Descartes' philosophy concerning the relationship between God and the eternal truths has been an unresolved and problematic issue since he first declared it. For Descartes, God's power is limitless and nothing can exist independently of Him. The problem is that if that is true, things such as "God knows that he does not exist" are possible because the truth of that proposition rests on God's power. In fact, the existence of any eternal truth depends on God’s power. Examples of such truths are: "the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," "3+4=7," and "two contraries cannot exist together." Descartes built his entire metaphysics around a certain conception of God, a conception that includes His not being a deceiver. But if it turns out that God is as limitless as Descartes thinks He is, Descartes' philosophy does not rest on as firm a foundation as he believes. In fact, it is inconsistent: we know what we clearly and distinctly perceive because God would not deceive us and his power is unlimited. But since His power is absolutely unlimited, it might be the case that God is not a deceiver and everything we know is true, but at the same time we have been misled by God and there is an actual reality we are not, and will never be, privy to. There have been a number of attempts to make Descartes’ view consistent. I consider two of the most recent and promising lines of interpretation. The first, Universal Possibilism, holds that God’s power is utterly limitless and He can make any proposition true, including problematic ones such as “I think, but I am not.” This theory argues that what we can and cannot conceive are merely epistemic limits rather than indicators of truth. The second, Limited Possibilism, maintains that God has power over the possibility of any proposition. Any proposition, under this view, is possibly possible; this preserves the integrity of the connection between what we conceive as true and what is actually true. The major drawback to this line of thought is that it puts an unintuitive limit on God: He can make something possible, but he can’t then do the seemingly simple task of making that thing true. I argue that a proper understanding of Descartes' conception of the meanings of "possible," "impossible," "contingent,". "necessary" and God's nature renders his position consistent. Descartes holds that God necessarily exists, and his nature is immutable and the existence of anything else is contingent. If one interprets Descartes' God to hold limitless power over contingent propositions, but not over his nature or existence, Descartes' position is no longer inconsistent.

The thesis examines the direct reference theory of proper names and natural kind terms as expounded by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and others and finds that it has not succeeded in replacing some kind of description theory of the reference of such terms - although it does concede that the traditional Fregean theory is not quite correct. It is argued that the direct reference theory is mistaken on several counts. First of all it is question-begging. Secondly, it is guilty of a 'use/mention' confusion. And thirdly, and most importantly, it fails to deal with the notion of understanding. The notion of understanding is crucial to the present thesis - specifically, what is understood by a proper name or natural kind term. It is concluded that sense (expressed in the form of descriptions) is at least necessary for reference, which makes a significant difference to Kripke's claim that there are necessary a posteriori truths as well as contingent a priori truths. It is also argued that sense could be sufficient for reference, if it is accepted that it is speakers who effect reference. In this sense, sense determines reference. The thesis therefore not only argues against the account of reference given by the direct reference theorists, it also gives an account of how proper names and natural kind terms actually do function in natural language. As far as the epistemology of necessity is concerned the thesis concludes that Kripke (along with many others) has not succeeded in establishing the existence of the necessary a posteriori nor the contingent a priori from the theory of direct reference. Whether such truths can be established by some other means, or in principle, is not the concern of the thesis; although the point is made that, if a certain view of sense is accepted, then questions of necessity and a priority seem inappropriate.

