for the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the number of managers (contestants) and wage spread. Instead, the results show a negative and significant effect of the number of executives and pay spread among managers.Finally, consistent with tournament theory, higher wage dispersion is found in firms operating in volatile product markets characterized by a high degree of output uncertainty. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2002

GONÇALVES, Francisco Luiz Salles. A participação dos trabalhadores nos lucros e resultados das empresas: dinâmicas e tendências. 2004. 98f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Sociologia). Universidade Federal do Ceará, Departamento de Ciências Sociais, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia, Fortaleza-CE, 2004. / Submitted by GLAUBENILSON CAVALCANTE (glaubenilson@yahoo.com.br) on 2011-11-18T14:09:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2004_DIS_FLSGONCALVES.pdf: 477229 bytes, checksum: 7d230c4e035a5b324c7ca108b7de710b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Josineide Góis(josineide@ufc.br) on 2011-11-28T13:16:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2004_DIS_FLSGONCALVES.pdf: 477229 bytes, checksum: 7d230c4e035a5b324c7ca108b7de710b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-11-28T13:16:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2004_DIS_FLSGONCALVES.pdf: 477229 bytes, checksum: 7d230c4e035a5b324c7ca108b7de710b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004 / Minha dissertação procura atribuir a devida importância ao surgimento da Participação dos Trabalhadores nos lucros das empresas, de forma a analisar seus aspectos positivos e negativos. Procura mostrar que na estrutura sindical, política e social do Brasil, a PLRtenda a trazer mais aspectos positivos que negativos, do ponto de vista dos trabalhadores, da autonomia sindical e da melhoria da distribuição de renda. O grande ponto fraco do sindicalismo brasileiro sempre foi sua ausência dos locais de trabalho, imposta pela CLT, e a lei da PLR abriu, pela primeira vez, de forma legítima, protegida por lei, a possibilidade deste tipo de ação. Meu convívio com sindicalistas, e também com empresários, ao participar, ao lado dos trabalhadores, em negociações coletivas de trabalho, foi muito útil, desde o início, sugerindo-me a importância potencial da PLR e a necessidade de despertar um interesse mais amplo, entre os trabalhadores e na sociedade em geral, a seu respeito. / Ma dissertation éssaie de donner sa vraie importance à la loi qui a établi la Participation des Travailleurs aux Bénefits et Résultats des Entreprises, en analisant ses aspects positifs et négatifs. Elle éssaie de montrer que, données les conditions à l´intérieur de la structure syndicale, politique et sociale du Brésil, la "PLR" dévrait entraîner, du point de vue des travailleurs, une amélioration des conditions de mobilization et des luttes dans les entreprises. de l´autonomie syndicale et de la distribution des révenus. Le principal point faible du syndicalisme brésilien a toujours eté son absence imposée des locaux de travail. Or, la loi de laPLR a iuvert, par la premiére fois, de forme legitime, protegée par la loi, la possibilité de ce genre d´action. Mon travail a coté des syndicalistes, et même face aux entrepreneurs,dans les negotiations coltectives, a eté très utile, dés le début, me faisant voir l´importance potentielle de la PLR et la necessité d´ éveiller un plus fort interêt, chez les eux, et dans la societé en general, a ce sujet.

The role that banks as key intermediaries play in the modern economy activities is unquestionable, it is admitted that banks remain one of the key financial intermediaries that provide a variety of services in the economy of every state. However, not all financial intermediaries have a significant impact on modern economies, only a stable and profitable banking sector can adequately play the role of financial intermediary in economy. The bank, as an intermediary in the modern economy must be profitable, and this profitability depends on a number of factors that are referred to in this study as determinants of bank profitability. The effect of internal and external determinants of the bank profitability in South Africa is the main focus of this study. It utilized annual time series internal and external data for the period 2001 to 2013. Quantitative approach methodology using secondary data and panel data technique to measure the impact of the determinants was used in the study. The sample consists of nine banks, followed for 12 years and sampled annually. The results for bank-specific consist of four statistically significant variables such as bank size, non-interest income and non-interest expense and credit risk and four non-significant variables (equity capital, loan, saving deposit, fixe term deposit) also the industry-specific consist only one significant variable (market concentration) while macro-economic determinants consist of three non-significant variables (economic growth, inflation, and lending interest rate). In conclusion, the empirical result shows that the bank specific factors are directly controlled by the Management thereby it has a positive correlation to the bank profitability while the industry specific (market concentration) also positively affects the bank profitability. However, the macroeconomic variables which are beyond the scope of management control were non-significant to profitability but show positive sign. Therefore, the variables which are significant affect positively the bank profitability, and the non-significant variables affect the bank profitability negatively. The findings were consistent with mixed results found in prior literature. / Business Management / M. Com. (Business Management)

