The objective of this Master's thesis is to analyse the term of "rule of law" and its Chinese variations (fazhi 法治 , fazhi 法制 , yifazhiguo 依法治国 ) since establishment of the People's Republic of China until present, with the emphasis on contemporary understanding of the concept, affected by political environment. The concept of the rule of law is presented throughout analysis of collected works of influential political leaders, namely Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping, reflected in official documents crucial to the legal system, such as the Constitution. Each historical period represents a different stance on the conception of rule of law and position of legal system, which results in analysis of current situation with a prospective future attitude to this issue. Keywords: rule of law, constitutional rule, Communist Party of China, China

To what extent does China's experience of economic reform since 1989 compel a reconsideration of the ontological foundations of contemporary capitalist development? China's political economy remains characterized by a unique and resilient political structure (the Chinese Communist Party) that penetrates both 'private' (market) and 'public' (state) organizations. The conceptual rootedness of contemporary theories of comparative and international political economy in a distinctly Western historical experience of capitalist development hinders their ability to understand Chinese capitalism on its own terms—as historically, culturally, and globally embedded. To generate greater analytic traction in understanding China's otherwise paradoxical constellation of actors and dynamics, I argue that contemporary capitalism should be studied as a set of mechanisms for managing and exploiting socio-economic uncertainty, rather than according to the binary logics of state regulation and market competition. These mechanisms can be conceptualized as an overarching risk environment. On this basis, I trace how the cognitive frames, social institutions, and relational networks that emerged within the 'socialist market economy' in China's post-Tiananmen financial system have placed the Chinese Communist Party at the nexus of the state and the market. I argue that specific ideas emerged about how to manage the flow of capital, playing a significant role in underpinning expectations of financial growth and stability. During this period the financial system underpinned the CCP's capacity to both manage and exploit socio-economic uncertainty through the path of reform, forming a central explanatory factor in a developmental trajectory marked by a trifecta of rapid economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and deepening socio-economic imbalances. Rather than viewing the path of financial reform in China solely in terms of 'partial' or 'failed' free- market reform, it thus becomes possible to cast China's development in a new light as the product of a more concerted vision of how the financial system would enable a mode of economic development that combined the drive for capital accumulation with the distinctive socio-political circumstances of post-1989 China.

This thesis introduces China's contemporary history especially the period 1949-1976 based on the analysis of selected British and American historiography. Through the criticism and comparison of British and American scholars' discourse, this thesis will obtain a deeper understanding of China's history. This thesis regards Mao Zedong as the main China's historical figure, as well as the construction of new China as the main line of writing. So the position of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party during the period of the construction of new China is an important part to discuss in this thesis. The thesis mainly talks about the period 1949-76 of China from the perspective of political and economic policies and movements, international relations, social issues, military actions and cultural movements. In addition, this thesis also emphasizes on discussing the angles, methodology and terminology of British and American historiography on China's contemporary history.

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數十年來，中國共產黨對於儒家主義的文化價值產生巨變。不似四十年前的革命，當時共產黨欲拔除儒道深植的價值，孔夫子成為國家反革命的代表形象。相反的，近年來黨內開始重塑孔夫子的地位，藉由每年慶祝孔子誕辰，立孔子像以彰顯他的貢獻，塑造成中國偉大的聖人。這大膽假設過去以馬克思主義的基本意識形態可能在改變，產生共鳴的對象從馬克思主義蛻變成儒家主義。另外一說：中國共產黨意圖採用普世的儒家價值來合理化其作為。因此我們應如何看待這個黨與過去其眼中的「魔」共舞？黨對於儒家主義的真正意圖為合？本文研究重點將解釋以上問題。 首先，本文將透過理論去探討儒家主義如何合理化政治行為。接著將透過重要的歷史背景因素證明一開始的中國共產黨對儒家主義的深惡痛絕。其後將透過第一手的文件和歷史文獻佐證在1980年代儒家主義復甦以後，黨轉變為尋找與大眾價值的共識──與儒家主義共存的立場。儒家主義的再次興起帶來了民族尊嚴，進而使黨更容易透過國家主義統一整個國家。另一方面，中國共產黨也試著傳播精心塑造的儒家主義，去蕪存菁的挑選出最利於黨的儒家元素架構。後段將提到中國共產黨如何選擇性的篩選儒家主義元素來支持獨裁統治，向國際營造中國穩定社會的形象；而非摒棄過去基本意識形態──馬克思主義卻選擇西化。最後駁斥某些立場：如中國共產黨正準備脫離現下的基本意識進而靠攏儒家主義。 因此，儘管過去中國共產黨批評儒家主義是製造階級化的淵藪，但現在卻一步步採用同樣思想，合理化獨裁統治。這種五十步笑百步的行為，挑選了利於黨的儒家元素，將存在中國兩千年的儒家主義的這甕舊酒，裝到中國共產黨統治下的這個新瓶裡。 / Over the last few decades, the Chinese Communist Party’s attitude towards the most profound determinant of the traditional Chinese culture – Confucianism – changed significantly. Not even 40 years ago, Confucius was represented as an anti-revolutionary enemy of the state, while the party tried to root out every sprout of Confucianism amongst the population. Contrarily, nowadays, the party seems to have re-instated Confucius to the position of ‘great Chinese sage’, for which it organizes his annual birthday parties, raises statues for him and praises his contributions to humanity. This leads some observers to the bold conclusion that the party might even be prepared to change its ideological basis from Marxism – which lost its resonance amongst the population anyways – to Confucianism. Others disagree, and argue that the party is just widening its legitimacy basis in a populist way by using all kinds of means, amongst which Confucianism. Thus, how should we assess the party’s dance with the former devil? What is actually the party’s plan with Confucianism? Giving an answer to the latter question is the main purpose of this research. First of all, as most authors relate this phenomenon to the party’s quest for political legitimacy, a basic theoretical overview will be given, showing possible causality between Confucianism and political legitimacy. Secondly, the most essential historical background will be provided in order to explain why the party was initially so malicious towards Confucianism. Subsequently, based on literature, and based on an analysis of primary sources, it will be argued that the party, after witnessing a popular revival of Confucianism in the 1980s, on the one hand sought consensus with the population by co-opting this revival – a revival which led to national pride, enabling the party to capitalize on its nationalist legacy as unifier of the country – while it on the other hand tried to channel this development into a meticulously constructed form of Confucianism – by selecting some elements and discarding others – that would benefit the party. The latter refers to a fragmented version of Confucianism which supports authoritarian rule, enhances social stability, shows a gentler face of China to the outside world, presents an attractive cultural alternative to Westernization, but - most importantly - doesn’t present an ideological alternative to Marxism. The latter refutes the claim that the CCP is preparing to depart from its current ideological base towards Confucianism. Concluding, despite the fact that the party previously vigorously blamed Confucianism for having facilitated the subjugation of the population, it now more or less uses Confucianism in a similar manner. The pot seems to have called the kettle black. Therefore, the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy strategy is old wine – symbolizing the way in which dynastical China has used a selection of Confucian teachings to enhance its authoritarian rule for two millennia – in a new socialist bottle.