Much ado has been made regarding Descartes's understanding of the creation of what he called the "eternal truths" because he described them, paradoxically, as both the free creations of God, and necessary. While there are many varying interpretations of Cartesian modality, the issue has heretofore been treated in a vacuum, as a niche issue having little import beyond being an interesting puzzle for Descartes Scholars. I argue that this treatment is misguided, and that in order to properly understand Cartesian philosophy at all, one must properly understand Descartes's theory of modality. This, however, is no small feat; in order to understand Descartes's seemingly peculiar view on modality, one must first make sense of what Descartes understood the nature of God to be. One reason for this, I argue, is the systematic nature of Cartesian philosophy; indeed when dealing with a dense inter-connection of philosophical issues, one must move from what is more known in itself to what is more known to us, and not the other way around. I argue that in the literature on Cartesian modality, insufficient attention has been paid to the influence of the French School of Spirituality (in particular the work of Cardinal Bérulle) on the Cartesian notion of the divine. I argue that this influence pushed Descartes to criticize traditional attempts (Aquinas's in particular) to split the horns of Plato's Euthyphro dilemma as violating a proper understanding of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Descartes's commitment to a radical form of the doctrine of divine simplicity leads him to a version of divine voluntarism wherein all `things' depend on God for their existence, and God cannot have had antecedent reason to prefer the creation of anything over anything else. There is little doubt that Descartes embraced the voluntarist horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, but just what that means for Cartesian modality and philosophy generally remains a contentious issue. I argue that Descartes is best read as what I call an `agnostic quietist' regarding God (and modality generally) given textual, historical, and systematic considerations. One virtue of an agnostic quietist reading is that I am able to square the passages where Descartes discusses the inconceivability of God's power with the conclusions reached regarding God's non-deceiving nature in the Meditations and elsewhere. Further virtues that I explore are the effects that a quietist reading has on the Cartesian scientific programme, the infamous mind-body problem, Descartes's seemingly inconsistent view regarding human free-will and Descartes's refusal to engage in "theology." Traditionally, Cartesian epistemology has been understood to be a purely a priori undertaking, which succumbs to deep and insurmountable problems. One of the greatest problems facing the Cartesian was the move from the mind to the world. Simon Blackburn, for example, says of the Cartesian epistemological project in the Meditations that Descartes "has put himself on a desert island from which there is no escape." This view is echoed by, and even motivates some of the contemporary views concerning Cartesian modality. I argue, however, that a proper understanding of the Cartesian doctrine of clear and distinct ideas circumvents this famous problem. By highlighting the proper understanding and application of the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, I show that such ideas not only guarantee the existence of an external truth-maker, but also that such ideas do not do much more than show that there is a truth-maker. I argue that in instances of clear and distinct perception, the truth of the idea is normatively certain, but what makes it true is yet to be established. In this way, clear and distinct ideas are both powerful, in terms of guaranteeing truth, and relatively unhelpful, in that further work is required in order to determine to what the ideas conform. I argue that this is the case not only for actual truths, but for some clearly intuited truths about possibility. As an illustration of my overall thesis, I address the Cartesian argument for the separability of mind and body, and entertain the various interpretations of Descartes's view of human freedom. I argue that in order to understand Cartesian views on either of these issues, one must first make sense of his modal commitments. In both of these cases Descartes claims that finite minds can know that something is possible, even though what makes it possible is well beyond what they can understand.

Husserl’s Logical Investigations contain an apparent discrepancy in their account of meaning. They first present meanings, contra psychologism, as commonly available, reiterable, invariant, possibly valid, and independent of our “acts of meaning”. They then present meaning, almost psychologistically, as a kind of intentional experience on which all truths and other transcendent meanings depend. I offer a critical developmental study of this problem within Husserl’s semantics. I argue (1) that Husserl had reason to adopt his dyadic account of signification, (2) that this “two-sided” account shaped, and was reciprocally informed by, the two-step phenomenological method, and (3) that Husserl’s proposed resolution to the strain within his semantics, while driven by legitimate motivations, is precarious. I begin with the Logical Investigations and their context. I represent their two sets of semantic claims, recalling how the discord between claims of those sets would have been especially conspicuous when the Investigations were published, amid much debate over psychologism, in 1900-01. I then show why Husserl embraced two discordant views of meaning. I survey the 19th century sources for these views, confirming Jocelyn Benoist’s genealogical thesis that Husserl’s semantics took its psychological and logical sides primarily from Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, respectively. And I present the Bolzanian arguments and Brentanian descriptions that served as grounds for Husserl’s semantics, showing how these pieces of reasoning were appropriated, and weighing their strength. Next, I trace how Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning, and its apparent incoherence, both inspired and determined the transcendental and eidetic reductions. I then examine how Husserl subsequently used the phenomenological method to reinforce, to integrate, and to revise his theory of meaning. And I address a methodological criticism that this circular development prompts. Finally, I assess Husserl’s attempt to explain the division within the phenomenon of meaning by reference to what he called “transcendental subjectivity”. I consider two contrary objections to this explanation. I indicate how Husserl’s explanation is responsive to the insight behind each objection, but contend that it is perhaps not adequately responsive to the insight behind either.

