When UN peacekeeping forces engage in unauthorized actions the question of which entity, the UN or the troop contributing nation, can be held responsible arises. UN peacekeeping forces are generally not considered to be UN subsidiary organs, but organs of the state put at the disposal of the UN. Therefore, a conduct of the peacekeeping force is attributable to the UN if it exercises effective control over that conduct.  The presumptive view of the effective control test consists of a presumption and a rebuttal phase. The conduct of a UN peacekeeping force is presumed to be attributable to the UN. If national contingents follow instructions from their contributing state and therefore fall out of the effective control of the UN, the presumption is rebutted. The presumptive view may, however, lead to responsibility gaps by presuming attribution to the UN, which enjoys immunity in national courts leaving victims without effective remedies. Dual attribution creates a possibility of attributing one conduct not only to the UN but also to the troop contributing nation. By applying dual attribution on conduct of UN Peacekeeping Forces some responsibility gaps could be avoided. If this possibility will be used in the future to ensure victims effective remedies, is up to the courts to decide.

Dataskyddsförordningen trädde i kraft den 25 maj 2018 och sedan dess har cirka fem år av rättsutveckling skett inom Sverige på det dataskyddsrättsliga området. Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten utövar tillsyn för dataskyddsförordningens efterlevande och har därför stor påverkan på hur dataskyddsförordningen bedöms inom Sverige.  Syftet med arbetet har varit att granska Integritetsskyddsmyndighetens beslutsfattande, både kvalitativt och kvantitativt för att sedan kunna dra vissa slutsatser gällande rättsutvecklingen. Undersökningen ämnar utreda vilka rättsområden som är aktuella, vad resultatet blir av överträdelser samt hur IMY resonerar i sina beslut. Metoden har varit i grunden rättsdogmatisk med vissa kvantitativa och kvalitativa moment. Detta har genomförts genom granskning av 67 beslut som Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten själva publicerat på sin hemsida för allmän tillgång, delvis i syfte att de ska vara vägledande. Resultaten har presenterats i nio olika diagram. Arbetets andra del har utgjorts av en kvalitativ granskning av Integritetsskyddsmyndighetens beslut inom rättsområdena kamerabevakning, överföring till tredjeland samt registrerades rättigheter. Utifrån det har bedömningarna brutits ner ytterligare genom att vissa artiklar i dataskyddsförordningen behandlas del för del.  Resultatet utifrån den kvantitativa undersökningen visar att beslut lett till åtgärd i 84 % av besluten och 16 % av besluten lämnades utan åtgärd. Sanktion var den mest populära åtgärden, vald i 60% av besluten följt av föreläggande med 36 %. Besluten hade överklagats till allmän förvaltningsdomstol i 34 % av besluten vilket visar att 66 % av Integritetsskyddsmyndighetens beslut slagits fast. Av de överklagade besluten som avgjorts i allmän förvaltningsdomstol instämde domstolen med IMY i 50 % av fallen respektive helt upphävt IMY:s beslut i 25 % av fallen. Inom rättsområdena kamerabevakning, överföring till tredjeland och registrerades rättigheter beaktades omständigheterna i det enskilda fallet men IMY har också tillförlitat sig på tolkningskällor som EU-domstolsavgöranden, förarbeten, EDPB:s riktlinjer samt svensk rättspraxis. Av de överklagade besluten som avgjorts i domstol instämde inte alltid förvaltningsdomstolarna i IMY:s bedömning, ibland gällande sakfråga och ibland huruvida en viss överträdelse ska leda till sanktion. Ett mål inom rättsfrågan kamerabevakning har beviljats prövningstillstånd i Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen.  Det kan dras olika slutsatser och lärdomar utifrån det underlag som använts i arbetet. Dataskyddsförordningens artiklar kan vara svårbedömda och måste avvägas utifrån enskilda fallet. Ju mer digitaliserad världen blir, desto mer behövs dataskyddsreglerna.

Skolverket beskriver i sina kursplaner för juridik att det juridiska språket ställer stora krav på exakthet, precision, saklighet och logisk skärpa. En del av det centrala innehållet i de tre juridiska gymnasiekurserna, Privatjuridik, Rätten och samhället samt Affärsjuridik, är juridiska begrepp och ett betygskriterium handlar om hur väl eleven kan förklara och använda juridiska begrepp.   Syftet med studien är att undersöka de didaktiska framgångsfaktorerna och utmaningarna vid undervisning av juridiska begrepp. Undersökningen har genomförts genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med fyra gymnasielärare.   Resultatet visar att lärarna organiserar undervisningen på liknande sätt genom bland annat genomgångar, begreppslistor, övningsuppgifter och rättsfall. De juridiska begreppen i sig beskrivs som såväl en framgångsfaktor som en utmaning för juridikundervisningen.    Lärarna beskriver att tala med juridiska begrepp, arbeta med begreppen, kontextualisera och en balans mellan elev- och läraraktivitet som framgångsfaktorer vid begreppsundervisningen. Lärarna framhåller även att få eleverna att förstå behovet av de juridiska begreppen samt repetition som framgångsfaktorer. Språket komplexitet beskrivs som den största utmaningen. Därtill beskrivs utmaningar såsom svaga språkkunskaper i svenska, stora grupper samt begränsat med tid.     Majoriteten av de intervjuade lärarna har svårt att initialt redogöra för grunden till de didaktiska val och överväganden som de gör vid utformningen av undervisningen. Detta kan möjligen bero på att den juridiska ämnesdidaktiken är outvecklad.

