Thesis (M.A.)--Zhongguo wen hua xue yuan. / Reproduced from typescript. Bibliography: p. 211-218.

This thesis examines the extent to which the doctrine of due measure can be rightfully called the skopos of Plato’s Statesman. In order to determine the doctrine’s explanatory power, the thesis adopts the Neoplatonic method of exegesis. It first examines the current state of Platonic scholarship in general and then of studies on the Statesman in particular, then provides both the philosophic and literary context of the dialogue in question. Next, it analyses the doctrine of due measure’s philosophic content, and then proceeds to examine its ability to illuminate the literary details of the text. In completing this exercise, this thesis hopes to demonstrate a method of interpreting a Platonic text, by which we can better understand how Plato wrote his dialogues, and how we can be better interpreters of his writing—both in its philosophical and literary aspects.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / Plato’s interlocutors discuss at length about psychology, politics, poetry, cosmology, education, nature, and the gods, in short, about the things that inscribe the transcendent and the grounding poles of human life. It stands to reason that what we wish to glean from Plato’s thinking will show itself more readily if we remain attentive to the self-undermining and the subversive elements of the dialogues. I call the interpretation, which follows the shape- and, hence, meaning-shifting structure of Plato’s writing, “paradigmatic procedure.” By this I do not mean that we ought to find, explain, and then interpretively apply to the whole of Plato’s thought any particular passages from the Republic, the Timaeus, or the Statesman, which mention paradigms. However, I, following Benardete, propose that “Plato must have learned from poets” who produced epos, tragedy, comedy, and myth. This means that Plato borrows these poetic elements and form when he writes the philosophical dialogues. Paradigmatic method of interpretation is conscious of the dramatic form. It situates and analyzes the arguments made both through speeches and through actions as these arise out of the play of literary images. The latter, in their turn, are made up of the tripartite convergence between the dialogical characters, their speeches, and their deeds. Depending on the colorations that the three impart to one another, the images of Plato are comic, tragic, or, which is most often the case, they are tragicomic. The dramatic tone of a given image, once it is detected, reflects back onto the dialogical discussion or account and presents the argument in this newly discovered light. It often happens that the difference between the initial and the paradigmatic reading is so drastic that the straightforward meaning of the studied passage is undone as Plato’s writing begins to show its self-undermining nature. This does not mean that Plato’s philosophizing, also, is undone. On the contrary, when we begin to think together with and through Plato’s subversive writing, instead of retrofitting our lives to some systems that may arise out of it and instead of forcing it to substantiate our views, then we begin to get a sense for the liberating force of Plato’s philosophy. In chapter one, I explain the relationship between paradigms and the tragicomic character of Plato’s writing. Consequently, I offer a reading of select passages from the Timaeus and from the Republic. My discoveries showcase how paradigms inform and how the paradigmatic reading uncovers the tragic dimension of the Timaeus. I show how comedy shines through the, seemingly, most serious passages in the Republic. Plato’s dialogues do not strictly divide into the tragic, comic, epic, mythic, sophistic, or pre-Socratic ones, but rather, most are woven out of all of these orientations. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that within parts or passages, such as those from the Republic, for example, a given form and theme is most pronounced. I turn to the examination of tragedy in the second chapter. There, I first argue that Sophocles’ Oedipus is a tyrant and then I expose the relationship between the psychopathology of tyranny, tragedy, and poetry in books VIII and IX of the Republic. The third chapter carries on the exploration of pathology and offers an examination of tyranny and the soul in the Timaeus. Paradigmatic analysis plays up the theatricality of the Timaeus and identifies several axes around which the dialogical accounts revolve. The three main horizons are made up of nous, necessity, and dream or choric logic. These are fleshed out by the distention given to the dialogical arguments through the enmeshment of φύσις, μῦθος, and πόλις. The fourth kind of emphasis, senselessness, ushers the dialogue’s grotesquely humorous ending and prepares the readers for the considerations of comedy in the fourth chapter of the present work. The comedy of divisions, mythic tall tales, the halving and the fitting cuts, with which Plato’s Statesman is woven through and through, reveal statesmanship’s sinister underbelly. If it were not for the comedic tone, the fourth chapter argues, the monstrousness of tyranny, which is interred in all of the paradigms entertained as models of rule in the Statesman, would have remained unseen. Attunement to the comical passages and references, in the Statesman, is made expedient by an analysis of tyranny in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. The fifth and final chapter sees to the convergence of the speciously opposite forms and themes. Tragedy is brought together with comedy, poetry with philosophy, and theater with ordinary life under the auspices of the twice-born god, Dionysus. The Dionysian, duplicitously evasive, nature is shown to be contemporaneous with the double-edged nature of shame. The contemplation of shame in Sophocles’ Oedipus and Aristophanes’ Clouds, aids the investigation of the humanity preserving and the corrupting role of shame in Plato’s Gorgias. The findings of the final chapter serve to locate the pressure points of pathology and tyranny as these recede into the tragicomic dramas of our lives. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The use of the term “sophist” in Plato’s Statesman has been understood to apply to all rulers who are not statesmen. They do not have the statesman’s expert knowledge but they all imitate the statesman. This seems to be consistent with the idea that a sophist is a false imitator. I argue against this interpretation and instead insist that only the tyrant in the Statesman is a sophist. I base this argument on the final definition of the sophist in Plato’s Sophist and the discussion of imitation in the Sophist. The tyrant is an important figure in the Statesman, even though he is only mentioned briefly. He is the ruler who pretends to be a statesman so that he can rule with the statesman’s power which is above the law. I use my narrower interpretation of the term “sophist” in the Statesman to argue that Plato’s purpose in the discussion of laws and regimes in the Statesman is to protect the city from the tyrant as a sophist. This requires that the people of the city recognize their own ignorance and completely forbid any type of political leadership that would make the city vulnerable to the false statesman. Instead, they imitate the statesman by their complete obedience to the law. The idea of complete obedience to the law, without any room for modification or change, is not politically appealing. However, it is important that part of Plato’s solution to the problem of tyranny is self-awareness of our lack of political knowledge. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / The use of the term “sophist” in Plato’s Statesman has been understood to apply to all rulers who are not statesmen. Instead, I argue that only the tyrant in the Statesman is a sophist. I base this argument on the final definition of the sophist in Plato’s Sophist and the discussion of imitation in the Sophist. I use my narrower interpretation of the term “sophist” in the Statesman to argue that Plato’s purpose in the discussion of laws and regimes in the Statesman is to protect the city from the tyrant as a sophist. This requires that the people of the city recognize their own ignorance and completely forbid any type of political leadership that would make the city vulnerable to a false statesman. This argument is important as it shows that part of Plato’s solution to the problem of tyranny is self-awareness of our lack of political knowledge.

