In this study of A Midsummer Night's Dream, The Merchant of Venice, and Measure for Measure I argue that the surface plots of these comedies point us to a philosophic understanding seldom discussed in either contemporary public discourse or in Shakespearean scholarship. The comedies usually involve questions arising from the conflict between the enforcement of law (whether just or not) and the private longings (whether noble or base) of citizens whose yearnings for happiness tend to be sub- or even supra-political. No regime, it appears, is able to respond to the whole variety of circumstances that it may be called upon to judge. Even the best written laws meet with occasional exceptions and these ulterior instances must be judged by something other than a legal code. When these extra-legal instances do arise, political communities become aware of their reliance on a kind of political judgment that is usually unnoticed in the day-to-day affairs of public life. Further, it is evident that the characters who are able to exercise this political judgment, are the very characters whose presence averts a potentially tragic situation and makes a comedy possible. By presenting examples of how moral and political problems are dealt with by the prudent use of wisdom, Shakespeare is pointing the reader to a standard of judgment that transcends any particular (or actual) political arrangement. Once we see the importance of the prudent use of such a standard, we are in a position to judge what this philosophic wisdom consists of and where it is to be acquired. It is just such an education with which Shakespeare intends to aid his readers.

Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV). / Nos recherches ont pour point de départ le constat d’un manque de dialogue entre trois philosophies politiques du XXe siècle nous provenant des États-Unis alors même que cet État devrait être le chef de file et un modèle d’ouverture en matière de réflexion sur la démocratie libérale. Les trois philosophies politiques en question sont celles de John Rawls, de Richard Rorty et de Leo Strauss. Nous avons donc procédé à l’amorce d’un dialogue en mettant en relation les idées des trois auteurs sur les grands thèmes de la vérité, de l’histoire, des dimensions de l’homme et des principes démocratiques, et avons fait un effort supplémentaire de rapprochement en montrant le rapport de chacun à onze dualismes classiques liés à ces quatre thèmes. Ces dualismes sont des oppositions binaires habituellement vénérables qui classent et divisent deux ordres de réalité. Avec ce langage commun des dualismes classiques, les obstacles aux rapprochements dus aux jeux de langage ou aux vocabulaires trop particuliers des trois auteurs sont tombés. Nous montrons d’abord qu’aucun vainqueur clair ne ressort de notre confrontation, mais qu’il y a moyen de porter un jugement sur les trois auteurs en fonction de critères non controversés (cohérence, complexité ou nuances, capacité à réfuter les deux autres). Ensuite, une confrontation et un dialogue directs des trois positions permettent de les faire s’exprimer sur les mêmes enjeux et de dégager des conclusions d’intérêt général dépassant le débat d’auteurs. Ces conclusions montrent quel genre de compromis peut être trouvé entre les principes de vérité et d’histoire, approuvent le projet de résoudre les tensions dans la vision de l’homme, en particulier entre les sphères publiques et privées, mais rappellent l’importance du point de vue ancien sur les principes repris par la démocratie (liberté, égalité, justice), ne serait-ce que pour faire contrepoids à la tendance générale. Ultimement, nous montrons comment de cette confrontation peut se dégager le programme pour la philosophie politique de vivre dans une tension féconde entre critique (prémoderne) et confiance (moderne), ainsi que la nécessité réaffirmée de poursuivre les efforts de dialogue pour rendre notre pensée digne de l’idée de la démocratie libérale. / Our study stems from the awareness that three twentieth-century political philosophies emanating from the United States have not partaken in any serious dialogue, even though this country should be a leader and model of openness regarding the topic of liberal democracy. The three political philosophies in question are those of John Rawls, Richard Rorty and Leo Strauss. Consequently, we have initiated a dialogue by confronting the ideas of these three thinkers on matters concerning truth, history, the dimensions of man, and democratic principles, having furthered this effort by highlighting the opinion of each on eleven classical dualisms related to these four matters. These dualisms are binary oppositions, generally venerable, which classify and divide two orders of reality. Using the common language of classical dualisms allowed us to overcome the obstacles due to the particular language game or vocabulary of each. In the first place, we show that if no real victor emerges from our confrontation, it is possible to judge each of the thinkers according to non contentious criteria (consistency, complexity or subtlety, capacity to refute the other positions). Then we illustrate that the direct confrontation through dialogue allows each of the three positions to express itself on the same issues and leads one to conclusions regarding matters beyond simple exegetic analysis. These conclusions show what kind of compromise is possible between the principles of truth and history. They support the project of resolving the tensions in our understanding of man, in particular, between the public and private spheres. Finally, they remind us of the importance of the ancient view of democratic principles (freedom, equality, justice), if only to counterbalance the current overwhelming trend. Ultimately, we explain how this confrontation can lead to a program for a political philosophy which balances the claims of (premodern) criticism and (modern) confidence, as well as restates the importance of continuing the dialogue in order that our thought be worthy of the idea of liberal democracy.

