The challenge in the law of defamation lies in finding the appropriate balance between the two competing rights of freedom of expression and an unimpaired reputation. From Roman and Roman-Dutch law into the modern era, criminal and civil defamation have been very closely linked. The elements and defences are substantially alike. There were several calls prior to 1994 for the abrogation of criminal defamation. Now that the right to an unimpaired reputation, as part of the right to human dignity, and the right to freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, quo vadis the crime of criminal defamation? The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently granted a petition for leave to appeal against convictions for criminal defamation on this very point: is the offence constitutional. Due to the paucity of criminal defamation precedent, the copious civil law precedent concerning civil defamation must be analysed to determine what view the Supreme Court of Appeal will adopt. Prior to 1994 the right to an unimpaired reputation has trumped freedom of expression. Since then, the two leading decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court have ameliorated this situation slightly, according freedom of expression more weight. Claiming the previous common law position was incorrect, they claim the present common law position is constitutionally sound. Thus the Constitution has in essence had no effect to date upon the balancing of competing rights in the law of defamation. Both courts have erred in according the right to freedom of expression too little weight. This may be due to three judicial errors. Firstly, they have under-appreciated that the values of dignity, equality and freedom fortify and are fortified by the right to freedom of expression. Aspects of dignity such as self-actualisation, self-governance and an acceptance that humans have intrinsic worth are heavily reliant on freedom of expression, particularly political expression. Secondly, while political expression lies at the core of freedom of expression, reputation lies nearer the periphery of the right to dignity. Rights at the core ought to trump competing but peripheral rights. Thirdly, erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate. Unless they too are protected, unacceptable self-censorship occurs. The correct approach is as a matter of policy, particularly regarding political expression, to balance the competing rights with one’s thumb on the free expression side of the scales. This seems the trend of the European Court of Human Rights in recent cases In Canada, an offence punishing libel made intentionally but without knowledge of its falsity was recently ruled unconstitutional. On the other hand, another offence punishing libel made with knowledge it was false, videlicet punishing the intentional publication of defamatory lies, was ruled constitutional. Criminal defamation clearly infringes upon the right to freedom of expression. For this infringement to pass constitutional muster it must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. It fails the limitation test due to the lack of proportionality between its objective in protecting the right to an unimpaired reputation and the harm it does to the right to expression. There are three reasons: firstly the “chilling effect” of imprisonment, over and above pecuniary damages, unacceptably stifles free debate. Secondly, it may punish even the truth, yet protect a falsehood, since the truth per se is not a defence. An undeserved reputation is thus more highly valued than the publication of that truth. Finally there is a well-developed civil remedy that adequately protects the right to reputation of aggrieved persons. In the appeal concerning the constitutionality of the common law offence of criminal defamation, the Supreme Court of Appeal ought to find it unconstitutional.

Reputational interests are protected against defamatory and injurious statements by the common law o f defamation, which permits the targeted individual to recover damages for the injury to his reputation. At the same time, this body of common law sets limits to the constitutional right to free expression of the person who made the penalized communication. However, since s.32(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - according to the Supreme Court of Canada - restricts the Charter's application to the actions of legislative, executive and administrative branches of government, the Charter will be at best a bit player in defamation litigation governed by common law rule. This thesis deals with the tension between promoting free speech and protecting a person's reputation, i.e. with the questions whether the common law of defamation has achieved the correct balance between the protection of the individual's reputation and freedom of expression, or whether it needs to be modified in order to better accord with the Charter. A n important component of this thesis is its review of the decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology, where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of whether defamation law needs to be reconsidered in light o f the Charter protection of free expression, and found the balance struck by the current law to be appropriate. A critical look at this decision, and more generally at the law of defamation itself, particularly its presumptions of falsity, malice and damages, will reveal the problems with the common law's resistance to making any major allowance for free expression. The author will argue that the Charter should apply to the common law in the same way as it applies to statutory law and that defamation law in particular would, in all