The protection of ownership right and property restitution in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Abstract The topic of this graduation theses is the protection of property as embodied and provided by European Convention of Human Rights and its authorities. The author also pays attention to how the European Court of Human Rights dealt with number of Czech and Slovak complaints concerning the restitution process taking place after the fall of the communism with purpose to rectify at least some of the last regime's wrongs as to the acts of deprivation occurred before the restoration of democracy. Emphasis is primarily put on Strasbourg authorities case law.

Les droits de l’homme au Royaume-Uni sont un objet de vif débat, à la frontière entre le domaine juridique et le domaine politique. L’une des toutes premières mesures du gouvernement de Tony Blair a été de faire voter une loi en 1998 incorporant la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme au droit national, transformant ainsi sa protection à l’échelle nationale. Pourtant, les faiblesses de la loi sont rapidement apparues et elle a été remise en cause. En outre, le gouvernement a dû faire des choix politiques pour mettre en œuvre la protection des droits de l’homme. L’évolution de celle-ci a pu être paradoxale : d’un côté le droit à l’égalité a été renforcé et élargi, quand, de l’autre, le développement d’une politique sécuritaire a entraîné de nombreuses limites aux libertés individuelles. Enfin, les cours britanniques ont pu participer à la création de nouveaux droits comme le droit à la vie privée, qui est apparu dans le droit britannique. Tous les changements législatifs ont entraîné un changement dans la distribution des pouvoirs au Royaume-Uni, tant à l’échelle nationale, où le pouvoir exécutif a été renforcé, qu’à l’échelle européenne, où les pouvoirs des cours internationales a été perçu comme une ingérence dans la souveraineté du Parlement britannique. La politique des droits de l’homme des gouvernements de Tony Blair et Gordon Brown a donc été pétrie de contradictions, entre un engagement réel pour la défense de certains droits et les limites apportés à certains autres pour défendre la sécurité, et entre une volonté d’intégration dans l’UE et une réaction à un euroscepticisme croissant. / In the United Kingdom, human rights have been strongly debated, both in the legal and political fields. One of the very first measures taken by the government of Tony Blair in 1998 has been to pass the Human Rights Act, a law incorporating the European convention on human rights into national law, therefore transforming the protection of human rights at the national level. However, the flaws of the Human Rights Act have appeared and it was contested soon after its passage. Furthermore, the government had to make political choices to implement in practice the protection of human rights. Their evolution can be considered paradoxical: the right to equality was strengthened and included more varied elements while the development of a strong security policy caused some civil liberties to be severely constrained. The British courts have also been able to participate in the creation of new rights, like the right to privacy which did not have an independent existence in English law until the courts recognised it, under European influence. The legal changes in the protection of human rights have caused a change in the way power is distributed in the United Kingdom, both at a national level, where the executive branch was strengthened, and in the relationship with Europe, where the power of international courts has been seen as infringing on British sovereignty. The human rights policies of the Blair and Brown governments, therefore, has been fraught with contradictions, living somewhere between the stronger protection of some rights and the tighter restraints created to defend security, and between the desire to participate more fully in European integration while still having to deal with growing Euroscepticism.

The Swedish government is legally obliged to conduct climate policy work that will protect nature and humanity from the harmful effects of climate change. Obligations related to the environment arise under Swedish domestic law, European law and international law. This thesis investigates the possibilities for the Swedish public to initiate climate change litigation against the Swedish government due to insufficient climate actions. I examine three climate change litigation approaches from selected jurisdictions, including Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. By transposing the three litigation approaches into the Swedish legal order I seek to discuss the possibilities for the public to challenge the Swedish state's responsibility in climate matters. This thesis claims that the possibilities for the concerned public to address climate change are restricted. International obligations derived from the European Convention on Human Rights and the Aarhus Convention have given individuals substantive rights and procedural rights in matters related to the environment. However, the implementation of the international obligations are not always enshrined in the national law.

Existing research on states and human rights focuses primarily on international treaty ratification, post-treaty rating systems, and ad hoc reports on adherence in individual countries. Additionally, the literature is characterized by disproportionate attention to certain rights to the neglect of others, thereby painting an incomplete and potentially inaccurate picture of a state’s practice and implementation of human rights. Consequently, the extant literature too frequently disregards key domestic and international factors as determinants of cross-national variation in the implementation and protection of human rights, and it instead generates paradoxical claims about human rights and state behavior. With Europe as its empirical focus, this study tests one assertion that state strength relative to societal actors impacts the frequency of cases heard at the European Court of Human Rights. Findings suggest that state strength indeed plays a role in the overall number of cases from member states in the European human rights system.

La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé. / Freedom of religion, often recognised as “first freedom” in numerous legal traditions, also reflects the different conceptions of the place of the individual and the collectivity in society. Our study will analyse the Canadian, American and European constitutional models of freedom of religion and conscience. In a first chapter, we will examine the theoretical conceptions of religion in the social sciences as well as from the perspectives of legal approaches in order to discern the manner in which religion is conceived and to better understand its various influences. In this way, we hope to enhance our understanding of both identity and to a greater extent, culture, both in and out of law. In the second and third chapters, we will attempt to characterise the relationship between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in Canada, as well as identify unresolved issues. In the final chapter, we will observe how freedom of conscience has been interpreted in the American legal setting as well as in the European Union, by way of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). We hypothesise that a better understanding of the relationship between the freedoms of conscience and religion can be arrived at by clarifying the theoretical conceptions of religion and conscience in comparative constitutional law.

