Innovation is widely seen as a basis for competition and knowledge plays a key role in underlying its effectiveness in the present economy which is knowledge-based. The innovation process is highly complex and uncertain; it is fraught with ambiguity, risks, errors and failures. How organisations respond to these downsides is not well reflected in the literature. They are often placed in a black box and left empirically unexplored. This researcher attempts to penetrate this box with an exploratory empirical study consisting of two research phases rooted in positivism. In Phase 1, a questionnaire survey is carried out with error management culture, organisational learning and knowledge management as antecedents of innovation effectiveness. The survey data collected are deductively analysed to test these four constructs. In Phase 2, the same data are inductively explored to determine the factors underlying innovation effectiveness. From deduction, knowledge management is found to be the sole antecedent of innovation effectiveness, affirming the importance of knowledge to innovation. From induction, autonomy and trust are found to be key factors underlying innovation effectiveness. Their attributes in this study are collaboration, knowledge sharing and control (for autonomy) and behaviour, relationship and reciprocal faith (for trust). The contributions from this study are – (a) an empirical confirmation on the importance of knowledge to innovation and (b) the derivation of autonomy and trust as key factors underlying its effectiveness. In addition, it contributes to research methodology with an exploratory integration of deduction and induction as complimentary modes of inference to facilitate the understanding of complex subjects like innovation. As a positivist research does not answer the causal how and why of innovation, it is recommended that future research on a similar topic moves to critical realism as a philosophical realm when an ontological dimension can be added to the epistemological exploration posited in positivism as found in this study.

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Made available in DSpace on 2015-10-21T01:03:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000475816-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 891315 bytes, checksum: 2f04cd28f1d31506ab10c98f28758679 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / The present study aims to establish a relationship between the thinking of Thomas Kuhn in Philosophy of Science and the thinking of Joseph Schumpeter for Economy, establishing a parallel between the concepts of "Scientific Revolution" proposed by Kuhn and "Creative Destruction" proposed by Schumpeter. Despite their interest in different areas, both Thomas Kuhn and Joseph Schumpeter considered that their fields have subjectivities related to human, social, and historical issues, and that organization and progress were the result of human understanding and its ensuing relations. To achieve this goal, we will discuss the central ideas of Thomas Kuhn, including the notions of “paradigm”, “normal science” and “incommensurability”, as described in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn’s main work. We will also emphasize the historical context of Kuhn’s work by highlighting the most prominent Philosophy of Science thinkers preceding him, as well as Kuhn’s responses to the main criticisms to his work, especially "relativism" and "irrationalism." An additional aim of the present study is to describe the evolution of Economy until its establishment as a "normal science" from a Kuhnian perspective. This will be done by illustrating the development on economic thinking until its neoclassical formulation, and by showing the significant consolidation that Economy studies have achieved since the first ideas of Adam Smith. Joseph Schumpeter’s ideas will be detailed from the perspective of the evolution of economic thinking, revealing his estrangement, as also occurs with Kuhn, from traditional ideas of equilibrium of the economic system. We will show that Schumpeter introduces elements of disequilibrium in environments that were previously considered stable, such as consumer behavior and production techniques. Thomas Kuhn and Joseph Schumpeter seem to have understood, each in their own way, that the scientific and economic processes lack a set of neutral categories that are independent of culture, because human and historical aspects are always combined to produce our choices and behaviors. Therefore, absolute rationalism is denied by both thinkers, who assume disequilibrium and disruption as part of their study areas. / A presente dissertação pretende estabelecer uma relação entre o pensamento de Thomas Kuhn na Filosofia da Ciência e o pensamento de Joseph Schumpeter para a Economia, estabelecendo