probability, not survive the test under s.l of the Charter, concerning the justification of a limitation to a fundamental right. It will be concluded that the common law of defamation needs to be modified, i.e. that it must accord significantly more weight to freedom of expression in order to be consistent with the Charter. Insofar as the extent of such modification is concerned, the author will propose first of all to give the element of fault a more significant role in the common law of defamation. In addition, she will argue that the common law presumptions should be abolished. In sum, the author's reform proposal requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the words he complains of are defamatory, identify him and are published to a third person, but also that they are false, did indeed cause damage to his reputation and that the defendant acted with fault, i.e. intentionally or negligently, when publishing the defamatory falsehoods. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Para que possa alcançar sua ratio essendi, isto é, promover a convivência pacífica, o Estado utiliza-se do Direito para realizar o controle social e, em última análise, acolher os cidadãos que vivem sob a sua regência. Neste sentido, o Direito Penal adquire especial importância, tendo em vista deter a incumbência de enunciar comportamentos especialmente ofensivos para a vida em sociedade, prevendo e fixando, para cada conduta criminosa, a aplicação de penas ou medidas de segurança. É certo, de igual forma, que este ramo é também a ultima ratio, ou seja, a última instância de proteção, razão pela qual só pode ser acionado a partir do fracasso ou ineficiência de todos os demais meios de resguardo judicial, eis que o poder punitivo investe, via de regra, contra o bem mais precioso do ser humano, quer seja, sua liberdade. Levando estes pressupostos em conta, assoma uma relevante inquietação: a honra, aspecto inerente à personalidade do homem, dadas as suas características dogmáticas, ainda merece a proteção do Direito Penal? Será que não existem outros meios aptos a trazer suficiente amparo legal? É a partir destas questões que se desenvolve a presente dissertação. Para tanto, buscar-se-á, em um primeiro momento, entender a maneira como os valores e interesses mais caros ao homem adentram na seara penal (teoria do bem jurídico). Após, empreender-se-á efetiva imersão no tema de pesquisa, buscando entender as bases que historicamente assentaram e determinaram a tutela jurídica da honra (bipartição metodológica), além de promover diagnóstico da guarida fornecida pelo Direito Civil e pelo Direito Penal, de modo a compreender se a honra civil difere da honra penal. Por fim, será feito uma análise crítica da honra enquanto bem jurídico penal, com o fito conclusivo de trazer apontamentos quanto aos horizontes futuros da tutela deste valor individual. / In order to achieve its essendi ratio, that is, to promote peaceful coexistence, the State uses the rule of law to perform social control and, ultimately, safeguard the citizens living under its rulership. In this sense, criminal law is particularly important seeing that it has the task of enunciating especially offensive behavior for life in society, besides providing and setting to apply, for each criminal conduct, penalties or security measures. It is true, too, that this branch is also the ultima ratio, the ultimate protection, which is why it can only be triggered as from the failure or inefficiency of all other judicial guard means, whereas the punitive power invests, as a rule, against the most precious of human rights, namely, their freedom. Taking these assumptions into account, looms a relevant concern: the honor, essential part of mens personality, given their dogmatic features, still deserves the punitive protection of criminal law? Are there no other means able to bring sufficient legal care? It is from these questions that this dissertation is developed. Therefore, it will be sought, at first, to understand how the most important values and dearest interests of man enter into criminal harvest (protected legal interest theory). Next, it will be undertaken an effective immersion in the research theme, seeking to understand the foundations that historically settled and determined legal protection of honor (methodological splitting), besides promoting an effective diagnosis of the shelter provided Civil Law and Criminal Law in order to understand if civil honor differs from penal honor. Finally, a critical analysis will be carried out, about honor as a protected legal interest in Criminal Law, with the final aim of bringing notes about future horizons regarding the guardianship of this individual value.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Para que possa alcançar sua ratio essendi, isto é, promover a convivência pacífica, o Estado utiliza-se do Direito para realizar o controle social e, em última análise, acolher os cidadãos que vivem sob a sua regência. Neste sentido, o Direito Penal adquire especial importância, tendo em vista deter a incumbência de enunciar comportamentos especialmente ofensivos para a vida em sociedade, prevendo e fixando, para cada conduta criminosa, a aplicação de penas ou medidas de segurança. É certo, de igual forma, que este ramo é também a ultima ratio, ou seja, a última instância de proteção, razão pela qual só pode ser acionado a partir do fracasso ou ineficiência de todos os demais meios de resguardo judicial, eis que o poder punitivo investe, via de regra, contra o bem mais precioso do ser humano, quer seja, sua liberdade. Levando estes pressupostos em conta, assoma uma relevante inquietação: a honra, aspecto inerente à personalidade do homem, dadas as