Should same sex couples have a right to marriage? This question has been debated frequently during the last two decades. The legislation across Europe shows a divide between countries that have legalised same-sex marriage and countries that have introduced constitutional bans on same-sex marriage. Using a theory that emphasises the moral dimension of human rights, I examine the right to marriage in the European Convention of Human Rights from an ethical perspective. The purpose of this thesis is threefold. The first aim is to investigate how the right to marriage is regulated in The European Convention on Human Rights and how its interpreted by The European Court of Human Rights. The second aim is to identify and assess central arguments in the debate about same sex marriage from a human rights perspective. The third and final aim is to perform a critical examination of the right to marriage in the European Convention of Human rights from an ethical perspective.   This study shows that The European Court of Human Rights is cautious in its interpretation of the right to marriage and has chosen to await a European consensus before including same-sex couples in the right to marriage. By looking closer at the evolutionary interpretation of the convention, as discussed by George Letsas & Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, I conclude that this interpretation should be based on certain moral principles. Through the examination of central arguments in the same-sex marriage debate I draw the conclusion that same sex couples have a moral right to marriage. Thus, this thesis suggests that there is a contradiction between the moral dimension of human rights and The European Court of Human Rights interpretation of the right to marriage for same-sex couples. I therefore argue that there should be an ethical demand to include same sex-couples in the right to marriage.

<p style="text-align: justify;">Објективна је чињеница да је Европски суд за људска права најстарији међународни форум за заштиту људских права. Вредносна оцена, да је овај Суд уз то и најзначајнији и најуспешнији суд такве врсте, последњих деценија постала је практично опште место у правној теорији. Као разлози успеха, уобичајено се наводе две чињенице: висок степен поверења које Суд ужива од стране држава чланица и лица која му се обраћају те велики утицај који је пракса тог Суда имала на укупан развој људских права на европском континенту али и шире.<br />Највећи утицај Европски суд за људска права, остварио је у домену успостављања стандарда заштите слобода и права гарантованих Конвенцијом, а који стандарди су доцније имплементирани на националном нивоу држава чланица. У том смислу, значај праксе Суда превазилази збир појединачно пружене заштите сваком од лица чија је представка у досадашњој историји Суда усвојена. Корпус судске праксе из које произилазе бројни стандарди заштите данас је у многоме полазна тачка у аргументацији и националних законодаваца и националних судова.<br />Из наведеног произилази и осетљива позиција коју Суд заузима у контролном механизму Конвенције. Са једне стране, да би био ефикасан, од њега се очекује да кроз своју праксу и даље утиче на заштиту људских права и слобода и да том праксом (некада непосредно, а некада посредно) интервенише на пољу остварења и заштите права и слобода на националном нивоу. Са друге стране, Суд мора оправдати висок степен поверења држава чланица, чијом је вољом постао и чијем вољом опстаје на међународној сцени. Државе чланице, осетљиве су у погледу очувања сопственог суверенитета, па тако, када Суд прекорачи границе интервенције на које су државе &bdquo;навикле― оне Суду упућују позиве да свој &bdquo;интервенционизам― ограничи.<br />На описани начин ствара се једна врста вертикалне тензије између Суда и држава чланица, услед чега је Суд приморан да у свом одлучивању балансира између захтева да пружи ефикасну и ефективну заштиту људских права, и захтева да своју интервенцију у националне правне поретке сведе на прихватљиву границу.<br />Алат који Суд корити у поступку таквог балансирања управо јесте начело супсидијарности. Ово начело, у својој досадашњој пракси, Суд је означио као једно од основних и најважнијих начела свог функционисања, наводећи да је оно инхерентно механизму заштите који Конвенција успоставља. Услед специфичне позиције коју заузима, Суд начело супсидијарности користи и као штит, да би ограничио поље и начин свог деловања и тиме се заштитио од критика држава чланица; али и као мач, као средство које му даје основа да нападне неправду коју је уочио и интервенише у циљу пружања ефективне заштите права.<br />Циљ овог рада управо јесте да испита сва релевантна питања која се постављају у вези са овим важним начелом функционисања Суда.<br />У раду ће бити испитано најпре шта је то супсидијарност али и како се она развијала ван контролног механизма Конвенције да би се могла упоредити са супсидијарношћу у оквиру контролног механизма Конвенције. Биће испитано када се супсидијарност први пут јавља у пракси Суда, колико често се јавља у пракси и са којим последицама. Испитаће се посебно које правне инструменте из Конвенције и сопствене праксе Суд користи као израз начела супсидијарности, те како и из којих разлога ти инструменти делују као штит или као мач.