Les institutions internationales ont à la suite de la 2ème guerre mondiale créé un corpus de droits reliés à l’essence de la condition humaine qui sont aussi intuitifs que difficiles à systématiser. Cette émergence se trouve à l’origine de la relation étroite entre le droit international et un noyau intangible de valeurs considérées comme universelles, érigé à la lumière de constructions philosophiques et juridiques du concept d’humanité jusqu’au moment où elles sont saisies par le droit international coutumier et conventionnel dans une logique de protection. Cette protection relève, d’un côté, du droit international pénal à partir notamment de l’édification des concepts de crime contre l’humanité et de génocide ayant comme corolaire également la définition du concept de graves violations et, de l’autre côté, du droit international des droits de l’Homme, en ce qu’il s’est occupé de la sauvegarde de l’individu en tant qu’être à la fois singulier et collectif, mais aussi des droits essentiels à la préservation de sa condition humaine. Le problème majeur qui se pose est celui des difficiles interactions entre le droit international et le droit national, combiné à l’héritage des paradigmes du droit international classique, ce qui nous amène à répondre à la question du comportement des États quand le droit international a pour objet la préservation de ce noyau dur des valeurs humaines. Dans la présente thèse, nous cherchons donc à démontrer que la protection tissée notamment sur la base des prohibitions apporte au droit international une position de suprématie liée à son caractère de jus cogens, de manière à imposer des devoirs non seulement aux États mais aussi aux individus. / Como resultado da Segunda Guerra Mundial, as instituições internacionais criaram um conjunto de direitos relacionados à essência da condição humana que são tão intuitivos quanto difíceis de sistematizar. Dessa emergência tem origem a estreita relação entre o direito internacional e a tutela de um núcleo intangível de valores da comunidade humana em seu conjunto, engendrados à luz das construções filosóficas e jurídicas do conceito de humanidade até o momento em que a mesma passou a ser protegida pelo direito internacional costumeiro e convencional. Essa proteção deu-se, de um lado, pelo direito internacional penal a partir da edificação do conceito de crime contra a humanidade e de genocídio, de modo a possibilitar a identificação do sentido de graves violações e, de outro lado, pelo direito internacional dos direitos humanos, naquilo em que se ocupou da salvaguarda do indivíduo enquanto ser ao mesmo tempo singular e coletivo, assim como dos direitos essenciais à preservação de sua condição humana. O problema maior que se apresenta diz respeito às difíceis interações do direito internacional com o direito nacional, agravado pela herança deixada pelos paradigmas do direito internacional clássico, o que nos leva a buscar responder à pergunta de como se comportam ou devem se comportar os Estados quando o direito internacional tem por objeto resguardar esse núcleo duro de valores humanos. Na presente tese, buscamos demonstrar que a proteção exercida sobretudo sob a base de proibições aporta ao direito internacional uma posição de supremacia que se liga ao seu caráter de jus cogens, de modo a impor obrigações tanto aos Estados quanto aos indivíduos. / Because of World War II, international institutions have created a set of rights related to the essence of the human condition that are as intuitive as they are difficult to systematize. The close relationship between international law and the protection of intangible values of the human community as a whole has its sources from this emergence. Indeed, these values were identified in the light of philosophical and legal constructions about the concept of humanity until the moment when it became protected by the customary and conventional international law. On the one hand, this protection came from the international criminal law and its enlightenment about the conception of crime against humanity and genocide, in a manner that it enabled the identification of the meaning of serious violations. On the other hand, this protection came likewise from international human rights law, in which it took care to safeguard the individual either as a singular and collective human being, as well as of the fundamental rights to the preservation of its human condition. The hardest problem that is presented here is about the difficult interactions between international law and national law. This problem is aggravated by the heritage left by the classic international law paradigms, which leads us to seek the answer concerning how the States react or how States must react when international law aims to safeguard these core human values. In this thesis, we seek to demonstrate that the protection exercised, especially on the basis of prohibitions, places international law in a position of supremacy linked to its character of jus cogens, in order to impose obligations over both States and individuals.