前人學者對於早期中國共產黨的研究，大多從第三國際輸出共產主義到中國的角度進行，自然強調了中蘇兩個共產之間在意識形態的影響及其作用，而忽略蘇俄對華政策如何影響中國共產黨（以下簡稱「中共」）的成立活動及其黨內路線變化的層面，包括蘇俄對中共的支援，本文集中探討此一過去學界所忽略的問題側面－－蘇俄對中共含有現實政治的動機與目的。 因此，本文主旨在於論析1917年10月革命後至1923年 1月為止，蘇俄的對華政策及蘇俄與中共間的互動關係。透過此論析，吾人欲加以論證者有以下兩點： 第一，中共的創立包括其主要路線的變化及大部分的活動，皆是在蘇俄的亞洲戰略以及對華政策的影響下進行。 第二，蘇俄接觸並支援中共，只是其亞洲戰略及對華政策的一個環節，並非只在於擴散共產主義理念的單一目的而已。 本文除導言及結論外，主體為參章。第壹章，闡明蘇俄於10月革命後，列寧政權如何從對外政策轉為現實路線，並闡述蘇俄對華政策的動機與其過程：第貳章，探討中共的創立及其活動與蘇俄在華工作的對應關係（functional relation）:第參章，論析中共自第一次全國代表大會（1921年7月）後開始至1923年1月「孫中山與越飛聯合宣言」為止的期間，中共政治路線及其發展因受到蘇俄對華政策影響的演變過程。

欲探尋中共和知識份子的關係，必先回顧其歷史發展。早在1940年代，中共已藉由「整風運動」，發展出一套「馴服」和「利用」知識份子的辦法。1949年中共建立新政權，更將此邏輯推及全國，對於當代中國知識份子而言，無疑是一巨大變化與挑戰。 　　胡風，作為一位與中共關係密切的作家、知識份子，其政治立場向來親共，乃被中共視為「同路人」。儘管如此，胡風仍有諸多意見，未能與中共全然契合。1954年，胡風向中共中央遞交「萬言書」，直陳中共文藝政策的缺失。1955年，毛澤東欽定「胡風反革命集團」一案，胡風和友人多遭逮捕、審查，並牽連甚廣。胡風一派因言獲罪，堪稱中共建政以來首宗「文字獄」，亦為重大政治冤獄。 　　本研究以胡風事件為主軸，圍繞胡風其人進行個案研究。第一章為導論，簡述本文研究動機，以及當代以來中國知識份子的思想變化。第貳章、第叁章為胡風之個人歷史，描述胡風求學、出洋、創作、涉入政治的人生歷程，作為討論胡風事件的背景介紹。第肆章為主文，詳述胡風事件的原委，進一步探討胡風事件的成因，分析中共黨政高層（特別是毛澤東）所扮演之關鍵決策角色，藉此釐清其政治責任。第伍章結論，為筆者的研究心得和展望。透過胡風事件的探究，筆者針對毛澤東的個人權威、中共與知識份子的特殊關係，以及中共政治文化提出檢討。 / To realize the relationship between the CCP and the intellectuals, we should review the historical development. Early in the 1940s, the CCP has already progressed the method of “using” the intellectuals. In 1949, the new regime was built by the CCP. Furthermore, they spread this strategy to whole mainland. Obviously, it was a big change and challenge to the contemporary Chinese intellectuals. Hu Feng, as an intellectual and a “comrade”, whose political position had been closed to the CCP. However, Hu Feng still had some opinions which differ from the CCP. In 1954, Hu Feng submitted his proposal which criticizing the CCP’s literature and art policy. In 1955, Mao ZeDong judged this case as “Hu Feng counterrevolutionary group”. After that, Hu Feng and his companions were arrested and investigated by the government. The Hu Feng Incident seemed to be such a literary persecution and injustice case. 　　This research mainly focuses on the Hu Feng Incident. Firstly, Chapter 1 is the “Introduction”, which introduces the reasons of this research and the changing thought of modern Chinese intellectuals. Secondly, the focus of Chapter 2 is the life course and career pattern of Hu Feng. Chapter3 is the narration of the big change to the intellectuals on 1949. Chapter 4, which includes the main idea of this research, not only analyzes the causes of the Hu Feng Incident, but also seeks the crucial role of Mao. In Conclusion, Chapter 5 summarized the reflection and the vision upon this research. The writer reviews Mao’s personal authority and the political culture of the CCP. Finally, the special relationship between the CCP and the Chinese intellectuals will still be a major issue, that will need further study on it.