This thesis addresses a topic which to date has not received any sustained attention within the field of health and social care. The thesis explores the understanding that lecturers in health and social care have of the nature of truth and how their conceptions of truth impact on their teaching and on their relationship with students. The study was conducted through interviews with nine lecturers, from five universities and several disciplines within health and social care, which allowed them to explore their understanding of truth in relation to their teaching. A phenomenological approach was employed, as this enabled the participants to describe the phenomenon of truth as it presented itself to them through their own lived experience and as it was imbricated in their teaching. In order to analyse the lived experience of the lecturers I used an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) approach because it is concerned with the interpretation of particular experiences of a phenomenon. One of the key findings that emerged from the analysis was that none of the lecturers believed that there was one version of truth but rather multiple truths or realities, often based on uncertainty rather than a certainty. The suggestion was that what was being taught in class was a theory of provisional validity rather than an absolute truth and this heavily influenced the way these lecturers saw their role within their students’ journeys towards their own versions of truth and authenticity. The study participants held that if students could become comfortable with questioning truth and accepting that more than one version of the truth exists, then they were enabled to deploy the art of critical evaluation and analysis within their own learning. Underpinning my analysis of my findings regarding the lecturers’ perceptions of their role in encouraging critical thinking and authenticity is the work of Barnet and Kreber. Barnet (2007) claimed that in order to become authentic, an element of critical thinking is required and Kreber (2013) builds on this when she suggests that authenticity is associated with being true to self in a critical social theory sense. Further key findings are very much related to the unique dimension of my study being placed within health and social care and include the connections between the nature of truth and matters such as: the participant’s identity as a health and social care professional and the influence this has on their teaching; how conceptions of truth impact on the health and social care knowledge base within the disciplines of the participants and how this discipline knowledge underpins their teaching; the relationship between the participants’ conceptions of the nature of truth and the professional attributes that feature in the participants’ teaching; and how the understanding of the nature of truth links into the health and social care curricula. The thesis concludes by discussing implications for theory and practice that appear to flow from the findings of this study.

This is a large collection of small poems.