Cette étude, qui s'intéresse aux appropriations de l'Antiquité grecque au XXe siècle, se propose d'analyser les impacts de la lecture de Platon sur le développement de la pensée politique et éthique de Hannah Arendt. Notre approche du sujet est historique et philosophique. Premièrement, nous considérerons la toile de fond biographique, intellectuelle et historique de cette lecture. La relation intellectuelle entre Hannah Arendt et Martin Heidegger reçoit une attention particulière, puisque le Platon arendtien présente parfois des similarités avec celui de Heidegger. Nous considérerons également la réception de Platon en Allemagne entre la période de Weimar et l'après-guerre : les lectures idéologiques de l'époque nazie, et le débat autour du statut de Platon en tant qu'ancêtre du totalitarisme, clamé par Karl Popper, ont assombri la réputation philosophique de Platon jusqu'à la fin du XXe siècle. Nous trouvons des échos de ce climat intellectuel particulier dans le traitement de Platon chez Arendt. Dans un deuxième temps, nous examinerons les thèmes et les motifs de la lecture arendtienne en observant minutieusement une sélection d'ouvrages, d'essais, d'ébauches d'Arendt, en plus des notes du Journal de pensée (Denktagebuch) et des extraits de dialogues de Platon sur lesquels s'appuient sa lecture. Arendt déconstruit, transforme, altère et utilise ces textes afin de démontrer que notre tradition de pensée politique s'est édifiée sur un mépris de la politique qui trouve sa source dans la pensée platonicienne. Ce mépris culmine dans la pensée de Marx et le totalitarisme. Mais les réflexions d'Arendt sur la pensée, le jugement et la conscience, et son traitement du cas Eichmann suggère qu'elle s'approprie par moments la pensée de Platon. Des comparaisons avec d'autres penseurs émigrés allemands, qui s'inspirent aussi de Platon et des Grecs pour édifier leur pensée politique, Leo Strauss et Eric Voegelin, vont nous permettre d'affiner notre compréhension du Platon d'Arendt. / This study, which concerns the appropriations of Greek Antiquity in the 20th century, proposes to analyze the impacts of the reading of Plato on the development of Hannah Arendt's political and ethical thought. Our approach of this subject is historical and philosophical. First, we will consider the biographical, intellectual and historical background of this reading. The intellectual relationship between Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger receive a special attention, since Arendt's Plato is sometimes similar to the heiddeggerian one. We also consider Platonic reception in Germany between the Weimar period and the postwar era : the ideological readings of the Nazi era, and the debate surrounding Plato's status as the forebearer of totalitarianism, as claimed by Karl Popper, darkened Plato's philosophical reputation until the end of 20th century. We find some echoes of this particular intellectual climax in Arendt's treatment of Plato. Second, we will examine the themes and motives of arendtian reading by scrutinizing a selection of Arendt's books, essays, drafts, and notes from the Denktagebuch, and excerpts from the Platonic dialogues that informs her reading. Arendt deconstructs, transforms, distorts and uses these texts in order to show that our tradition of political thought was founded on a contempt for politics that finds its source in Platonic thought. This contempt culminates in Marx's thought and totalitarianism. But Arendt's reflections on thinking, judgment and conscience, and her treatment of Eichmann's case suggests that she sometimes appropriates Plato. Some comparisons with other German Émigrés thinkers who also reads Plato and the Greeks to inform their political thought, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, will enhance our understanding of Arendt's Plato.