</p> / <p style="text-align: justify;">Objektivna je činjenica da je Evropski sud za ljudska prava najstariji međunarodni forum za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Vrednosna ocena, da je ovaj Sud uz to i najznačajniji i najuspešniji sud takve vrste, poslednjih decenija postala je praktično opšte mesto u pravnoj teoriji. Kao razlozi uspeha, uobičajeno se navode dve činjenice: visok stepen poverenja koje Sud uživa od strane država članica i lica koja mu se obraćaju te veliki uticaj koji je praksa tog Suda imala na ukupan razvoj ljudskih prava na evropskom kontinentu ali i šire.<br />Najveći uticaj Evropski sud za ljudska prava, ostvario je u domenu uspostavljanja standarda zaštite sloboda i prava garantovanih Konvencijom, a koji standardi su docnije implementirani na nacionalnom nivou država članica. U tom smislu, značaj prakse Suda prevazilazi zbir pojedinačno pružene zaštite svakom od lica čija je predstavka u dosadašnjoj istoriji Suda usvojena. Korpus sudske prakse iz koje proizilaze brojni standardi zaštite danas je u mnogome polazna tačka u argumentaciji i nacionalnih zakonodavaca i nacionalnih sudova.<br />Iz navedenog proizilazi i osetljiva pozicija koju Sud zauzima u kontrolnom mehanizmu Konvencije. Sa jedne strane, da bi bio efikasan, od njega se očekuje da kroz svoju praksu i dalje utiče na zaštitu ljudskih prava i sloboda i da tom praksom (nekada neposredno, a nekada posredno) interveniše na polju ostvarenja i zaštite prava i sloboda na nacionalnom nivou. Sa druge strane, Sud mora opravdati visok stepen poverenja država članica, čijom je voljom postao i čijem voljom opstaje na međunarodnoj sceni. Države članice, osetljive su u pogledu očuvanja sopstvenog suvereniteta, pa tako, kada Sud prekorači granice intervencije na koje su države &bdquo;navikle― one Sudu upućuju pozive da svoj &bdquo;intervencionizam― ograniči.<br />Na opisani način stvara se jedna vrsta vertikalne tenzije između Suda i država članica, usled čega je Sud primoran da u svom odlučivanju balansira između zahteva da pruži efikasnu i efektivnu zaštitu ljudskih prava, i zahteva da svoju intervenciju u nacionalne pravne poretke svede na prihvatljivu granicu.<br />Alat koji Sud koriti u postupku takvog balansiranja upravo jeste načelo supsidijarnosti. Ovo načelo, u svojoj dosadašnjoj praksi, Sud je označio kao jedno od osnovnih i najvažnijih načela svog funkcionisanja, navodeći da je ono inherentno mehanizmu zaštite koji Konvencija uspostavlja. Usled specifične pozicije koju zauzima, Sud načelo supsidijarnosti koristi i kao štit, da bi ograničio polje i način svog delovanja i time se zaštitio od kritika država članica; ali i kao mač, kao sredstvo koje mu daje osnova da napadne nepravdu koju je uočio i interveniše u cilju pružanja efektivne zaštite prava.<br />Cilj ovog rada upravo jeste da ispita sva relevantna pitanja koja se postavljaju u vezi sa ovim važnim načelom funkcionisanja Suda.<br />U radu će biti ispitano najpre šta je to supsidijarnost ali i kako se ona razvijala van kontrolnog mehanizma Konvencije da bi se mogla uporediti sa supsidijarnošću u okviru kontrolnog mehanizma Konvencije. Biće ispitano kada se supsidijarnost prvi put javlja u praksi Suda, koliko često se javlja u praksi i sa kojim posledicama. Ispitaće se posebno koje pravne instrumente iz Konvencije i sopstvene prakse Sud koristi kao izraz načela supsidijarnosti, te kako i iz kojih razloga ti instrumenti deluju kao štit ili kao mač.</p> / <p style="text-align: justify;">European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) is the oldest international forum for the protection of human rights. The opinion that the European Court of Human Rights is the most important and most successful court of its kind has become, in recent decades, a matter of uncontested consensus in legal theory. There are two main commonly cited reasons for such success: the high level of confidence that the Court enjoys from the Member States and the persons who turn to it, and the great influence that the jurisprudence of that Court has on the overall development of human rights on the European continent, and beyond.</p><p>The greatest impact of the EctHR can be found in the domain of the establishment of standards for the protection of freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Convention, which were subsequently implemented at the national level of the Member States. In this respect, the importance of the Court&#39;s practice goes beyond the sum of individual protection provided to each of the persons whose application in the previous history of the Court has been upheld. The current case law, which gave rise to development of human rights standards, necessarily plays a vital role in human rights argumentation of both national legislators and national courts.