The aim of this thesis is to examine the problem of soul in Plato's Timaeus while paying due respect to its close connection with the topics of cosmology and cosmogony. The inquiry proceeds from the highest level of the cosmos itself to the lowest level of the souls of mortal beings. In the first chapter, an important question, whether the cosmos singularly came into being or not is being examined. In this context, two traditional approaches are distinguished and it is argued that a proper answer to this question has to contain some elements of them both. The second chapter examines the nature of Plato's maker of this world, the demiurge. It is argued that he is a primordial deity who should not be identified with any aspect of the created cosmos or the intelligible being and who not only creates the bodily world and its soul but serves as a sort of paradigm for the soul in respect to its capacities as well. The topics of soul and cosmos blend equally in the third chapter which is devoted to the world-soul. It concentrates on three main topics which are relevant also for the souls occupying a lower position in the hierarchy. These are the blending of the soul that explains its basic properties, the structuring of the soul and attributing it a particular motion and finally the problem of cognition...

In this paper, we discuss some possible readings of Physics IV 2, where Aristotle identifies the Platonic χώρα of the Timaeus with ὕλη, μεταληπτικόν and μεθεκτικόν. We will study common features that bring the receptacle of the Timaeus closer to Aristotelian matter and space, and that make it natural for Aristotle to identify χώρα with matter. However, we will try to show that, in spite of the similarities between the receptacle and what Aristotle understands for place and matter, the mechanics of appropriation of the Platonic text that the Stagirite operates, forcing an equivalence with his own technical terms, possibly implies a distortion that, in the end, does not do justice to the formulations of the teacher. / En el presente trabajo, discutiremos algunas lecturas posibles de Física IV 2, donde Aristóteles identifica la χώρα platónica del Timeo con ὕλη, μεταληπτικόν y μεθεκτικόν. Estudiaremos rasgos comunes que acercan el receptáculo del Timeo con la materia y el espacio aristotélicos, y que hacen que Aristóteles encuentre natural identificar la χώρα con la materia. Sin embargo, intentaremos mostrar que, a pesar de las semejanzas entre el receptáculo y lo que Aristóteles entiende por lugar y materia, la mecánica de apropiación del texto platónico que opera el Estagirita, forzando una equivalencia con sus propios términos técnicos, posiblemente implique una distorsión que no termina de hacer justicia a las formulaciones del maestro.

This graduation thesis describes life in the border village Podmokly in the period between 1853-1918. The author presents the penetration of the Saxon capital at this time and further developing the business mostly Germans from Saxony in the chocolate industry. It focuses on chocolate, which at that time originated in the village, and the chocolate Jordan & Timaeus, Hartwig & Vogel, and Otto Rüger. Initially focused on the development of village Podmokly, the characteristic time, the amount of customs duties and surcharges on raw materials for production of chocolate and cocoa. In this work the author shows contemporary practice in the manufacture of chocolate, recipes and curiosities, which were associated with the production of chocolate. The analysis of chocolate, the author focuses on the history of chocolate on the description of the factory and its reorganization, social policy, in compliance with regulations and laws that were created at this time. Furthermore, the author explores the field of advertising, international exhibitions, sales and production of chocolate and firm structure. The work is drawn primarily from contemporary sources, or. journal of modern literature and scientific studies

This thesis compares the interaction of philosophy and literature in Plato and Lucretius. It argues that Plato influenced Lucretius directly, and that this connection increases the interest in comparing them. In the Introduction, I propose that a work of philosophical literature, such as the De Rerum Natura or a Platonic dialogue, cannot be fully understood or appreciated unless both the literary and the philosophical elements are taken into account. In Chapter 1, I examine the tradition of literature and philosophy in which Plato and Lucretius were writing. I argue that the historical evidence increases the likelihood that Lucretius read Plato. Through consideration of parallels between the DRN and the dialogues, I argue that Plato discernibly influenced the DRN. In Chapter 2, I extract a theory of philosophical literature from the Phaedrus, which prompts us to appreciate it as a work of literary art inspired by philosophical knowledge of the Forms. I then analyse Socrates’ ‘prelude’ at Republic IV.432 as an example of how the dialogue’s philosophical and literary teaching works in practice. In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider the treatment of natural philosophy in the Timaeus and DRN II. The ending of the Timaeus is arguably an Aristophanically inspired parody of the zoogonies of the early natural philosophers. This links it to other instances of parody in Plato’s dialogues. DRN II.333-380 involves an argument about atomic variety based on Epicurus, but also, through the image of the world ‘made by hand’, alludes polemically to the intelligently designed world of the Timaeus. Through an examination of Plato’s and Lucretius’ polemical adaptation of their predecessors, I argue that even the most seemingly technical passages of the DRN and the Timaeus still depend upon literary techniques for their full effect. The Conclusion reflects briefly on future paths of investigation.