[pt] Uma das temáticas mais fascinantes e recorrentes nas Ciências Sociais e, mais especificamente na Antropologia, é a problemática da ordem. Essa dissertação foca a sua análise em como os homens empreendem a imprescindível tarefa de dar significado às suas vidas, às suas instituições, às suas sociedades. Ordenar, nesse contexto, nada mais é do que dar uma justificação, um fundamento à todas as coisas que compõem a vida humana. Assim, parto da ideia de que a maneira mais eficaz de dar ordem e significado (seja a vida individual ou a sociedade e suas instituições) se encontra na religião. Admito, porém, que as estruturas de significado presentes nas diferentes culturas não possuem a firmeza necessária para se impor a todos com a mesma intensidade e da mesma forma. Portanto, para evitar que o mundo social perca a sua eficácia, é necessário nomizar ou ordenar a sociedade de uma forma estável e duradoura. A religião, admitida aqui como a forma mais eficaz de dar ordem ao meio social, aparecerá no contexto do que o filósofo Eric Voegelin chamou de sociedades cosmológicas, ou nas chamadas sociedades frias como denominou o antropólogo Claude Lévi-Strauss. A ordem e a construção dos significados nas diferentes sociedades serão analisadas através das obras desses dois autores. / [en] One of the most fascinating and recurring themes in Social Sciences and, more specifically, in Anthropology, is the problem of order. This dissertation focuses its analysis on how men undertake the essential task of giving meaning to their lives, their institutions and societies. To order, in this context, is nothing more than to give a justification, a ground for all things that make up human life. Thus, I take off from the idea that the most effective way of ordaining and establishing meaning (whether to individual life or society and its institutions) lies in religion. I admit, however, that the structures of meaning present in different cultures do not have the necessary firmness to enforce all with the same intensity and in the same manner. Therefore, to prevent the social world from losing its effectiveness, it is necessary to normalize or order society in a stable and lasting way. Religion, admitted as the most effective way to provide order to social life, appears in the context of what the philosopher Eric Voegelin called cosmological societies., or cold societies as Claude Lévi-Strauss called in his works. The order and the construction of meanings in the different societies will be analysed through the works of this two authors.