Aggressive tax planning practices through schemes involving low-tax jurisdictions have been the target of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to end harmful tax competition and the so-called “race to the bottom”. Pillar Two Model Rules is the latest OECD way to achieve this objective. This thesis calls into question the design of these rules when applied to the realities of developing countries and argues that the idea that the GloBE Rules are a golden opportunity for source countries to raise significant additional tax revenues seems to fail when confronted with the circumstances of developing countries, mainly source countries. The design of the Pillar Two provisions makes countries’ tax policies intertwined. Therefore, developing countries are not exempt from Pillar Two consequences whether they choose or not to domestically implement its rules. The challenge is real for these countries, which must assess the potential impact on their tax competition and future tax revenues and determine whether the GloBE rules can help them achieve their sustainable development goals. This thesis attempts to give a perspective on what lies ahead for these countries in the Pillar Two new era.

In October 2021, 137 countries and jurisdictions agreed on a common approach towards a global minimum tax of 15% on the profits of large multinational companies that is referred to as the Pillar Two Model Rules, ‘Anti Global Base Erosion’, or ‘GloBE’ Rules. This political agreement implies that member countries who wish to implement such a tax regime have to streamline its design by modelling it after the so called Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (‘GloBE’) that the IF has developed as ‘Pillar 2’ of its work program on tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy. On 17 June 2015, the European Commission presented an Action Plan for a fairer and more efficient corporate tax system in the European Union (EU). The powerful document re-defines the future course of corporate taxation in the EU. The GloBE Model Rules are an opportunity – an impulse – for the European Union to begin coordinating tax rates in corporate income tax among its Member States and to proceed further, in the near future, in the direction of harmonizing those rates. On December 22, 2021, the European Union (EU) announced the Proposal for a Directive to ensure a global minimum level of taxes for multinational groups. It follows the Pillar Two implementation planoutlined in the Inclusive Framework (IF) statement released on October 8, 2021, and the model rules published on December 20, 2021.5In this thesis the authors focus on whether the Global Anti-Base Erosion (‘GloBE’) rules, specifically Income Inclusion Rule, as set out in an Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’) Blueprint of October 2020, comply with the EU fundamental freedoms. This compatibility is tested based on two differentscenario’s. In the first scenario the assumption is taken that the GloBErules will be implemented directly by the Members States (Assumption A). It will be addressed by the rule of reason doctrine by analysing which freedoms are getting affected then making a restriction test, then justification test and finally the proportionality test. In the second assumption is that the GloBE-rules will be implemented indirectly through an EU Directive (Assumption B). This analysis will show that, even though the GloBE-rules conflict with the freedom of establishment, they could still be implemented effectively because of the considerable discretion granted to the Union legislature by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).7 The directive at discussion in the thesis is the Minimum tax directive 2022/2523.

No description available.

No description available.

The enforcement mechanism of international investment arbitral awards is an es- sential safeguard for resolving investment disputes. Under the existing machinery, the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention provide an effective legal framework for the enforcement of international arbitral awards. Many countries have provided a favorable domestic statutory regime for investor-state arbitral awards enforcement.  With China's accession to the ICSID Convention and the signing of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties with many countries, China has become more open and active in international investment in recent years. At the same time, some legal risks in settling investment disputes have emerged. For instance, one of the most significant issues is whether investor-state arbitral awards can be ef- fectively enforced in the PRC.  Though the New York Convention was primarily designed to enforce commercial arbitral awards, it is widely accepted that it also permits the enforcement of awards against sovereign states. However, it is risky for overseas investors resort- ing enforcement in the PRC based on the New York Convention since China left the commercial reservation clause when acceding to the New York Convention.  Thus, the ICSID Convention is more beneficial for foreign investors when entering into contracts with the PRC. However, the execution of ICSID awards is subject to the domestic law of the enforcement forum, but China does not provide specific domestic legislation that complies with the ICSID Convention. Therefore, some legal obstacles should be carefully considered during the enforcement phase, such as sovereign immunity and public policy.  This thesis focuses on the enforcement regime of investor-state arbitral awards under the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention. It also predicts the legal risks of enforcing investor-state arbitral awards in the PRC, thus putting 2 forward suggestions for overseas investors and for improving the Chinese arbitra- tion legal system.

No description available.

Corruption, and in particular the bribery of public officials, causes great harm to society, especially in countries with economies in transition and in developing countries. Pervasive corruption affects both citizens and businesses. This phenomenon, unfortunately, has also affected the practice of international investment arbitration, where the arbitration tribunal, in the course of resolving disputes between an investor and the state, has to deal with facts of possible corruption (giving a bribe, bribing the public officials, and so on) on the part of investors during the entry into the state market, which, undoubtedly, does not correspond to the legal norms of almost any state. This fact is used by states (as a rule, respondents in investment arbitration) as a tool to exclude the jurisdiction of the investment arbitration tribunal. In this paper, an in-depth analysis of the legal mechanisms for excluding the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal in connection with investor corruption will be provided, as well as a number of high-profile investment arbitration cases in which the arbitration tribunal ruled that there was no jurisdiction due to corrupt actions of the investor during the investment process will be examined.