L’autonomie personnelle a été consacrée par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme comme principe interprétatif des garanties de la Convention, et tout particulièrement de l’article 8, qui protège le droit au respect de la vie privée. Dans ce domaine, le principe d’autonomie personnelle implique « le droit de disposer de son corps », incluant « des activités (…) d’une nature physiquement ou moralement dommageables ou dangereuses pour la personne ». Ce principe a été « emprunté » au droit nord-américain par le juge de Strasbourg, pour être opportunément intégré au corpus de la Convention. En effet, celui-ci souhaite marquer la libéralisation du droit au respect de la vie privée européen, justifiant une disposition corporelle absolutiste. Or, le droit interne est censé accueillir le principe d’autonomie personnelle, et donc, de loin en loin, admettre celle-ci, malgré son attachement à un encadrement strict des possibilités d’utiliser son corps. Toutefois, en dépit de ses virtualités, le principe d’autonomie personnelle est doublement limité. En effet, s’agissant du droit européen, ce principe conduit à fonder le droit au respect de la vie privée sur une conception subjective de la dignité, ontologiquement « a normative ». S’agissant du droit français, nonobstant les possibilités toujours plus nombreuses de disposer de son corps, la réception aboutie du principe semble compromise par un ordre public corporel pérenne. Au total, le principe d’autonomie personnelle ne semble menacer, pour l’heure, ni la stabilité de la Convention, ni l’équilibre jusque-là sauvegardé entre la disposition corporelle et l’ordre public y afférant en droit français. Néanmoins, ce constat invite à la modestie, au regard des enjeux scientifiques et politiques toujours plus pressants que suscite l’accès à l’humain. / The personal autonomy was consecrated by the European court of human rights as an interpretation principle of the guarantees of the Convention, and especially the article 8, protecting the right to respect for private life. In this field, the principle of personal autonomy implicates « the right to use one’s own body » including « activities (…) physically or morally harmful or dangerous for the person ». This principle was « borrowed » from north american right by the judge of Strasbourg, to be integrated to the corpus of the Convention with opportunity. Indeed, he wants to mark the liberalization of the european right to respect for private life, justifying an absolutist body using. Yet, the french right is supposed to welcome the principle of personal autonomy, and so, admit this one, despite its severe supervision of the possibilities of body using. Nevertheless, in the face of its virtualities, the principle of personal autonomy is limited in two ways. Indeed, concerning european right, this principle leads to justify the right to respect for private life on a subjective conception of dignity, intrinsically « no normative ». Concerning the french right, in spite of the possibilities always more importants of body using, the reception with success of the principle seems impaired by a perennial public order. Finally, the principle of personal autonomy doesn’t seem to threaten, for now, nor the stability of the Convention, neither the balance safeguarded until now between the body using and the public order concerning it in french right. However, this constatation invites to self-effacement, regarding to scientific and political issues always more pressing that human access sparks off.

Positive obligations of state arising from Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights focusing on persons with disabilities Absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is clearly set in article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. When assessing particular obligations, which are arising out of it, we need to look deep into the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. The aim of this thesis is to analyse positive obligations of state arising from article 3 focusing on persons with disabilities. This is achieved also with the aid of various human right bodies such as UN Human Rights Committee, UN Committee on Torture or UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Due to the fact that this area is not really covered yet, certain parts of this thesis are focused on defining important terms and putting them together. The approach is analytic with elements of comparison between the view of European Court of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights bodies. The thesis is composed of three main chapters. Chapter One is introductory and defines the main terms such as ill-treatment, torture, scope of the article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in connection with rights of persons with disabilities and the concept of positive obligations...

This thesis aims to identify divergent interpretations of particular ECHR's articles in jurisdiction of the CJEU and the ECtHR using methods of analysis and comparison. An interim target is to define the scope and powers of the CJEU and the ECtHR in relation to the ECHR. Initial hypothesis states: "The EU accession to the ECHR would help to eliminate inconsistencies in interpretation of the ECHR and to define a clear relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR."

The right of freedom of expression is often mentioned as one of the most significant human rights. Despite its importance and necessity for functioning and development of any democratic society, this right is not without limits. The aim of this theses is to find the limits of the right of freedom of expression within the system of the ECHR which represents one of the most important documents in the human rights field at the international level. The important position of freedom of expression will be proved by an analysis of the theoretical context of freedom of expression in the system of the ECHR as well as by examination of the work of the European Court of Human Rights and its case law connected to the right of freedom of expression.

Le phénomène de désétatisation de l’utilisation de la notion d’intérêt général conduit à s’intéresser au rôle que cette notion joue dans le cadre du système de la Convention. Dans le contexte de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme, l’intérêt général ne se manifeste pas seulement comme un concept consubstantiellement lié à l’État. En effet, la nature indéterminée, flexible et fonctionnelle de l’intérêt général permet l’utilisation de cette notion par les divers acteurs du système conventionnel et facilite, par conséquent, son intégration dans ce même système. Face à une diversité des utilisateurs de la notion d’intérêt général, l’utilisation effectuée par la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme se démarque en particulier en raison de son pouvoir d’interprète authentique. Cela permet de s’interroger sur l’existence d’une conception de l’intérêt général propre au système de la Convention ainsi que sur les fonctions que l’intérêt général occupe dans le cadre de ce système. / The phenomenon of destatization of the use of the notion of general interest raises questions with regard to the role that this concept plays in the system of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the context of the European Convention, the general interest does not manifest itself as a concept consubstantially linked to the State. Indeed, the indeterminate, flexible and functional nature of the general interest allows the use of this concept by various actors of the system of the European Convention and facilitates its integration into this system. Faced with the diversity of users of the concept of general interest, the use by the European Court of Human Rights stands out in particular because of its power of authentic interpretation. This makes it possible to question the existence of a conception of the general interest specific to the system of the Convention and to research the functions of general interest in this context.