um paralelismo entre os conceitos de “revolução científica” em Kuhn e “destruição criadora” em Schumpeter. Tanto Thomas Kuhn quanto Joseph Schumpeter, apesar de serem pensadores de áreas distintas, consideravam que seus campos de estudo tinham subjetividades relacionadas a aspectos humanos, sociais, e históricos, onde a organização e progresso davam-se como resultado da compreensão humana e de suas relações. Para tanto, iremos desenvolver as ideias centrais de Thomas Kuhn, como “paradigma”, “ciência normal” e “incomensurabilidade”, a partir de sua principal obra “A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas”. Também daremos ênfase a seu contexto histórico a partir dos pensadores até ali destacados na Filosofia da Ciência, e sua resposta às principais críticas recebidas, podendo-se destacar o “relativismo” e o “irracionalismo”. Este trabalho pretende também descrever a evolução da Economia até seu estabelecimento como “ciência normal” a partir de uma perspectiva Kuhniana. Para tanto iremos ilustrar a evolução do pensamento econômico até sua formulação neoclássica, onde será possível verificar a significativa consolidação que os estudos da Economia alcançaram desde as primeiras ideias de Adam Smith. As ideias do economista Joseph Schumpeter serão detalhadas a partir da evolução do pensamento econômico, revelando seu distanciamento, assim como em Kuhn, das ideias tradicionais de equilíbrio do sistema econômico. Será possível observar que Schumpeter colocou elementos de desequilíbrio no que antes era considerado estável, como o comportamento do consumidor ou as técnicas de produção. Thomas Kuhn e Joseph Schumpeter parecem ter entendido cada a um seu modo, que no processo científico e econômico, não há um conjunto de categorias que sejam neutras e independentes da cultura, pois sempre haveria combinações nas escolhas e nos comportamentos que teriam aspectos humanos e históricos. Nesse sentido, o racionalismo absoluto é negado por ambos, já que consideravam o desequilíbrio e a ruptura como parte integrante de suas áreas de estudo.

By using statistical methods and methods of macroeconomic analysis it has been proved that Schumpeter's theory of the creative destruction works not only as a theoretical model but it holds true even in real economics. With these methods it has been proved that during the currency and economic crisis in the 1997 and following the creative destruction was present in Czech economy and that it has changed the economy to be more effective and more productive than it was before which has helped to reach steeper growth rate afterwards. This means that the crisis through the creative destruction in fact has improved a condition of the whole Czech economy. Such an improvement has been also proved by an international comparison with the economy of the Slovak republic where the creative destruction didn't act so much due to an absence of economic crisis.

Submitted by Setor de Tratamento da Informa??o - BC/PUCRS (tede2@pucrs.br) on 2015-10-20T10:09:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 475816 Texto Completo.pdf: 891315 bytes, checksum: 2f04cd28f1d31506ab10c98f28758679 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-10-20T10:09:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 475816 Texto Completo.pdf: 891315 bytes, checksum: 2f04cd28f1d31506ab10c98f28758679 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-10 / The present study aims to establish a relationship between the thinking of Thomas Kuhn in Philosophy of Science and the thinking of Joseph Schumpeter for Economy, establishing a parallel between the concepts of "Scientific Revolution" proposed by Kuhn and "Creative Destruction" proposed by Schumpeter. Despite their interest in different areas, both Thomas Kuhn and Joseph Schumpeter considered that their fields have subjectivities related to human, social, and historical issues, and that organization and progress were the result of human understanding and its ensuing relations. To achieve this goal, we will discuss the central ideas of Thomas Kuhn, including the notions of ?paradigm?, ?normal science? and ?incommensurability?, as described in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn?s main work. We will also emphasize the historical context of Kuhn?s work by highlighting the most prominent Philosophy of Science thinkers preceding him, as well as Kuhn?s responses to the main criticisms to his work, especially "relativism" and "irrationalism." An additional aim of the present study is to describe the evolution of Economy until its establishment as a "normal science" from a Kuhnian perspective.This will be done by illustrating the development on economic thinking until its neoclassical formulation, and by showing the significant consolidation that Economy studies have achieved