</p><p>Bearing in mind the reasons for the Court&lsquo;s success mentioned above, it seems that there is a delicate position that the Court holds within the control mechanism of the Convention. On the one hand, the Court needs to intervene into national legal orders of the Member States (directly or indirectly) when those States fail to secure guaranties provided in the Convention. On the other hand, the Court must justify a high degree of confidence among the Member States, who constituted the Court and whose consent made the Court a prominent actor on international stage. Member States are sensitive in terms of preserving their own sovereignty. When the Court exceeds the limits of intervention to which States are &quot;accustomed&quot; they call upon the Court to limit its &quot;interventionism&quot;.</p><p>In this way, a sort of a vertical tension is created between the Court and the Member States, which is why the Court is compelled to balance its decisions between the requirement to provide efficient and effective protection of human rights, on one hand, and demands that its intervention into national legal orders should be reduced to an acceptable margin, on the other.</p><p>The mechanism used by the Court in the process of such balancing is, in fact, the principle of subsidiarity. This principle has been designated by the Court as one of the fundamental and supreme principles of its functioning, and as a principle that is inherent to the protection mechanism established by the Convention. Due to its specific position the Court has used the principle of subsidiarity both as a shield and as a sword. As a shield when required to limit the scope and method of its functioning thereby protecting itself from the criticism of the Member States. As a sword, when grappling with the manifest injustice on national level in order to intervene and provide effective protection of human rights.</p><p>The aim of this dissertation is to examine all the relevant issues raised in relation to this important principle of the functioning of the Court.This dissertation will firstly examine subsidiarity and how it evolved outside the control mechanism of the Convention, in order to be able to compare it with subsidiarity within the Convention&#39;s control mechanism. Furthermore, the research covers issues of frequency and consequences of the principle of subsidiarity in the Court&lsquo;s jurisprudence. The goal of the research is also to detect legal arguments and legal concepts used by the Court to express the principle of subsidiarity. The task is to examine whether and when these concepts and arguments are used as a shield or as a sword.</p>

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This thesis examines predictive modelling from the legal perspective. Predictive modelling is a technology based on applied statistics, mathematics, machine learning and artificial intelligence that uses algorithms to analyse big data collections, and identify patterns that are invisible to human beings. The accumulated knowledge is incorporated into computer models, which are then used to identify and predict human activity in new circumstances, allowing for the manipulation of human behaviour. Predictive models use big data to represent people. Big data is a term used to describe the large amounts of data produced in the digital environment. It is growing rapidly due mainly to the fact that individuals are spending an increasing portion of their lives within the on-line environment, spurred by the internet and social media. As individuals make use of the on-line environment, they part with information about themselves. This information may concern their actions but may also reveal their personality traits. Predictive modelling is a powerful tool, which private companies are increasingly using to identify business risks and opportunities. They are incorporated into on-line commercial decision-making systems, determining, among other things, the music people listen to, the news feeds they receive, the content people see and whether they will be granted credit. This results in a number of potential harms to the individual, especially in relation to personal autonomy. This thesis examines the harms resulting from predictive modelling, some of which are recognized by traditional law. Using the European legal context as a point of departure, this study ascertains to what extent legal regimes address the use of predictive models and the threats to personal autonomy. In particular, it analyses Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adopted by the European Union (EU). Considering the shortcomings of traditional legal instruments, a strategy entitled ‘empowerment’ is suggested. It comprises components of a legal and technical nature, aimed at levelling the playing field between companies and individuals in the commercial setting. Is there a way to strengthen humanity as predictive modelling continues to develop?

La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé. / Freedom of religion, often recognised as “first freedom” in numerous legal traditions, also reflects the different conceptions of the place of the individual and the collectivity in society. Our study will analyse the Canadian, American and European constitutional models of freedom of religion and conscience. In a first chapter, we will examine the theoretical conceptions of religion in the social sciences as well as from the perspectives of legal approaches in order to discern the manner in which religion is conceived and to better understand its various influences. In this way, we hope to enhance our understanding of both identity and to a greater extent, culture, both in and out of law. In the second and third chapters, we will attempt to characterise the relationship between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in Canada, as well as identify unresolved issues. In the final chapter, we will observe how freedom of conscience has been interpreted in the American legal setting as well as in the European Union, by way of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). We hypothesise that a better understanding of the relationship between the freedoms of conscience and religion can be arrived at by clarifying the theoretical conceptions of religion and conscience in comparative constitutional law.

Freedom of Religion or Belief in the Context of European and International Law This PhD dissertation focuses on selected aspects of freedom of religion or belief in Europe. It aims to introduce the legal framework in which religious freedom has to operate, and to place this essential freedom into a broader cultural, religious and human rights context. The contextualisation emphasised throughout this dissertation is based on an assumption that it is not possible to establish a pure legal notion of religious freedom that would not bear any imprint of the societal, legal, cultural and religious context of its authors; in reality, each person's understanding of religious freedom is rooted in his culture, religion and experience. This should not lead, however, to a complete rejection of the possibility of a common understanding and universal protection of religious freedom. On the contrary, it should motivate each interpreter and law-maker in the area of religious freedom to study the understandings of all persons and entities involved in a particular case or situation. Having thoroughly studied all presented claims rooted in religious freedom and having taken into consideration all other rights, principles and interests involved, it should be possible for the decision-makers to resolve the case in a...

L’autorité de la chose interprétée des arrêts de la Cour EDH est un concept avec une double signification. Il désigne à la fois l’autorité jurisprudentielle et l’autorité interprétative de la Cour EDH. Ces deux aspects interconnectés témoignent du caractère propre de sa jurisprudence. Ainsi, la force obligatoire que revêt par hypothèse la décision rendue n’est pas isolée à l’espèce mais elle peut être étendue aux États tiers au litige dans la mesure où la Cour EDH est expressément investie du pouvoir d’énoncer des interprétations authentiques qui font corps à la Convention. Certains arrêts de la Cour EDH ont donc une force référentielle obligatoire et sont, de ce fait, opposables à l’ensemble de la communauté des États contractants. Complètement dissociée de l’obligation qui concerne l’État défendeur au titre de l’article 46 de la Convention, l’obligation de tenir compte de la jurisprudence européenne implique l’intervention proactive de l’État pour mettre en conformité son système national sans attendre la condamnation de la Cour EDH. Les juridictions nationales ont progressivement reconnu cet effet dissuasif de la jurisprudence de la Cour de Strasbourg en contribuant au développement d’un partenariat inter-juridictionnel puisque la mise en oeuvre des arrêts de la Cour EDH est une responsabilité judiciaire partagée. / The Res interpretata effect of the ECtHRs’ judgments is a concept with double significance. It designates both the authority of the ECtHR’s case-law and its interpretative authority. These two interconnected aspects demonstrate the special nature of the Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the binding force of the Court's judgment is not restricted in the case at hand, but it can be extended to the States that were not a party to the proceedings insofar as the ECtHR has the power to enunciate the authentic interpretations of the Convention. Certain judgments of the ECtHR have, thus, an obligatory referential force and are, as a consequence, binding on the entire community of the Contracting States. Entirely separated from the obligation that concerns the defendant State under Article 46 of the Convention, the obligation to take into account the ECtHR’s case-law involves the State’s proactive intervention to bring its national system in conformity with the ECtHR’s standards. The national jurisdictions have progressively accepted the dissuasive effect of the ECtHR’s case-law by contributing to the development of an inter-jurisdictional partnership since the implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments is a shared judicial responsibility.