suas características dogmáticas, ainda merece a proteção do Direito Penal? Será que não existem outros meios aptos a trazer suficiente amparo legal? É a partir destas questões que se desenvolve a presente dissertação. Para tanto, buscar-se-á, em um primeiro momento, entender a maneira como os valores e interesses mais caros ao homem adentram na seara penal (teoria do bem jurídico). Após, empreender-se-á efetiva imersão no tema de pesquisa, buscando entender as bases que historicamente assentaram e determinaram a tutela jurídica da honra (bipartição metodológica), além de promover diagnóstico da guarida fornecida pelo Direito Civil e pelo Direito Penal, de modo a compreender se a honra civil difere da honra penal. Por fim, será feito uma análise crítica da honra enquanto bem jurídico penal, com o fito conclusivo de trazer apontamentos quanto aos horizontes futuros da tutela deste valor individual. / In order to achieve its essendi ratio, that is, to promote peaceful coexistence, the State uses the rule of law to perform social control and, ultimately, safeguard the citizens living under its rulership. In this sense, criminal law is particularly important seeing that it has the task of enunciating especially offensive behavior for life in society, besides providing and setting to apply, for each criminal conduct, penalties or security measures. It is true, too, that this branch is also the ultima ratio, the ultimate protection, which is why it can only be triggered as from the failure or inefficiency of all other judicial guard means, whereas the punitive power invests, as a rule, against the most precious of human rights, namely, their freedom. Taking these assumptions into account, looms a relevant concern: the honor, essential part of mens personality, given their dogmatic features, still deserves the punitive protection of criminal law? Are there no other means able to bring sufficient legal care? It is from these questions that this dissertation is developed. Therefore, it will be sought, at first, to understand how the most important values and dearest interests of man enter into criminal harvest (protected legal interest theory). Next, it will be undertaken an effective immersion in the research theme, seeking to understand the foundations that historically settled and determined legal protection of honor (methodological splitting), besides promoting an effective diagnosis of the shelter provided Civil Law and Criminal Law in order to understand if civil honor differs from penal honor. Finally, a critical analysis will be carried out, about honor as a protected legal interest in Criminal Law, with the final aim of bringing notes about future horizons regarding the guardianship of this individual value.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die siviele lasterreg word gekenmerk deur verdeeldheid aangaande bewyspligtigheid. 'n Unieke situasie doen horn voor: weerlegbare regsvermoedens van onregmatigheid en animus iniuriandi word opgevolg deur verskeie regsverdigingsgronde. Bykomend hiertoe stel die Grondwet die vereiste van konstitusionele regverdiging vir beperkings op fundamentele regte. 'n Oorsig oor die regspraak in sowel die voorgrondwetlike - as na-grondwetlike bedeling, dui op 'n versuim deur die howe om behoorlik aandag te skenk aan die bewyspligtigheidsgevolge van die regverskynsels wat hulself in die lasterreg voordoen. In hierdie verhandeling word bewyspligtigheid in lastersake krities ondersoek om vas te stel of dit die reg korrek weerspieel en om 'n werkbare bewyslasformule vir lasteraksies in 'n konstitusionele litigasie te vind. Daar word voorgestel dat die probleem opgelos word deur 'n tweefase-benadering: Die eiser moet in die eerste fase die omvang van sy reg bewys en dat daarop inbreuk gemaak is. In die tweede fase moet die verweerder sy regverdigingsgronde bewys, asook dat dit konstitusioneel regverdigbaar is. / The civil law of defamation is marked by discord regarding onus of proof. A unique situation evidences itself: rebuttable presumptions of law concerning unlawfulness and animus iniuriandi are followed by various grounds of justification. In addition thereto the Constitution sets the requirement of constitutional justification for limitations on fundamental rights. An overview of case law in the pre-constitutional as well as the post-constitutional dispensation, indicates a failure by the courts to pay proper attention to the evidentiary consequences of the legal phenomena found in the law of defamation. In this dissertation onus of proof in defamation cases is critically examined to ascertain whether it reflects the law correctly and to find a workable "onus of proof" -formula for defamation cases in a constitutional dispensation. It is suggested that the problem be solved by a two stage approach: in the first phase, the plaintiff must prove the extent of his right and the encroachment thereof . In the second phase the defendant must prove his grounds of justification and show that they are constitutionally justifiable. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