since the first ideas of Adam Smith. Joseph Schumpeter?s ideas will be detailed from the perspective of the evolution of economic thinking, revealing his estrangement, as also occurs with Kuhn, from traditional ideas of equilibrium of the economic system. We will show that Schumpeter introduces elements of disequilibrium in environments that were previously considered stable, such as consumer behavior and production techniques. Thomas Kuhn and Joseph Schumpeter seem to have understood, each in their own way, that the scientific and economic processes lack a set of neutral categories that are independent of culture, because human and historical aspects are always combined to produce our choices and behaviors. Therefore, absolute rationalism is denied by both thinkers, who assume disequilibrium and disruption as part of their study areas. / A presente disserta??o pretende estabelecer uma rela??o entre o pensamento de Thomas Kuhn na Filosofia da Ci?ncia e o pensamento de Joseph Schumpeter para a Economia, estabelecendo um paralelismo entre os conceitos de ?revolu??o cient?fica? em Kuhn e ?destrui??o criadora? em Schumpeter. Tanto Thomas Kuhn quanto Joseph Schumpeter, apesar de serem pensadores de ?reas distintas, consideravam que seus campos de estudo tinham subjetividades relacionadas a aspectos humanos, sociais, e hist?ricos, onde a organiza??o e progresso davam-se como resultado da compreens?o humana e de suas rela??es. Para tanto, iremos desenvolver as ideias centrais de Thomas Kuhn, como ?paradigma?, ?ci?ncia normal? e ?incomensurabilidade?, a partir de sua principal obra ?A Estrutura das Revolu??es Cient?ficas?. Tamb?m daremos ?nfase a seu contexto hist?rico a partir dos pensadores at? ali destacados na Filosofia da Ci?ncia, e sua resposta ?s principais cr?ticas recebidas, podendo-se destacar o ?relativismo? e o ?irracionalismo?. Este trabalho pretende tamb?m descrever a evolu??o da Economia at? seu estabelecimento como ?ci?ncia normal? a partir de uma perspectiva Kuhniana.Para tanto iremos ilustrar a evolu??o do pensamento econ?mico at? sua formula??o neocl?ssica, onde ser? poss?vel verificar a significativa consolida??o que os estudos da Economia alcan?aram desde as primeiras ideias de Adam Smith. As ideias do economista Joseph Schumpeter ser?o detalhadas a partir da evolu??o do pensamento econ?mico, revelando seu distanciamento, assim como em Kuhn, das ideias tradicionais de equil?brio do sistema econ?mico. Ser? poss?vel observar que Schumpeter colocou elementos de desequil?brio no que antes era considerado est?vel, como o comportamento do consumidor ou as t?cnicas de produ??o. Thomas Kuhn e Joseph Schumpeter parecem ter entendido cada a um seu modo, que no processo cient?fico e econ?mico, n?o h? um conjunto de categorias que sejam neutras e independentes da cultura, pois sempre haveria combina??es nas escolhas e nos comportamentos que teriam aspectos humanos e hist?ricos. Nesse sentido, o racionalismo absoluto ? negado por ambos, j? que consideravam o desequil?brio e a ruptura como parte integrante de suas ?reas de estudo.

<p>In modern, Swedish political science there are different ways of looking at ‘democracy’. A very common distinction is that between three groups of democratic theories: electoral democracy, participation democracy and deliberative democracy.</p><p>The nowadays frequently used concept of electoral democracy is often used as synonymous with the older concept of repre­­­­sen­tative or indirect democracy – frequently regarded as a contrast to the direct democracy of ancient Athens. However, there are also important differences. As for elections, people have no other significant role than voting for different political parties. It is a common view among defenders of electoral democracy that ‘ordinary people’ ought not to try to influence politicians between the elections.</p><p>There are mainly two different ways of looking at representative democracy; one stresses the future and focuses on mandates; the other focuses on retrospective accountability.</p><p>The modern concept of electoral democracy has many similarities with Joseph Schumpeter’s elite perspective. The main difference is that modern electoral democrats accept the concept of a ‘popular will’ – a concept that Schumpeter regarded as metaphysical.</p><p>The many meanings of the concept of ‘representation’ are analysed with reference to political scientist Hanna Pitkin, who defines its core character as ‘acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’. Others, like Bernard Manin, regard representative democracy as substantially different from direct democracy. The main difference is the election in contrast to the lot. For Manin, the election is indeed equal and democratic because every person has one and only one vote but at the same time unequal and aristocratic – sometimes even oligarchic – because we usually choose a person who is ‘better’ than the average.