A sociological approach is used to analyze incidences of extreme opportunism in financial markets. Through an analysis of arguably the most widely publicized "rogue" trader events in recent history, a determination is made of the validity of explaining these events as aberrations, attributable to the actions of "rogues". The primary focus is the role of structural factors underlying these incidences of extreme opportunism in financial markets. A diverse range of documentary and other sources is used to avoid any form of bias as far as possible. It was found that structural factors act as countervailing forces to inhibit such behavior or as motivators and facilitators acting as catalysts for extreme opportunism. The balance between these factors largely determines the level of opportunistic behavior in a particular environment. Extreme opportunism is therefore not an aberration or "rogue" occurrence but a manageable phenomenon intrinsic to the social structural context within which it occurs. By conceptualizing these factors as countervailing forces one is forced to view structural factors, like compensation structures and formal and informal restraints, relative to one another and no longer in isolation. This realization translates into the conclusion that restraints and oversight systems for example, should be designed relative to the relevant motivators and facilitators in its area of application. In an environment where traders of highly geared financial products are motivated with multimillion USD incentive packages, a low budget oversight system and inexperienced regulatory staff, is clearly not the appropriate tools to control and manage extreme opportunism. / Criminology and Security Science / D.Phil. (Sociology)

The principal goal of this research study was to critically evaluate the current accounting treatment of purchased goodwill in terms of a theoretical framework established, including an evaluation of the true nature of goodwill. The main conclusion of this study is that goodwill is an intangible asset representing various intangible factors contributing to the enterprise's earning capacity and providing returns in excess of a normal return on assets employed for which an acquiring enterprise is willing to pay an amount in excess of the fair value of the identifiable net assets acquired. The cost of purchased goodwill is measured as the difference between the total purchase price and the fair value of the net assets acquired after ensuring that all assets, tangible and intangible, had been properly identified. Purchased goodwill should be amortised over the estimated period that the enterprise is expected to benefit from the acquisition of the goodwill. / Financial Accounting / M. Com. (Accounting Science (Applied Accountancy))

South African company law is currently the object of comprehensive review. One o f the areas under scrutiny is that of corporate governance. Control over management is vital in the interests of the company itself, its shareholders and its creditors. Effective accountability should be balanced against the need to allow those who manage a certain measure of freedom and discretion in the exercise of their function. Company directors are subject to various duties. This thesis concentrates on their fiduciary obligation. It is suggested that this sui generis obligation is owed to the company as a separate entity. Interests of other groups may sometimes merit con­ sideration. Against the background o f a com parative investigation, a "corporate opportunity" is defined as any property or economic opportunity to which the com­ pany has a claim. South African law protects a company’s claim to an opportunity if it is in the company’s line of business and if the company has justifiably been relying upon the director(s) to acquire it or to assist in its acquisition for the company. The application of established fiduciary principles suffice to resolve corporate opportunity matters. Essentially the application o f these rules amount to a determination whether the director has complied with his fundamental duty to act in the company’s best interests. There seems to be no need for a separate doctrine of corporate opportunities.' A director should only be absolved from liability on account of the company’s inability to pursue an opportunity or its rejection by the company if there was no real conflict of interest. The appropriation of corporate opportunities should not be ratifiable, both because the ratification constitutes a fraud on the minority, and because the decision to ratify cannot be regarded as being in the interests of the company. The relationship between the appropriation of corporate opportunities, misuse of confidential information and competition is investigated. These aspects fre­ quently overlap, but should be distinguished because their bases, and accordingly their appropriate remedies, may differ. Effective control may benefit by a restatement of directors’ fiduciary duties in the Companies Act. To this end certain amendments to the Act are recommended. / Mercantile Law / LLD