The purpose of this thesis is to reveal the slanderous rhetoric of the Federalist and Republican parties during the American presidential election of 1800. Both parties relied on newspapers, pamphlets, sermons, and songs to influence public opinion; however, newspapers were the most effective means of swaying the voters. Although the Federalists, led by John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, had almost twice as many partisan newspapers to disseminate their propaganda, the Republicans, under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson, had a much larger number of journals that were substantially more dogmatic in their denunciations. This advantage, coupled with internal Federalist crises, enabled the Republicans to be victorious at the polls. This study proves that the campaign of 1800 was one of the most libelous and rancorous in United States history.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die siviele lasterreg word gekenmerk deur verdeeldheid aangaande bewyspligtigheid. 'n Unieke situasie doen horn voor: weerlegbare regsvermoedens van onregmatigheid en animus iniuriandi word opgevolg deur verskeie regsverdigingsgronde. Bykomend hiertoe stel die Grondwet die vereiste van konstitusionele regverdiging vir beperkings op fundamentele regte. 'n Oorsig oor die regspraak in sowel die voorgrondwetlike - as na-grondwetlike bedeling, dui op 'n versuim deur die howe om behoorlik aandag te skenk aan die bewyspligtigheidsgevolge van die regverskynsels wat hulself in die lasterreg voordoen. In hierdie verhandeling word bewyspligtigheid in lastersake krities ondersoek om vas te stel of dit die reg korrek weerspieel en om 'n werkbare bewyslasformule vir lasteraksies in 'n konstitusionele litigasie te vind. Daar word voorgestel dat die probleem opgelos word deur 'n tweefase-benadering: Die eiser moet in die eerste fase die omvang van sy reg bewys en dat daarop inbreuk gemaak is. In die tweede fase moet die verweerder sy regverdigingsgronde bewys, asook dat dit konstitusioneel regverdigbaar is. / The civil law of defamation is marked by discord regarding onus of proof. A unique situation evidences itself: rebuttable presumptions of law concerning unlawfulness and animus iniuriandi are followed by various grounds of justification. In addition thereto the Constitution sets the requirement of constitutional justification for limitations on fundamental rights. An overview of case law in the pre-constitutional as well as the post-constitutional dispensation, indicates a failure by the courts to pay proper attention to the evidentiary consequences of the legal phenomena found in the law of defamation. In this dissertation onus of proof in defamation cases is critically examined to ascertain whether it reflects the law correctly and to find a workable "onus of proof" -formula for defamation cases in a constitutional dispensation. It is suggested that the problem be solved by a two stage approach: in the first phase, the plaintiff must prove the extent of his right and the encroachment thereof . In the second phase the defendant must prove his grounds of justification and show that they are constitutionally justifiable. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

En cette ère que plusieurs surnomment le « Web 2.0 », les usagers se sont emparés avec enthousiasme des fonctions liées aux communications et au partage sur Internet, ce médium devenant ainsi une nouvelle plate-forme pour les enjeux liés à la vie privée et à la réputation. La diffamation constitue justement un des problèmes prédominants constatés en lien avec ce contenu électronique, plus particulièrement lorsqu’il est question de contenu généré par les utilisateurs. Face à cet outil permettant une diffusion et une intéractivité sans précédent, comment devons-nous aborder Internet au regard des règles de droit applicables au Canada en matière de diffamation? L’analyse juridique traditionnelle sied-elle aux nouvelles réalités introduites par ce médium? Le bijuridisme canadien nous impose d’étudier parallèlement les régimes de droit civil et de common law et ce, dans une optique comparative afin de comprendre les concepts et le fonctionnement propres à chacune des approches juridiques cohabitant au pays. Cette analyse nous permettra de mettre en lumière les particularités du médium électronique qui se révèlent pertinentes lorsqu’il est question de diffamation et qui font la spécificité des situations et des acteurs en ligne, distinguant ainsi Internet des modes de communications traditionnels que le droit connaît. Cette approche comparative permet de poser un regard critique sur chacun des régimes de droit en vigueur au Canada, considérant la réalité propre à Internet et au contenu généré par les utilisateurs, mais surtout, vise à promouvoir le développement de méthodes d’analyse véritablement ancrées dans le fonctionnement du médium en cause et susceptibles d’évoluer avec celui-ci. / In this era often called « Web 2.0 », users have jumped with enthousiasm on the functions of communications and sharing on the Internet, this medium becoming a new platform for issues relating to privacy and reputation. Defamation is one of the main concerns about electronic content, more specificially regarding user generated content (UGC). Dealing with this tool which enables an unprecedented dissemination and interactivity in communications, how should we treat Internet with regards to the legal rules applicable in matters of defamation in Canada? Does the traditionnal legal analysis fit the new reality introduced by this medium? Because of Canada’s bijuralism, we will study separately the civil law and common law regimes with a comparative method in order to understand the concepts and the functionning specific to each of the legal approaches cohabiting in Canada. It will allow us to identify the special features of the electronic media which stand out when confronted with matters of defamation and which caracterize the specificity of the online context and users, therefore distinguishing it from the traditionnal means of communication known by the law. This comparative analysis aims to take a citical look at each of the law regimes in effect in Canada, considering the reality of Internet and its user generated content. Mainly, this study aims to foster the development of analytical methods truly entrenched in the functionning of the medium concerned and likely to evolve therewith.