</p><p>In the electoral democracy model as well as in Schumpeter’s view, ordinary people need not participate much in the political parties or in the nomination process. The ballot is coming to the voter from the outside – like a stock on the market. For Manin, on the other hand, the nomination process is the central point.</p><p>One conclusion of this analysis is that the so-called electoral model may be regarded as an ideal type, in a Weberian sense. However, there is a risk that the model is interpreted as an ideal in a normative sense, since the concept of electoral democracy not only is narrower and ‘thinner’ than the concept of representative democracy. It is also narrower than the democratic views of Pitkin and Manin. More specifically, using ‘electoral democracy’ synonymously with ‘representative democracy’ may exclude these authors’ understanding of the dynamic mechanisms of the latter’s nomination processes.</p>

In modern, Swedish political science there are different ways of looking at ‘democracy’. A very common distinction is that between three groups of democratic theories: electoral democracy, participation democracy and deliberative democracy. The nowadays frequently used concept of electoral democracy is often used as synonymous with the older concept of repre­­­­sen­tative or indirect democracy – frequently regarded as a contrast to the direct democracy of ancient Athens. However, there are also important differences. As for elections, people have no other significant role than voting for different political parties. It is a common view among defenders of electoral democracy that ‘ordinary people’ ought not to try to influence politicians between the elections. There are mainly two different ways of looking at representative democracy; one stresses the future and focuses on mandates; the other focuses on retrospective accountability. The modern concept of electoral democracy has many similarities with Joseph Schumpeter’s elite perspective. The main difference is that modern electoral democrats accept the concept of a ‘popular will’ – a concept that Schumpeter regarded as metaphysical. The many meanings of the concept of ‘representation’ are analysed with reference to political scientist Hanna Pitkin, who defines its core character as ‘acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’. Others, like Bernard Manin, regard representative democracy as substantially different from direct democracy. The main difference is the election in contrast to the lot. For Manin, the election is indeed equal and democratic because every person has one and only one vote but at the same time unequal and aristocratic – sometimes even oligarchic – because we usually choose a person who is ‘better’ than the average. In the electoral democracy model as well as in Schumpeter’s view, ordinary people need not participate much in the political parties or in the nomination process. The ballot is coming to the voter from the outside – like a stock on the market. For Manin, on the other hand, the nomination process is the central point. One conclusion of this analysis is that the so-called electoral model may be regarded as an ideal type, in a Weberian sense. However, there is a risk that the model is interpreted as an ideal in a normative sense, since the concept of electoral democracy not only is narrower and ‘thinner’ than the concept of representative democracy. It is also narrower than the democratic views of Pitkin and Manin. More specifically, using ‘electoral democracy’ synonymously with ‘representative democracy’ may exclude these authors’ understanding of the dynamic mechanisms of the latter’s nomination processes.

L'industrie automobile tient une place à part dans l'histoire du capitalisme, dont elle détermine jusqu'à l'appellation de sa dernière grande période : le " fordisme ". Depuis la fin du 20ème siècle, elle se trouve confrontée à une double contrainte environnementale : l'épuisement annoncée des carburants fossiles et la lutte contre les pollutions, atmosphériques notamment. Le transport routier représente en effet 20% des émissions de GES. L'objectif de ce travail est d'analyser la réaction de cette industrie pour internaliser cette double contrainte, en se centrant sur la dimension " innovation ". La grille théorique proposée par Schumpeter et prolongée par les auteurs évolutionnistes est mobilisée pour tester l'hypothèse suivante : l'industrie automobile est en train d'amorcer un nouveau sentier de dépendance pour s'émanciper de cette double contrainte. Dès lors, le passage au moteur hybride, lu comme une éco-innovation de rupture, marque la fin du " lock in " sur le sentier précédant caractérisé par la dépendance au moteur à combustion interne.