Ondřej Krása, Causes of the Creation of the World in Plato's Timaeus Abstract of the Thesis The aim of the thesis is to explain the causes of the creation of the world in Plato's Timaeus. The causes of the creation of the world are manifold. The Demiurge created the world according to an eternal paradigm. The paradigm of the world is an intelligible animal that encompasses everything that is eternal. The Demiurge is the best of eternal beings and created the world as an image of the entirety of eternal beings. What is then the relationship between the Demiurge, who is reason, and the entirety of eternal beings, that reason can comprehend? Timaeus characterizes the eternal being as having no other relationships than those towards itself. On the contrary, the Demiurge is a being that has constitutive relationships towards the world. The entirety of being that consists of both the Demiurge and that, which is in itself, is therefore a being in which reason relates self-contained relationships of that, which reason can comprehend, towards something else, namely becoming. The world was created in a receptacle as an embodied soul. Each body is a regular geometrical figure with no "matter" inside. Bodies are both in space and they are modifications of space. Souls are in space as well, but their being in space is...

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The analysis of the system of speculative thought of Plato and Zoroaster, as found in Plato's Timaeus and Zoroaster's Gathas, seeks to compare a well-known philosophy, that of Plato, to a lesser known and often misunderstood system of speculative thought within a religion, namely Zoroastrianism. The purpose of such a comparison is to show that the speculative thought found in religion is often comparable to philosophy, as is the case in the doctrines postulated in the Gathas. It serves to illuminate the philosophy within a lesser known religion (Zoroastrianism) by comparing it to a well-known philosophy (that of Plato), and in doing so, to cast new light on both. The comparison of Plato and Zoroaster has been proposed and sometimes executed by other scholars as well. The main problem in these other comparisons, thus far, has been the fact that no historical contact or definite doctrinal influence of Zoroaster on Plato has been or is likely to be established. Though Plato might well have been familiar with Zoroastrian doctrines, this cannot be satisfactorily proven. This study does not depend on historical contact or doctrinal influence (though the possibility of the latter has been discussed), but compares the two doctrines independent of historical factors and is based solely on the striking similarities between these two systems of thought. This study has focussed on some of the basic concepts within the two doctrines, such as creation, the soul, and dualism. In this study I have emphasised the philosophical aspect of Zoroastrianism, though it is classified as a religion, because I believe that much of what has been classified as religion also incorporates speculative thought that can be analysed separately, and as a system of speculative thought it is comparable to other traditions of speculative thought, such as Greek philosophy. This comparison therefore seeks to counteract some of the assumptions about religions, and how they are studied, by focusing on the philosophical basis underlying the doctrines in the Zoroastrian religion. Another aspect to the comparison is a focus on the similarities of doctrine originating in two cultures previously held to be vastly different, namely Persian and Greek. There has previously been a tendency to consider the cultures of the classical and the ancient Near Eastern world as separate and completely distinct from each other, and in doing so, ignoring important historical contact. Although the historical interaction between these two areas has received increased attention, comparative investigations have emphasised the differences between the cultures of these regions, although similarities do abound and the comparison of analogous aspects of the various cultures could prove valuable to the study of the ancient world. Recognition of the larger context within which the various cultures of the ancient world operated can only add to the understanding of the ancient world, and pave the way for reassessing the traditions and world-views of various cultures. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die analise van die spekulatiewe denkstelsels van Plato en Zoroaster, soos uitgelê in Plato se Timaeus en Zoroaster se Gathas, beoog om 'n bekende filosofie te vergelyk met 'n minder bekende en dikwels wangeïnterpreteerde spekulatiewe denkstelsel binne 'n religie, naamlik Zoroastrisme. Die doel van so 'n vergelyking is om te demonstreer dat die spekulatiewe denkstelsel wat binne 'n religie gevind kan word dikwels vergelykbaar is met 'n filosofie, soos die geval is met die leerstellings/denkstelsels wat uitgelê word in die Gathas. Dit dien om die filosofiese binne 'n relatief onbekende religie (Zoroastrisme) uit te lig deur dit te vergelyk met 'n bekende filosofie (dié van Plato), en in die proses is dit moontlik dat daar nuwe lig gewerp kan word op albei. Die vergelyking tussen Plato en Zoroaster is al deur verskeie academici voorgestel en soms uitgevoer. Die hoofprobleem in al die vorige vergelykings is dat daar tot dusver by Zoroaster geen historiese kontak met of invloed op die leerstellings van Plato vasgestel kon word nie. Alhoewel Plato heel moontlik bekend kon gewees het met Zoroaster se leerstellings, kan dit nie bo alle twyfel bewys word nie. Hierdie studie voorveronderstel geen historiese kontak tussen of beïnvloeding deur die leerstellings van Zoroaster en Plato nie (hoewel die moontlikheid van laasgenoemde bespreek word). Dit is 'n vergelyking wat slegs gemotiveer is deur die treffende ooreenkomste tussen hierdie twee denkstelsels. My studie fokus op 'n aantal basiese konsepte binne die twee leerstellings, soos skepping, die siel, en dualisme. Ten spyte van die feit dat Zoroastrisme as 'n religie geklassifiseer word, word die filosofiese aspek van Zoroastrisme in hierdie studie beklemtoon, want ek glo dat baie sisteme wat as religieë geklassifiseer word spekulatiewe denke inkorporeer wat onafhanklik van die religie self as 'n spekulatiewe denkstelsel soos filosofie geanaliseer kan word, en verder ook vergelyk kan word met ander tradisies van spekulatiewe denkstelsels, soos die oud-Griekse filosofie. Hierdie vergelyking poog om die aannames oor religieë, insluitend aannames oor hoe religieë bestudeer moet word, teen te werk deur te fokus op die onderliggende filosofiese basis in die leerstellings van Zoroastrisme. 'n Ander aspek van die vergelyking is 'n fokus op die ooreenkomste tussen leerstellings wat hul oorsprong het in twee kulture (die Persiese en Griekse onderskeidelik) wat voorheen as heeltemal uiteenlopend en verskillend beskou is, en in die proses is die belangrike historiese kontak geïgnoreer. Alhoewel die historiese interaksie tussen die twee areas toenemend aandag geniet, word die kulturele verskille beklemtoon ten spyte van die feit dat daar veelvuldige ooreenkomste is en dat 'n vergelyking van ooreenkomste tussen verskeie kulture baie waardevol kan wees vir die studie van die antieke wêreld. 'n Waardering van die wyer konteks waarbinne die verskeie kulture van die antieke wêreld gefunksioneer het, kan net bydra tot 'n beter begrip van die antieke wêreld en die weg baan vir 'n herevaluering van die tradisies en wêreldbeskouings van die betrokke kulture.