Nos recherches ont pour point de départ le constat d’un manque de dialogue entre trois philosophies politiques du XXe siècle nous provenant des États-Unis alors même que cet État devrait être le chef de file et un modèle d’ouverture en matière de réflexion sur la démocratie libérale. Les trois philosophies politiques en question sont celles de John Rawls, de Richard Rorty et de Leo Strauss. Nous avons donc procédé à l’amorce d’un dialogue en mettant en relation les idées des trois auteurs sur les grands thèmes de la vérité, de l’histoire, des dimensions de l’homme et des principes démocratiques, et avons fait un effort supplémentaire de rapprochement en montrant le rapport de chacun à onze dualismes classiques liés à ces quatre thèmes. Ces dualismes sont des oppositions binaires habituellement vénérables qui classent et divisent deux ordres de réalité. Avec ce langage commun des dualismes classiques, les obstacles aux rapprochements dus aux jeux de langage ou aux vocabulaires trop particuliers des trois auteurs sont tombés. Nous montrons d’abord qu’aucun vainqueur clair ne ressort de notre confrontation, mais qu’il y a moyen de porter un jugement sur les trois auteurs en fonction de critères non controversés (cohérence, complexité ou nuances, capacité à réfuter les deux autres). Ensuite, une confrontation et un dialogue directs des trois positions permettent de les faire s’exprimer sur les mêmes enjeux et de dégager des conclusions d’intérêt général dépassant le débat d’auteurs. Ces conclusions montrent quel genre de compromis peut être trouvé entre les principes de vérité et d’histoire, approuvent le projet de résoudre les tensions dans la vision de l’homme, en particulier entre les sphères publiques et privées, mais rappellent l’importance du point de vue ancien sur les principes repris par la démocratie (liberté, égalité, justice), ne serait-ce que pour faire contrepoids à la tendance générale. Ultimement, nous montrons comment de cette confrontation peut se dégager le programme pour la philosophie politique de vivre dans une tension féconde entre critique (prémoderne) et confiance (moderne), ainsi que la nécessité réaffirmée de poursuivre les efforts de dialogue pour rendre notre pensée digne de l’idée de la démocratie libérale. / Our study stems from the awareness that three twentieth-century political philosophies emanating from the United States have not partaken in any serious dialogue, even though this country should be a leader and model of openness regarding the topic of liberal democracy. The three political philosophies in question are those of John Rawls, Richard Rorty and Leo Strauss. Consequently, we have initiated a dialogue by confronting the ideas of these three thinkers on matters concerning truth, history, the dimensions of man, and democratic principles, having furthered this effort by highlighting the opinion of each on eleven classical dualisms related to these four matters. These dualisms are binary oppositions, generally venerable, which classify and divide two orders of reality. Using the common language of classical dualisms allowed us to overcome the obstacles due to the particular language game or vocabulary of each. In the first place, we show that if no real victor emerges from our confrontation, it is possible to judge each of the thinkers according to non contentious criteria (consistency, complexity or subtlety, capacity to refute the other positions). Then we illustrate that the direct confrontation through dialogue allows each of the three positions to express itself on the same issues and leads one to conclusions regarding matters beyond simple exegetic analysis. These conclusions show what kind of compromise is possible between the principles of truth and history. They support the project of resolving the tensions in our understanding of man, in particular, between the public and private spheres. Finally, they remind us of the importance of the ancient view of democratic principles (freedom, equality, justice), if only to counterbalance the current overwhelming trend. Ultimately, we explain how this confrontation can lead to a program for a political philosophy which balances the claims of (premodern) criticism and (modern) confidence, as well as restates the importance of continuing the dialogue in order that our thought be worthy of the idea of liberal democracy. / Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV).

Bart6k's own expanded tonal ("supradiatonic") pronouncements reveal that his music, notwithstanding tonally camouflaging surface details, clearly had a tonal foundation which in many respects is a reaction to the emerging atonalism of Schonberg. Analysis of three piano works (1908 - 1916) reveal that Bart6k's tonal language embraced intuitively the expanded tonal idiom. The harmonic resources Bart6k employed to obscure tonicisation embrace double-degree constructions, quartal formations, chords of addition and omission and other irregular constructions. Diatonic tonal pillars are evident in pedal points, tonic triads and dominant to tonic root movement. Through an application of the Riemann function theory expanded by Hartmann's supposition of fully-chromaticised scales tonal syntax (especially secondphase Strauss cadences or closes) becomes apparent within an expanded tonal product. The analyses conclude that Bart6k's inimitable "sound-world" is a twentieth-century manifestation of traditional tonality's primary tenets. / Musicology / M.Mus.

Neoconservatism has long had a tenuous relationship with International Relations theory. Despite an abundance of explanatory material and its influence in US foreign policy, few works in IR have attempted to build a stand-alone theory out of it. Furthermore, previous work on the topic has resulted in an under-developed and poor understanding of the movement’s core ideas. The thesis redefines neoconservatism as a trifecta of i) a set of explanatory ideas on world politics, ii) an approach to foreign policy, and iii) an ideology that stems from the European Enlightenment, all the way to the present day. Using this expanded conceptualization, the thesis builds a theory out of what can broadly be considered an ideology. The theory takes the form of an ideal-type construct and emphasizes hegemony in the international system. It offers an explanation for the causes of alliances, as well as regional and systemic conflicts. The theory also adopts a prescriptive function and offers an account of foreign policy analysis. It is highly recommended that the assumptions of the theory that are laid out here be tested in future work.

No description available.

In this dissertation, I investigate connections between French philosophy and the theory of architecture from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. In the mid-1960s, many architects became acutely aware of the crisis of modern architecture embodied in the failings of social housing, the routinized corporate modernism of the postwar period, and the commodification of design. They questioned the principles of the Modern Movement and emphasized the “arbitrary” nature of the relationship between form and function while turning to French structuralism, semiology, and post-structuralism for potential answers. My period of study spans from the the period of political uprisings of the 1960s to the advent of digital design in the early 1990s.To date, little in-depth research has been done on the close relation between French philosophy and architecture in this period and its role in foreshadowing postmodern developments. My dissertation addresses this gap by presenting case studies of the theoretical work of six different architects: Aldo Rossi, Alan Colquhoun, Mario Gandelsonas and Diana Agrest, Bernard Tschumi, and Peter Eisenman. These case studies share a common thread: a preoccupation with structuralist and poststructuralist concerns with language. However, concepts such as “structure,” “event,” and “meaning” often have different meanings for each of these architects. Thus, my project could be described as a history and criticism of architectural theory—one that focuses specifically on the dissonances and contradictions present within the theoretical writings of these architects, while examining the polemics and discussions between them. I consider their built work only to the extent that it helps to elucidate or challenge theoretical concepts. Thus, in my case study on Aldo Rossi’s writings, I interrogate the analogy between the structuralist concern for articulating discrete and finite linguistic units and the latter’s notion of “type” and urban morphology. In the chapter on Alan Colquhoun, I discuss the influence that the work of Roland Barthes, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Ferdinand de Saussure had on his reflections about “meaning” and “convention” in architecture. In the case study on the work of Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas, I examine the extent to which their understanding of “theory” and of “ideology” is indebted to the work of Louis Althusser and trace the influence of Roland Barthes, whose seminar on S/Z they attended in Paris before moving to New York in 1971. Likewise, I analyze the role that thinkers such as Henri Lefebvre, Roland Barthes, and the Tel Quel circle in the late 1970s, and Jacques Derrida in the early 1980s had on Bernard Tschumi’s writings on the “polysemy of meaning” and on the “event.” Finally, I examine Peter Eisenman’s collaboration with Jacques Derrida in the 1980s questioning Eisenman’s eclectic appropriation of Derrida’s philosophical concepts. Besides elucidating this significant period of architecture in which many of the fundamental principles of modern architecture were overturned, in the conclusion of this study, I discuss briefly the “post-critical turn” in the architectural scholarship of the past two decades with the hope of challenging its basic assumptions. My hope is to contribute, through its critical reevaluation, to theory’s renewal.

One of the central questions in political theory deals with the nature of rights. What sorts of rights do people possess? How are these rights justified? How ought these rights be reflected and related when seen in political, economic, and social institutions? Following the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), rights have once again returned to dominate much of contemporary political theory. However, natural law, which was the historical basis of the early Enlightenment theories of rights, is no longer the primary system appealed to when discussing rights. In fact, classical natural law has been all but discarded in most of political theory today. There has also been renewed debate over the nature of public neutrality, and what the relationship ought to be between the public and private sphere. The mainstream view of how our liberties relate to our rights, as well as what kinds of rights we have over our private affairs, has come under fire from a newly emerging political philosophy known as communitarianism. This thesis will present a robust theory of rights that provides a new understanding of the relationship between positive and negative rights through a defense of classical natural law as an ethical foundation for political theory. It will side with the communitarian critics of public neutrality, and offer a practical method of determining when the state is justified in limiting private liberties due to public interest.