La dimension objective représente l’une des principales théories d’interprétation des droits fondamentaux en Allemagne. Peu connue en dehors de son cadre national, elle se déploie toutefois au niveau européen et en particulier dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne, sans être pensée en tant que telle. La présente étude vise à analyser cette conception à l’échelle européenne à travers ses caractéristiques essentielles dégagées à partir du droit allemand, et mettre en évidence l’influence de ce dernier sur le droit européen. La dimension objective se présente ainsi comme une interprétation téléologique et totale, qui indexe la protection des droits sur des valeurs politiques et morales, et assure leur rayonnement au sein mais aussi à travers les ordres juridiques. Si elle constitue un point d’orgue dans la sophistication de la théorie des droits, elle emporte néanmoins le risque de relativiser ces derniers dans leur fonction subjective de protection des libertés individuelles. / The objective dimension is one of the main theories of the interpretation of fundamental rights in Germany. Although relatively unknown outside its national context, it exerts an influence at a European level, especially in case-law in the European Court of Human Rights, without being regarded as such. The present study aims to analyze this approach of rights at a European scale through its main characteristics drawn from German law, as well as to highlight the influence of the latter on European law. The objective dimension appears to be a teleological and total interpretation that establishes the protection of rights on certain political and moral values, and ensures their radiating effect within but also through legal systems. If it is a breakthrough in the elaboration of the theory of rights, it also carries the risk of weakening these same rights in their subjective function which is to protect personal freedom. / Bonjour Sophie, Madame Danova a déposé un nouveau contrat ce 10/09/2015. Le rôle FICH est à modifier. Merci d'avance Suzanne

La tension entre la singularité de chaque individu et la dimension sociale de l’être humain est souvent réduite par le droit à une contradiction. Fondé sur la nécessité de protéger la dignité individuelle et les droits qui lui sont attachés contre les atteintes portées par la collectivité et ses institutions, le droit européen des droits de l’homme fait ainsi figure de rempart à la suprématie du groupe sur l’individu. Cependant, le développement de nouveaux systèmes régionaux de protection des droits de l’homme en Amériques et en Afrique fondés sur des traités moins empreints de l’antagonisme entre l’individuel et le collectif, ainsi que la multiplication de groupes sociaux prétendant détenir et faire valoir leurs intérêts, mettent en évidence la dimension sociale de l’individu et font entrer les intérêts collectifs dans la sphère juridique. Cette étude vise à rechercher si cette dimension est, à ce point, constitutive de l’humanité de l’individu que les intérêts que ce dernier détient conjointement et indissociablement avec tout ou partie ses semblables sont des droits de l’homme, qui devraient être consacrés et défendus comme tels. / The tension between the uniqueness of each individual and the social dimension of the human being is often reduced by law to a contradiction. European human rights law is seen as a bulwark against the supremacy of the group over the individual, as it is based on the need to protect individual dignity and the rights attached to it against attacks by the wider community and its institutions. However, the development of new regional systems of human rights protection in the Americas and Africa based on conventions that are less imbued with the antagonism between the individual and the collective, as well as the proliferation of groups claiming to have interests and to defend them, highlight the social dimension of the individual and bring collective interests to the legal sphere. This study aims to investigate whether this dimension is so inherent to the humanity of the individual, that the interests that the latter owns jointly and inseparably with all or part of his fellows are human rights, which should be enshrined and defended as such.