The What If Collection is a visual narrative that confronts white supremacy, the social, economic, and political ideology used to subjugate black civilization via colonial rule and enslavement in history and via structural racism today. Many white people have been socialized into a racial illiteracy that fosters white supremacy. This racial illiteracy fails to realize and understand the destructive effects of Western dominance on the rest of the world, particularly on past and present Africa and her diaspora. In response, utilizing discursive design, the collection constructs a counter-story that depicts a shift in the power structure in which the white oppressor is placed in the historical experience of the black oppressed. Moving forward from the past, a contemporary society is visualized where black people are the dominant force.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the constitutional right of the Métis to hunt in the Canadian legal consciousness in the four levels of court that heard the Powley case and comment on the judicial approach and observations. After a comparative analysis of the precedent setting Powley decision, a brief examination is undertaken of two recent cases regarding Métis rights in Canada: Laviolette and Willison. <p>Ultimately, the purpose of this research has been to show the treatment of Métis and First Nations Aboriginal rights have not been treated equally and to confront the challenges that this analysis raises. Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution has not provided the protections to Aboriginal rights that one would expect. In order to make changes to the legal system I have identified some fundamental problems with Aboriginal law in Canada associated with the identification of the source of those rights. <p>Further, I have made some suggestions on the approaches that could be taken to change the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding its interpretations of Métis rights.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the constitutional right of the Métis to hunt in the Canadian legal consciousness in the four levels of court that heard the Powley case and comment on the judicial approach and observations. After a comparative analysis of the precedent setting Powley decision, a brief examination is undertaken of two recent cases regarding Métis rights in Canada: Laviolette and Willison. <p>Ultimately, the purpose of this research has been to show the treatment of Métis and First Nations Aboriginal rights have not been treated equally and to confront the challenges that this analysis raises. Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution has not provided the protections to Aboriginal rights that one would expect. In order to make changes to the legal system I have identified some fundamental problems with Aboriginal law in Canada associated with the identification of the source of those rights. <p>Further, I have made some suggestions on the approaches that could be taken to change the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding its interpretations of Métis rights.

This study explores the complex relationship between radical right rhetoric and the genre of apocalyptic rhetoric. The radical right consists of the White Nationalist and Patriot movements, two common "hate group" movements in the United States. The Klanwatch (1998d) explains that the number of hate groups in the United States grew by 20 percent in 1997. They attribute much of this growth to the movement's use of the Internet. Although these hate groups are highly diverse, Christian Identity is a common theology to which many members of the radical right adhere.This study analyzes two artifacts representational of Christian Identity rhetoric. These artifacts were found on the Web site of the Northwest Kinsmen, a radical right group from the Pacific Northwest. Christian Identity is a "pseudo-Christian" theology that claims that white Christians are the true Israelites and that Jews are actually "children of Satan." Christian Identity followers believe that there will be a racial war (i.e., racial apocalypse) in which white Christians will triumph over the forces of evil (Abanes, 1996).This study utilizes the rhetorical method of generic criticism to determine that the Christian Identity rhetoric present on the Northwest Kinsmen's Web site is apocalyptic rhetoric. Generic theory, the theoretical foundation of this study, argues that rhetorical genres have common situational, substantive, and stylistic features and a common "organizing principle" that unifies the genre. Therefore, this study compares the key features of apocalyptic rhetoric to the Northwest Kinsmen artifacts. Through this study, a greater understanding of the social reality, beliefs, attitudes, and values of the radical right, Christian Identity rhetors is obtained.This study discovers that the Christian Identity rhetoric found on the Northwest Kinsmen's Web site is apocalyptic rhetoric. This study illustrates that these Christian Identity rhetors believe that they are living in a chaotic world of inexplicable problems. Through apocalyptic rhetoric, the rhetors help explain the "crises" facing the audience and therefore restore order in their lives. Specifically, this study shows how these apocalyptic rhetors utilize conspiracy theories to restore order. Additionally, it illustrates how the rhetorical strategies associated with apocalyptic rhetoric (i.e., typology, transfer, and style and language) are used to enhance the credibility of the rhetor and the legitimacy of even the most racist assertions. Finally, this study provides insight into the use of the Internet by radical right groups. / Department of Speech Communication

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

History / D. Litt. et Phil. (History)

A modulação temporal de efeitos como técnica de decisão possibilita ao Supremo Tribunal Federal a mitigação dos efeitos retroativos da declaração de inconstitucionalidade, ao mesmo tempo em que resguarda o princípio da supremacia da Constituição. Nos casos em que há mudança de jurisprudência, atua como importante mecanismo de salvaguarda das legítimas expectativas dos jurisdicionados na estabilidade dos julgados do Tribunal Constitucional. Em ambas as hipóteses, concretiza o princípio da segurança jurídica, inclusive na sua vertente subjetiva, a proteção da confiança legítima e assegura a melhor realização dos interesses públicos, próprios de uma sociedade pluralista. / The prospective doctrine as a decision technique makes possible the mitigation of the retroactive effects of the unconstitutionality declaration to the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, at the same time it protects the Constitution supremacy principle. In cases with statement of overruling precedents, it plays an important role in protecting the legitimate expectations of the citizens in the stability of the Constitutional Court precedents. In both cases, it enforces the principle of legal certainty, including its subjective aspect, the legitimate confidence protection and it assures the best fulfilment of the public interests that are typical of a pluralist society.