L'industrie automobile tient une place à part dans l'histoire du capitalisme, dont elle détermine jusqu'à l'appellation de sa dernière grande période : le « fordisme ». Depuis la fin du 20ème siècle, elle se trouve confrontée à une double contrainte environnementale : l'épuisement annoncée des carburants fossiles et la lutte contre les pollutions, atmosphériques notamment. Le transport routier représente en effet 20% des émissions de GES. L'objectif de ce travail est d'analyser la réaction de cette industrie pour internaliser cette double contrainte, en se centrant sur la dimension « innovation ». La grille théorique proposée par Schumpeter et prolongée par les auteurs évolutionnistes est mobilisée pour tester l'hypothèse suivante : l'industrie automobile est en train d'amorcer un nouveau sentier de dépendance pour s'émanciper de cette double contrainte. Dès lors, le passage au moteur hybride, lu comme une éco-innovation de rupture, marque la fin du « lock in » sur le sentier précédant caractérisé par la dépendance au moteur à combustion interne. / Automotive industry has a special place in the history of the capitalism, of which it determines up to the name of its last great period: “Fordism”. It has to face double environmental constraints since the end of the 20th century: predicted exhaustion of world fossil fuel resources and the control of pollution, particularly atmospheric. Road transport accounts for 20% of the emission of greenhouse gases. The purpose of this work is to analyse how this industry will react to internalize that double constraint by focusing on “innovation”. The theoretical framework proposed by Schumpeter and prolonged by the evolutionary authors is mobilized to test the following assumption: automotive industry is starting a new path of dependence to become emancipated from this double constraint. Consequently, the transition to the hybrid engine, as an “breakthrough eco-innovation”, points out the end of the “lock in” on the previous path characterized by the dependence upon the internal combustion engine.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T20:22:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ronaldo Tadeu de Souza.pdf: 589010 bytes, checksum: c2d6046b6148efe03f72fd16fa7b513f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-11-26 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This aims at studying the contemporary democratic theory, specifically, the study of theory elitist democracy of Joseph Schumpeter. The democratic theory and after World War II was decisively influenced by the ideas of democracy of Joseph Schumpeter. This means that the discipline of political science was also influenced by the ideas of democracy elitist of Schumpeter. The theory of Schumpeter on democracy sought resolve the question of how to limit the participation and assistance from the man of the people in the decisions of state. To answer this Schumpeter draws on some variables. Among those highlighted the parameters of the English parliamentary system and functionality of the social democrat parties. These two variables allowed Joseph Schumpeter to define democracy as an institutional method that allows the selection of leaders through the fight for votes of the people. Several authors and democratic currents had criticized the theory of limited democracy in the Austro-American economist, for example: the participativistas Carole Pateman and Peter Bachrach and deliberativista Jürgen Habermas, but all were inadequate. So I chose undertake this critical study from the Marxist political theory, more precisely the Marxist theory that was contemporary with Joseph Schumpeter, namely the Marxist theory of the beginning of this century. This is also justified by the fact that Schumpeter himself in his work "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy" undertakes a critique of Marxist socialism to build his theory of democracy based on leadership and the exclusion of people from politics. Our method was to analyse the main points of the central text of "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy", namely the text of Part IV - "Socialism and Democracy." We also use as a method historical research-politician who served on Schumpeter to build their own theory. Our hypothesis is that the theory of democratic leadership of Joseph Schumpeter was an attempt to develop a conceptual structure that would allow the continuation of the unstable equilibrium of the bourgeois domination / O presente tem como objetivo o estudo da teoria democrática contemporânea, especificamente, o estudo da teoria elitista da democracia de Joseph Schumpeter. A teoria democrática após e Segunda Guerra Mundial foi influenciada decisivamente pelas concepções de democracia de Joseph Schumpeter. Isto significa dizer que a disciplina de ciência política foi influenciada também, pelas concepções da democracia elitista de Schumpeter. A teoria de Schumpeter sobre a democracia buscou resolver à questão de como limitar a participação e intervenção do homem do povo nas decisões de Estado. Para responder isto Schumpeter recorre a algumas variáveis. Dentre estas destacamos os parâmetros do regime parlamentar inglês e a funcionalidade dos partidos social-democratas. Estas duas variáveis permitiram a Joseph Schumpeter a definir democracia como um método institucional que permite a seleção de lideres através da luta pelos votos do povo. Diversos autores e correntes democráticas haviam criticado a teoria restrita de democracia do economista austro-americano, como por exemplo: os participativistas Carole Pateman e Peter Bachrach e o deliberativista Jürgen Habermas; mas todas se mostraram insuficientes. Por isso escolhemos empreender este estudo crítico a partir da teoria política marxista, mais precisamente da teoria marxista que foi contemporânea a Joseph Schumpeter, ou seja, a teoria marxista do começo do século XX. Isto se justifica também pelo fato de que o próprio Schumpeter em sua obra Capitalismo, Socialismo e Democracia empreende uma crítica ao socialismo marxista para construir sua teoria da democracia baseada na liderança e na exclusão do povo da política. Nosso método consistiu em analisar os pontos principais do texto central de Capitalismo, Socialismo e Democracia , a saber, o texto da Parte IV - Socialismo e Democracia . Também utilizamos como método investigações histórico-político que serviram ao próprio Schumpeter para construir sua teoria. Nossa hipótese é que a teoria da liderança democrática de Joseph Schumpeter era uma tentativa de elaborar uma estrutura conceitual que permitisse a manutenção do equilíbrio instável do regime de dominação burguês