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:19:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Deborah Regina Lambach Ferreira da Costa.pdf: 721094 bytes, checksum: 08a6d037883f68580c4820a74a74bd27 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-09-23 / In a globalized world, owners of image rights are more vulnerable to damages for which compensation may be sought. New technologies, the web, TV, broadcasting channels and mechanical systems in general, which disseminate information in real time making it accessible to millions of people, increase this exposure to defamation. Both legal entities governed by private and public law that own rights of publicity consistent with their legal status run the risk of having their images damaged. Items V and X of article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution provide that these entities are entitle to compensation for libel and slander, or moral damages in a literal translation from Portuguese. Detaching the concept of libel and slander from pain and suffering , the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice published case law summary [ Súmula ] No. 227 which resulted in the application of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights to prevent abuse of the freedom of expression and ensure maximum protection to reputation. This study is an in-depth analysis of image rights based on the initial assumption that these are autonomous rights of publicity entitled to protection both at constitutional and infraconstitutional level. The compensation for image damages leaves formal positivism aside to follow the paradigm shift introduced by the Constitution of Brazil ratified in 1988 when social, ethical and operational principles -- even within the scope of civil liability -- where brought to light allowing the interpretation of the Civil Code to be consistent with the concepts of equity and justice in an attempt to foster ethics and compassion in society / Na era globalizada, o titular do direito à imagem está mais vulnerável a sofrer um dano ressarcível. O avanço da tecnologia, a Internet, a televisão, os meios de radiodifusão e o sistema mecanizado em geral, que propagam a informação em tempo real, acessível a milhões e milhões de outros sujeitos, expõe as pessoas cada vez mais ao vilipêndio. Tanto as pessoas jurídicas de direito privado, como as de direito público, podem ser vítimas de dano à imagem, porque titulares de direitos da personalidade compatíveis com a sua natureza jurídica. Ademais, lhes é assegurada a reparação do dano moral nos incisos V e X do artigo 5º da Constituição Federal. A jurisprudência, desapegando-se do conceito de dano moral como o dano da alma , editou a Súmula n. 227 do Superior Tribunal de Justiça. Passou-se a interpretar o artigo 10 da Convenção Europeia de Direitos Humanos de modo a coibir abusos do direito de livre expressão na proteção da reputação em toda a sua amplitude. De modo que o direito à imagem será analisado com profundidade, tomando-se como ponto de partida a afirmação de que é um direito da personalidade autônomo, recebendo proteção constitucional e infraconstitucional. A reparação do dano à imagem aparta-se do rigor formal do positivismo, acompanhando a mudança de paradigma trazida pela Constituição Federal de 1988, que aflorou, inclusive no âmbito da responsabilidade civil, princípios como da socialidade, da eticidade e da operabilidade, com vistas a dar interpretação e subsunção às normas do Código Civil consentâneas com a equidade e a justiça, em prol de uma sociedade mais ética e fraterna

The opposition against Gustavus III (1746–1792) had limited access to the printing press, but managed to spread a variety of political pamphlets through clandestine manuscripts. The main purpose of the dissertation is to analyse this communication and thereby enhance our understanding of the political culture of the period. The manuscript published oppositional works against Gustavus III have hitherto been little explored. With source material consisting of 120 manuscript libels, this study makes use of three interrelated methodological perspectives: media analysis, rhetorical analysis and analysis of ideas. The combination of media studies and classical rhetoric is inspired by the works of Peter Burke. Questions of production, distribution and consumption frame the discussions. The libels – published anonymously for fear of persecution – were spread through what Harold Love calls “user publication”. This means that many readers contributed to their distribution and through the act of copying also functioned as co-authors. The majority of the libels originated among the estate of the nobility and their political allies. The authors were often accomplished writers, skilfully using a variety of rhetorical strategies to interest and entertain their readers. When viewed in an international context, the Swedish material is revealed as relatively conservative. The arguments in the Swedish works were generally founded on established and traditional values and ideas, and treated Monarchy and Lutheran Christianity as given institutions which stood unquestioned. In comparison to French libels against royalty, Swedes were also more reluctant to use sexual slander. One explanation for this conservatism is that the authors were aiming for a wide audience, and therefore strove to ground their arguments in common values. Another explanation can be found in the fact that many of the works originated within the noble classes: a privileged group which had much to gain from the preservation of traditional social structures.