Parce que l’infinité divine n’est pas une évidence théologique, Descartes travaille à lui donner un sens particulier : à la fois instauratrice des vérités créées dans les lettres du printemps1630 et nom divin par excellence selon les exigences de la philosophie première en 1641, elle endosse des déterminations incontestablement dionysiennes (l’incompréhensibilité) en même temps qu’elle relève au plus haut point de la métaphysique en voie de constitution (idea maxime vera). La détermination de la situation de l’infinité de Dieu chez Descartes au regard d’autres concepts du corpus (immensité, indéfini), de ses rapports au concept aristotélicien d’apeiron et de son histoire médiévale (Thomas d'Aquin, Bonaventure, Henri de Gand, Scot) et moderne (Suarez, Bérulle, Montaigne), doit permettre de faire voir la tension interne dont l’infinité grève la métaphysique cartésienne. / Because divine infinity is not a theological obvious fact, Descartes works to give him a particular meaning : at the same time founder of the eternal truths in the letters of printemps1630, and the divine name par excellence according to the requirements of the first philosophy in 1641. Then, infinity both assumes dionysian characteristics (incomprehensibility) and fulfils the requirements of the metaphysics in the process of constitution (idea maxime vera). The determination of the situation of God's infinity in Descartes with regard to the other concepts of the corpus (unlimitedness, indefinite), of its relationships with the Aristotelian concept of apeiron and its medieval history (Thomas d' Aquin, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Scot) and modern (Suarez, Bérulle, Montaigne), allows to show the internal tension the infinite burdens Cartesian metaphysics.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-27T13:45:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FLOMAR AMBROSINA OLIVEIRA CHAGAS.pdf: 1530429 bytes, checksum: 9422b5af4e2f925f2b31a78686b58a17 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-09-09 / This study aimed to analyze the concepts and the functions of the library over time and to verify how the production of truths operates in the field of education, showing that the library, as a social product, is also pervaded by power relations and, to understand the poetic dimension of knowing. It presents the formation of the libraries, of the knowledge, of the truths, at different times: in the Renaissance, in the antiquity, in the Classical Era and in the Modernity. To avoid the risk of being lost in time and by the forgetfulness, brackets to house and preserve the sayings that were written in clay, stone, metal, wood, leather, papyrus, parchment, paper and virtual are presented in different historical period. It is also examined the functioning of the school towards politically passive society (panoptic), for which Foucault instigates the intellectual (the educator) to resist the prescribed truths because they have expiration dates. And through language, it gives voice to the library that has long been and is still denied to silence. The library is the space of scientific and poetic knowledge (slope almost silenced by the theories applied in the school). The library as a possibility of discovery has been a place devoid of life. When it is asked whether the libraries, especially the public ones, contribute to the formation of male and female readers, this study brought to light, a discouraged affirmative, alias, a negative. Like in a tripod, the theoretical support came primarily from the works of Bachelard, Chartier and Foucault. / Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo analisar as concepções e as funções da biblioteca ao longo do tempo e verificar como a produção de verdades atua no campo da educação, evidenciando que a biblioteca, como produto social, também se encontra permeada por relações de poder e ainda, compreender a dimensão poética do conhecer. Apresenta a constituição das bibliotecas, dos saberes, das verdades, em diferentes épocas: na Renascença, na Antiguidade, na Idade Clássica e na Modernidade. Para não correr o risco de se perder no tempo e pelo esquecimento, apresentam-se em diferentes momentos históricos, suportes para abrigar e conservar os ditos, que foram escritos em: barro, pedra, metal, madeira, pele, papiro, pergaminho, papel e virtual. Buscou também analisar o funcionamento da escola diante da sociedade politicamente passiva (panótica), para o qual Foucault instiga ao intelectual (educadora e educador) a resistir às verdades prescritas, pois elas têm prazo de validade. E por meio da linguagem, dar voz à biblioteca que durante muito tempo foi e ainda é renegada ao silêncio, biblioteca esta que é o espaço do conhecimento científico e poético (vertente quase silenciada pelas teorias aplicadas no âmbito escolar). A biblioteca como possibilidade de descoberta tem sido um lugar sem vida. Ao interrogar se as bibliotecas, especialmente as bibliotecas públicas, contribuem para a formação de leitores e leitoras o presente estudo trouxe à tona, uma afirmativa desanimadora, ou melhor, uma negativa. Como num tripé, o suporte teórico, veio principalmente das obras de Bachelard, de Chartier e de Foucault.

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日本學界曾針對緣起的意涵，引起一場論爭。例如宇井伯壽等人主張緣起是同時的邏輯關係，木村泰賢等人則認為緣起還有異時的因果面，另外上田義文還指出了緣起的寂滅面。 　　本文依據印順法師的主張，亦即因果不能分割為同時或異時，並且徵引龍樹的論文，重點地批評上述日本學者的意見。依阿含經，所謂緣起的定義是：此有故彼有，此無故彼無。而龍樹的空義是不二的，可以說無彼亦無此。而且，《大智度論》有法性不待因緣的說法，在龍樹那□，空性是等同於法性的，因此，向來所說緣起與空為同義的說法，有必要再釐清。本論文的第四章就做了這方面的嘗試。關於二諦，日本學界曾經提出許多關於語源學的研究，本論文則從《大智度論》尋找論據，證明龍樹所謂的世俗諦就是語言，亦即緣起的假名面；而勝義諦則是語言的寂滅性，亦即是空。二諦之間的關係則是相即。根據以上的研究成果，本文檢討了英美學界對於龍樹空性及二諦的詮釋。大致地區分，英美對於龍樹空義的詮釋經歷了三個階段：虛無主義，絕對主義及語言哲學的詮釋，本論文重點地評破了虛無主義的詮釋，對於後兩種詮釋則有所取捨。本文的貢獻在於提出《大智度論》中法性不待因緣的說法，從而使緣起與空的關係得到更多的理解。