A presente dissertação examina a cessão fiduciária do direito do acionista aos dividendos, bem como a titularidade fiduciária (garantia real) dela resultante. A razão para a análise desses institutos deve-se ao aumento no uso desta forma de garantia em operações financeiras complexas realizadas no mercado nacional. Primeiramente, é feita uma análise das diversas acepções (perfis) que o direito do acionista ao dividendo pode assumir no contexto do ordenamento jurídico nacional, para daí concluir que tal direito é passível de cessão tanto em sua condição de crédito, presente ou futuro (a depender, justamente, da existência ou não de lucros sociais já deliberados), quanto em sua condição de direito expectativo. Isto é, de direito que o acionista detém, a partir do momento em que se torna titular de ações, de vir a adquirir direitos de créditos de dividendos a serem distribuídos pela companhia de tempos em tempos. Em razão da necessidade da imediata constituição da garantia real, especialmente diante de uma eventual falência ou recuperação judicial do devedor, este trabalho conclui que a titularidade fiduciária deve recair sobre o direito expectativo aos dividendos, visto ser ele um direito já existente e que permite ao seu respectivo titular se tornar, direta e imediatamente, proprietário dos créditos de dividendos que vierem a ser futuramente distribuídos pela companhia, desde que estes estejam limitados a certos valores e/ou períodos previamente acordados entre o credor/financiador e o devedor/acionista. Ademais, apesar de ser um direito inerente à participação social, o destaque e a cessão autônoma do direito expectativo aos dividendos não conflita com o disposto no art. 28 da LSA. O presente estudo argumenta também que o credor fiduciário pode, nos termos do art. 113 da LSA, exercer certos direitos de voto na companhia, desde que (1) o objeto da garantia seja o direito expectativo aos dividendos e (2) a sua influência nas deliberações sociais restrinja-se a estabelecer a forma como o lucro social será apurado e distribuído pela sociedade. Por fim, é argumentado também que, por ser uma garantia que recai sobre direitos patrimoniais pagos em dinheiro, duas consequências imediatas revelam- se aplicáveis: (i) durante o período em que não existe qualquer inadimplemento ou vencimento regular da dívida garantida, os dividendos que vierem a ser pagos pela companhia deverão ser destinados ao acionista devedor, podendo o credor deles se beneficiar apenas quando existir o efetivo vencimento ou inadimplemento da dívida; e (ii) durante o período de inadimplemento ou na data de vencimento regular da dívida, o credor pode reter os recursos necessários à satisfação de seu crédito, desde que restitua o eventual excedente ao acionista devedor, não havendo, por isso, razão que justifique o enquadramento da excussão da garantia como sendo uma violação à proibição do pacto comissório, conforme prevista no Direito brasileiro. / This dissertation examines the fiduciary assignment of shareholders rights to dividends, as well as the fiduciary ownership (security interest) resulting from it. The reason for the analysis of these legal institutes comes from the increasing use of this type of security interest in complex financial transactions carried out in the local markets. Firstly, this works conducts the analysis of the various meanings (perspectives) which shareholders\' rights to dividends may have in different contexts of the Brazilian legal system, concluding that this right may be transferred either as a credit right, existing in the present or in the future (depending precisely on the existence of corporate profits already distributed or not), or as an expectance right. By this last one, we mean the right held by the shareholder as soon as he/she/it becomes the owner of the shares issued by a certain company that enables him/her/it to become the owner of the dividends distributed by the company from time to time. Due to the importance of the immediate granting of the security interest, especially in light of a possible bankruptcy or judicial reorganization process involving the debtor, this paper concludes that the fiduciary ownership should have the expectance right to dividends as its underlying asset. This is so because such right is already an existing right that allows the shareholder to become, directly and immediately, the owner of the dividends to be distributed by the company in the future, as long as those dividends are limited to certain amounts or periods previously agreed between the creditor/financier and the debtor/shareholder. Furthermore, despite being an inherent right to the equity stake, the detach of the expectance right to dividends from the shares which comes from, following by its assignment to other parties, does not conflict with the provision set forth in Section 28 of the Brazilian Corporation Act. This study also argues that the secured creditor may exercise certain voting rights in the company responsible for the payment of the dividends, pursuant to Section 113 of the Brazilian Corporation Act, provided that: (1) the underlying asset of the security interest is the expectance right to dividends; and (2) his/her/its influence in the companys decisions is limited to the manner according to which the corporate profits will be accounted and distributed by the company. Finally, it is also argued that, for being a security interest that has receivables as its underlying assets, two consequences turn out to be applicable. (i) Over the period in which there is no default or regular maturity of the secured debt, dividends paid by the company shall be allocated in favor of the shareholder/debtor. The creditor will be able to receive them in the maturity date or upon the occurrence of a default only. (ii) Over a default period or on the regular maturity date, the creditor may retain the necessary amount of dividends to satisfy his/her/its credit, provided that any excess cash shall be transferred to the shareholder/debtor, reason for which there are reasonable grounds to sustain that this foreclosure mechanism does not violate the non-retention of collateral assets convention rule (pacto comissório) provided under Brazilian law.

M.Comm. (Financial Management) / There is a wide perception that bank net interest margins (NIMs) in Sub-Saharan Africa in general and South Africa in particular, are higher compared to other regions. The study investigates four commercial banks in South Africa with the aim of identifying the relevant factors affecting the behaviour of NIMs in commercial banking in South Africa, and draws comparisons with other markets. The study employs the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) data estimating technique to analyse net interest margins over the period 2000 to 2010. The study takes note of Ho and Saunders’s seminal work produced in 1981, and subsequent extensions and modification by other authors and researchers. Net interest margins are modeled in a single-step together with explanatory variables driven from the theoretical model. Using data obtained from the Bankscope data base, the variables examined in the study are; competitive structure of the market, average operating costs, management’s propensity for risk aversion, credit risk exposure, the quantum of the bank’s operations, short-term money market interest rate volatility, the opportunity cost of holding reserves and quality of management running the institution. The findings of the study suggest that market power, average operating costs, degree of risk aversion, credit risk exposure, and size of operations are major factors explaining the behaviour of NIMs in South Africa. These variables are major in terms of the number of banks that exhibit statistical significance. Market power, interest rate volatility and opportunity cost of holding reserves are also relevant factors, although they affect fewer banks than the major factors. Comparison of South African net interest margins determinants with those from other regions reveals some fundamental differences. These differences indicate that banks from different countries and regions are faced with different operating environments and risk profiles that drive net interest margins.