In this thesis I attempt to bring out some interesting implications of Plato’s political thought as it is presented in the Politicus. In particular, I will show how this dialogue provides a new picture of the relation between ruler and ruled; a picture that stresses the importance and responsibility of every citizen, not just of the statesman himself. This is achieved by an analysis of the notion of political craftsmanship envisaged by the main speaker of the dialogue, the Eleatic Stranger. However, before I turn to consider the Politicus itself, I provide a brief presentation of another Platonic craftsman, the demiurge of the Timaeus. As will be clear, the teleological structure, and the accompanying terminology, of his craftsmanship will mirror that of the true statesman and thus help us understand the latter’s political rule. My choice to focus on this aspect of the Politicus is motivated by the text itself. For the question of the kind of craftsmanship involved in political rule is picturesquely, yet effectively, brought to the fore by the myth in the early parts of the dialogue, which distinguishes between two rival conceptions and associates the statesman with one of them. I conclude by reflecting on the significance of my findings for Plato’s political thought as a whole.

Le présent mémoire décrit le rôle et l’application de la méthode platonicienne des divisions telle que décrite dans le Sophiste, le Politique, le Phèdre et le Philèbe. Il met en relief les différences et les similitudes du rôle et de l’application de la méthode dans ces quatre dialogues, afin d’analyser la possibilité ou bien de postuler l’unité de la doctrine platonicienne, ou bien de retracer les lieux de son évolution. Certains auteurs du siècle dernier affirment qu’il n’est pas possible de retracer quelque évolution que ce soit dans la doctrine, et estiment même que la méthode des divisions est utilisée bien au-delà de ces quatre dialogues, et que son absence des dialogues de jeunesse ne doit en aucun cas être prise pour une absence de la doctrine de l’époque. D’autres sont au contraire convaincus que la méthode des divisions est propre à un stade de la pensée de Platon qui ne peut être que postérieur à l’introduction de la théorie des Formes intelligibles, et que cette méthode incarne même, à toutes fins pratiques, la dialectique platonicienne des dialogues tardifs. / This thesis aims to describe the role and application of Plato's method of divisions as it is seen and described mainly in Sophist, Statesman, Phaedrus, and Philebus. Through analysis of similarities and differences of the method in the different dialogues I intend to describe the possibilities of claiming the unity of Plato's doctrine, or to see in which regards it has evolved. In the last century some authors were convinced that no such evolution could clearly be seen in Plato's thought, and that the method of divisions was to be found in a lot of passages both before and after the four dialogues mentioned above, whereas others argue that the method of divisions is to be seen as specific t the later dialogues, because it cannot possibly be used before the introduction of the theory of the Forms, and further, that it is to be identified with Plato's later method of dialectic.

Das vom Institut für Slavistik der TU Dresden und der Brücke/Most-Stiftung im Rahmen der 16. Tschechisch-Deutschen Kulturtage am 7. November 2014 veranstaltete 8. Bohemicum Dresdense war der Persönlichkeit, dem Denken und den Wirkungen Tomáš Garrigue Masaryks gewidmet. Äußerer Anlass zur Wahl des Themas war die Erinnerung an den Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs, in dessen Folge die Erste Tschechoslowakische Republik mit Masaryk als ihrem ersten Präsidenten entstand. Dass das Jahr 1914 für Masaryk auch persönlich eine Zäsur darstellte, daran erinnerte der Generalkonsul der Tschechischen Republik, Dr. Jiří Kuděla, in seinem Grußwort. Im November 1914 habe Masaryk buchstäblich die Koffer gepackt und seine akademische Karriere hinter sich gelassen, um sich seiner politischen Vision zu widmen. Bis heute sei Masaryk eine politische Leitfigur in der Tschechischen Republik und die bekannte Abkürzung TGM für viele Tschechen fast so etwas wie eine magische Formel. Gleichwohl sollte Masaryk auf der Tagung nicht nur als politischer Visionär und Staatsmann, sondern auch – und vor allem – als Philosoph, Literat und religiöser Denker zur Geltung kommen, was Holger Kuße vom Institut für Slavistik in seiner Begrüßung der TagungsteilnehmerInnen hervorhob.

Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.

Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.