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Internationally, China’s promotion of its cultural heritage has gained much attention as a means to gain soft power and exert influence. In 2021, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), released the 14th Five-Year Plan stating the country’s overarching ambitions in the coming years. In contrast to previous plans, this year’s policy document contains strong wordings concerning enhancing soft power, socialist culture and for the Chinese people to ‘inherit and carry forward’ Excellent Traditional Culture, signifying that China’s approach to soft power and cultural promotion may be of increased importance also in the domestic context. Against this backdrop, this paper aims to explore the discourse used to promote ‘Excellent Traditional Chinese Culture’ within China.   By applying thematic analysis to articles from The People’s Daily seven dominant themes emerged regarding promotional efforts. Between the time interval of 2021-2022, the promotion of ‘Excellent Traditional Chinese Culture’ emphasized the following themes: Leadership of Xi Jinping, Integration of Marxism and Chinese Characteristics, Combining Tradition and Modernity, Cultural Self-Confidence and Nationalism, Creativity and Innovative Transformation, National Rejuvenation and Inheritance, and China’s International Cultural Soft Power. As previous research on soft power in the Chinese context suggests, discourse and narratives seem to build on the notion of building a united and cohesive nation. Instilling a cultural and ideological basis that should permeate all of Chinese society.

滿清末年以來，中國文官節制武官的傳統受到嚴重破壞，地方團練取代政府軍，地方軍隊演變成軍閥主義，國家領導人都是由戰場上勝利的軍人擔任。江澤民時期開始，中共實施世代交替，黨、政、軍高層領導人，轉移給一批技術官僚與軍事專業人員手上，此期間中共黨、政、軍互動關係為本文研究之目的。透過歷史比較，江澤民，是一個幾乎與解放軍毫無淵源的文官，沒有任何服役與作戰的經驗，卻能順利掌握軍隊與國家，本研究證明在中國中斷數百年來「文官統制武官」的歷史傳統，已經恢復。此外，近二十年來，中共軍事現代化成就確實令人刮目相看，與江澤民的外語專長及電機專長有密切關係，這些人格特質也是他令軍隊信服的重要工具。軍政軍民關係上，江澤民堅持民主集中制，排除多黨制，造成軍隊遠離政治紛擾，並與黨充分合作，以獲致預算並做好軍民與軍政關係。在解放軍內部，推動軍事教育的改革，也造就解放軍戰略思維的重大轉變，形成解放軍現代化的動力之ㄧ。然而，敏感性的軍文關係議題，例如一黨領軍，中共有禁忌而且沒有試驗場，台灣的寶貴經驗，很值得大陸參考。 關鍵字：中國共產黨、軍隊現代化、解放軍、文人統制、軍事專業主義 / During the decline of Chin Dynasty, as an unintended result to rely upon localized National Guard defeating upraise event, the Chinese traditional Civilian Control system was replaced by warlord system. Since then, the war hero was the one who advanced to political leadership. Until Jiang Zemin, a civilian with civil college certificate took leadership over the PLA, CCP, and PRC. The purpose of this paper is to exam the civil-military interaction during Jiang Zemin’s journey. Through historical comparison, this paper confirmed that the Chinese traditional Civil-Control system has been revived. Also, Jiang Zemin was the military leadership over PLA modernization. With personal attributes of profound languages and electronic profession, he shaped his position successfully in PLA community. This paper also recognized significant relationship between one-party theory and PLA, and the relationship between PLA　NDU and strategic thinking. Key Words: Chinese Communist Party, Military Modernization, People Liberation Army, Civil-Control and Military Professionalism.