La doctrine pythagoricienne de la Tétractys est sans doute une des questions les plus délicates de l’histoire de la philosophie. Elle représente non seulement une des théories essentielles de l’arithmologie, mais aussi, ainsi que la doxographie ancienne en témoigne, « le plus grand secret et le fondement de la philosophie pythagoricienne ». Armand Delatte, dans ses classiques Etudes sur la littérature pythagoricienne, a souligné l’importance véhiculée par ce philosophème. Dans la première partie, « méthodologique », de notre étude, nous traitons du lien entre Platon et la pensée pythagoricienne, en prenant comme fil conducteur trois notions essentielles: le silence voué des initiés de l’ordre et la pratique du secret ; l’expression énigmatique et « symbolique » ; la pratique de l’allégorie (hyponoia), indissolublement associée, elle, à celle du mythe. La deuxième partie de notre travail est centrée sur le témoignage le plus ancien au sujet de la Tétractys, à savoir sur la fameuse maxime des Acousmatiques : « Qu’est-ce que l’oracle des Delphes ? La Tétractys, c'est-à-dire l’harmonie où se trouvent les Sirènes ». En outre, en modérant, d’une certaine manière, l’ « ésotérisme historique » de l’Ecole de Tübingen, dont nous nous prenons des distances quant à certains points (comme, par exemple, l’importance de la méthode allégorique), nous tentons, dans la troisième et dernière partie de notre étude, de lire certains passages mythiques de Platon comme des allégories susceptibles d’être comprises et de trouver leur cohérence à la lumière de la tradition indirecte, voire de la théorie platonicienne sur les nombres, théorie intimement liée à la doctrine pythagoricienne de la Tétractys. Dans cet ordre d’idées, à partir de la République et du Timée jusqu’au Phèdre et au Gorgias, la mathématisation platonicienne de la réalité se verrait intégrée aux mythes, dont la somptuosité poétique ne serait qu’une image de l’enchantement philosophique entraînant l’élévation de l’âme vers l’Un – Bien. Bien qu’ayant toujours présents à l’esprit les dangers auxquels notre étude s’expose, nous n’avons pas toujours su les éliminer. Nous ne méconnaissons aucunement ses lacunes et ses faiblesses. Nous considérons en revanche que son avantage réside en ce qu’elle tente de contribuer à éclairer d’une lumière nouvelle certains aspects méconnus. C’est sans doute là que se situe le danger, mais aussi son intérêt.

This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause behaviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indirectly, connects with Plato’s other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse. Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite. Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic’s Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato’s notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By exploring the Republic’s ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite – a multiform and appearance oriented source of motivation – is an essential part of this account. Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus.

The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence.

The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence.